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legally and politically has been the subject of much discussion and debate on the 
international stage. This book presents a study of changes in the legal treatment 
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centrally deals with the political offence exception and how it has changed. The 
book looks at this change from an international perspective with a particular focus 
on the United States. Interdisciplinary in approach, it examines the fields of ter-
rorism and political crime from legal, political science and criminological perspec-
tives. It will be of interest to a broad range of academics and researchers, as well 
as to policymakers involved in creating new anti-terrorist policies.
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1“Terrorism has nothing to do with politics.” This statement was made by an 
esteemed lawyer specialising in international law, as a reaction to a presentation 
I held on the political nature of terrorism. Even if this lawyer had an expert 
view on the topic and some very good reasons to make that claim, their opinion 
did not alter the starting point of this book, which is opposite to theirs. This 
book argues that terrorism is, indeed, in all its atrocity, a political act. In fact, its 
political nature has motivated a widespread attempt to depoliticise it, to label it 
‘common’ criminality. Why? To facilitate international collaboration against it, to 
inhibit the treatment of terrorists as ‘freedom fighters,’ to simplify the extradition 
of terrorists and to remove any justification to atrocious violence.
For a long time, terrorists were treated as political criminals. Even now, as 
Professor Jan Klabbers has pointed out, “international law has great difficulty in 
deciding whether terrorists should be treated as ordinary criminals or as politi-
cal actors.”1 This book argues that this difficulty strongly relates to the so-called 
political offence exception to extradition (POE) protecting political offenders 
from extradition. This principle has been used in the vast majority of (Western) 
extradition treaties since 1834.
Soon after the POE was created, it became obvious that it could also be used 
to protect, in addition to offenders fighting for legitimate causes, violent crimi-
nals struggling for unwanted political goals. For this reason, it was soon restricted 
with the so-called attentat clause. Until the emergence of the modern terror-
ist threat in the 1970s, other limitations to the exception were, however, rare.2 
Gradually, the restrictions grew in number to cover specific types of serious crimi-
nal methods often used by terrorists. For instance, several United Nations (UN) 
antiterrorism conventions, the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism and the 1985 US–UK Supplementary Extradition Treaty limited the 
POE in order to exclude terrorists from its protection. When this reactive strategy 
proved inefficient, debates concerning the annihilation of the exception arose. 
1  Klabbers, 2003, 299.
2  Certain war crimes and genocide were already excluded from the scope of the protection of 
the POE in 1948 and 1949.
Introduction
1
2 Introduction 
Finally, with the coming into force of the European Arrest Warrant in 2004, the 
political offence exception has ceased to exist within Europe. It remains to be 
seen whether this will happen worldwide.
It is argued in this study that this deadly blow to the political offence excep-
tion has been a reaction to the modern threat of international terrorism and 
that it can have implications also for non-violent offenders. The liberal idea that 
emerged soon after the French Revolution, according to which political dis-
sidents, regardless of their political views, deserve protection, has all but ceased 
to exist amongst Western countries. This has been a result of the collision of 
practical problems and an acute sense of threat, with democratic ideals and the 
rule of law.
The rise of the terrorist threat during the last decades, the international depo-
liticisation of terrorism and the changes in the political offence exception to 
extradition from the 1830s until 2004 all go hand-in-hand. Perhaps surprisingly, 
concurrently with these trends, terrorism has been repoliticised in the national 
legislation of several countries. This book contextualises these seemingly con-
trasting developments and the political reasons behind them and analyses their 
implications. One of the core threads of the study is to examine how the US has 
affected these changes.
It is the intention of this work to encourage a discussion on the motives of 
terrorism as well as on the impetus resulting in the creation of the POE. The key 
argument put forward in this study is that the POE forms a part of the inheritance 
of the rise of liberalism and should be protected as such. The original aim of the 
POE was to protect those fighting for the liberal cause and this motivation should 
be acknowledged when applying the exception. Further, violent terrorists do not 
deserve the protection of the exception and they should be excluded from it. 
Such an exclusion will only be possible if terrorism is defined internationally. For 
this purpose, this book presents a working definition of terrorism. The definition 
acknowledges that terrorists have political motives.
1.1  A historico-legal approach
Western nations have been fighting terrorism in one way or another since the late 
1800s. Starting from the early years of the 21st century, it has been one of the 
focus points of global criminal and security policies. Because the phenomenon 
has relatively long historical roots, it is both important and interesting to contex-
tualise it. This book presents a thorough analysis of a vast number of historical 
sources and demonstrates the important changes in how terrorism has been dealt 
with. It also highlights some intriguing historical analogies.
The scope of the research extends to a period of nearly 200 years, from 1834 
to 2004. The choice of the time period covered is based on some of the initial 
findings of the research. The natural starting point emerged from the introduc-
tion of the political offence exception into extradition treaties in 1834. The end-
ing point is more debatable. The choice is based on a key conclusion of the 
research: the year 2004 can arguably be seen as a closure for an era which I have 
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named the era of romantic liberalism vis-à-vis political offenders.3 That year, the 
POE was effectively eliminated within European Union (EU) member states. In 
part, the discussion of the study extends beyond 2004 to illustrate more recent 
developments, but does not focus on creating a systematic analysis of this more 
recent period.
The study focuses on legal developments within a historical and international 
political context. The main research questions are “How and when did the cur-
rent trend of depoliticising terrorism emerge?” “How did terrorism affect the 
political offence exception to extradition?” and “Why did these changes occur 
and what are their implications?” With an academic background in political his-
tory, I position myself in the field of social sciences even when researching legal 
topics. This position that integrates divergent fields is fruitful, but naturally, 
also comes with weaknesses. Some detail is always lost in research that covers a 
lengthy period of time and is a crossover of different academic fields. However, 
this study provides a comprehensive historical view and a unique analysis of the 
themes covered, and as such, it fills a clear gap in existing research.
In order to tackle some of the most fundamental questions that relate to the 
study of terrorism, I have adopted a critical strategy to the study of terrorism, 
following Professor Philip Jenkins’s ideas. If terrorism is understood as a phe-
nomenon that has “nothing to do with politics,” as presented at the beginning of 
this chapter, the solutions to the problem will look very different to those that are 
used if terrorism is understood as an inherently political phenomenon.
The analytical method chosen for the purposes of this study is historical and 
source-critical. Legal changes are contextualised by analysing political develop-
ments that have led to them. The research has been inspired by the writings of 
Judith N. Shkar4 and the idea of the law as something functioning within a soci-
ety, never completely neutral and free of political and moral considerations. Legal 
changes do not emerge in a separate ‘bubble,’ but are intertwined and linked with 
political and social developments.5 As a result, legal materials offer a viewpoint 
to issues that are inherently political, such as terrorism. This book argues that 
terrorism, as a subject of policy- and lawmaking, is indeed a political phenome-
non. Sometimes, however, terrorism has been constructed as a non-political issue; 
in other words, depoliticised.6 Because of this interpretation, a constructionist 
approach to the theme is useful for the purposes of analysis and for the purposes 
of selecting the relevant sources.
The interest of this study lies in analysing the ways in which the political 
offence exception and terrorism as legal constructions have changed since their 
creation and in examining the political motivations to these changes. According 
to Jenkins, terrorism has been a flexible problem that has been convenient to 
3  See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1 for a definition of romantic liberalism.
4  See especially Shkar, 1986.
5  See e.g. Kekkonen, 2013.
6  The concept of depoliticisation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.8.
4 Introduction 
different interest groups and political causes.7 The construction of the terrorist 
problem during different times and its labelling as political or non-political relates 
to wider political goals.
The sources used in this study are international treaties, conventions and reso-
lutions, as well as political recommendations. It covers a vast amount of bi- and 
multilateral extradition treaties and offers an extensive view on the language used 
in them and their evolution. The viewpoint is global with a special emphasis on 
the US to enable a systematic analysis of the developments in extradition treaties. 
In addition, US treaties are compared with some key French and UK extradition 
treaties. Almost all US extradition treaties are accessible online,8 which has facili-
tated the creation of an analysis that covers the time period from the emergence 
of the POE to modern days.
The focus on the US can be justified because, according to Boister, it has, 
during the last century, used its national legislation as a model for new treaties, 
thus affecting law reforms around the world.9 There are significant similarities 
between extradition treaties, even across civil and common-law systems, as noted 
by Geoffrey Gilbert. It is typical for courts even to refer to decisions from a dif-
ferent jurisdiction. Provisions regarding extradition in domestic legislations also 
typically bear resemblance as domestic laws often reflect international treaty pro-
visions. For these reasons, an analysis of even an individual state practice can be 
meaningful and relatively comprehensive.10
Further, the wider diplomatic role of the US in the world since the Second 
World War is incontestable. It has been one of the leading agents in the inter-
national fight against terrorism and played a key part in the UN and Interpol, 
two organisations that have made considerable efforts in the battle against 
terrorism. Based on previous research on Interpol,11 it was possible to begin 
with the hypothesis that change in the US’s take on terrorism also changed 
how it was approached by Interpol and that this, in turn, had a noticeable 
effect on the organisation. The present book deliberates this claim further and 
elaborates on it.
In addition to the US, the research focuses on Western European states. With 
a relatively long history of dealing with terrorism, European states such as France 
and Italy serve as interesting examples. The focus on Western states solely can, 
naturally, be criticised, and it is clear that there is a lot of room left for research on 
how non-Western states have viewed terrorism. Specific cases of interests would 
be Brazil, China and Russia. However, within the confines of a single book, the 
selection of these two points of focus can be justified.
7  Jenkins, 2003, 189.
8  Although not on one specific site. I have searched them using various search engines includ-
ing the United Nations Treaty Collection, treaties.un.org (Retrieved 18 October 2018).
9  Boister, 2015, 22.
10  Gilbert, 1991, 1–2.
11  See Jansson, 2008.
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The study does not provide an extensive analysis of the developments of defi-
nitions of terrorism in domestic laws. This is because the main interest of the 
current research lies in antiterrorism tools that concern international relations 
between states, and not so much each state’s internal affairs. In other words, 
the focus is on how the political nature of terrorism has been understood in the 
international field. Some national laws are, however, referenced for demonstra-
tive purposes.
In addition to extradition treaties, key research material includes UN 
Security Council and General Assembly counterterrorism resolutions, UN con-
ventions that relate to terrorism, Interpol antiterrorist resolutions, and differ-
ent European policy and legal documents, including the Council of Europe 
documents.12 This choice of sources provides a wide set of data starting from 
the early 1800s until 2004.
The value of official documents for the purposes of a historical analysis can 
be criticised. According to Gilbert, “Indeed any analysis of transnational terror-
ism and fugitive offenders based simply on treaty provisions alone is prone to 
this limited vision of State aims and objectives. The provisions have to be seen 
in the context of their application and of other measures designed to achieve 
similar ends.”13 However, as the interest of this study does not lie in the applica-
tion of the resolutions and recommendations but in analysing their intention, 
the choice can be validated. The aim is to build a picture of how terrorism has 
been viewed and how the (perceived) intensification of the problem has affected 
decision-making. In other words, the study presents how the terrorist problem 
has been constructed internationally and how this, in turn, has affected other legal 
constructions.
Official documents such as treaties, conventions and laws, in general, portray 
the ‘accepted version.’ The wording in internationally drafted official documents 
made for public use, such as Interpol resolutions and UN treaties, is a result of 
countless hours of diplomatic debates and discussions. As such, they represent a 
‘global compromise’ on terrorism. The same is true for European documents, 
just in a narrower context. UN resolutions are given by the Security Council 
(SC) and the General Assembly (GA). The GA’s resolutions are recommenda-
tory. These resolutions become legally significant when they are recited and cop-
ied into other international instruments.14
The sources have been selected with the aim of offering different points of 
view to the same topic: the texts formulated by the UN are a highly authorita-
tive source in international law; international antiterrorist conventions are legally 
12  The choice of documents has been aided by three key works by international law scholars: 
Noone and Alexander, 1997; Bassiouni, 2001; and Saul, 2011.
13  Gilbert, 1998, 289.
14  See e.g. Bassiouni, 2001. It is noteworthy that it has been argued that the Security Council’s 
role since 2001 has been quasi-legislative in nature as it has been invoking binding obliga-
tions to the legislators of member states. See Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 21.
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binding to those states that have ratified them; resolutions by Interpol offer a law 
enforcement-oriented view on terrorism; US extradition treaties point to changes 
in US policies and interests during the studied period, and European docu-
ments point to a growing mutual trust amongst European states. The Council of 
Europe’s recommendations and resolutions are also non-binding but their politi-
cal role is of importance. They are particularly interesting because the Council of 
Europe concentrates on human rights issues, democracy and the rule of law, all 
of which are issues that can become highly complicated when dealing with ter-
rorism. An emphasis on them often generates a heated debate on the question of 
whose rights are more important: those of the terrorists or those of the (poten-
tial) victims. A compromise where both parties’ rights could be protected seems 
to have been considered a utopian option.
With the help of the described data set, it is possible to do meaningful basic 
research on the development of the political offence exemption and of the treat-
ment of terrorism internationally. Presented also is a table15 compiling detailed 
information on US extradition treaties over the years.
The present research is, first and foremost, a political history study that uses 
legal materials to analyse, explain and portray wider political changes. However, it 
communicates with a variety of divergent fields, including international and crim-
inal law, political science, legal and political history, and the sociology of law. At 
the core of this study lies extradition law which is, in itself, an interesting mix of 
legal and diplomatic issues and as such necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach.
This study aspires to follow the footsteps of scholars who have previously suc-
cessfully merged two or more of these fields in order to create new knowledge. 
In the field of international law, M. Cherif Bassiouni’s extensive research cannot 
be bypassed.16 Bassiouni has, for instance, brought light to the political offence 
exception, to irregular rendition processes and to terrorism. Extradition law and 
the political offence exception have also been a focus of other well-known schol-
ars such as Christopher L. Blakesley, Geoffrey Gilbert, Manuel R. García Mora 
and Christopher H. Pyle. Pyle’s book Extradition, Politics and Human Rights 
touches upon many of the themes in this study but concentrates on the develop-
ment of US legislation. The aim of this present book is to complement Pyle’s 
thorough work by introducing a comparative international perspective to the US 
legal sources that Pyle used, as well as by setting the developments presented by 
Pyle into the wider context of depoliticisation.
Political crime and the political offence exception cannot be discussed with-
out making a reference to the 1980 book The Political Offence Exception to 
Extradition: The Delicate Problem of Balancing the Rights of the Individual and 
the International Public Order by Dr Christine van den Wijngaert.17 Van den 
Wijngaert has pointed to the complexity of the POE with regard to violent inter-
15  See Appendix.
16  See e.g. Bassiouni, 1969, 1973, 1987; and Bassiouni and Wise, 1995.
17  Van den Wijngaert, 1980.
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national criminals whose deeds seem to threaten the very basis of democracy. 
However, Van den Wijngaert finalised her book close to 40 years ago and many 
events have since significantly affected the POE.
Political crime as a phenomenon has been a subject of scholarly work especially 
during the 1960s and 1970s. During this era, the magnitude of the current ter-
rorist threat was still unimaginable, but the idea of political criminals as a more 
noble class of criminals started to fade out. Concurrently with the rise of interna-
tional terrorism, interest in the political offence exception amplified and judicial 
responses to terrorism grew in number. However, since this period, less attention 
has been paid to the concept of political crime and its relationship with terrorism, 
in particular. One of the key scholars in this field today is Jeffrey Ian Ross, who 
has written comprehensive books on the matter.18
In dealing with the concept of the political in a wider sense, this study builds 
a dialogue with German jurist and political scientist Carl Schmitt. In particular, 
his ideas on the concept of the political are an interesting starting point when 
discussing the political nature of terrorism.19 The contribution of the present 
book to the debate on the definitions of terrorism could not have been done 
without Alex P. Schmid’s work on the definitions of terrorism.20 Also, Ben Saul’s 
massive opus on terrorism, alongside his other research on international law, has 
served as an important stepping stone.21 Further, Mathieu Deflem’s research on 
the depoliticisation of terrorism and Interpol have been major sources of inspira-
tion for this study.22
Additionally, the historical foundation for the analysis lays on a wide variety 
of historical scholarship providing knowledge and understanding of the most 
important political changes that can be linked to the motivations behind the lim-
iting of the POE as well as the de- and repoliticisations of terrorism.
1.2  Structure of the book
This book is mostly built on a chronological structure. Following this introduc-
tory chapter, the second chapter offers a critical and historical discussion on the 
rather complex concepts that are used for the purposes of analysis throughout 
the research. It argues that terrorism falls into the category of so-called relative 
political crimes, which are ‘common’ crimes committed for political purposes. It 
further discusses the concepts of depoliticisation and offers a condensed view on 
extradition and the political offence exception to extradition.
The third chapter of the book concentrates on the period starting from the 
aftermath of the revolution of 1830 in France. During this period, discussed 
18  Ross, 2003 and 2012.
19  Schmitt, 1996 (1932).
20  Schmid, 1984, 2004, 2011; Schmid et al., 1988.
21  Saul, 2012.
22  E.g. Deflem, 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
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under the title “The rise and decline of romantic liberalism: from the 1800s to the 
1960s,” the so-called political offence exception emerged. The chapter presents 
the underlying political motivations for the creation of the exception and the first 
political controversies it sparked in Europe, especially in relation to the protection 
of political assassins and anarchists. It suggests that the exception was created in 
the spirit of romantic liberalism in an era of political turmoil in Europe. The chap-
ter ends with a discussion on the League of Nations anti-terrorist convention of 
1937, which was created as a result of political alarm caused by terrorist attacks in 
Europe. The attempt to create a comprehensive convention, however, failed, and 
the Second World War pushed concerns regarding terrorism to the side.
The second historical period covered is the period after the Second World 
War until the final decade of the Cold War when the terrorist threat started to 
resurface on the global security policy agenda. This period is discussed in Chapter 
4, “Taking the political out of the political: 1960s–1980s.” This era witnessed 
the first international terrorist attacks that received wide publicity. The US and 
the UN made attempts to create new comprehensive conventions that would 
have defined terrorism and joined the world in the fight against it. However, this 
process failed due to a number of difficult political considerations. The chapter 
demonstrates that this led to the choosing of a seemingly new strategy; gradual 
limitations to the POE; and a piecemeal approach to criminalising specific terror-
ist deeds, which essentially meant the depoliticisation of terrorist acts by separat-
ing them from their motivations. This development culminated in the US–UK 
Supplementary Treaty of 1985, which excluded all violent acts from the protec-
tion of the POE and related to the rise of the global terrorist threat as well as of 
conservatism in both countries.
The third period starts from the beginning of the 1990s when it became clear 
that the growth of the terrorist threat was not a passing phenomenon and that 
the US could no longer see itself as separate and protected from global events. 
These developments are discussed in Chapter 5, “Dedication to the fight against 
terrorism since the 1990s.” The chapter analyses the process where the West 
started to openly consider terrorism a global threat and the political nature of the 
phenomenon was pushed to the side. It is argued that the POE that had proved 
to hinder the fight against terrorism, an inherently political phenomenon, was 
abolished within the EU in 2004, which also marks the end of the period studied 
in this book. This chapter also discusses the motivations for the existence of the 
POE and the implications of its annihilation as well as the reasons behind the 
chosen strategy of depoliticisation. It further opens a discussion on the repolitici-
sation of terrorism, which is argued to serve the same purpose as the strategy of 
depoliticisation.
The contents of the study are brought together in the conclusive Chapter 6, 
“Conclusion: protecting political offenders – pipe dream of romantic liberalism.” 
This chapter lays out the findings of the study as well as opens up potential for 
further research.
22.1  Political crime and terrorism
2.1.1  Defining political crime
This study uses the notions ‘political crime’ and ‘political offence’ as synonyms. 
Both of these concepts have been widely employed in studies of politics and of 
law, regardless of the lack of definition for either. Defining these concepts is not 
an easy task, as even the term ‘political’ seems to evade all attempts at definition.1
Otto Kirchheimer has suggested that “something is called political if it is 
thought to relate in a particularly intensive way to the interests of the community.”2 
Understanding the concept in this manner, it is possible to argue that all crime 
is political. This is true also because all laws portray values and morals in a given 
society.3 Laws come into being as a result of a political decision-making process 
and reflect the values of those in power in a society.
‘Political crime’ is not a natural concept, but a political creation in itself.4 As 
Barton L. Ingraham described, political crimes are “acts which officials treat as if 
they were political and criminal regardless of their real nature and the motivation 
of the perpetrators.”5 As a rule of thumb, illegal actions with the intent to oppose 
the state can be called political crime.6
This category of crime has not been accepted in all societies. For instance, 
England never incorporated the concept into its national legislation, and, as a 
consequence, the United States never took on the notion.7 Ingraham and Tokoro 
have explained this by the prevalence of the doctrine of legalism in England, 
reflecting the history and philosophy of the country. Traditionally, the English 
1  Knauss and Strickland, 1988, 91.
2  Kirchheimer, 1961, 25.
3  Schafer, 1971, 380.
4  See Kirchheimer, 1961, 26-45 for a detailed account on the development of the idea of politi-
cal crime.
5  Ingraham, Barton L., Political Crime in Europe: A Comparative Study of France, Germany 
and England, 1979. Cited in Ross, 2003, 34.
6  See e.g. Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1226.
7  Ferrari, 1920, 308; Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 160; Schmid, 1984, 27.
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viewed obedience to laws as a moral necessity. Both in England and the US, the 
state and the law were seen as the providers of basic protection for the citizens’ 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to express dissenting opinions.8 
Because the state was the protector of those values, a crime that would gain 
legitimation from being ‘political’ could not exist. All crime was ‘common’ crime. 
However, such a view did not concern foreign political criminals whose ideolo-
gies did not contradict domestic interests. They were treated differently from 
other criminals.9
Many states have been willing to apply the concept of ‘political crime,’ but, 
typically, this has been done without giving it a legal definition. The first, and 
seemingly only, attempt to define political crime within any national law was the 
German Extradition Law of 1929. It defined political acts as “those punishable 
offences […] which are directed immediately against the existence of the security 
of the State, against the head or a member of the government of the State, as 
such, against a body provided for by the constitution, against the rights of citi-
zens in electing or voting, or against the good relations with foreign States.” The 
definition has been criticised, especially because it completely excludes crimes 
committed by totalitarian states against their own citizens.10 Some classifications 
of political crime have, indeed, included ‘state crimes,’ or crimes committed by 
the state.11 The focus of this study is on oppositional political crime, and for this 
reason crimes committed by states are ruled out. This is because the main interest 
in this study is the reactions of the states when opposing oppositional political 
crime. Oppositional political crimes can further be categorised into two groups: 
nonviolent and violent crimes.12
The concept of political crime can be distinguished from the political use of 
justice and political trials. These concepts are linked and intertwined, but still 
form separate categories. Political trials are typically understood as abuses of the 
legal system for the purpose of furthering political aims.13
Otto Kirchheimer has classified political trials into three main categories.14 
The first category is closely connected to my usage of the concept of political 
crime. In Kirchheimer’s classification, this type of trial concerns common crime 
8  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 160. See also Shkar, 1986, 210; and Oppenheim, Jennings 
and Watts, 1992, 965.
9  McElrath, 2000, 23–24. However, this view changed during the last decades of the 20th 
century, as discussed in this book.
10  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1230.
11  Hagan, 1997, 2, 177; Ross, 2003, 5, 38. Whether crimes committed by the state are included 
in the classification of political crime is under dispute. In Ross’s classification, crimes are 
divided into two groups: oppositional (or anti-systemic) and state (pro-systemic). The first 
group refers to acts of individuals or groups against the prevailing political force, whereas 
crimes committed by the state’s “criminogenic agencies” (police, military, security forces 
etc.) against individuals or other governments form the second group. Ross, 2003, 9.
12  Ross, 2003, 38.
13  Shkar, 1986, 143–151.
14  See also on political trials e.g. Shkar, 1986, 143–151; and Teitel, 2000, 75–77.
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committed for political purposes, aiming at gaining political benefits. In my opin-
ion, terrorism falls into this category, as it indeed has political goals and seeks 
political effects. I will discuss these claims in more detail in Chapter 2, Sections 
2.1.1–2.1.6.
Kirchheimer’s second category is the “classic political trial” where the regime 
aims at discarding its foe by incriminating their behaviour. The third category 
of political crime is the “derivative political trial, where the weapons of defama-
tion, perjury and contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute upon 
a political foe.”15 Also these two other categories can be linked to the concept of 
terrorism.
First, ‘terrorist’ is sometimes used as a label against a person who is considered 
a danger to the whole society. For instance, Julian Assange, the whistle-blower 
whose case is discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4, has sometimes been labelled 
as a terrorist16 even if his actions as the founder and leader of WikiLeaks did 
not involve any physical violence.17 Second, understanding a ‘terrorist’ deed as a 
special category of violence allows for it to be treated more severely in a court of 
law. This idea is linked to my idea of the repoliticisation of terrorism discussed 
particularly in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.
Interestingly, none of Kirchheimer’s categories concern trials for purely politi-
cal crimes, such as sedition.18 It is, however, clear that a trial against someone 
who has, for instance, committed treason is highly political. Its political nature 
concerns both the aims and consequences of the crime, as well as the implications 
of the outcome of the trial. However, as Judith N. Shkar has noted, it is possible, 
at least theoretically, to have an ordinary criminal trial for a political offence. 
Nonetheless, she also acknowledges that it is difficult to maintain “judicial calm 
when the deepest political passions have been aroused.”19
Shkar has also identified three types of political trials. In addition to the afore-
mentioned trial for a political offence bearing resemblance to an ordinary criminal 
trial, a political trial can also be the conviction of a person for a crime that they 
have not committed or for an act that has not been classified as criminal in leg-
islation. The latter case contradicts the principle of legality: nullum crimen sine 
lege.20 Third, political trials can be used to strengthen the identity of the ruling 
power.21 The subjects of political trials are the ‘other,’ against whom the justice 
15  Kirchheimer, 1961, 46. According to Kirchheimer, many jurists deny the existence of politi-
cal trials. Kirchheimer, 1961, 48.
16  Fox News, 30 November 2010, “Yes, WikiLeaks is a terrorist organization and the time to 
act is NOW”; The Guardian, 19 December 2010, “Julian Assange like a hi-tech terrorist, 
says Joe Biden.”
17  NB: This statement does not relate to the rape charges against Assange, but merely to his 
position as the head of WikiLeaks.
18  The division between purely and relative political crimes is discussed later.
19  Shkar, 1986, 150.
20  Shkar, 1986, 152.
21  See Shkar, 1986, 147.
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system is used. Political criminals are also the ‘others,’ who threaten the unity 
and values of the state. Political trials are useful tools for history-making during a 
transitional period. With the assistance of trials, it is possible to create a narrative 
of history that serves to tie a nation together.22 For instance, the Nuremberg trial 
of Nazi war criminals before the International Military Tribunal partly served this 
purpose.23
Political crime, understood as crime against the state,24 emerged concur-
rently with modern state structures. However, the use of the concept in official 
contexts is a more recent development. It was introduced into the legislation 
of the majority of Western European countries in the first half of the 19th 
century.25 The term has most commonly been used in relation to extradition, 
but also to identify crimes that were subject to a special procedure or a special 
punishment.26
Originally, the term ‘political crime’ had the same legal meaning in both 
national and international law. In both contexts, naming a criminal deed politi-
cal resulted in granting preferential treatment to the offender. Since then, the 
term has been used in different ways in different contexts: (1) the term ‘political 
offence’ has had a broader scope in extradition law than in domestic law; (2) the 
concept ‘related’ or ‘relative’ political crimes has only existed in the context of 
extradition; (3) in extradition law, the same term can be interpreted differently by 
courts and administrative decision makers; and (4) the exceptions to the political 
offence exception (POE)27 only exist with respect to extradition and are unknown 
to domestic law.28
Internationally, there has been a long-unsolved debate concerning the defini-
tion of ‘political crime.’29 A key question is whether common crimes can become 
political under specific circumstances and, if they can, under which conditions. 
The answers to these questions vary from country to country. A further complica-
tion is caused by the fact that because political offenders typically believe that they 
are working towards a more pure and higher goal, and illegal means are justifiable 
22  Teitel, 2000, 72.
23  See Shkar, 1986, 153–170, for a discussion on the Nuremberg trial as a political trial and on 
its lack of legalistic grounds. It was set up as a political necessity and for the sake of future 
political advantage. Whether this was right or wrong depends on one’s perspective on the 
principle of legality. According to Shkar, “Ironically, perhaps, a trial without law, in this 
instance, was still a closer approximation of justice, more in keeping with legalistic values, 
than any other course of action.” Shkar, 1986, 160.
24  I concentrate my discussion on the concept of political crime to crimes against the state, as 
explained in the introductory chapter.
25  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 145.
26  Deere, 1933, 247.
27  The POE excludes political crimes from the scope of extradition. The concept will be dis-
cussed in detail later.
28  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 98.
29  See also Schmid, 1984, 20, for a discussion on the term ‘political violence,’ which raises 
many similar points that are brought out in this chapter.
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in order to achieve this objective,30 the offenders themselves do not always con-
sider their acts illegal.31
Most commonly the concept of political crime has been defined in a ‘nega-
tive’ manner by excluding specific crimes from this category. A growing num-
ber of crimes, including for instance attacks against the lives of heads of state, 
war crimes, genocide and finally terrorism, have been labelled as non-political. 
The exclusion of terrorism from this category is a core interest of this study. 
International crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity covered by 
the Geneva Conventions are not discussed in detail.
Christine van den Wijngaert, who has done an extensive study on the topic of 
political crime has written: “[‘Political offence’] is a comprehensive term encom-
passing various forms of delinquent behaviour and, as such, it covers a wide range 
of offences. It can be viewed as a spectrum, with at one end purely passive offences 
such as political dissidence and on the other active offences of opposition against 
prevailing social order or against the ruling group in power. It is a continuum 
of offences in which the political and common elements are more or less repre-
sented, rather than a distinct category of crimes which could be distinguished 
from the ‘common offences’.” She has also noted that most definitions of a politi-
cal offence are tautologous, as they use the term ‘political’ without defining it.32
In the strictest reading, only plain political deeds, acts against the state, which 
do not contain elements of common crime are viewed as political offences. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the ‘political crime’ umbrella covers a wide variety 
of criminal deeds. Most understandings of what ‘political crime’ is fall between 
these two extremes. The term can cover crimes that are considered political for an 
objective reason. These would include, for instance, all crimes committed during 
the course of political unrest, or all criminal acts that have political consequences, 
meaning that they have an effect on the ‘polis,’ the existing socio-political order. 
It can also cover crimes that are political for a subjective reason, that is all infrac-
tions motivated by ideology or politics, as opposed to private interests, such as 
greed or passion.33 In some cases, the pure affiliation of the individual has been 
sufficient for a crime to be classified as political. For instance, a strong connection 
with a terrorist group could be interpreted as enough proof of a political moti-
vation of the actions of a person.34 Sometimes also acts directly connected with 
political offences are treated as political offences.35 There is no general agreement 
about what level of ‘politicisation’ an act must have in order to be considered 
political.36
30  Hagan, 1997, 2, 177–1788; Bassiouni, 2001, 24–26. On justifying the use of violence by 
terrorists, see e.g. Fletcher, 2006, 906–907.
31  Ross, 2003, 9.
32  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 96, italics orig.
33  Hagan, 1997, 2; Ross, 2003, 4.
34  Ross, 2003, 5.
35  See in more detail later. Deere, 1933, 248.
36  Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 964.
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M. Cherif Bassiouni has suggested that at least three factors must be consid-
ered in evaluating a political crime. The first is the involvement and commitment 
of the actor in the ideology or movement on behalf of which they were acting and 
their belief for the justification of the means used. Second, the link between the 
political motive and the crime committed needs to be weighed. The third point 
that needs to be evaluated is the proportionality of the acts committed in relation 
to the end sought.37
Bassiouni describes “common crimes” as attacks against interests that are 
shared by organised societies with different social and political views as worth 
protecting. In contrast, political crimes go against interests that are not common 
to all societies. The laws that criminalise these acts may vary in time and place.38 
Similarly, according to García-Mora: “political offence in the courts of one coun-
try may be a common crime in those of another.”39
Even if one had a clear definition of political crime, specific cases could still be 
confusing. Some offences can seem to be political, but after closer scrutiny, they 
lose that character. A political context does not necessarily make a crime politi-
cal and circumstances have an effect on how a deed is judged. For instance, the 
killings of police officers by the Black Liberation Army in the 1970s were treated 
as political crimes, whereas attacks against police officers by anti-globalisation 
protesters at the turn of the 20th century were not.40 In some cases the intent 
of a specific act is unclear. Some ‘pure’ political crimes can be committed for a 
non-political purpose. An example of this would be acting as a spy for purely 
financial reasons.41 On the other hand, common crimes can also be committed by 
‘altruistic’ motivations. For instance, the motivation for a murder can be to offer 
euthanasia or as the classic example suggests, food can be stolen in order to feed 
one’s children.42
Jeffrey Ian Ross’s summarisation of how to recognise political crime follows 
along the lines of the age-old expression: “If it looks like a duck, walks like a 
duck and quacks like a duck, then it must be a duck.” Further, he continues: “In 
sum, you can identify a political crime through triangulating among existing laws, 
the individual’s (or group’s) motivations, the kind of victim/target attacked, the 
result and the context of the action.”43 It is clear that such an imprecise definition 
does and should not suffice for legal purposes. The existence of a concept that 
continuously has legal implications but lacks a legal definition creates uncertainty 
and doubt.44
37  Bassiouni, 1969, 250. Bassiouni’s idea is related to the so-called predominance test, or Swiss 
test, discussed in Section 2.2.5.
38  Bassiouni, 1969, 229.
39  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1229.
40  Ross, 2003, 4.
41  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 30; Ross, 2003, 4–5.
42  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 31.
43  Ross, 2003, 5.
44  Deere, 1933, 247; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1226–1227.
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As shown, academics have not agreed upon what political crime is. Drawing 
the line between political and common crimes becomes even more complicated 
when the definition becomes a legal or a political question. Christine van den 
Wijngaert has pointed out that the legal meaning can have concrete ramifications 
on matters such as the extraditability of a person, whereas the sociological mean-
ing does not have these kinds of implications.45
2.1.2  Classifying political crime
For analytical purposes, it is useful to separate different types of political crimes. 
Political crimes are generally classified into two groups. The first is the ‘pure’ or 
‘purely’ political crimes, which are direct attacks against the political organisa-
tion or government of a state. Pure political crimes lack any element of common 
crime and they do not injure people or cause damage to property. Deeds such as 
treason, subversion or insurrection fall within this category.46
In the strictest interpretation of the political offence exemption, only pure 
political crimes are considered non-extraditable. This interpretation was vocalised 
by a French court in the Giovanni Gatti case in 1947.47 However, during the time 
of list-based extradition treaties, pure political crimes were typically never listed 
as extraditable crimes.48
The second group of political crimes is that of ‘mixed’ or ‘relative’ political 
crimes or délits complexes in French. They mix a political/ideological element 
with a common crime. Mixed political crimes can be, for instance, kidnappings 
or assassinations committed for an ideological goal.49 There are different views 
on which acts count as relative political offences. Some suggest a relative political 
offence is one where a common crime is committed in connection to a political 
act or event. Others consider any common crime with a political motive a relative 
political crime.
In addition, some have added a third group for classification purposes: that of 
compound political offences, which are punishable acts combining a purely politi-
cal offence and a common crime.50
The line between a relative political offence and a common crime is not easy 
to draw. For instance, Van den Wijngaert has defined a political offender as “a 
person who violates the criminal law on the grounds of his political and ideologi-
cal convictions. This politico-ideological motivation is the only criterion on which 
45  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 97.
46  See e.g. Deere, 1933, 248; Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 146; Bassiouni, 1969, 244–245; 
Hagan, 1997, 2.
47  In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 ann. Dig. 145 (Cour d’appel, Grenoble 1947). See, in more detail, 
Section 2.2.5.
48  See also Section 2.2.4.
49  See e.g. Deere, 1933, 248; García-Mora, 1956, 78; Bassiouni, 1969, 244; Ingraham and 
Tokoro, 1969, 146; Hagan, 1997, 2; Gilbert, 1991, 119; Gilbert, 1998, 215–216.
50  Kälin and Künzli, 2000, 65.
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to distinguish political criminals from common offenders and from pseudo-political 
offenders since there is often no difference between the crimes committed.”51 In 
contrast, Bassiouni has criticised the use of the term ‘relative’ or ‘quasi’ political 
offence. He has called them descriptive labels with no judicial value. According to 
him, the motivation of a crime cannot change its nature. In fact, the focus on the 
criminal’s motive contradicts theories which remove motive from the elements of 
criminal offences. The element of intent, the mens rea, does not question why a 
specific act was committed.52
If the motivation is understood as the sole factor separating common and 
political crimes, the line between the two can easily become blurred.53 Modern 
courts typically do not accept that a political motive would suffice in characteris-
ing a common crime as political in extradition cases.54
The division between pure and mixed political crimes partly follows the tra-
ditional classification that divides illegalities into two categories: mala in se and 
mala prohibita, natural as opposed to conventional or statutory crime. Mala pro-
hibita refers to classifications of crime that vary according to time and political 
culture. Mala in se, in turn, represents crimes that are considered condemnable 
by most nations and across legal systems. Pure political crimes are never mala in 
se.55 Relative political crimes, on the other hand, can be mala in se, that is crimes 
with a political motive.
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the exact meaning of the notion 
‘political crime,’ nearly all states have needed to formulate their own understand-
ing of the phenomenon. This is due to what is called the ‘political offence exemp-
tion’ to extradition. The exemption and its emergence are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1. The classification of specific crimes as political for the 
purposes of the exception is one of the core themes of this book and thus runs 
through the whole study.
2.1.3  Terrorism: the problem of definition
A study that explores terrorism can never evade the problem of definition. This 
study focuses on the changes in the way in which terrorism has been under-
stood and dealt with in different times. For this reason, the definitional ques-
tion is embedded in the research. Hence, this initial conceptual part is merely 
51  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 27, italics added.
52  Bassiouni, 1969, 248–249.
53  “The boundaries become blurred, in instances such as when drug cartels or large-scale crimi-
nal organisations use violence against political elites and institutions to exercise control over 
their chosen domain (drugs, gambling, prostitution). Even in these examples, however, the 
primary aim of attacking political targets is to safeguard the criminal activity and not to affect 
the political environment per se.” Wight, 2015, 108. See also García-Mora, 1956, 76; Ingra-
ham and Tokoro, 1969, 146; Hagan, 1997, 2; Wight, 2015, 113.
54  Gilbert, 1991, 120.
55  Ferrari, 1920, 308–309.
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preparatory to the wider discussion on the nature of terrorism. The aim of this 
chapter is to present some of the most widely used definitions of terrorism as well 
as the problematic nature that lies in trying to create an internationally accepted 
definition. Finally, it explains my own understanding of the phenomenon and 
how it should be classified.
The main definitional selection done for the purposes of this study has been to 
exclude state terrorism from its scope in its entirety even if, it can easily be argued, 
its human costs have been much higher than those of anti-state terrorism.56 The 
interest of this research lies especially in different states’ and international organi-
sations’ responses to anti-state terrorism.57 Trying to tackle state terrorism in this 
context would be out of the scope and purposes of this study. Further, state crime 
is regulated by international human rights law (IHRL) and international humani-
tarian law (IHL, or the law of armed conflict) and thus forms an entirely different 
category of crime compared to anti-state terrorism. This does not mean that the 
state or its individual authorities cannot commit atrocities that amount to terror-
ism and perhaps should also be labelled as such, but merely that the legal mecha-
nisms that are in place for the purposes of punishing such acts are different to 
those used against individuals or groups committing oppositional terrorist acts.58
Regardless of worldwide counterterrorism efforts and a debate that has been 
going on for decades, an internationally agreed legal definition of terrorism still 
does not exist.59 For instance, all UN terrorism definitions are diverse. The 1994 
Declaration on Measures against International Terrorism defines terrorism as 
56  See e.g. Pyle, 1988, 184. The concentration on anti-state violence is, unfortunately, a typical 
exclusion, done also by scholars researching other forms of political violence than terror-
ism. See e.g. Schmid, 1984, 22; Bassiouni, 1988, x. Wight has argued that the concept of 
state terrorism is analytically useless: “I argue that the concept of state terrorism, although 
it makes intuitive sense, provides no additional purchase on a critique of unacceptable state 
practices beyond that already covered by international law. Indeed, since there is no agreed 
international definition of terrorism, then to move certain state practices into the realm of 
state terrorism effectively leaves those practices outside legal redress. Nothing is gained, and 
much lost, by talking of state terrorism.” Wight, 2015, 15. See also Wight, 2015, 118. The 
concept is not recognised in international law. Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 9.
57  It could be argued that the concept of anti-state terrorism is, in fact, not useful, as most acts 
of terrorism do not actually target the state apparatus but, instead, they attack the general 
public instead. See Klabbers, 2004, 305.
58  For instance the International Law Commission in its 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind defined international terrorism solely as acts committed 
by state officials. According to the draft, an international terrorist is “An individual who as 
an agent or representative of a State commits or orders the commission of any of the follow-
ing acts: undertaking, organising, assisting, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts against 
another State directed at persons or property and of such a nature as to create a state of ter-
ror in the minds of public figures, groups of persons or the general public.” Article 24, UN 
Doc. A/46/10, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third 
session (29 April–19 July 1991). Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, Vol. 
II, Pt. 2, Pt. 2. See also Cassese, 2006, 944.
59  See e.g. Saul, 2005; Young, 2006; Schmid, 2011; Saul, 2012.
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“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes,”60 whereas 
the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism61 and the 
Terrorist Financing Convention62 avoid the problem of openly labelling terror-
ism as ‘political,’ by referring to the inherently political purposes of listed violent 
acts: “when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.” These definitions and their relevant details are 
discussed in the following sections.63
The main obstacle for international counterterrorism initiatives and the crea-
tion of a shared definition has been the political and ambiguous nature of terror-
ism.64 According to Saul, a debate on how terrorism should be defined will always 
be a debate on what is meant by concepts describing different types of political 
violence such as revolution, uprising, guerrilla warfare or war. As the analysis of 
the different applications of the POE will show, there is no general understanding 
of which forms of political violence are acceptable65 and whether terrorism can, 
for instance, include deeds committed during armed conflicts against military 
targets. For this reason, Saul has claimed that “the apparent agreement on the 
definition of terrorism is still subject to disagreement.”66
Trying to define an act at the same time elusive and highly political is difficult, 
or possibly even unattainable. As Alex P. Schmid has stated, “definitions gener-
ally tend to reflect the political interests and moral judgment (or lack thereof) of 
those who do the defining.”67 Philip Jenkins has underlined the nature of ter-
rorism as a socially constructed concept, which will be understood differently in 
different times and cultures.68 Arguably, this is true of all crimes, as demonstrated 
by the constant evolution in law making. No law is created in a vacuum free of 
social and political interests and values, nor should it be. Additionally, all criminal 
law is established with the intention to send a signal regarding what conduct is 
unwanted.
60  Part I (3) UN GA Resolution Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
annexed to the Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, 9 
December 1994, italics added.
61  Article 2 (1) (b) Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/55/1, 28 August 2000.
62  Article 1 (b) Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [Terrorism 
Financing], UN Doc. A/54/109, 9 December 1999.
63  Cassese has argued that a customary international consensus of a definition has already 
emerged, as the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the Draft Comprehensive Con-
vention, and most national laws and case law take a similar stance on what is to be considered 
terrorism. Cassese, 2006, 935–957.
64  See e.g. Nuotio, 2006, 1002.
65  Saul, 2006, 5.
66  Saul, 2015, 400.
67  Schmid, 2011.
68  Jenkins, 2003, ix.
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The classical dilemma and one of the most commonly used opening phrases 
of terrorism-related studies is “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter.” This saying has been confirmed by some and pronounced useless or 
purely wrong by others. For instance, Jenkins has provocatively argued that “ter-
rorists can succeed – though if they do, we call them ‘Mr. Minister’ or ‘Your 
Excellency,’ rather than terrorists.”69 If a party gains power, it is more likely that 
the atrocities they might have committed prior might be forgotten.
Some have attempted to make a definitional distinction between terrorists and 
‘freedom fighters.’ For instance, Allan has claimed that there is a clear difference 
between the two: “When violence is directed at symbols of a government in 
power by those whose stated aim is to overthrow, then the violence is a revolu-
tion. If the violence is aimed at civilians and civilian property, then the violence is 
terrorism.”70 This clear-cut division has been challenged, and many would agree 
that, for instance, killing a policeman, on or off duty, may be seen as an act of ter-
rorism.71 In addition, the point about the policeman also represents the problem 
in categorically defining who is a civilian and who is not.
Some have pronounced the entire concept of terrorism dead and analytically 
useless. Some have, in turn, argued that the prevention and suppression of terror-
ism have been unsuccessful partly because there is not enough understanding of 
terrorism or a consensus on how it should be defined.72
Even if no internationally accepted legal definition of terrorism exists, many 
international legal obligations are tied to the use of the concept. Nations have 
agreed to implement measures against terrorists, without a joint understanding 
of what the concept means.73 Conventions and laws refer to terrorism without 
defining it creating uncertainty and doubt. For this reason, the lack of definition 
is a potential source for violations of human rights.74 A definition of terrorism 
would create a legal standard which would prevent, at least in part, the ran-
dom use of the concept and political abuses of the term75 and impede the use of 
the concept as a mere synonym for “evil.”76 It has been pointed out that some 
national laws have actually defined terrorist offences in a manner that contradicts 
international human rights law.77
Without an international definition of terrorism, each country is able to use 
the concept for its own purposes, sometimes for oppressing non-violent politi-
cal protests. Further, if terrorism is not defined, a very broad understanding of 
69  Jenkins, 2003, 81.
70  Allan, 1993, 329.
71  See also e.g. Fletcher who discusses government targets as targets of terrorist acts. Fletcher, 
2006, 903–905.
72  See e.g. Bassiouni, 1975, xi; Schmid, 1992.
73  Saul, 2006, 5.
74  See e.g. Saul, 2006, 5, 50; Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 15; Wight, 2015, 97.
75  Saul, 2006, 22.
76  Saul, 2006, 68.
77  Saul, 2015, 403.
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it may prevail. As a result, it will remain unclear which forms of resistance are 
legitimate when facing political oppression. ‘True revolutionaries’ or innocents 
can be silenced by using the terrorism label.78 Additionally, according to Ben 
Saul, the criminalisation and defining of terrorism internationally would demon-
strate the condemning and the stigmatisation of offenders by the international 
community.79
Despite all the problems relating to the concept of terrorism and the lack of a 
definition, the concept continues to be used. The persistent application of such 
a debated notion, even if possibly due to the absence of a viable alternative, sug-
gests that the term seems to be applicable in describing or denoting an existing 
social phenomenon.80
The lack of a shared understanding of the concept is highlighted when the 
term terrorism meets another concept that has not been defined internationally: 
that of political crime. As discussed in length throughout this study, there is a 
strong connection between the definition of terrorism and the so-called political 
offence exception to extradition. Without a solid and widely accepted definition 
of terrorism, it cannot be properly excluded from the scope of those political 
offences traditionally protected from extradition. Further, it is problematic that 
laws are, as a rule, expected to be precise and predictable, but this principle has 
been applied neither for political offences nor terrorism.
2.1.4  Ideologically motivated acts
Is it possible to claim that terrorism is political, even if there is no accepted 
definition declaring it as such and there is an international trend of depoliticis-
ing it? According to Carl Schmitt, “Every religious, moral, economic, ethical 
or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to 
group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy.”81 Using this 
view as a starting point, it becomes clear that terrorism is a political phenom-
enon and notion. Terrorism divides people, and terrorists are often described 
as enemies (of the whole mankind, hostis humani generis).82 In fact, terrorism is 
a value-laden concept and it is only used against one’s political opponents.83 As 
Philip Herbst puts it, the label terrorist conveys “criminality, illegitimacy and 
even madness.”84
78  DeFabo, 2012, 69–70, 92–94.
79  Saul, 2006, 7, 21.
80  Duyvesteyn, 2004, 440.
81  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 37. See in more detail, Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 37–45.
82  Saul, 2006, 21.
83  The term, for instance, has been used by China against the Uighur separatist minority, by 
Russia against the Chechen rebels, by India against the militants in Kashmir, by Indone-
sia against the insurgents in Aceh and West Papua, by Nepal against the Maoists and by 
Morocco against the Islamists, just to name some cases. Saul, 2006, 50.
84  Herbst, 2003.
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According to Otto Kirchheimer there is a traditional distinction between 
inimicus, the private adversary, and hostis, the foe of the commonwealth.85 If this 
distinction is understood as the distinction between political and common crime, 
it is clear that terrorists, like pirates, belong to the category of hostis.
Scholars have made a multitude of attempts at defining terrorism. An academi-
cally often cited definition is that by Alex P. Schmid:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idi-
osyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assas-
sination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (tar-
gets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from 
a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-
based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imper-
illed) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a 
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propa-
ganda is primarily sought.86
Even if Schmid’s definition divides terrorism into three categories – idi-
osyncratic, criminal and political terrorism – most of the academic classifi-
cations consider an act of terrorism to be an act committed for a political 
goal.87 Different types of terrorism and terrorists groups are usually categorised 
according to the ideology behind them.88 Other ways of classifying terror-
ist groups include for instance looking at the tactics and targets they use or 
their historical roots.89 In a chart published in Ross’s The Dynamics of Political 
Crime (2003) that combines different academics’ definitions of terrorism, 
out of four terrorism classics – Proal (1898), Sagarin (1973), Ingraham and 
Tokoro (1969) and Turk (1982) – only one study, that of Sagarin, does not 
classify terrorism as political crime.90
In a study conducted in 1988, Schmid compared a large number of existing 
definitions of terrorism. ‘Violence’ was mentioned in 80 per cent of the studied 
definitions, ‘political’ in 65 per cent and ‘fear’ or ‘terror’ in 51 per cent. This 
variance shows how difficult it is to find an accurate and acceptable definition of 
terrorism, but also that most scholars have typically understood that the political 
85  Kirchheimer, 1961, 26.
86  Schmid, 2011, 61, italics added.
87  Some other scholars have also identified non-ideologically motivated terrorism. DeSchutter 
has called this type of terrorism “terrorisme crapuleux.” DeSchutter, 1975, 380.
88  See e.g. the classification in Flemming, Schmid and Stohl, 1988, 155–162.
89  Flemming, Schmid and Stohl, 1988, 165–169.
90  Ross, 2003, 35.
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nature of terrorism is one of its defining factors.91 What is noteworthy is that only 
6 per cent of the 109 studies had used ‘criminal’ as a definitional element.92
The same year, the UN Inter-Regional Meeting of Experts accepted the defi-
nition by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, a well-known authority in the field of 
international law. Bassiouni defined international terrorism as “an ideologically 
motivated strategy of internationally proscribed violence designed to inspire ter-
ror within a particular segment of a given society in order to achieve a power-
outcome or to propagandise a claim or grievance, irrespective of whether its 
perpetrators are acting for and on behalf of themselves, or on behalf of a state.”93 
Bassiouni also made a distinction between domestic terrorism and common crime 
with the help of two criteria: “1) the ideological motivation of the actor; and 
2) the political purpose, or power-outcome, contemplated by the act of violence.”94
Similarly to Bassiouni, Philip Jenkins has also been of the opinion that a ter-
rorist is someone acting on behalf of an ideological motivation. “By most defini-
tions, though, we can only speak of terrorism when a specific political intent is 
involved, and that means were have to know the person or group responsible.”95 
According to Jenkins, terrorists do not aim at only producing destruction or 
chaos, but in long-term, they aim at becoming a real political force and poten-
tially forming a government.96
C.A.J. Coady has also underlined the ideological element in a terrorist act. 
He has written: “But on my account, terrorism is not ‘ordinary’ murder since it 
is a form of murder committed for political purposes by (normally) an organised 
group.”97 His concept of political includes religious goals that tie to politics.98 
Coady has drawn the following definition for terrorism: “A political act, ordinar-
ily committed by an organised group, which involves the intentional killing or 
other severe harming of noncombatants or the threat of the same.”99
It is worth comparing Coady’s definition with Colin Wight’s, who has writ-
ten that “Terrorism, [is] the use or threat, of violence by non-state actors against 
non-state actors to communicate a political message in pursuance of political 
ends, can be one tactic employed by those protesting against the state.”100 These 
two definitions are less than ten years old. They differ in important ways, most 
91  Schmid, 1988.
92  Jongman, Schmid et al., 1988, 5–6.
93  See Bassiouni, 2001, 16–17. Bassiouni’s definition includes also acts of terror committed 
during international and non-international armed conflicts. Bassiouni, 2001, 18.
94  Bassiouni, 2001, 19.
95  Jenkins, 2003, 6.
96  Jenkins, 2003, 81.
97  Coady, 2008, 159.
98  Coady, 2008, 165–166.
99  Coady, 2008, 159.
100  Wight, 2015, 12. It is interesting to note that the first antiterrorism exclusion to the POE, 
the attentat clause, discussed in the following chapter, would not fall into Wight’s classifica-
tion of terrorism at all. Wight gives a more detailed definition of terrorism later in his book. 
See Wight, 2015, 120–121.
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centrally in the employment of the concept of non-combatant, which Wight is 
not willing to use.101 The other key difference is Wight’s underlining of the role 
of the state in the definition. However, they are related by the way they under-
stand terrorism as an inherently political phenomenon.
Another well-known scholar to underline the political element in terrorism 
definitions is Clive Walker. According to Walker: “Putting the public in fear 
should only be called ‘terrorism’ if perpetrated with a political motive.”102 Also, 
terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has emphasised the difference between a crimi-
nal and a terrorist act. A criminal act is committed for selfish reasons, whereas a 
terrorist act aims at creating wider repercussions.103 As political criminals by defi-
nition, terrorists seek benefit not only for themselves but also for the cause and/
or the community that supports that cause. A terrorist might also be glorified for 
his or her actions, a treatment common criminals rarely receive.104
In her research on political crime, Van den Wijngaert also came to the conclu-
sion that from a sociological perspective, most acts of terrorism can be seen as 
political crimes.105 This is because in most cases, at the time of the writing, they 
were directed against the state or its subdivision. For this reason, terrorist acts 
were political offences lato sensu, however serious the acts and whatever their 
ultimate purpose they are aimed at serving. Simultaneously, Van den Wijngaert 
underlined the difference between this sociological understanding of terrorism 
as a political offence and its legal definitions, which have varied across times and 
between interpreters.106
The political element has been acknowledged also by the Global Terrorism 
database, which has gathered information on most international and domestic 
terrorist attacks since 1970. The database has applied two different definitions in 
deciding upon which incidents to include in the material. Both definitions men-
tion ideological goals. The first of these definitions is “the threatened or actual use 
of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” In the second 
definition, two of three criteria have to be met: (1) “The violent act was aimed 
at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.” (2) “The violent act 
included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other 
message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims.” 
101  “The term non-combatants, on the other hand, is too restrictive and, taken literally, implies 
that attacks on political leaders, for example, would not be terrorism.” Wight, 2015, 11.
102  Walker, 1992, 9.
103  Hoffman, 1998, 41. A similar idea has been expressed e.g. by Cohen. See Cohen, 2012, 
240.
104  Ganor and Conte, 2005.
105  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 24. She excludes those of psychopathic or common nature from 
these acts, but I would argue that these acts should not be classified as terrorism to begin 
with, as their motivations are not political and as this has been seen as an important defini-
tional criteria in defining terrorism. This will be discussed further later.
106  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 24–25.
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(3) “The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian 
Law.”107
According to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) the 
most important difference between terrorism and what might be perceived as 
‘ordinary crime’ is that “A terrorist is motivated by a higher cause or ideology 
that is greater than his or her personal motivations or gains. He or she acts for 
the furtherance of that external cause (whether it be a localised secessionist move-
ment or global jihad) and the benefit this has to both the cause and the peo-
ple of it.”108 This definition perfectly fits with the most common understanding 
of political crime. As discussed earlier, a central element that separates political 
crime from ‘ordinary’ crime is the motivation.
In Table 2.1, a number of known legal definitions are compared. Two issues 
become apparent in this initial analysis. First, there is no general understanding of 
what elements constitute terrorism. Second, as opposed to academic definitions, 
legal definitions rarely mention political or ideological motivations to be a part of 
terrorism definitions due to reasons discussed in this study.
A notable exception is the UK Terrorism Act 2000, under which an act of ter-
rorism is an action which “[…] (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the 
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use 
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.”109
In 2002, the European Union (EU) adopted a Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism, which, for the first time, succeeded in defining terrorism 
within the EU. The decision makes a key distinction between common crimes 
and terrorism based on the intent of the act, and thus acknowledges the political 
aims behind the acts even without making a direct reference to political motives. 
This distinguishes it from national law in both ‘common law’ and ‘continental’ 
systems.110 The decision lists violent acts which are to be considered terrorist 
offences if they aim at “(1) seriously intimidating a population, or (2) unduly 
compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain 
from performing any act, or (3) seriously destabilising or destroying the fun-
damental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or 
international organisation.”111
107  See Data Collection Methodology, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/. Retrieved 
23 July 2017.
108  Ganor and Conte, 2005. For instance, Saul has pointed out that the emblematic terrorist 
of our time, Osama bin Laden also had political claims, including: “remove foreign military 
bases; stop supporting Israel and corrupt Muslim leaders; forbid usury; permit shariah law, 
and convert to Islam.” Saul, 2006, 45.
109  Terrorism Act 2000 c. 11, Part I, Section 1.
110  Casale, 2008.
111  Article1 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, 
2002/475/JHA, OJ L 164, 22 June 2002.
T
ab
le
 2
.1
  E
le
m
en
ts
 o
f t
er
ro
ri
sm
 d
efi
ni
tio
ns
In
st
an
ce
/
or
ga
ni
sa
ti
on
A
nt
i-
A
na
rc
hi
st
 
C
on
fe
re
nc
e 
of
 R
om
e
Le
ag
ue
 o
f 
N
at
io
ns
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
E
ur
op
ea
n 
C
ou
nc
il
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
In
te
rp
ol
 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
C
ou
nc
il 
of
 th
e 
E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
A
us
tr
al
ia
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
Le
ga
l 
in
st
ru
m
en
t
Fi
na
l 
pr
op
os
it
io
ns
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
Pr
ev
en
ti
on
 
an
d 
Pu
ni
sh
m
en
t 
of
 T
er
ro
ri
sm
D
ra
ft
 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
Pr
ev
en
ti
on
 a
nd
 
Pu
ni
sh
m
en
t o
f 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 A
ct
s
E
ur
op
ea
n 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Su
pp
re
ssi
on
 
of
 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
Pr
ev
en
ti
on
 
of
 T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 
Pr
ov
isi
on
s)
 
A
ct
 c
. 4
, 
Pa
rt
 V
, 2
0.
R
es
ol
ut
io
n:
 
M
ea
su
re
s t
o 
E
lim
in
at
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
R
es
ol
ut
io
n
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
A
ct
 2
00
0 
c.
 1
1
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
D
ec
isi
on
 o
n 
C
om
ba
ti
ng
 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
Le
gi
sla
ti
on
 
A
m
en
dm
en
t 
(T
er
ro
ri
sm
) 
A
ct
18
 
U
.S
.C
. 
C
h.
 3
8,
 
T
it
le
 2
2,
 
§ 
26
56
f
U
.S
.C
. 
C
h.
 1
13
B
, 
T
it
le
 1
8,
 
Pa
rt
 I
, §
 
23
31
 (
1)
Y
ea
r
18
98
19
37
19
72
19
77
19
89
19
94
19
99
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
02
20
18
20
18
E
L
E
M
E
N
T
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
io
le
nc
e
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
X
x
X
X
X
X
T
hr
ea
t 
of
 
vi
ol
en
ce
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x
 
X
 
 
Id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l 
m
ot
iv
e/
 
pu
rp
os
e
 
 
 
X
 
x
 
X
 
Po
lit
ic
al
 m
ot
iv
e/
 
pu
rp
os
e
 
 
 
 
X
X
 
 
x
 
X
X
 
C
iv
ili
an
 t
ar
ge
ts
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
Su
bn
at
io
na
l/
 
re
vo
lu
tio
na
ry
 
gr
ou
ps
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
N
on
-c
om
ba
ta
nt
 
ta
rg
et
s
 
 
 
 
X
 
X
H
ea
ds
 o
f s
ta
te
s/
IP
Ps
 a
s 
ta
rg
et
s
 
X
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
In
st
an
ce
/
or
ga
ni
sa
ti
on
A
nt
i-
A
na
rc
hi
st
 
C
on
fe
re
nc
e 
of
 R
om
e
Le
ag
ue
 o
f 
N
at
io
ns
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
E
ur
op
ea
n 
C
ou
nc
il
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
In
te
rp
ol
 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
C
ou
nc
il 
of
 th
e 
E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
A
us
tr
al
ia
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
Le
ga
l 
in
st
ru
m
en
t
Fi
na
l 
pr
op
os
it
io
ns
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
Pr
ev
en
ti
on
 
an
d 
Pu
ni
sh
m
en
t 
of
 T
er
ro
ri
sm
D
ra
ft
 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
Pr
ev
en
ti
on
 a
nd
 
Pu
ni
sh
m
en
t o
f 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 A
ct
s
E
ur
op
ea
n 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
on
 th
e 
Su
pp
re
ssi
on
 
of
 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
Pr
ev
en
ti
on
 
of
 T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
(T
em
po
ra
ry
 
Pr
ov
isi
on
s)
 
A
ct
 c
. 4
, 
Pa
rt
 V
, 2
0.
R
es
ol
ut
io
n:
 
M
ea
su
re
s t
o 
E
lim
in
at
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
R
es
ol
ut
io
n
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
Fi
na
nc
in
g 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n
T
er
ro
ri
sm
 
A
ct
 2
00
0 
c.
 1
1
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
D
ec
isi
on
 o
n 
C
om
ba
ti
ng
 
T
er
ro
ri
sm
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
Le
gi
sla
ti
on
 
A
m
en
dm
en
t 
(T
er
ro
ri
sm
) 
A
ct
18
 
U
.S
.C
. 
C
h.
 3
8,
 
T
it
le
 2
2,
 
§ 
26
56
f
U
.S
.C
. 
C
h.
 1
13
B
, 
T
it
le
 1
8,
 
Pa
rt
 I
, §
 
23
31
 (
1)
Y
ea
r
18
98
19
37
19
72
19
77
19
89
19
94
19
99
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
02
20
18
20
18
H
os
ta
ge
 t
ak
in
g/
ki
dn
ap
pi
ng
 
 
X
 
 
X
 
X
Pr
op
er
ty
 d
am
ag
e
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
x
X
 
 
 
U
se
 o
f a
rm
s 
or
 
ex
pl
os
iv
es
 
X
 
X
 
 
X
 
Fe
ar
/
 t
er
ro
r/
 
in
tim
id
at
io
n
 
 
 
 
X
X
X
X
 
X
X
 
X
Pe
ac
et
im
e 
w
ar
 
cr
im
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
ffe
nc
e 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 t
he
 U
N
 
tr
ea
tie
s
 
 
 
X
 
X
X
X
 
 
 
 
 
In
flu
en
ci
ng
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
 
X
 
 
X
x
X
X
X
In
flu
en
ci
ng
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
X
X
 
 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
of
 s
oc
ia
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
X
 
 
X
 
X
 
T
ab
le
 2
.1
  C
on
tin
ue
d
 Concepts employed 27
The US federal criminal code defines international terrorism as specific vio-
lent criminal activities that occur primarily outside US territorial jurisdiction 
and that “appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popula-
tion; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
or kidnapping.”112 Similar to the EU definition, in this definition the political 
motive of terrorism has not been openly stated but is referred to in the purposes 
of terrorist acts. The US federal criminal code also contains another definition 
of terrorism, for the purposes of the Secretary of State’s annual country reports 
on terrorism in foreign states. According to this definition, “the term ‘terrorism’ 
means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncom-
batant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”113 Interestingly, this 
definition openly accepts the political motivation of terrorism.
Even if not all legal definitions incorporate the concept of the political as a 
component, it is possible to claim from an analytical point of view that terror-
ism can be distinguished from common crimes on the basis of its ideological 
motivation. As discussed, the incentive for ‘ordinary crimes’ is usually the search 
for personal gain. What would terrorist acts be without the political/ideological 
element? They would be called mass killings, hijackings, bombings… Common 
criminality, often with uncommonly destructive elements.114
Can it then be said that terrorism is political criminality if the political/ideo-
logical element is always present in the acts? This has been a topic of discussion 
for decades, and there is no conclusive answer to the question. However, based 
on the fact that there is always a criminal element to terrorism, and there seems 
to be a general understanding of terrorism as a means to achieve political goals, 
realistic or not, it can be claimed that terrorism fits into the category of political 
crime. This is confirmed by the classifications of authoritative researchers.
However, while the notion ‘political crime’ seems to be fitting to describe 
terrorism, it is clear that based on the aforementioned classifications, terrorism is 
not a ‘pure’ political crime. It would fall under the concept of ‘mixed’ or ‘relative’ 
political crimes. This makes the question of terrorism as a political crime more 
complex, as there is no shared understanding of which relative political crimes, if 
any, count as political crimes.
Some have pointed out that there are similarities between acts of terrorism 
and ‘pure’ political crimes. The label terrorism can be used to delegitimise and 
criminalise opposition to the rule of the state. The same has been true of pure 
political crimes such as ‘sedition,’ ‘treason’ and ‘subversion.’ It has been claimed 
that ‘terrorism’ as a concept is used in a similar manner as these terms before it. 
112  U.S.C. Ch. 113B, Title 18, Part I, § 2331 (1).
113  18 U.S.C. Ch. 38, Title 22, Annual country reports on terrorism, § 2656f 3(d).
114  For instance the Canadian government has made the point that removing the motive ele-
ment would make terrorism offences indistinguishable from ordinary crimes. See Saul, 
2008, 3.
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These terms are used to label differing political views and action in a way that 
opens them up for state repression.115 However, placing terrorism into the same 
category as these pure political crimes is not justifiable due to its violent element.
Terrorism is often treated as an ideology itself, possibly because the concept 
seems to link it with other ‘isms,’ concepts that typically describe ideologies and 
belief systems. However, according to C.A.J. Coady, in the concept of terrorism, 
the ‘ism’ points to the systematic nature of the method or tactic.116 Terrorism 
is not an ideology but is used to serve an ideological purpose. In other words, 
it is not an end, but a means to an end, as different forms of violence typically 
are.117 Terrorism can never be completely eliminated as it can serve any given 
ideology.118
When terrorism is understood as a means to achieve an end rather than as 
an end itself, it becomes clear that a division between so-called freedom fight-
ers and terrorists cannot be made. Terrorists use terroristic violence in trying to 
achieve a political goal. As pointed out by Wight, the nature of the goal does not 
change the nature of the act. Hence, the goal might, for instance, be labelled as 
freedom.119 As freedom is a term that does not come with a clear-cut definition, 
it is clear that terrorists might understand their acts as serving the purpose of pro-
moting freedom. For this reason, I find the separation made between ‘freedom 
fighters’ and ‘terrorists’ analytically useless.
An extensive description of terrorism is given by the Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT):
Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmos-
phere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions 
they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to 
take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be a violation of the rules 
of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is gener-
ally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are politi-
cal, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve 
maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit 
for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond 
115  Grace and Leys, 1989, 66.
116  Coady, 2008, 155.
117  Coady, 2008, 157. See also Jenkins, 2003, 4. A similar point has been made by Wight, 
2015, 8, 12. Charles Tilly has made an interesting note between the concepts of force and 
violence: “Rulers, police, philosophers, and historians often distinguish between force and 
violence. Force, in this view, consists of legitimate short-run damage and seizure – which 
typically means that the persons who administer damage enjoy legal protection for their 
action. Force might therefore include legitimate self-defence but not unprovoked aggres-
sion. In such a perspective, violence refers to damage that does not enjoy legal protection.” 
According to Tilly, the boundary between the two is not necessarily useful or clear. Tilly, 
2003, 27.
118  Jenkins, 2003, 4.
119  Wight, 2015, 110.
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the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological 
repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists 
may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist 
and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to 
discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance 
with their demands.120
This description makes two strong statements, one of which is accepted by many 
(“all terrorist acts are crimes”) and the second of which has been questioned by 
some (“the motives of all terrorists are political”). Whether this premise is true 
depends on which definition of terrorism one accepts. If such a claim is accepted, 
it can have major implications for instance on the status of the criminal in the 
eyes of the public (political wrongdoers can even be regarded as selfless saints), 
and from a legal viewpoint. One important and very practical consequence of a 
crime being labelled political is the protection the offender can get from extradi-
tion procedures. Traditionally, political criminals are protected from extradition 
by treaty provisions. Understanding terrorism as political criminality could have a 
major effect on how terrorists are treated, as long as terrorism is not internation-
ally excluded from the protection of the POE.
In my view, terrorism should be excluded from the protection of the POE and 
it should be viewed as political crime. I understand terrorism as violent criminal 
action aimed at persons used as symbolic targets with the objective of generating 
extreme fear in the general population, for the purposes of advancing political or 
ideological goals.121 My definition includes acts committed during wartime, as even 
during the course of war, using persons (civilians or soldiers) as symbolic rather than 
strategic targets should not be acceptable. This way it evades the definition of a spe-
cifically civilian target. Acknowledging the political roots of terrorism should serve 
the purpose of analytically separating it from other types of serious crime, which in 
turn should assist in combatting it in the most appropriate manner.
2.1.5  Terrorism as uncivil disobedience
Not all students of terrorism would place it into the category of political crime. 
According to Schmid, it is problematic to call terrorism political violence. First, 
this implies that also non-political terrorism would exist. Second, he sees that the 
120  Terrorism Knowledge Base/MIPT, http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page=about. 
Retrieved 12 December 2007.
121  Compare with Cassese, 2006, 937, who has argued that the generally agreed definitional 
elements of terrorism are that the acts are nationally criminalised, they are intended to 
provoke a state of terror or coerce a state or international organisation and they are politi-
cally or ideologically motivated. See for further discussion on the definition Dugard, 1973; 
Schmid, 1984, 1992, 2011; Herbst, 2003; Saul, 2005; Fletcher, 2006; Young, 2006; 
Blakesley, 2007; Bryan, 2012; Wilkinson, 2012; Angli, 2013; and Di Filippo, 2014, 
amongst many others.
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concept of political violence typically relates to collective movements, whereas 
terrorism is the work of a marginal segment in society. Third, political violence is 
typically used to describe a domestic phenomenon, whereas the nature of terror-
ism is international. Finally, describing terrorism with a term as vague and general 
as ‘political violence’ does not seem useful.122
I agree with Schmid’s idea about terrorism always being a political phe-
nomenon. Non-political terrorism should be described with other concepts. 
However, I disagree with the idea that terrorism is a marginal phenomenon. 
True, the number of terrorists is minimal but they can still be motivated by 
political views shared by a wider group. Additionally, I do not see that there 
is a need to distinguish between domestic and international terrorism on the 
definitional level.
Some scholars accept acts committed for other than political motives in their 
classifications of terrorism. Their categorisations of terrorism would thus include 
for instance certain types of serious violent acts committed by psychopaths or 
organised crime groups. There are varying classifications that include other types 
of terrorism than political terrorism. For instance, the Report of the Task Force 
on Disorders and Terrorism in 1976 identified five different types of terrorism: 
political terrorism, non-political terrorism, quasi-terrorism, limited political ter-
rorism, and official or state terrorism.123
Out of these, political terrorism was characterised as “violent criminal behav-
iour designed primarily to generate fear in the community for political purposes.” 
Non-political terrorism, in turn, is committed for private purposes, whereas 
quasi-terrorism describes “those activities incidental to the commission of crimes 
of violence that are similar in form and method to true terrorism but which nev-
ertheless lack its essential ingredient.” The essential ingredient referred to is the 
ideological motivation behind the actions. Limited political terrorism in this clas-
sification was understood as “acts of terrorism which are committed for ideologi-
cal or political motives, but which are not part of a concerted campaign to capture 
control of the state.” For instance, lone-wolf types of actions could fall into this 
category. This categorisation also included official or state terrorism. State behav-
iour would be considered terrorism in states where the ruling “is based upon fear 
and oppression that reach terroristic proportions.”124
Other classifications have also been separated between different types of ter-
rorism based on their motivations. Paul Wilkinson (1976) divided terrorism into 
criminal, psychotic, war, and political, which can be either revolutionary, sub-
revolutionary, or repressive. Frederick Hacker (1978) saw terrorists representing 
three groups: ‘crusaders,’ ‘criminals’ and ‘crazies.’ Also, Alex Schmid and Janny 
de Graaf (1982) classified terrorism into three groups: (1) insurgent terrorism, 
(2) state or repressive, and (3) vigilante. In this classification, insurgent terrorism 
122  Schmid, 1984, 22.
123  National Advisory Committee, 1976, pp. 3–6, cited in Hagan, 1997, 134.
124  Hagan, 1997, 134.
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can further be divided into three subgroups: (a) social revolutionary; (b) separa-
tist, nationalist or ethnical; and (c) single issue.125
In more recent academic publications, terrorism is growingly linked with 
the phenomenon of organised crime as opposed to political crime. Many 
‘handbooks’ and other compilation books discuss these under the same chap-
ter.126 This trend follows the lines of the United Nations and police organisa-
tions, which are also growingly treating terrorism as a part of a wider problem 
of organised criminality.127 As terrorist acts require assets, and these assets are 
often at least partly obtained by illegitimately moving money, people and/or 
chemicals/weaponry across national borders, some have claimed that terrorism 
is best described as a form of organised crime.128 Furthermore, in some cases, 
former political terrorists have become more and more like common criminals. 
For instance, in Northern Ireland, some of the former paramilitaries often 
seen as terrorists have turned towards committing crimes for the purpose of 
personal gain.129
It is interesting that several academic writers include acts committed for purely 
personal motives in their groupings of terrorism and use a specific term usually 
implying the presence of a political motive to describe an act committed for non-
ideological reasons. In these cases, it seems that the term ‘terrorism’ is merely 
used to underline the seriousness of the crimes. The use of the term for such a 
purpose does not serve the aim of trying to create an international definition of 
terrorism. Interestingly, Murphy, writing in 1985, noted that for some govern-
ments, acts of terrorism were exactly those committed for personal motives, and 
acts committed for a political cause, such as against colonialism or for the cause 
of national liberation, fell out of the scope of the term, constituting legitimate 
measures of self-defence. It was thus the rightness of the cause that made the 
difference.130
In addition to the categorisation of terrorism as a common or political crime, 
another division lies in whether it is seen as a crime at all. It is conceivable to 
judge a terrorist act as an act of warfare as opposed to a criminal act. If terrorism 
is considered as a crime, it is necessary to treat it like one: to gather evidence, 
arrest the perpetrators and put them on trial. This kind of approach may pose 
problems for international cooperation and is not applicable in cases where the 
terrorist act is executed by a ‘distant organisation’ or a country. To consider ter-
rorism as warfare the importance of individual guilt is less relevant and the focus 
is on the proper identification of the enemy. In contrast, by treating terrorism as 
125  Hagan, 1997, 135. See for a discussion on different typologies of terrorism, Wight, 2015, 
173–178.
126  Maguire, Morgan and Reiner, 2007.
127  This will be discussed in more detail later.
128  Levi, 2007, 774–775.
129  Levi, 2007, 791.
130  Murphy, 1985, 4.
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an ‘ordinary’ crime, the possibility of treating criminals differently for political 
reasons is or should be prevented.131
Both the ‘warfare’ and ‘criminal’ approaches have been used as a basis for 
anti-terrorist actions. For instance, the ongoing work of Interpol represents the 
‘criminal’ approach and the unfinished wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the ‘warfare’ 
approach.
This book concentrates purely on anti-state political terrorism. As most schol-
ars perceive that the political motivation is a constituting factor of terrorism, 
it is possible to argue that acts without political motives cannot be considered 
terrorist but serious organised crime.132 Thus the concept of terrorism can be 
understood to exclude ‘ordinary’ criminal motives or deeds committed by people 
with mental problems.133
Terrorist acts (try to) serve a purpose: they do not usually aim at produc-
ing random chaos in society, but at challenging the authority of the ruling 
government, accelerating social disintegration, or demonstrating the inabili-
ties of the current regime to govern.134 Terrorists seek fundamental change in 
a society,135 and use violence as a means of political action.136 It is clear that 
the use of terrorist tactics, indiscriminate violence against the civilian popula-
tion, is condemnable, but tactics labelled terrorism have also been used to 
rebel against tyranny and oppression.137 Additionally, if assassinations of heads 
of states are considered terroristic, the criteria of indiscriminate acts are no 
longer valid.
Many writers before me have seen terrorism as a form of political violence.138 
I understand political violence in the same way as Wight does, as the use of force 
for political ends.139 Charles Tilly claimed that all forms of collective violence 
are forms of contentious politics: “[Collective violence] counts as contentious 
because participants are making claims that affect each other’s interests. It counts 
as politics because relations of participants to governments are always at stake.”140
Some writers have called political terrorism a ‘political tactic,’ ‘political behav-
iour,’ or a ‘political shortcut.’141 There are bases for using such labels. Terrorism 
is a tactic, chosen out of a selection of different tactics. It is often used when the 
131  Ganor and Conte, 2005.
132  Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 103–104. Such an act could also fall under a national 
definition of terrorism, as noted by Cassese. Cassese, 2006, 940.
133  Ross, 2003, 63.
134  Stohl, 1988, 16.
135  Stohl, 1988, 5; Targ, 1988, 130.
136  Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 103.
137  See e.g. Bassiouni, 1975, xii.
138  Wight, 2015, 2.
139  In this definition, violence is understood as “behaviour involving physical force intended to 
hurt, damage or kill someone or damage something.” Wight, 2015, 106.
140  Tilly, 2003, 26.
141  Corrado and Evans, 1988, 374; Stohl, 1988, 11; Targ, 1988, 130; Wright and Miller, 
2005, 1225–1230; Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 103.
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political goals sought lack democratic support, and when legitimate means seem 
inefficient in pursuing these goals.142
Most of all, terrorism is a means to transmit a message,143 a form of politi-
cal communication, aimed at criticising current political structures.144 Common 
crimes do not aim at disseminating an agenda. The combination of sending a 
message with seeking change in the society has inspired some to call terrorism 
‘diplomacy of violence’ or ‘coercive diplomacy.’145
In the era of mass media, terrorism in democratic societies is a cry out that 
is unlikely to go unheard. It is possible that terrorism gets its message through 
to a larger audience. According to Ted Robert Gurr, “Terrorism is a cheap and 
easy way of doing so, and one that carries relatively little risk.”146 However, the 
strategy can be counterproductive in democratic nations. Only in a handful of 
cases, terrorism has had a political effect.147 It has been claimed that the so-called 
Munich Massacre committed by the Palestinian group Black September in 1972 
made the Palestinian cause known to the wider public.148 Even if the goal has 
not been reached, terrorism has undeniably had an effect on the politics in the 
Middle East.149
The objectives of terrorists vary. Some have ‘non-negotiable demands,’ such 
as the total destruction of a specific society or way of life, impossible to satisfy 
by political agents. These types of terrorists are usually treated as security prob-
lems. Others with more achievable goals can use terrorism as a bargaining tac-
tic.150 Gurr has compared this kind of terrorism to labour protests. Strikes were 
also treated as security problems before they grew in proportion and the accom-
modation of workers’ demands became necessary.151 At the same time, Gurr’s 
research (1988) showed that in four-fifths of terrorist cases, the objectives could 
be inferred from the nature of the action.152 Thus the purpose of terrorism is a 
means to communicate a message. Its efficiency of doing so and, naturally, its 
legitimacy can be questioned.
All of the aforementioned features – aiming for social change, trying to com-
municate a message, using terrorism as a strategy to achieve political goals – point 
to the strong link between terrorism and politics. I understand terrorism as a part 
of a continuum of political action, where at one extreme lies sanctioned political 
142  Gurr, 1988, 51.
143  See e.g. Stohl, 1988, 3, 5; Hoffman, 1998, 42; Wight, 2015, 2.
144  Wight, 2015, 3. See in detail on the relationship between terrorism and the state, Wight, 
2015.
145  Stohl, 1988, 5.
146  Gurr, 1988, 52.
147  Gurr, 1988, 48.
148  See e.g. Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2.
149  Stohl, 1988, 20–23.
150  Gurr, 1988, 53; Flemming, Schmid and Stohl, 1988, 155.
151  It has to be noted, though, that Gurr’s text dates from the late 1980s, a time which hadn’t yet 
seen the massive devastation terrorism would cause in the coming decades. Gurr, 1988, 53.
152  Gurr, 1988, 46.
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participation (such as voting), in the middle accepted measures of opposition 
such as protests and civil disobedience, and at the other extreme illegitimate 
measures and finally terrorism.
As political action, terrorism could be called ‘uncivil disobedience,’ a concept 
used by Christian Bay. He has first defined ‘civil disobedience’ to include “any 
act or process of public defiance of a law or policy enforced by established gov-
ernmental authorities, insofar as the action is premeditated, understood by the 
actor(s) to be illegal or of contested legality, carried out and persisted in for lim-
ited public ends […] by way of carefully chosen and limited means that exclude 
measures that could cause personal injuries or even the loss of life.” Uncivil diso-
bedience, in turn, does not recognise the limits mentioned in this description.153 
Similarly, Colin Wight has placed terrorism at the extreme end of a continuum 
of political protest.154
As the preceding discussion has shown, there is a clear link between politics 
and terrorism, no matter how indefensible the acts. The political nature of terror-
ism is what separates it from other types of violent crime.
2.1.6  Terrorism as an international crime
It seems evident to think about terrorism as an international crime. However, 
international law has had difficulties with dealing with the phenomenon because 
the body of international law is state centred and has had trouble with fitting 
international organisations or individuals in the picture.155 Further, even the use-
fulness of labelling terrorism as an international crime can be debated. If such a 
label is used, terrorism is no longer left to domestic legal systems to prosecute,156 
but it falls within the international domain which offers, in fact, more protection 
to the accused than domestic laws do.157
A vivid debate on whether terrorism should be considered an international 
crime is ongoing in the field of international criminal law.158 Partly this debate 
was already solved in 1949 when crimes of terrorism during international armed 
conflicts were incorporated into the Geneva Conventions. The conventions pro-
hibit the use of “measures of terrorism” and “acts of terrorism.” The Fourth 
Convention forbids “collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimida-
tion or of terrorism” and the 1977 Additional Protocol II prohibits “acts of 
terrorism” against persons not or no longer taking part in hostilities during 
153  Bay, 1989, 42.
154  Wight, 2015, 11.
155  Klabbers, 2004, 300.
156  Because no international tribunal has the competence to prosecute terrorist acts, only states 
are able to enforce anti-terrorist laws and prosecute those acts that are nationally criminal-
ised. Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 30.
157  Klabbers, 2004, 301.
158  See e.g. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2006, issue 5; Cassese, 2006; Saul, 
2006; Ambos and Timmerman, 2014.
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non-international armed conflicts. The main aim is to emphasise that neither 
individuals nor the civilian population may be subject to collective punishments, 
which, among other things, obviously induce a state of terror.159
Once the ‘war on terror’ was proclaimed after the terrorist attacks in the United 
States in 2001, the question arose whether terrorist attacks could amount to an 
armed conflict regulated by International Humanitarian Law (IHL).160 It seems 
that IHL might be able to accommodate terrorist acts but no general consensus 
over this exists.161 IHL specifically rules out isolated, sporadic and low-level acts 
of violence. However, in some cases the conflict between a state and an organised 
group can be intense enough to amount to a non-international armed conflict.162 
The status of terrorist crimes during peacetime has been more unclear and much 
debated. Typically, terrorism is not a matter that is brought to an international 
court but dealt with in domestic courts instead.163
International criminal law can be divided into treaty-based crimes and ‘true’ 
core international/supranational crimes. Specific acts of terrorism are also defined 
by UN antiterrorism conventions and are, as such, international treaty crimes. 
By their very nature, they can become part of the signatory states’ legal systems 
either automatically (monist systems) or through implementation in the legisla-
tion (dualist systems).164 Certain acts of terrorism are treaty-based international 
crimes, as discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. Treaty-based crimes need to be 
implemented and prosecuted nationally, which limits their coverage. True inter-
national crimes create individual international criminal responsibility and they can 
be prosecuted in an international court. A treaty-based crime can develop into a 
true international crime through customary law.165
However, there is no general understanding of whether terrorism can also be 
considered a core international crime. The emergence of an international defini-
tion could possibly qualify it as such.166 For instance, when the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was being created, some states suggested that a new crime 
159  Article 33, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
12 August 1949. Article 4 (2) (d) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
160  Saul, 2014b, 209.
161  See Saul, 2014b, and Arnold, 2014, or a longer discussion on the relationship of IHL and 
terrorism. According to Cassese, for example, the creation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone with jurisdiction over terrorist 
crimes together with UN instruments condemning terrorism would seem to suggest that 
terrorism can be understood as a war crime. See in more detail Cassese, 2006, 945–946.
162  Saul, 2014b, 212.
163  Nuotio, 2006, 1000.
164  There is variation in monist systems for example concerning where the treaties fall in the 
hierarchy of laws and in whether their provisions are directly applicable in the criminal pro-
ceedings. Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 9–12. The UN treaties covering specific 
crimes of terrorism are covered in Chapters 4 and 5.
165  Ambos and Timmerman, 2014, 23–25.
166  Nuotio, 2006, 1003.
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of terrorism should be under its jurisdiction. This proposition faced opposition, 
for instance from the United States. One of the key reasons for the opposition 
was the lack of an international definition of terrorism. In addition, there was fear 
that the court would be politicised and that nations would not wish to join. Some 
were worried about the workload of the ICC, while others claimed that terrorism 
was not a serious enough crime to be considered in the court. Additionally, many 
of the developing countries wanted a distinction made between terrorism and the 
struggle for self-determination or independence.167 Some have argued that even if 
terrorism is not a core international crime, it can amount to one in case the attack 
fulfils specific requirements such being “widespread and systematic” and target-
ing the civilian population.168
In 2012, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) identified a definition of 
international terrorism under customary international law. The elements of the 
definition include the use or threat of use of violence, the indiscriminate nature of 
the act, its targeting of civilians, and its aim to coerce a government or an interna-
tional organisation.169 According to Saul, the legal consequences of the definition 
have been rather theoretical than practical.170
2.1.7  The de- and repoliticisation of terrorism
The process of extradition is one of the key non-violent means to fight terror-
ism, but it has not gained as much publicity as other, more drastic measures.171 
Especially prior to the current era, where a war on terrorism172 has openly been 
waged, non-violent means were the most important mechanisms in combatting 
terrorism. Up until the 2000s, military means were rarely used in the fight against 
terrorism.
Extradition is not a preventative measure, as it is only used after a crime has 
occurred. However, the importance of extradition treaties should not be under-
estimated. They reduce the number of safe havens for terrorists and prevent them 
from escaping justice. The aut dedere aut judicare principle used in many interna-
tional antiterrorism conventions obliges states to either extradite persons found 
167  Cassese, 2001, 994; Cohen, 2012, 223–229. See for a discussion on the possible inclusion 
of the crime of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the ICC, Cohen, 2012, and Arnold, 
2014.
168  Nuotio, 2006, 1000. In such a case it could represent a crime against humanity. See in 
more detail Cassese, 2006, 948; and Cohen, 2012, 242–246. For instance, the terrorist 
attacks against the US in 2001 have sometimes been interpreted as crimes against humanity. 
See Cassese, 2001, 994–995.
169  STL Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I, 89, Feb. 16, 2011. See also 
Cohen, 2012, 230–231. See e.g. Ambos and Timmerman, 2014, 28–30, for a commentary 
on the statement by the STL; and Mettraux, 2014, for a more detailed analysis.
170  Saul, 2015, 406.
171  Petersen, 1992, 771.
172  See in more detail e.g. Blakesley, 2007, 295–307.
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in their territory who are wanted for trial for an extraditable offence by another 
party or to try the fugitives themselves.173
The extradition of terrorists has, however, not always been successful. One 
reason for the lack of success has been the political offence exception to extradi-
tion. To prevent terrorists from escaping justice, terrorist acts have growingly 
been depoliticised so that they can be excluded from the scope of protection. 
Depoliticisation is one of the key concepts used as a tool of analysis in this study. 
In the following, I will define the term for the purposes of this study.174 What 
makes this task challenging is the “extreme ambiguity of the concept.”175 This 
section elucidates the interpretation of the concept in the framework of this book.
The concept of depoliticisation can be used for various purposes. It can be 
understood as an official act performed by a government, as something brought 
about by the media (e.g. depoliticising a conflict) or by actors a specific govern-
ment or international organisation on a certain issue, or it can be understood as 
a process in the society.
For instance, at the beginning of the 1960s, there were fears and assump-
tions of the depoliticisation of society in some Western European countries. 
Depoliticisation was used to describe a passive phenomenon, as opposed to depo-
liticising, and it was understood as a threat.176 Contemporaries characterised the 
phenomenon as the “erosion of ideology.”177
The Merriam-Webster dictionary now defines depoliticisation and depoliticis-
ing equally and in a straightforward manner: “to remove the political character of: 
take out of the realm of politics.” According to David Held, something is depolit-
icised when it is “arbitrarily treated as if it were not a proper subject of politics.”178 
In general, something depoliticised is interpreted as politically neutral.179
Depoliticisation can be perceived as the opposite of politicisation. Kari Palonen 
clarifies the meaning of politicisation by comparing it with politicking. “In 
Weberian terms, I consider politicking as the search for new power shares within 
an existing polity, while politicisation concerns the redistribution of such shares 
in a polity-complex in a manner that opens new Spielräume for politicking.”180 
Depoliticisation thus removes an issue from the sweep of political.
The concept of depoliticisation is used in this study in a manner that partly 
differs from its traditional use. It is used to describe the outcome of the act of 
depoliticising. Instead of a passive phenomenon, I understand depoliticisation 
as a deliberative act. Examples of the use of the strategy of depoliticising can be 
173  Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 953. See also Plachta, 1999, 123–140.
174  See the special issue on depoliticisation in Policy and Politics, volume 42, number 2, April 
2014, for a detailed discussion on the concept and its current meanings.
175  “l’extrême ambiguïté du concept” Vedel, 1962, 5.
176  Himmelstrand, 1961; Vedel, 1962, 8, 11.
177  Himmelstrand, 1961, 2.
178  Held, 174, 1995.
179  Turner, 1989, 550.
180  Palonen, 2003.
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found in history. It has been stated that modern liberalism was founded on the 
depoliticisation of religion as a result of the wars on religion.181
The depoliticisation of terrorism can take many different forms, as presented 
in Table 2.2. I have separated six different forms of depoliticisation for analytical 
purposes. All these six forms have been visible in the policies, treaties, conven-
tions and laws analysed in this study.
First, depoliticisation can be understood as the transfer of functions com-
monly thought of as political to organs that are (at least to some extent) remote 
from political control. Buller and Flinders argue that depoliticisation should be 
referred to as ‘arena-shifting’: 
decisions are made no less political by delegating them to an ‘independent’ 
body or making them according to a rule-based framework. In reality, poli-
tics is transferred to a new arena. […] While politicians may seek to insulate 
certain issues from the political domain, it is unlikely that the wider public 
181  Turner, 1989, 555.
Table 2.2  Methods of depoliticisation
Method of depoliticisation Employed by (examples)
Transfer of political 
powers to ‘non-
political’ actors
Application of the POE in the hands of the courts (USA)
Ends do not justify the 
means
Council of Europe Recommendation on International 
Terrorism 684 (1972) and 703 (1973); UN 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism (1994); Interpol Resolution on the 
Financing of Terrorism (1999)
Exclusion from the POE ECST (1977); US–UK Supplementary Treaty (1985); 
UN Terrorist Bombing Convention (1998); UN 
Terrorism Financing Convention (1999)
Claim that terrorism has 
nothing to do with 
politics
Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome (1898)
No mention of political 
motivation
League of Nations Terrorism Convention* (1937); 
UN Terrorist Bombing Convention (1998); UN 
Terrorism Financing Convention (1999); UN Draft 
Convention on Terrorism (2000)
Dealing with specific 
elements
UN antiterrorism conventions, e.g. the Montreal 
Convention (1970); the Hostages Convention 
(1979)
* Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.
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of that polity will accept that a certain issue is no longer ‘political’. It is clear 
from past experience that if an issue becomes politically salient in the eyes 
of the public it will make little difference to the public whether the policy is 
the responsibility of a state-owned company, an independent regulator or a 
quasi-autonomous agency.182
Depoliticisation can thus protect the government from the consequences of 
unpopular policies. One example of such depoliticisation is the tradition in the 
US of giving decision-making powers over extradition procedures to the courts 
instead of the executive.
Second, it is possible to depoliticise terrorism by claiming that whatever the 
ends of the offenders, they are not justified by the use of terroristic means. This 
formulation does not depoliticise the acts themselves, as it acknowledges their 
motivations. However, it depoliticises their treatment.
Third, excluding terrorists from the scope of the protection of the political 
offence exception can be seen as a form of depoliticisation. This is one of the core 
themes of this study. This solution is related to the previous one, as it does not 
necessitate the denial of the political nature of the acts, but merely excludes them 
from being treated similarly to other political crimes.
The fourth, most overt way to depoliticise terrorism is to openly claim it has 
nothing to do with politics. This open formulation has only been used by the 
Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome 1898.183
Fifth, it is possible to understand that referring to terrorism as something 
non-political is also a strategy of depoliticisation. This is because as established, 
terrorism is, by (academic) definition, an inherently political phenomenon.
Finally, one of the most commonly used tactics to depoliticise terrorism is to 
criminalise, with no mention of their motivations, specific acts typically used by 
terrorists, be they done for political or other reasons. This way terrorism can be 
treated as common criminality. This is linked with the fifth method, not mention-
ing the political objectives at all.
Following Mathieu Deflem’s ideas, the last strategy implies that terrorist 
acts are stripped of their political contexts and aims and their criminal nature 
is emphasised. More concretely, terrorist acts are broken down into their con-
stituent parts, so that their criminal elements can be identified and subjected to 
police investigations.184 Deflem sees that the depoliticisation or criminalisation of 
terrorism “is accomplished by defining terrorism very vaguely (‘a crime against 
humanity’) and/or by identifying and isolating the distinctly criminal elements 
(bombings, killings) from terrorist incidents.” Understanding terrorism separate 
from its ideological motivations enables one to consider it criminal. This way 
182  Buller and Flinders, 2005.
183  See in more detail Chapter 3, Section 3.2.
184  Deflem, 2006.
40 Concepts employed 
terrorism can be separated from politics. The same logic was followed first in 
extradition treaties and later also in UN antiterrorist treaties.185
Repoliticising, a term also used in this study, is the opposite: it underlines 
the political nature of terrorist acts. Punishing certain political acts that are not 
in themselves criminal due to their relationship with terrorist acts can also be 
understood as repoliticisation. Such acts can include for instance spreading ter-
rorist propaganda. It is argued in this book that the purpose of the repoliticisa-
tion of terrorism has, perhaps surprisingly, been the same as the depoliticisation. 
Repoliticisation serves the purpose of more severely condemning terrorist actions, 
of criminalising auxiliary acts and of bringing terrorists to military courts. Chapter 
5, Section 5.3 discusses the repoliticisation of terrorism which has occurred simul-
taneously with the trend of depoliticising terrorism.
2.2  Extradition: legal and diplomatic function
2.2.1  Reciprocal legal assistance
Extradition is one of the key concepts of this study. It is suggested that one of 
the reasons why terrorism has been depoliticised globally is the so-called political 
offence exception to extradition (POE), which has traditionally been included in 
almost all extradition treaties. The aim of this part is to give an overview of the 
topic of extradition.
Extradition is a form of mutual legal assistance between two states, and as such 
it lies at the intersection of national and international law.186 In extradition pro-
ceedings, one state requests the surrender of a fugitive for prosecution or for the 
purpose of executing a sentence. National sovereignty requires that each state has 
jurisdiction over persons in its own territory. The state has no duty to admit or to 
exclude aliens to or from its territory, and thus no duty to extradite upon request 
unless a treaty is in place.187 In other words, international law does not require 
extradition.188 Extradition is regulated either through bilateral treaties, regional 
multilateral treaties, mutual recognition schemes such as the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW), UN Conventions, ad hoc arrangements or through comity, 
which means the willingness to extradite when no treaty is in place.189 Bilateral 
185  E.g. “In terms of the objectives of social control, the bureaucratisation of policing involves 
most noticeably a de-politicisation of the target of counter-terrorism. This criminalisation 
of terrorism is accomplished by defining terrorism very vaguely (‘a crime against humanity’) 
and/or by identifying and isolating the distinctly criminal elements (bombings, killings) 
from terrorist incidents.” Deflem, 2006.
186  Blakesley, 2007, 257–258.
187  See e.g. Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 405; or Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 
1992, 948–971, on the rules of international law concerning extradition; and Gilbert, 
1998, for a detailed view on extradition processes.
188  Gilbert, 1991, 8.
189  See e.g. Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 406; Murphy, 1985, 36. However, extradi-
tion without a treaty is also possible. Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 951, 957.
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treaties bear resemblance to one another, as they typically were created based on 
the French model.190
The extradition process is regulated through domestic legislation or self-exe-
cuting treaties in municipal courts.191 In addition to extradition based on treaties, 
some states, such as the United States, may extradite fugitives even without the 
existence of a treaty between the requesting and requested state, depending on 
specific provisions in its national legislation.192
Extradition aims at ensuring the application of criminal law. It is a means to 
secure “that the preventive, educative or expressive uses of the criminal law are 
not diluted by the recurrent spectacle of offenders managing to avoid trial by 
fleeing to a foreign sanctuary.”193 As such, it also forms a part of the procedural 
framework of international criminal law.194
There are two ways of looking at extradition. On the one hand, it can be seen 
as a tool serving a common global interest in guaranteeing that justice is served. 
This would require the existence of an internationally shared social or moral 
order.195 As a consequence, one of the roles of national criminal laws would be to 
secure that common order. On the other hand, extradition can be seen as a form 
of international cooperation aiming at supporting reciprocal self-interest. It is in 
the interest of each state to be able to execute its criminal law. In order to gain its 
fugitives back, the state, however, needs to assist others with the same aim.196 As 
Boister has argued, the enforcing of the criminal laws of a state is an expression of 
their sovereignty. Extradition as a process is interesting because it forces states to 
rely on the sovereign decision-making of other states to be able to enforce their 
national laws against those criminals who cross borders.197
In the past, extradition typically formed a part of a treaty concerning another 
matter. The first multilateral convention that dealt also with extradition was the 
Treaty of Amiens of 1802. However, its extradition article was never put into 
190  Freestone, 1981, 206. See also American Journal of International Law, Introductory 
Comment, Supplement, 1935, 45.
191  Gilbert, 1991, 1.
192  See The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Jurisdiction 
§ 312, Tentative Draft No 3 (2017): “The United States generally extradites only pursuant 
to treaties. A narrow statutory exception to this practice authorises the extradition of per-
sons other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States who have 
committed crimes of violence against U.S. nationals in foreign countries, upon certification 
by the Attorney General.” See also 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b). Gilbert, 1991, 125; Oppenheim, 
Jennings and Watts, 1992, 968; Gilbert, 1998, 227. See more on self-executing treaties in 
the US in e.g. Blakesley, 2007, 266–275; and Blakesley, 2002, 541. See for a detailed his-
tory of US extradition practice Nadelmann, 1993.
193  Bassiouni, Wise, 1995, 26. See also e.g. Gilbert, 1991, 3.
194  Gilbert, 1991, 3.
195  Bassiouni and Wise, 1995, 26–28.
196  See Pyle, 1986 and 2001.
197  Boister, 2015, 11.
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force due to war.198 The Webster–Ashburton treaty of 1842 between the US and 
Great Britain that covered a variety of issues concerning the US–British North 
American (later Canadian) border had an article that covered the extradition of 
those wrongdoers charged with murder, assault with intent to commit murder, 
piracy, arson, robbery, forgery and utterance of forged paper.199 Little by little, 
treaties concentrating solely on extradition were signed. The first US treaty that 
dealt solely with extradition was the 1843 treaty with France.200 The first mul-
tilateral treaty that concentrated exclusively on extradition was the Treaty on 
Extradition Signed in Lima, Peru, 1879, which was signed by nine Central and 
Southern American states.201
Several treaties dealing with international crime have included extradition as 
a central tool. For instance, in the UN Conventions that relate to terrorism, 
extradition is a key element in dealing with terrorist deeds. Other treaties that 
mention extradition as a key control mechanism include the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949.202
Extradition has a dual function: legal and diplomatic. A decision to extradite is 
never a purely judicial matter, as it affects and is affected by questions of foreign 
policy.203 Christopher H. Pyle has claimed that extradition is highly political and 
it lies at the intersection of international politics, ethnic politics and interbranch 
rivalries.204
The political nature of extradition is visible in the process of allowing extradi-
tion. According to Bassiouni, the closer the political systems of the requesting and 
requested states are, the less likely it is that the crime will be considered a political 
offence and the more likely it is that extradition is granted.205 For instance, it has 
198  See for a short history of multilateral extradition conventions American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Introductory Comment, Supplement, 1935, 47–48. See also Zanotti, 2006, 
1, on the Amiens treaty.
199  Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 9 August 1842; Abbell, 2010, 3.
200  Convention for the Surrender of Criminals between the United States of America and His 
Majesty the King of the French, 8 Stat. 580 (1844), 9 November 1843.
201  Zanotti, 2006, 1. The Lima treaty was adopted by the American Congress of Jurists and 
was signed by the representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Gua-
temala, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Zanotti, 2006, 5. A detailed list of multilateral 
conventions and treaties that deal with extradition can be found in Zanotti, 2006.
202  Article 49, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention I; Article 50, second para-
graph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention II; Article 129, second paragraph, of the 1949 
Geneva Convention III; and Article 146, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion IV provide: “Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search 
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. 
It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand 
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such 
High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.”
203  See e.g. Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 39; Freestone, 1981, 206; Pyle, 2001, 155.
204  Pyle, 2001, viii. See also Nadelmann, 1993, 815–816.
205  Bassiouni, 1969, 232, 249.
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been shown that communist countries categorically refused to extradite nationals 
to non-communist countries.206 Further, Bassiouni has claimed that the refusal or 
allowing of extradition has always been more a matter of political interests than 
a matter of objective judicial decision-making or of pondering the rights of the 
individual concerned.207
Due to the legal–diplomatic duality, there is variance in whether the decision 
to extradite belongs to the judiciary or to the executive. In the US, the courts 
decide on the extraditability of a person and the Secretary of State decides on 
whether the fugitive is surrendered. The courts’ role has been criticised for 
instance by William M. Hannay who has argued that “a courtroom is an inap-
propriate forum in which to attempt an evaluation of the complex internal 
political struggles of foreign countries.”208 Similarly, Cindy Schlaefer has seen 
a serious problem with the judiciary resolving political issues, as in the case of 
applying the POE to for instance terrorism, the decision-making will always be 
political.209
In contrast, Christopher L. Blakesley has supported the role of US courts in 
the application of the POE:
True, if the judiciary must make this decision, it might make a mistake. 
A mistake would be tragic. However, even if the government believes the 
Executive Branch would not make such mistakes, it seems the judiciary, 
armed with jurisprudence developed over the past two hundred years and the 
constitutional mandate to decide such issues of fact and law, is best equipped 
to render just decisions case by case. More important, failure to leave this as 
a judicial prerogative is a failure to abide by our primordial constitutional 
principles of checks and balances, the separation of powers, and the notion 
that questions of law and fact relating to human liberty are within the prov-
ince of the judiciary.210
In principle, the role of the judicial inquiry is to make sure that the extradition 
request fills the criteria laid down for it. The aim is not to evaluate the guilt or 
innocence of the requested person. However, this is truer with regard to con-
tinental systems. Common-law countries have tended to require that all initia-
tions of legal processes satisfy certain standards, thus fulfilling the probable cause 
requirement. In other words, an extradition decision should be based on reason-
able grounds to believe that the fugitive is guilty of the crime accused. These 
criteria are not easy to satisfy.
206  Gold, 1970, 196.
207  Bassiouni, 1969, 232.
208  Hannay, 1980, 383. See also e.g. Lubet, 1982, 281.
209  Schlaefer, 1981, 642–643.
210  Blakesley, 1986, 123.
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2.2.2  Extradition and human rights protections
Extradition is a process between two states. The fugitive, whose extradition is 
sought, is at the core of the process, but until recently, the rights of this indi-
vidual were not of major concern. Nowadays these rights are growingly taken 
into account but they are always weighed against the interests of the states con-
cerned, as well as against the interest of the world community in preserving the 
global order.211 For this reason, there is always tension between the rights of the 
fugitive and the interests of the state in suppressing crime.212 The extradition 
procedure is an official procedure and, as such, it has to take into account the 
rights of the fugitive. Extradition treaties typically contain clauses that aim at 
protecting the human rights of the person sought for extradition. These include, 
for instance, the double criminality principle, the political offence exception and 
the discrimination clause.213 Even without specific clauses, international human 
rights rules regulate extradition processes. However, the main concern of these 
limitations has been, first and foremost, to create protection for the sovereignty 
of the state rather than for the protection of the individual.214 Transnational crime 
suppression conventions aim principally at suppressing crime and it remains a 
duty of the states to protect the human rights of individuals.215 It is left to the 
state to decide whether to breach its duties under the suppression convention or 
to act according to international law.216
Since the Second World War, the rights of individuals have become growingly 
protected. However, as pointed out by Currie, for a long time, the duty of a state 
to protect the human rights of a fugitive was connected only to its territory. Once 
the person was extradited, the duty practically vanished. Legal decision-making 
in the 1980s and 1990s changed this perspective. For example, the famous case 
of Soering decided upon by the European Court of Human Rights extended the 
duty of concern over the human rights of the fugitive: the states that are parties 
to the ECHR are now considered to be bound by human rights norms upon their 
participation in international collaboration.217
In international law, the primary concern is nowadays always to protect the 
rights of individuals, as opposed to facilitate extraditions. This is because the 
human rights norms arise from notions of jus cogens. Such a viewpoint has been 
211  Bassiouni, 1973, 25. See Gilbert, 1998, 147–174; and Dugard and Van den Wijngaert, 
1998, 188, for more details concerning the relation between extradition and human rights.
212  Dugard and Van den Wijngaert, 1998, 187. See Blakesley, 2000, for a thorough discussion 
on the topic.
213  Boister, 2002, 202. See in more detail about the double criminality principle e.g. Blakesley, 
2000, 40–49.
214  Blakesley, 2000, 2–4.
215  See in more detail on the protection of human rights in the crime suppression conventions 
e.g. Boister, 2002; and Currie, 2015, 28–34.
216  Boister, 2002, 219.
217  Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. See also Blakesley, 
2000, 64–69; Boister, 2002, 204–205; and Currie, 2015, 36.
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supported by scholarly writing on the Soering case and by statements made by 
three premier nongovernmental international law associations: the Institute 
of International Law, the International Law Association and the International 
Association of Penal Law.218
Boister has suggested that the Soering case could have had a more global 
effect through the case of Ng v. Canada. In Ng, the UN Human Rights 
Committee endorsed the Soering approach and decided that the extradition of 
Ng to California, where he could have faced death row and been executed by gas 
asphyxiation, represented a breach of Canada’s duties under the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, the US has been 
opposed to this interpretation in the application of the ICCPR.219
Regardless of the strengthening of human rights norms during the past dec-
ades, the rights of the individuals have in many cases been pushed to the side. 
Especially since the terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, new methods that 
have been considered more efficient in the fight against terrorism have been used 
in the transfer of suspected terrorists.220 Unlawful seizures and irregular rendi-
tion devices have been used as alternatives to extradition since the 1970s and 
1980s.221 Since that period, military language has been commonly applied to 
the fight against crime. Wartime metaphors have facilitated the ignorance of the 
presumption of innocence and as well as the use of the law as an instrument of 
oppression.222
These ‘alternative’ methods do not provide the same legal safeguards for 
fugitives’ rights as the extradition process does.223 Their nature is mostly extra-
legal or illegal, and they are typically resorted to when legal means of rendi-
tion are exhausted.224 Deportation, for instance, has been an important method 
218  Dugard and Van den Wijngaert, 1998, 194–195.
219  Boister, 2002, 205. See also Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994).
220  Currie, 2015, 37.
221  M. Cherif Bassiouni has classified these into three categories: “(1) the abduction and kid-
napping of a person in one state by agents of another state; (2) the informal surrender of 
a person by agents of one state to another without formal or legal process; and (3) the use 
of immigration laws as a device to directly or indirectly surrender a person or place him in 
a position in which he or she can be taken into custody by the agents of another state.” 
Bassiouni has strongly criticised these methods: “Aside from the flagrant violation of the 
individual’s human rights, these practices affect the stability of international relations and 
subvert the international legal process.” States using kidnapping as a rendition technique 
while simultaneously on the official level calling kidnappings terrorism hardly strengthens 
trust in the international legal system. Bassiouni, 1973, 26–27. For more details see e.g. 
Bassiouni, 1973; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 50–63; Freestone, 1981, 204–205; Murphy, 
1985, 81–93; Gilbert, 1991, 182–207; Nadelmann, 1993, 857–882; and Gilbert, 1998, 
337–377.
222  Pyle, 2001, 146.
223  Freestone, 1981, 205; Gilbert, 1991, 4; Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 407.
224  Bassiouni, 1973, 62. See Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 940–948, on the rules of 
international law concerning the expulsion of aliens.
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in  bringing offenders to trial. As it is a simpler procedure than extradition, it has 
often been used by states willing to collaborate in capturing terrorists but unwill-
ing to use the complicated method of extradition.225 McElrath has claimed that 
extradition and deportation are not separate from one another, but that deporta-
tion is merely the substitute for situations where extradition fails.226
Since the early years of the 21st century, a new concept which relates to the 
surrender of suspected terrorists has emerged, the so-called extraordinary rendi-
tion. The concept is usually understood as the removal of a terrorist without 
judicial supervision. Extraordinary rendition is used instead of extradition to 
avoid judicial limitations such as the application of specific human rights norms 
such as norms regulating the status of prisoners of war or the political offence 
exception.227
The legality of these methods in the surrendering of fugitives is disputable. 
For instance, Basso has suggested that deportation can legally be used instead 
of extradition. According to her, different ideologies lay behind deportation 
and extradition. Even if both have the same result, removing a person from the 
country, they serve different purposes.228 The difference between extradition and 
deportation is that only aliens can be deported, whereas, for instance, the US 
law allows for the extradition of nationals.229 The US has used deportation in 
cases where a foreign nation with which it does not have an extradition treaty has 
demanded the return of a fugitive.230
The purpose of deportation is to remove a person who is unwanted in a 
specific country, without a need for punishment. In extradition, a fugitive is 
surrendered for trial or for the execution of a punishment. For this reason, 
deportation can never substitute for extradition. Someone who cannot be 
extradited can still be deported.231 Additionally, in extradition, the fugitive is 
delivered to the requesting state, whereas a deportee can typically choose the 
state where they go.232 Deportation is used as a substitute for extradition typi-
cally in cases which concern two neighbouring states, where it is easy to transfer 
the deportee.233
Even if deportation as an alternative to extradition seems like a path around 
legal norms, deportees are still protected by human rights rules. For instance, the 
Convention Against Torture prohibits the extradition or expulsion of a person 
225  Freestone, 1981, 205.
226  McElrath, 2000, 64.
227  See in more detail e.g. Borelli, 2014, 363. See also Boister, 2002, 203.
228  Basso, 1989, 330–332.
229  Epps, 1979, 76.
230  Basso, 1989, 332.
231  Basso, 1989, 330–331; see also e.g. Epps, 1979, 76; Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 
1992, 945.
232  Epps, 1979, 76.
233  Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 947.
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“to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.”234
During the 20th century, especially immediately after the Second World War, 
international human rights law and the limitations to the powers of states vis-
à-vis their subjects developed in big leaps.235 During this period, new means of 
protecting individuals from states emerged. With regard to expulsion, the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement saw daylight,236 and with regard to extradition, the dis-
crimination clause was created. Additionally, the principle of refuge was also laid 
down.237
The discrimination clause, created and modified based on Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention,238 extended the protection of fugitives to those who risked 
getting discriminated based on their political ideologies. It is applicable in situa-
tions where it is suspected that the person is sought for the purpose of prosecut-
ing them for a political offence, or that their extradition might result in their 
prosecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or other 
comparable reasons, or if one of these reasons could affect the way the person 
is treated in the requesting country.239 The discrimination clause has also been 
labelled as the “equal protection clause”240 or the “freedom from persecution 
clause.”241 A related clause was already suggested in 1880 by the Institute of 
International Law at its Oxford meeting. In its final resolutions, this authorita-
tive institute affirmed that in order to extradite someone for the commission of 
a political crime, the requesting state should assure that the person extradited 
would not be brought to “des tribunaux d’exception.”242
The discrimination clause partially overlaps with the POE. However, their 
purposes are different. The POE was created to protect those who commit 
234  Article 3, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT), A/RES/39/46, 10 December 1984.
235  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 18; see also e.g. Galgani, 2013, 182–183.
236  See Article 33, United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951.
237  See the following section on the concept of refuge. 
238  United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951. See also 
Kälin and Künzli, 2000, 68.
239  See e.g. the wording in the France–Israel treaty of 1958, Article 4: “L’extradition ne sera 
pas accordée lorsque l’Etat requis considérera que les éléments de l’infraction ou les motifs 
de la demande sont fondés sur des considérations politiques, raciales ou religieuses.” Con-
vention d’extradition entre la France et l’état d’Israél, 12 November 1958. See also e.g. 
Pyle, 1988, 188. A landmark case applying the discrimination clause concerned Soering, 
who fled to the UK after allegedly murdering his girlfriend’s parents in the US. His case was 
referred to the ECHR based on the claim that he would risk being subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment by being kept on death row for an extensive period of time. The 
ECHR decided that the UK should not extradite Soering. See in more detail Dugard and 
Van den Wijngaert, 1998, 191–192.
240  Petersen, 1992, 773.
241  See e.g. Gilbert, 1991, 152–153.
242  Article 15, Justifia et Pace, Institut de Droit International, Session d’Oxford, Résolutions 
d’Oxford (Extradition), 9 September 1880.
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political offences, whereas the discrimination clause can also protect common 
offenders, should their treatment be prejudiced in one way or another if extra-
dited. Additionally, the POE protects offenders entirely from being prosecuted, 
whereas the discrimination clause protects them from unfair trials.
The discrimination clause was first introduced in the European Convention of 
Extradition in 1957, and its historical roots can be found in the French law on 
extradition of 1927. The principle is based, similar to the POE, on the considera-
tion that all political offenders might not receive a fair trial, especially in the state 
whose interests they have attacked.243
The discrimination clause prevents the political uses of the trial process and 
guarantees the due process of law. However, states have been reluctant to use 
this clause, as it means taking a stand on the judicial process of another state and 
its internal dynamics and could, for this reason, result in unwanted diplomatic 
incidents. The existence of the clause seems to demonstrate an inherent element 
of mistrust between treaty partners. It has also been criticised for mixing judicial 
matters with wider political interests.244
Since the introduction of the discrimination clause to the European Convention 
on Extradition in 1957, similar provisions have emerged in some US treaties.245 
The discrimination clause is now a common addition in many extradition trea-
ties.246 However, it has not been commonly used by the US, as US courts have 
been tied by the rule of non-inquiry, preventing them from evaluating the fair-
ness of a foreign judicial system.247
A nearly identical legal construction to the discrimination clause is the non-
refoulement principle. The UNHCR, the United Nations Refugee Agency, 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees includes the following clause: 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”248 However, the non-refoulement only applies 
to political refugees, whereas the non-discrimination only protects fugitives who 
243  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 2–3. See also Abbell 2010, 119; and Galgani, 2013, 182–183.
244  Freestone, 1981, 213–216; Petersen, 1992, 774; Galgani, 2013, 183–184.
245  The first one was the Jamaica International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 14 
June 1983. See also Abbell, 2010, 119; Galgani, 2013, 182.
246  Gilbert, 1991, 152–153.
247  Blakesley has commented this rule in the following way: “[The rule of non-inquiry] is 
applied by courts to avoid considering the propriety of extradition, when questions about 
the fairness of the requesting state’s justice system are raised. The requested state sees its 
interest in not embarrassing the requesting state as being stronger than the fugitive’s inter-
est injustice or fairness.” Blakesley, 2000, 5.
248  Article 33(1), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951. However, the 
principle of non-refoulement does not limit the actions of the state upon the refugee in 
other ways. The state may refuse asylum, or send the person elsewhere or even imprison 
them. The only restriction this principle offers is that the refugee cannot be returned to 
where they are likely to be persecuted. Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 93.
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are sought for punishment or prosecution.249 As a principle of customary interna-
tional law, the non-refoulement principle is binding upon all states, whether they 
are signatories of the convention or not.250
A similar clause to the non-refoulement clause had already been incorporated 
into the 1933 League of Nations Convention on the International Status of 
Refugees. This principle was used in the latter part of the decade to protect refu-
gees from Nazi Germany and from Spain during its civil war.251
In addition to the POE and the discrimination clause, there are several grounds 
based on which states can deny extradition provided in treaties. For instance, 
states can deny extradition based on domestic policy considerations. Most states 
are, problematically,252 opposed to the extradition of their own nationals due 
to considerations of national sovereignty, domestic policy and political consid-
erations. This practice of non-extradition of nationals has existed as long as the 
practice of extradition itself and is the most common in civil law jurisdictions.253
Like the practice of non-extradition of political offenders, this practice can also 
be seen as a reflection of mistrust between states. Partly it is a result of similar con-
cerns as the POE or the discrimination clause: the fear of unfair treatment in the 
receiving state.254 It protects the right of the state to exercise jurisdiction over its 
own nationals and the nationals from being surrendered to a foreign jurisdiction. 
At the same time, however, it can also protect the perpetrators of serious crimes.255
Regardless of the controversies that relate to its application, many nations 
refuse to extradite their own nationals. This principle has also formed a part of 
many international extradition conventions, such as the European Convention 
on Extradition of 1957256 and the UN Model Treaty on Extradition of 1990.257 
In the 1996 European Union Extradition Convention, the right to refuse extra-
dition based on the nationality of the offenders was denied. However, this provi-
sion was still subject to reservations.258
The principle has proved to be extremely problematic, especially with regard to 
the extradition of perpetrators of international crimes. The system of international 
249  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 66. See in more detail regarding the position of the political 
offender vis-à-vis human rights rules Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 66–93. See also Oppen-
heim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 971.
250  Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 93.
251  Article 3 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, 28 October 1933. League 
of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663. See also Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 92.
252  One example of the problems caused by the usage of this principle is the denial of Libya to 
extradite its own nationals for the purposes of trial after the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. 
Plachta, 1999, 130–132.
253  Deen-Racsmány, 2007, 3. See Shearer, 1966; Nadelmann, 1993, 847–857; Plachta, 1999; 
and Deen-Racsmány, 2007, for more details the practice of non-extradition of nationals.
254  Nadelmann, 1993, 847; Plachta, 1999, 99.
255  McDermott, 2015, 291.
256  European Convention on Extradition, ETS No. 24, 13 December 1957.
257  UN Model Treaty on Extradition. Annex: A/RES/45/116, 14 December 1990.
258  Article 7 Convention, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union, Dublin, 
27 Sept. 1996, O.J. 1996, C 313/12.
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courts cannot function if criminals are sheltered within the borders of their own 
nation states.259 A suggested solution for the problems created by the application 
of this principle has been the introduction of the aut dedere aut judicare clause in 
a number of international legal instruments. This principle obliges states to either 
extradite persons found on their territory, wanted for trial by another state for an 
extraditable offence or to try the fugitives themselves.260 However, the applica-
tion of this principle is not without problems, either.261
Similar to the POE, this principle has also ceased to exist within the European 
Union with the coming into existence of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).262 
As with the elimination of the POE, the evisceration of this principle can be seen 
to reflect shared cultural values and mutual trust between European states.263
There is a strong link between human rights law and terrorism. First, an act of 
terrorism clearly undermines the human rights of the victims. Second, the pre-
vention and the combatting of terrorism can be executed in such a manner that 
the human rights of the suspects are seen as secondary to the goal of punishing 
the perpetrators. For this reason, human rights concerns with regard to the battle 
against terrorism have become central to the UN, for instance.264
2.2.3  POE versus political refuge: different legal constructions
In many instances, the concepts of invoking of the POE and providing asylum are 
blurred, and the concept of political refuge and the principle of non-extradition of 
political offenders are entangled.265 The application of the POE is even sometimes 
referred to as political asylum.266 Many writers seem to equate the invoking of the 
POE with offering refuge to the fugitive.267 In 1982, Steven Lubet wrote: “In fact, 
259  Deen-Racsmány, 2007, 8.
260  The aut dedere aut judicare principle obliges states to either extradite persons found of 
their territory who are wanted for trial for an extraditable offence by another state or to try 
the fugitives themselves. Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 953. See on the principle 
and its history in more detail e.g. Bassiouni and Wise, 1995; and Plachta, 1999, 123–140. 
261  See Dugard and Wijngaert, 1998, 209–210.
262  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Sur-
render Procedures between Member States – Statements Made by certain Member States on 
the Adoption of the Framework Decision, 2002/584/JHA, OJ L 190, 18 July 2002.
263  It is interesting to note that the practice of non-extradition of nationals was persistent 
between Communist states. See Plachta, 1999, 101–102.
264  See Nuotio, 2006, 1004–1005. See in more detail on infringements of human rights dur-
ing the course of terrorism investigations Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 352–371.
265  Gilbert has pointed out that “both popularly and even judicially, the right to asylum is con-
fused with the principle of non-refoulement, which does not help make for a clear analysis.” 
Gilbert, 1991, 233. See Gilbert, 1991, 231–244; Nicholson and Twomey, 1999; and Li, 
2017, 91–111, for details on refugee law in relation to extradition law; and Gilbert, 2014, 
for a discussion on the link between terrorism and refugee law. See in more detail regarding 
the links between the Refugee Convention and the POE Kälin and Künzli, 2000.
266  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 71.
267  See e.g. García-Mora, 1956, 2; Bassiouni, 1969, 232; Gold, 1970, 197; Stanbrook and 
Stanbrook, 2000, 16.
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the principle that a nation should not deliver a political offender to the government 
against which he has taken up arms is held so universally that we now commonly may 
speak of a right of political asylum. Thus, the political offence exception is a concept 
which is involved intimately with the international protection of human rights.”268
Similarly, in 1909 Assistant Solicitor of the US Department of State Reuben J. 
Clark argued that “[the general purpose of the political clause in extradition trea-
ties appears to be to provide against the surrender of political refugees for pun-
ishment for political crimes.”269 Here Clark was using the concept of refugee as 
synonymous with the concept of fugitive. Even if in Clark’s time these concepts 
were related and used interchangeably,270 nowadays they have different meanings. 
However, in some cases, the two concepts may also overlap. A person might be 
of the opinion that they are a refugee, but the state requesting their extradition 
would consider them a fugitive.
The concept of asylum is older than the protection of political offenders. 
During religious wars, other states offered refuge to those targeted for their faith. 
Slowly, the idea of asylum evolved, but for a long time, it did not concern crimi-
nal fugitives.271 Asylum can be defined as “protection which a state grants to a 
foreign citizen against his own government.”272
The core in both the protection of refugees and of political offenders is the 
same: trying to protect a person from unfair treatment from political opponents. 
However, the legal rules protecting them are different.273 A political offender seek-
ing refuge is not a, strictly speaking, a refugee. The political criminal has always 
committed an offence, whereas the political refugee cannot return to the country 
of his origin because he is persecuted because of his political convictions or other 
personal reasons, such as religion.274 Thus the political offender is an active part in a 
political conflict, whereas the refugee is a passive victim of persecution.275
268  Lubet, 1982, 283.
269  Clark, 1909, 109.
270  In fact, in the Introductory Comment to the Supplement on extradition in the American 
Journal of International Law in 1935, asylum is linked “only to those who have committed 
political or military offen[c]es.” It also noted that prior to the emergence of the POE, the 
right of asylum had also protected common criminals. American Journal of International 
Law, Introductory Comment, Supplement, 1935, 45–46, italics added.
271  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 6–7.
272  García-Mora, 1956, 1.
273  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 28. See in more detail concerning the differences between ref-
uge and the protection of political offenders e.g. Gilbert, 1998, 431–450. See also Gil v. 
Canada (M.E.I.), [1995] 1 F.C. 508 (F.C. Appeal).
274  See Article 1, United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951, which defines a refugee as a person “owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” See on the discussion on the 
interpretations of the concept e.g. Sztucki, 1999.
275  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 27–28.
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Geoffrey Gilbert has spelled out the distinction between asylum in the more 
general sense and asylum as a legal concept: “Asylum in its colloquial sense 
means a decision not to expel or deport an alien to a state where he might be 
persecuted; under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, this obligation is termed non-refoulement. Asylum is much more 
serious measure in that it grants to the refugee rights approaching those of a 
national.”276
Similarly, M. Cherif Bassiouni has made a distinction between “asylum in the 
sense of permission by one state to an individual to enter its territory or remain 
therein when such individual is not sought by another state” and “asylum in the 
sense of allowing a person sought by a state to be shielded from its processes by 
a denial of extradition.”277
Formal refugee status protects the person from extradition. In this regard, 
being granted asylum has the same result as invoking the political offence excep-
tion to extradition.278 However, the denial of extradition does not automatically 
mean the person is granted asylum.279 The state can decide whether it wants to 
grant asylum in addition to denying extradition. This decision depends on two 
key factors: First, what effect would the granting of asylum have on the foreign 
relations of the requested and requesting states? Is the fugitive worth that disrup-
tion? How important are the values that the protection of the fugitive represents 
to the protecting state? Second, would providing refuge compromise the national 
public order of the receiving state?280
If the requested person is not extradited, they can still be deported under 
asylum laws. This is common, even if, arguably, it is not something that should 
be a part of US practice, for instance.281 Some have argued that granting the 
political offence exception should also mean granting asylum.282 As discussed 
earlier, sometimes extradition is formally denied, but the fugitive is still expelled 
through extralegal procedures. Some judges have promoted the idea that refu-
gee and asylum principles could be used when evaluating the political nature 
of an offence.283
States are not bound by either the POE or the idea of asylum. As discussed 
earlier, the invoking of the POE is dependent on treaty provisions and the states’ 
political decisions. With regard to asylum, it remains unclear if international 
law, in fact, establishes a duty to protect. Whether such a right exists depends 
on the circumstances and the state of refuge and on how international law is 
276  Gilbert, 1991, 232–233.
277  Bassiouni, 1969, 233. See also Li, 2017, 21–23.
278  Bassiouni, 1969, 231; Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 96. Sometimes similar considera-
tions have been used in both cases, see Gilbert, 2014, 479.
279  Bassiouni, 1969, 231–234; Murphy, 1985, 41.
280  Bassiouni, 1969, 234.
281  Epps, 1979, 78; Epps, 1988, 207–208; McElrath, 2000, 46.
282  García-Mora, 1956, 78.
283  Gilbert, 1991, 231.
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interpreted. Traditionally, it is seen that the receiving state can decide whether it 
offers asylum.284
Many states’ legislation provides the right to asylum for persons persecuted 
for political reasons. However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights only 
provides the right to seek asylum from persecution, but not the right to gain 
asylum.285 The same applies to the Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 1967.286 
Nonetheless, it is possible to claim that any foreign state is provisionally an asylum 
to an individual fleeing their home country, as all states hold territorial supremacy 
over those who reside on their territory.287
The difference between offering asylum to a refugee and invoking the non-
refoulement principle discussed earlier is that the non-refoulement principle 
does not prevent the state from sending a person to another state as long as his 
life or freedom is not threatened there.288 Additionally, the Refugee Convention 
does not seem to have an impact on extraditions as its Article 1(F)(b) limits its 
protection of the entire convention from those “with respect to whom there 
are serious reasons for considering that […] he has committed a serious non-
political crime outside of the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee.” Additionally, the non-refoulement clause is especially 
limited so that it does not protect a person who, based on reasonable grounds, 
is regarded as a danger to the security of the receiving country or has commit-
ted a “particularly serious crime.”289 Most extraditable offences are these types 
of serious offences. However, it once again seems that the definition of a ‘non-
political’ offence or ‘particularly serious crime’ is left to the state deciding upon 
offering refuge.
Comparably, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), asylum cannot be used to avoid prosecution for non-political crimes 
or other acts “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”290 
The Declaration on Territorial Asylum also limits the right to asylum in a simi-
lar manner but does not exclude those struggling against colonisation from its 
scope.291 The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 excluded terrorists 
from the protection of the refugee status.292
These limitations aim at protecting the receiving community from accepting 
a dangerous person. Simultaneously, they make it possible to shelter those who 
284  Gilbert, 1991, 233–236. See also Li, 2017, 24–49.
285  Article 14, UDHR 10.12.1948, GA Res 217 A.
286  Declaration on Territorial Asylum, UN GA Res 2312 (XXII) 14 December 1967.
287  Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 901. See generally on the status of refugees in 
international law pp. 890–896 and Li, 2017.
288  Gilbert, 1991, 238. See in more detail, Li, 2017, 101–103.
289  Article 33(2), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951.
290  Article 14 (2), UDHR, 10 December 1948, A/RES/217 (III).
291  Article 1, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14.12.1967, A/RES/2312 (XXII).
292  UN Security Council Resolution 1373 Threats to International Peace and Security Caused 
by Terrorist Acts. UN Doc. S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001.
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have committed less serious common crimes or political offences.293 Some have 
claimed that one of the possible purposes in creating these conventions has also 
been to protect politically motivated offenders from oppressive regimes.294 In this 
way, the Refugee Convention, the UDHR and the POE meet.
2.2.4  History of the extradition of political criminals
Extradition itself has a long history. Early extradition served as an “arbitrary tool 
of kings by means of which they sought to gain control of persons who had 
offended them.”295 Until the French Revolution, political crimes were seen as the 
most heinous of all crimes. By threatening the entire state and not just individuals, 
they potentially could create chaos. For this reason, special tribunals and severe 
punishments were required for political crimes. Political crimes had a specific 
name, crimen majestatis (crimes de lèse-majesté, crimes contre la sûreté de l’état), 
crimes against the divine right of governments. Because of the severity of their 
crimes, the capturing of political criminals was seen as a priority. This triggered 
the birth of the tradition of extradition centuries ago. The practice was already 
known in Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean and Assyro-Babylonian civilisations.296
Most extradition treaties were designed to return political offenders to their 
country of origin for punishment. For instance, the treaty of 1834 between Prussia, 
Austria and Russia stated, “All persons that, in Austria, Russia and Prussia have 
been found guilty of a crime of high treason, capital treason or armed rebellion, or 
a member of an association whose purpose is directed against the security of the 
throne and the government, will not find protection or asylum in the other states. 
The parties reciprocally agree to surrender all persons accused of such crimes.” A 
similar clause can be found in the 1828 treaty between Switzerland and France.297 
These treaties were amongst the last ones to concentrate on political offences.
The extradition for common crimes was not equally important as for political 
offences, as they did not create a threat to the public order and they were usually 
prosecuted only by the victims. In addition, not that many common criminals 
fled the country, as exile was a harsh penalty in itself; the rights states offered to 
foreigners were scarce.298
Only at the end of the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century did 
extradition treaties for common crimes emerge as a part of diplomatic practice 
between states.299 Until then, the sovereignty of nations and the principle of non-
293  Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Con-
vention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 
Reedited, Geneva, January 1992, UNHCR 1979.
294  See Steinbock, 1999, for a discussion on the matter.
295  Deere, 1933, 249.
296  See e.g. Ferrari, 1920, 311; Deere, 1933, 249; Epps, 1979, 62; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 5.
297  García-Mora, 1956, 74.
298  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 5; Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 951.
299  Epps, 1979, 62; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 5–7.
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interference in the matters of another state were seen as more fundamental than 
the need to capture criminals.300 The extradition of common criminals became 
more important when criminals moving across borders started to seriously affect 
states’ economic interests. This created a common interest for the suppression 
of crime.301 Thus the growing use of the practice of extradition arose from an 
increased interdependence between states.
A typical extradition treaty from the mid-19th century onwards included a list 
of offences that created a duty to extradite to the contracting state. Such a list 
ordinarily included crimes such as murder, arson, bigamy and embezzlement. 
The list system persisted throughout the 19th century. During the 20th century, 
these lists were in most cases replaced by a provision that crimes of certain gravity 
were extraditable, subject to the double criminality principle, meaning that the 
crimes needed to be classified as such crimes in both states.
For a variety of reasons discussed later, states have wished to protect political 
offenders from extradition. As extradition is a highly political matter, the extra-
dition of political offenders is even more so. According to Christopher H. Pyle, 
“The extradition of political fugitives has more to do with politics than with 
justice.”302 For the purpose of offering protection, the political offence exemp-
tion to extradition was created in the 1800s. The POE is a reservation in extra-
dition treaties which allows states to deny the extradition of an offender should 
their actions be considered to be of a political character.303 As the reservation 
provides a right to refuse extradition, but not a duty to renounce it, it does not 
guarantee the immunity of political offenders from extradition.304
As discussed earlier, sometimes extradition can take place even when no 
extradition treaty between the requesting and requested state exists. The deci-
sion whether to extradite always lies with the requested country, subject to 
binding treaty provisions. The requested state can thus choose to extradite a 
political offender to a state with which it has an existing extradition treaty that 
contains the POE, or any offender to a state with which it does not have a 
treaty.
The political offence exception has been incorporated into most extradition 
treaties since the mid-19th century and it is one of the first international legal 
doctrines that aimed at protecting the individual.305 Many regard it as a funda-
mental democratic principle306 and some as a legally binding principle. Others 
regard it as a political axiom of liberal democracies. Geoffrey Gilbert has argued 
300  See Held, 1995, 74–78.
301  Deere, 1933, 249; Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 951.
302  Pyle, 2001, ix.
303  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 1.
304  Gold, 1970, 192; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 45, 133.
305  On a wider scale, this tendency only blossomed after World War II. See e.g. Van den Wijn-
gaert, 1980, 37.
306  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 133.
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that the POE might have become a part of the ‘folklaw’ of the political tradition 
of Western democracies.307
Regardless of the prevalence of the POE, its scope is typically not defined in 
treaties. As explained, in the past, extradition treaties contained a list of extradit-
able offences. Because these lists did not incorporate pure political crimes such as 
treason, the exception was first and foremost applicable to relative or mixed polit-
ical offences. However, as discussed, there is no general consensus over which 
acts constitute relative political offences. Nowadays, treaties growingly contain 
clauses that define extraditable offences without using the list system, but rather 
by setting a minimum penalty for the offence to be extraditable. As many crimes, 
such as treason, come with severe penalties and are punishable in most states, it 
is possible to consider such crimes extraditable, unless protected by the POE. 
Additionally, many crimes that could in theory be classified as political offences 
have been depoliticised so that they are not included in the exception. The politi-
cal offence exception and the depoliticisation of specific crimes, including terror-
ism, are discussed and analysed in detail throughout this book.
As there is no generally accepted definition of political crime, states are able to 
use the POE as they please. However, as Lieberman has pointed out, the states’ 
own interests should protect the exception from over usage. If the exception is 
invoked too often, it is less likely that the requested state will accept an extradi-
tion request. Additionally, the overuse of the principle may disrupt the political 
order and stability, which in turn can diminish the whole extradition framework 
and criminal prosecutions.308
Throughout times, the political offence exception has caused debates and dip-
lomatic collisions, especially because it has been used to protect not only non-vio-
lent offenders but also perpetrators of atrocious acts of wanton violence. Arguably, 
the protection of such criminals was never the purpose of the exception.309
The most important changes to extradition treaties relate to the rise of inter-
national terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s. The European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) of 1977 excluded terrorists from the protection 
of the POE. Since this treaty, both US and European extradition treaties have 
slowly limited the POE so that it would no longer protect violent offenders. The 
question remains whether the chosen limitations have been able to protect the 
spirit of the POE whilst excluding a wide variety of offences from the protection.
2.2.5  Who is a political offender? Four tests
In 1909, Frederic Coudert stated:
If this be the law and the United States is forced to refuse extradition for 
acts which are abhorrent to rudimentary notions of morality, is it not time 
307  Gilbert, 1998, 280.
308  Lieberman, 2007, 183.
309  See especially Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4, for the discussion on the purposes of the exemption. 
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that some change be made in the law? Are we to be slaves to mere legalism, 
or will we try to fulfil the real purpose of extradition, viz.: remove from this 
country those persons whose brutal and hideous conduct, whatever its ulti-
mate causes may have been, make them dangerous and unfit members of our 
society?[…] Is legal language so feeble that we can find no rule to differenti-
ate between acts which excite our severest condemnation and those which 
may be well admired?310
The coming into practice of the political offence exception and its later use has been 
dependent on the definition of ‘political crime.’ For this purpose, offences were 
categorically divided into relative and pure political offences, as discussed earlier. 
Different nations included different acts in the scope of the exception. Applying 
the POE to pure political offences, such as treason or sedition, has been straight-
forward in state practice. However, when faced with a mixed or relative political 
crime, the application of the exemption has proved difficult, as the requested state 
has to evaluate and balance an act that violates both state and private interests.311
As the judiciary has been faced with cases where an offender sought has 
claimed that the offence in question was of political nature, it has been forced to 
evaluate and delineate the POE. For this purpose, different courts have created 
tests that assist in determining who is protected by the exemption.312 There are 
four tests that typically have been used for the purpose of deciding whether the 
POE can be applied. These are the political incidence test, the predominance 
test, the political motivation test, the injured rights theory, and as a fifth test, the 
mixed approach which combines all four. In the following, the emergence and 
application of these four theories are presented. The aim is to provide a view on 
the difficulties in applying the POE, which has had implications on the decisions 
to delineate or even demolish it.
2.2.5.1  The UK: the political incidence test
As described, the United Kingdom and the United States never had specific laws 
that concerned political crime due to the prevalence of the doctrine of legalism313 
within English history and philosophy. As the state provided for the basic free-
doms of its citizens, it was considered a moral duty for the citizen to obey the 
law. In fact, in the United States, political crime was traditionally viewed as more 
immoral than an ordinary crime. This is because the political criminal challenges 
the whole society, the guarantor of liberties.314
310  Coudert, 1909, 141–142.
311  Sofaer, 1986, 126.
312  This chapter presents these tests and some of the most notable cases summarily. For more 
detailed information, see e.g. Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 111–120.
313  Legalism, as defined by Shklar, “is the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a 
matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined 
by rules.” Shklar, 1986, 1.
314  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 160–161.
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The lack of such a concept in national legislation has not prevented these 
countries from accepting the political offence exemption to extradition in their 
bilateral extradition treaties and applying a rather liberal view on political offend-
ers from other countries.
The UK has since the late 1800s applied the so-called political incidence test. 
This test was gradually developed in UK case law.315 It first limited the POE to 
deeds committed ‘in the course of’ and ‘in furtherance of’ a political disturbance 
attempting to change either the government or its approach. This interpretation 
was developed in the 1891 case In re Castioni.316
In the Castioni case, Swiss officials made a request to England for the extradi-
tion of Angelo Castioni who had murdered Luigi Rossi, a public official, during 
an armed popular uprising. As this deed, in addition to furthering political goals, 
was incidental to and formed a part of wider political disturbances, and did not 
relate to private grudges, the conditions of the incidence test were filled.317
Hannay has suggested that the court in the Castioni case relied on “some 
notion of ‘respectable’ political upheavals such as the War of the Roses or the 
American or English civil wars in which gallant men in dashing uniforms met fair 
and square on the field of battle.”318 He has also argued that “the brutality of 
modern terrorism has rendered the Castioni test obsolete and the complexity of 
modern political struggles has rendered it unworkable.”319
The application of the political incidence test by the United Kingdom was, 
however, not consistent. In the Kolczynski case320 in 1954, Poland requested the 
extradition of Kolczynski and six other seamen who had revolted in British waters. 
The revolters brought their ship to an English port to seek political asylum. They 
expressed their concern about their political discussions being overheard on 
board and claimed that they would face trial should they be returned to Poland. 
There was no political uprising in Poland, but the British court deemed that it 
should be no crime for one to leave his country,321 even if the extradition treaty 
between Poland and the UK included revolt in its list of extraditable crimes.322
L.C. Green argued in 1962 that the Kolczynski case both preserved an 
appearance of continuity with earlier practice, as well as gave the courts 
315  See in more detail the development of the POE in British law Pyle, 2001, 84–95.
316  In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. See e.g. Gilbert, 1985, 697; Gilbert, 1991, 121; Pyle, 
2001, 93–95.
317  See e.g. García-Mora, 1956, 79; Green, 1962, 330; Bassiouni, 1969, 250; Epps, 1979, 
62; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 111; Schlaefer, 1981, 625; Gilmore, 1992, 705; Noone and 
Alexander, 1997, 62–64, for details on the decision.
318  Hannay, 1980, 401.
319  Hannay, 1980, 411.
320  Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 2 Q.B. 540.
321  See e.g. Epps, 1979, 66–68; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 112; Schlaefer, 1981, 626–627; 
Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 186; Gilmore, 1992, 709; Noone and Alexander, 1997, 66–68; and 
Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 72, for details on the decision.
322  Article 3 (29) Extradition treaty between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, 
and the President of the Polish Republic, 11 January 1932.
 Concepts employed 59
flexibility. It made it possible for the courts to decide to protect a certain indi-
vidual who might have faced political persecution if returned, rather than only 
refuse the extradition of an offender who had committed a particular type of 
offence.323 The decision was based on the application of the discrimination 
clause in the UK–Poland treaty, which allowed for the request of extradi-
tion to be denied “if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in 
fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for a crime or offence of a 
political character.”324 Valerie Epps has pointed out that Kolczynski was one 
of the cases where it was clear that the fugitive’s political views and the fact 
that Poland was a Communist state affected the outcome of the extradition 
request: a fugitive with acceptable political views was more likely to receive 
protection under the POE.325
Nowadays, for the United Kingdom to deny extradition for a political offender, 
the political offence committed does no longer need to be in connection with 
a specific political uprising. However, the person whose extradition is sought 
needs to be in political opposition with the requesting state.326 These criteria 
emerged in the Cheng case, where the crime the fugitive was requested for was 
directed against Taiwan, whereas the requesting state was the US. In this case, 
the British court allowed extradition for a crime that was undoubtedly of political 
motivation.327
2.2.5.2  The US application of the incidence test: In re Ezeta 1894
In its early decisions concerning the applicability of the POE, the United States 
closely followed the United Kingdom. However, unlike the United Kingdom, 
the US courts did not require a clear link between the crime itself and the political 
goal it was committed for.
The United States has a history of treating political offenders leniently. In the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, most political offenders earned refuge, even when 
the conditions of their crimes were not tightly connected with political activities. 
Further, also acts against private individuals, not only political persons, could 
qualify.328
323  Green, 1962, 331.
324  Article 7, Extradition treaty between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and 
the President of the Polish Republic, 11 January 1932.
325  Epps, 1979, 68. Similarly, Gilbert has called the cases where the courts departed from the 
incidence test when fugitives from Communist countries were in question, “a small ‘hic-
cup’” in the systematic application of the POE. Gilbert, 1991, 121.
326  DeFabo, 2012, 81.
327  Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville [1973] 2 A I1 E.R. 204, 209. See in more detail e.g. Epps, 
1979, 67; Carbonneau, 1980, 280; Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 188; Noone and Alexander, 
1997, 70–73; Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 428–430.
328  Clark, 1909, 120. See also e.g. Deere, 1933, 268; Evans, 1969, 204; Stanbrook and Stan-
brook, 2000, vii–viii; Pyle, 2001, 115.
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In most cases where a fugitive sought the protection of the POE, US courts 
required that there must be a revolutionary movement in the demanding country 
and that the fugitive be a member of this movement. The crime itself needed to 
be committed “in the course of, and as a part of, the political activities of that 
party to which he belonged.” The extent or prospect of success of the uprising 
in question was not important. The courts did not assess the “wisdom of the act 
in furthering the asserted political objective, the motive of the accused, nor the 
organisation or hierarchy of the uprising group.”329 Neither did they investigate 
the fairness of the requesting system or the basis of the extradition. This so-called 
rule of non-inquiry permitted the judges to refrain from making political assess-
ments, but at the same time “This deliberative unrealism would contrast sharply 
with the traditional scepticism regarding the capacity of foreign regimes to match 
American standards of justice.”330
Traditionally, the US, for instance, had a strong dedication to remaining neu-
tral when it came to the morality of certain acts or their purposes. As Secretary 
Root explained to the Russian Ambassador who had pushed the US to the adop-
tion of the Swiss proportionality test in 1909 (discussed later): “However much 
the Government of the United States may deplore or condemn acts of violence 
done in the commission of acts bearing a political purpose, however unnecessary 
or unjustified they may be considered, if those acts were, in fact, done in the 
execution of such a purpose, there is no right to issue a warrant of extradition 
therefor.”331
The US position was first developed in 1894 in the In re Ezeta case,332 in 
which the court’s ruling was based on the logic of the Castioni case. In this rul-
ing, the court interpreted that any crime committed “in the course of” or “in fur-
therance of” a political disturbance, civil war or insurrection, could be considered 
of a political character.333
In the case, General Antonio Ezeta, the former president of the Republic 
of Salvador (now El Salvador), and four of his commanders and staff officers 
were wanted for crimes, including executions, they allegedly had committed to 
attempting to suppress a coup d’état which took place in 1894. Ezeta was also 
accused of robbing a bank and using the stolen money for his soldiers’ wages. 
The court saw that as the crimes were connected with the armed conflict, they 
were political in nature and not extraditable. As in many other US extradition 
treaties, Article 3 of the US–Salvador extradition treaty from 1874 provided that 
329  Lieberman, 2007, 189.
330  Pyle, 2001, 118. See more on the rule of non-inquiry e.g. Dugard and Van den Wijngaert, 
1998, 189–191; and Blakesley, 2002, 605–609.
331  Cited in Pyle, 2001, 114.
332  In re Ezeta. In re Bolanos, In re Colocho. In re Cienfuegos. In re Bustamante, 62 F. 972 
(District Court, N.D. CA 1894).
333  See e.g. Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1244–1245; Epps, 1979, 68–69; Hannay, 1980, 391–392; 
Lubet, 1982, 262; Gilbert, 1985, 700; Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 183–184; Pyle, 2001, 109–
110; Piemonte, 2013, 623, for a discussion on the case.
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“The provisions of this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offence of a political 
character.”334
The court did not examine the goals or tactics used. The two criteria based on 
which the District Court made its decision were, first, that an uprising, revolu-
tion or rebellion against an existing government had to be occurring concurrently 
with the commission of the crime. Second, the crime had to be committed in 
order to assist this rebellion. The District Court judge justified this by arguing 
that “I have no authority, in this examination, to determine what acts are with the 
rules of civilised warfare, and what are not. War, at best, is barbarous and hence 
it is said that ‘the law is silent during war.’”335 As such, as feared by the Castioni 
court, the Ezeta decision made it possible to consider almost any crime as politi-
cal.336 The decision also showed that the protection by the POE was not limited 
to revolutionaries against autocracies.337
Another case where the political incidence test protected an offender from 
extradition from the US for questionable reasons was that of Lynchehaun in 1903. 
The Catholic Irishman James Lynchehaun was requested by the British govern-
ment for brutally assaulting and murdering his Protestant landlady. At first, it 
seemed that Lynchehaun’s attack was motivated by personal grudge over his evic-
tion. Upon his arrival to the US, Lynchehaun, however, claimed the offence had 
been of political nature and the attack was part of an organisational decision by 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood to fight for the cause of oppressed tenants. In 
consequence, the American court saw the crime as “incidental to a popular move-
ment to overthrow landlordism in Ireland” and thus unextraditable.338
Similarly to the Ezeta case, the Ornelas case339 from 1896 followed the logic 
of the Castioni ruling. In this case, Mexico sought the extradition of three men 
who were wanted for murder, arson, robbery and kidnapping, allegedly commit-
ted during an attack on a local village. Unlike the District Court had done, the 
Supreme Court finally granted extradition. It took into consideration the nature 
of the crimes, the way in which they had been committed and the persons of 
the victims. As there were no Mexican government forces near the village at the 
time of the attack and the accused had fled the scene with stolen items, the court 
deduced that the crimes were not incidental to a political occurrence.340
334  The contents of the treaty is cited in In re Ezeta. In re Bolanos, In re Colocho. In re Cienfue-
gos. In re Bustamante, 62 F. 972 (District Court, N.D. CA 1894).
335  In re Ezeta. In re Bolanos, In re Colocho. In re Cienfuegos. In re Bustamante, 62 F. 972 (Dis-
trict Court, N.D. CA 1894). Also cited in Lieberman, 2007, 191.
336  Gilbert, 1991, 125; Gilbert, 1998, 227.
337  Pyle, 2001, 109–110.
338  See in more detail García-Mora, 1956, 79; McElrath, 2000, 11; Pyle, 2001, 116; and The 
Irish Independent, “Hero or villain? The gruesome tale of the ‘real’ Playboy of the Western 
World,” 6 May 2012.
339  Ornelas v. Ruiz 161 U.S. 502, 510–512 (1896).
340  See in more detail e.g. Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1245–1247; Epps, 1979, 69–70; Hannay, 
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In the light of the Ornelas case, it is interesting to note that the extradition 
treaty between the US and Mexico that was renewed a few years after the deci-
sion in 1899 had been the only treaty in US history to include only purely politi-
cal crimes into the scope of the POE.341 It is possible that the case affected the 
decision-making of the drafters of the treaty, and that their wish was to prevent 
the possibility of violent offenders escaping extradition, even if in the Ornelas case 
the fugitive did not manage to escape justice.
Extradition law in the United States does not contain the so-called discrimina-
tion clause, a provision that extradition can be banned for the fear that the person 
requested might face persecution if returned. The clause has also been rarely used 
in US extradition treaties.342 The only question courts decide upon is whether the 
person accused is wanted for a political crime.343 Thus, one of the main reasons 
behind the creation of the POE, the possibility of the suspect receiving biased 
treatment by the requesting state’s courts, has never been discussed in applying 
the incidence test.344
2.2.5.3  Evaluating the incidence test
As the political incidence test concentrates on evaluating the existence of a politi-
cal disturbance instead of the motives of the perpetrator, some have considered it 
as the most objective way to assess whether the POE is applicable.345 It excludes 
deeds by individuals and groups with no popular support. As a result, groups such 
as the RAF in Germany or the Direct Action in France could not have received 
the protection of the POE even if their acts clearly were politically motivated.346
However, even if seemingly simple, applying the incidence test has not been 
straightforward, as it has remained unclear how the concepts of political conflict 
or incidence are defined.347 Additionally, while judges in US courts have typi-
cally concentrated on the target of the action, which has sometimes been seen as 
a more ‘objective’ approach, it still remains unclear what kind of a target could 
turn a ‘common’ crime into a ‘political’ crime.348 Further, when the political inci-
dence test is applied, the seriousness of the acts is not considered. This approach 
has been criticised, for instance, by Christine van den Wijngaert, who has argued 
that the gravity of the crimes should be used as the main criteria for establishing 
whether the POE is applicable.349
341  Article 3, United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, 22 February 1899. See “Political 
Offence,” 1909.
342  See Section 2.2.2.
343  Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 170.
344  Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 182.
345  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 111; Sapiro, 1986, 671.
346  Pyle, 1988, 187.
347  Sapiro, 1986, 672; Lieberman, 2007, 188–189.
348  Sapiro, 1986, 675–676.
349  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 117–118.
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The incidence test has received criticism for being simultaneously overinclusive 
and underinclusive. The underinclusiveness of the incidence test is visible when 
no ‘recognised’ rebellion exists. In such a case, those attacking the government 
cannot be protected by the POE.350 Then again, the test is sometimes overinclu-
sive, as it can be used to protect any act that coincides with political turbulence 
or assists a rebellion in any way.351 Steven Lubet argued in 1982 that bringing 
the Castioni test to its “insane but logical end,” might end up protecting terror-
ists from extradition. This point of view was based on the British experience. In 
Britain, courts had ended up nearly abandoning the test for this reason.352 In the 
1980s, it became clear that Lubet’s prediction had been correct. The details of 
this will be discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.
The problematic nature of the direct application of the incidence test first 
became clear when Yugoslavia sought for the extradition of Artukovic,353 an ex-
Minister of the Interior of a pro-Hitler government in Croatia during WWII. 
Artukovic was responsible for thousands of killings, which amounted to war 
crimes and genocide. The United States court deciding the case considered the 
crimes political, and thus non-extraditable.354 According to Christopher H. Pyle, 
“The decision to grant Artukovic benefit of the political offence exception has 
been called ‘one of the most roundly criticised cases in the history of American 
extradition jurisprudence.’ More than any other decision, it caused the political 
offence exception to lose its reputation as a shield for liberal revolutionaries and 
come to be seen as a ‘legal loophole’ benefiting every sort of tyrant its inven-
tors most despised.”355 It remains unclear whether the strict interpretation of the 
incidence test was a purely judicial opinion, or if it was affected by wider politi-
cal considerations, namely the fact that the request was made by a Communist 
country.356
Similarly, the Ramos v. Diaz357 case of 1959 has been suspected to have been 
influenced by anti-Communism. The case involved two Cubans who had been 
convicted of murder by the Castro government. The pair escaped from prison 
350  Kulman, 1986, 767.
351  García-Mora, 1956, 79; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1246–1247; Lubet, 1982, 263; Kulman, 
1986, 766.
352  Lubet, 1982, 263–264.
353  247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), surrender 
denied on remand sub nom. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
See e.g. Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1247.
354  See e.g. Bassiouni, 1973, 36; Epps, 1979, 71–72; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 118–119; 
Hannay, 1980, 392; Schalefer, 1981, 627–629; Lubet, 1982, 263; Banoff and Pyle, 
1984, 184; Sofaer, 1986, 130; and Pyle, 2001, 132–139, for details on the decision. It 
has to be noted that the US only ratified the Genocide Convention of 1948 in 1988. 
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355  Pyle, 2001, 138–139.
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and fled to the United States. Their claim was that the murder had been com-
mitted as part of revolutionary activities. The court was of the opinion that the 
Cuban government had not shown that the crimes were non-political in nature 
and for this reason denied extradition.358
In comparison, in the case of Gonzales359 in 1963, extradition was granted. 
The defendant allegedly took part in the torturing and killing of two prisoners 
while working in a military or quasi-military capacity for the dictatorial Trujillo 
regime in the Dominican Republic. The court held that the offences were not 
political in nature. Valerie Epps has pointed to the political relevance of this 
decision; the regime requesting for the extradition was the new regime, not the 
Trujillo dictatorship which the US disfavoured.360 In a footnote, Judge Tyler 
pointed to the case of Kolczynski and “the history of the political offence excep-
tion in Anglo-American law” which “arguably indicates that the political offence 
exception legitimately can be applied with greater liberality where the demanding 
state is a totalitarian regime seeking the extradition of one who has opposed that 
regime in the cause of freedom.”361
In the case of Mylonas in 1960,362 the Greek request for the extradition of an 
accused embezzler was denied, partly against the rule of non-inquiry typically 
applied by US courts. The court noted that the accused Mylonas had been an 
active anti-Communist and would not necessarily get a fair trial in the hands of 
the predominantly Communist municipal government.363 This stance was taken 
notwithstanding the lack of a discrimination clause in the US–Greece extradition 
treaty.364
Epps has compared the Mylonas case to the similar case of Jimenez v. 
Aristeguieta where extradition was permitted.365 Jimenez was the former presi-
dent of Venezuela. He had gained power through a military coup d’état but was 
later overthrown. The new regime sought for his extradition from the US based 
on charges of embezzlement and murder. Evidence for the embezzlement charge 
was found to be sufficient, and Jimenez was extradited regardless of claiming 
that the offences had been political. According to Epps, the difference between 
the cases of Mylonas and Jimenez “appears to be that Jimenez had been part of 
a disfavoured regime, and the United States had no wish to offend the newly 
established Venezuelan government.”366
358  See e.g. Epps, 1979, 73; Hannay, 1980, 397–396.
359  In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
360  Epps, 1979, 73.
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363  See e.g. Epps, 1979, 73–74; Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 190.
364  Greece International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 6 May 1931.
365  Aristeguieta v. Jimenez, 274 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1960).
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Nowadays, the US test categorically excludes certain crimes from the scope 
of the POE for being inefficient as a means to achieve a political objective.367 
According to Christopher H. Pyle:
In retrospect, it is curious that more was not done earlier, in both the UK 
and the US, to exclude wanton crimes from the scope of the political offence 
exception. But in Meunier, Ezeta, the Mexican border raid cases, the Russian 
death-squad cases, and Lynchehaun, the terroristic nature of the crimes was 
downplayed, as was the requirement of a full-scale, popular revolution. So 
long as the ‘movement’ did not export its killing to Western Europe or the 
US, its atrocities and futility could be tolerated by an America that was still 
sufficiently uninvolved in international relations to be able to see the rebels 
(or their adversaries) for what they were.368
2.2.5.4  The French injured rights theory
Where the United States’ take on the political offence exemption has been an 
encompassing one, France has taken a narrow stance on the matter. In the case 
of In re Giovanni Gatti369 in 1947, the Grenoble Court of Appeals outlined that 
only crimes directly injuring the state, causing no harm to individuals, could be 
included within the scope of the exemption. Thus only a few crimes could fall 
into this category: espionage, sedition or treason.370 It is noteworthy that these 
are crimes that were not typically listed as extraditable offences in extradition trea-
ties, meaning that the POE in the French treaties was essentially void.
In the Gatti case, the fugitive, Giovanni Gatti, had attempted to kill a member 
of a Communist cell. San Marino sought his extradition, but Gatti pleaded that 
he could not be extradited as his offence was political in nature.371 The court, 
however, reasoned: “The fact that the reasons of sentiment which prompted the 
offender to commit the offence belong to the realm of politics does not itself 
create a political offence. The offence does not derive its political character from 
the motive of the offender but from the nature of the rights it injures.”372 “The 
reasons on which nonextradition is based do not permit the taking into account 
of mere motives for the purpose of attributing to a common crime the charac-
ter of a political offence.”373 Further: “In brief, what distinguishes the political 
367  Lieberman, 2007, 189.
368  Pyle, 2001, 117.
369  Gatti (1947) Ann. Dig. 145, 146 (Case no. 70). Cited in Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1236; Green, 
1962, 335; and Gilbert, 1985, 700.
370  García-Mora, 1956, 77; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1236, 1249–1250; Green, 1962, 335–336; 
Carbonneau, 1980, 276; Gilbert, 1985, 700; Gilbert, 1991, 127.
371  García-Mora, 1956, 77; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1236, 1249–1250; Green, 1962, 335–336; 
Carbonneau, 1980, 276; Gilbert, 1985, 700.
372  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1249–1250. See also e.g. Hannay, 1980, 391.
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crime from the common crime is the fact that the former only affects the political 
organisation of the state, the proper rights of the state, while the latter exclusively 
affects rights other than those of the state.”374
The French take has been labelled as the ‘injured rights theory’375 or the objec-
tive test376 and it limits the scope of political offences to crimes that target the 
political organisation of the state, regardless of the political motivation of the 
offender or lack thereof.377 The political nature of the crime is thus not defined 
by the motive of the offender, but rather by the target and the means used. As 
a result, relative political offences containing elements of common crime were 
excluded from the French interpretation.378
The French model received criticism, as the protection of the political offence 
exemption was denied to those offenders whose target was other than political 
institutions. At the same time, common criminals with purely private motives 
using the state as a target can be protected by the exemption, which originally 
aims at protecting political offenders.379
2.2.5.5  The predominance test
All of the aforementioned approaches used to determine whether a fugitive can 
be protected by the political offence exemption have received criticism. As they 
all ignore the outcome of the extradition, one of the main reasons for which 
the exemption was created in the first place was forgotten: the worry about the 
treatment the person might receive should they be extradited. In addition, these 
approaches also attempt to examine the consequences or the motivation behind 
the acts. Such considerations do not usually belong to criminal law, except when 
the motivation of the person is used to determine the guilt in concreto or the 
penalty (aggravating or mitigating circumstances). These deliberations do not, 
however, affect the nature of the crime in question.380
The Swiss approach, the so-called predominance test, or political motivation 
test, applied also for instance by the Netherlands,381 tries to avoid the aforemen-
tioned issues and has become the most widely accepted amongst academics.382 In 
the 19th century, Switzerland served as a safe haven for political refugees who 
were using its soil as a base of their revolutionary activities. Several extradition 
requests to capture these fugitives failed, and as a result, other countries criticised 
374  Cited in Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1236.
375  Blakesley, 1986, 113.
376  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1249.
377  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1249; Bassiouni, 1969, 250.
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 Concepts employed 67
Switzerland for the protection of rebels. In 1892, Switzerland enacted an extradi-
tion law which incorporated the predominance test.383
In the predominance test, first laid out in the V.P. Wassilieff case, the relation-
ship between the offence and the end it seeks are balanced. In the Wassilieff case, 
Russia sought the extradition of its national wanted for the murder of a chief of 
police. Extradition was granted, as, to the surprise of other states, the Swiss court 
considered the act as predominantly a common crime, as it did not pursue the 
realisation of a purely political offence and the accused would have had other, 
non-violent means for pursuing his political goal.384 Thus the Swiss test tried to 
evaluate whether the end sought could be efficiently be achieved through the use 
of the illegal means in question. As explained in the case of In re Nappi, if the 
means were seen as efficient in pursuing the political goal, the political element 
could be seen to prevail.385 This meant a change in the traditional policy of the 
Swiss to protect political offenders.386
Based on the proportionality test, Switzerland also granted the extradition 
of Kaphengst in 1930. In this case, a German national was accused of terroris-
tic bombings in Prussia, allegedly political in motive.387 Similarly, Della Savia,388 
who was a member of an anarchist–nihilist organisation called 22 October, was 
extradited. The Swiss court held that the acts did not have a clear relation to any 
political struggle. The court pointed out that the accused might have achieved his 
political end by legal means and was not forced to resort to atrocious methods. 
Interestingly, Savia was caught with the assistance of Interpol, which was dedi-
cated to keeping out of political matters.389
The predominance test was further developed in In re Ockert.390 The test now 
measured also proportionality, meaning that the means used needed to be in 
proportion to the end sought. In the In re Kavic case,391 members of the crew 
of a passenger plane who were Yugoslav nationals intimidated other crew mem-
bers, redirected the plane to Switzerland and sought asylum. The Swiss court 
came to the same conclusion as its English counterpart in a similar case, Ex parte 
383  See e.g. Deere, 1933, 256-257; García-Mora, 1956, 79-80; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1252; 
Green, 1962, 333.
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1998, 234.
386  See Jensen, 2014, 332.
387  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1254.
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Kolczynski:392 the Federal Tribunal invoked the predominance theory and denied 
extradition. It concluded that the ideals connected with the escape from a totali-
tarian regime and the link between the deed and its aim were strong enough to 
justify the injury to private property and other, less serious crimes.393
The protection of fugitives from totalitarian states was of wider concern 
in the decades following the Second World War. For instance, in 1961, Otto 
Kirchheimer wrote: “More and more it is considered a noble service to shield 
nonpolitical fugitives whom totalitarianism threatens with a politically motivated 
prosecution.”394 At this stage, the liberal roots of the POE were clearly visible.
Switzerland applied the tightest criteria to violent crimes in evaluating whether 
the political element could outweigh the common element of the crime. The key 
was that violence had to be the only means to achieve the sought political end. 
Hence, the Swiss test seems to exclude all terrorism from the scope of the political 
offence exemption.395 However, it does not categorically deny a political charac-
ter to certain offences, as opposed to for instance the attentat clause.396
The Swiss proportionality test would seem to best serve the purpose of pro-
tecting ‘true’ revolutionaries and excluding terrorists. In addition to many schol-
ars, the application of the predominance test to the POE has received support 
from Irish397 and Dutch courts,398 some extradition treaties and the national 
legislation of some countries.399 The UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 1951 also refers to a similar criterion when assessing the nature of the 
crimes committed by a refugee. The Refugee Convention also protects political 
392  Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski [1955] 1 Q.B. 540. See Chapter 
3, Section 3.2.1.
393  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1254-1255.
394  Kirchheimer, 1961, 380.
395  See e.g. Deere, 1933, 258; García-Mora, 1956, 77; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1254; Bassiouni, 
1969, 252; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 126–129; Gilbert, 1985, 700–702; Gilbert, 1991, 
129; Gilbert, 1998, 236, 305; Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 77. However, Deere has 
suggested that even anarchist offences have fallen into the category of political offences 
based on the application of the predominance test. Deere, 1933, 257.
396  Deere, 1933, 253. See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3, for a discussion on the attentat clause.
397  According to Gilbert, for the Irish courts, the turning point was the McGlinchey v. Wren 
decision of 1982. Gilbert, 1991, 148.
398  Gilbert, 1991, 150.
399  García-Mora has pointed out that “The convention between Poland and Czechoslovakia 
which provides that extradition will not be granted ‘if the offence is political or is connected 
with a political offence, unless the characteristic of an offence under ordinary law predomi-
nates.’” Convention Between Poland and Czechoslovakia, 21 January 1949, Article 60, 
(b), 31 U.N.T.S. 300. See also Treaty of Extradition with Brazil, 13 January 1961, Article 
V, para. 6(a), 44 Dept State Bull. 166 (1961); Extradition Treaty Between Brazil and 
Bolivia, 25 February 1938, Article III, § 1, 54 U.N.T.S. 348; Convention between Finland 
and Sweden, 29 November 1923, Article 2, para. 1, 23 L.N.T.S. 42; Convention between 
Latvia and Lithuania, 12 July 1921, Article 2, 25 L.N.T.S. 313; Additional Protocol to the 
Extradition Treaty between Argentina and Italy, 9 June 1904, Article IV, [1905] Foreign 
Relations. U.S. 33 (1906). Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1255.
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criminals and determines whether an offence is considered political by looking 
at “whether it has been committed out of genuine political motives and not 
merely for personal reasons or gain.” Additionally, a “close and direct causal 
link between the crime committed and its alleged political purpose and object.” 
Finally, “The political element of the offence should also outweigh its common-
law character. This would not be the case if the acts committed are grossly out of 
proportion to the alleged objective.” Further, the atrocious nature of the crimes 
may also affect whether the crime is considered political.400
However, as Geoffrey Gilbert has pointed out, the test is not perfect for mod-
ern requirements: “To use it [the predominance test] is merely to continue apply-
ing nineteenth-century standards, drafted to combat the problems of that era in 
Europe, to twentieth-century circumstances. Moreover, the Swiss interpretation 
is open to abuse, since it is possible to extradite a fugitive in circumstances where 
his trial would be prejudiced and partial in the requesting state.”401 Additionally, 
also the Swiss test is subjective and dependent on the political views of the 
requested state.402 However, according to Gilbert, the Swiss test is the most suit-
able for the use of trying to achieve both ends, the promotion of the international 
public order and the protection of political activism,403 as it is simple and univer-
sally applicable and preserves judicial discretion. The Swiss test has sometimes 
also been applied in German and English extradition cases.404
2.3  Conclusion
This chapter has been an introduction to the key concepts used in this study. 
It has presented the concepts of ‘political crime,’ ‘terrorism,’ ‘extradition,’ the 
‘political offence exception to extradition’ as well as ‘depoliticisation’ in a manner 
that makes it possible to use all of these concepts as subjects of study and tools for 
analysis in the coming chapters of the book. As shown, none of these concepts is 
easily definable and one objective of this research is to be involved in the discus-
sion that surrounds the ongoing process of definition.
The aim of this chapter has also been to position my research on the map of 
existing scholarship, with regard to the use of the key concepts but also with 
400  Para 152, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. HCR/IP/4/Eng/
REV.1, UNHCR 1979, reedited January 1992.
401  Gilbert, 1991, 130.
402  Gilbert, 1991, 151; Gilbert, 1998, 307.
403  Gilbert, 1991, 131.
404  See e.g. the case of T where the UK extradition court as well as the House of Lords ruled 
that a bomb attack by Islamists against an airport in Algiers could not, in spite of its politi-
cal context and motivation, be considered a relative political offence because of the danger 
posed to innocent bystanders. T v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1995] 2 All 
E.R. 1042, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 545; T v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 
All E.R. 865. Kälin and Künzli, 2000, 66. 
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regard to the researchers I engage in a discussion with. As stated, my viewpoint 
is that of a social scientist engaged in research on a variety of legal issues. My 
background is visible in the way I look at legal concepts; first and foremost, I 
understand them as products of their own time and as social constructions.
This viewpoint has given me the possibility to look beyond legal concepts and 
to frame them in a way that makes their usage more transparent and understand-
able. I readily accept that for the purposes of applying the law, my considerations 
might not necessarily be useful, because the more I look into these concepts, the 
more questions I find unanswered. However, for the purposes of further analysis 
and research, unanswered questions should prove a fertile ground to build on for 
others.
The next chapter begins with deepening the understanding of the concept of 
the political offence exception and offers a historical viewpoint to its development.
33.1  The emergence of the political offence exception 
in the 1830s
3.1.1  Revolution as evolution
One of the leading historians of our times, Eric Hobsbawm, called the early 19th 
century (1789–1848) the Age of Revolution.1 This period saw an unprecedented 
amount of political turmoil in Europe and North America, and permanently 
changed the ideological views on how the world should be run. The Age of 
Revolution witnessed the rise of nationalism and of new nation states. Emerging 
nations needed to assert their independence, authority and equality in the new 
field of political players. One of the key areas where new relationships were estab-
lished was the field of treaty law, which extradition formed a part of. The idea that 
the state is limited by the law emerged. The Age of Revolution also witnessed a 
new take on political offenders, who were now seen as heroes fighting for liberty2 
instead of traitors opposing the might of the king. This led to the creation of the 
so-called political offence exception (POE), which protected political criminals 
from extradition.
The first steps in what later became known as human rights law were taken 
during this same period. As a distinction from autocratic regimes, the newly 
established liberal nations set up rights for individuals, the legal safeguards 
provided by extradition treaties being part of them. Geoffrey Gilbert has 
described this process as “prevailing philosophies of the eighteenth century 
shaped the developing extradition law under the unfolding umbrella of inter-
national law.”3 
The idea that political offenders were in need of protection emerged in the 
spirit of a revolutionary atmosphere, combined with emerging liberalist ideas 
1  Hobsbawm, 1962.
2  For instance Jules Michelet (1798–1874), professor of history in Paris and a republican, 
understood the revolutionaries of 1789 as brave, creative and big-hearted. See more on con-
temporaries’ ideas on the revolutionaries of the Age of Revolution. Gemie, 2006, 125–135.
3  Gilbert, 1991, 11. See also Gilbert, 1991, 115; and Gilbert, 1998, 208.
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concerning the rights of the individuals. The unwillingness of nations to sur-
render political fugitives has been linked with the falling apart of the feudalist 
system. The feudalist system had been built on a structure of personal obliga-
tions. During the Age of Revolution, this structure disintegrated and criminal 
law became less politicised. Concurrently, major ideological changes took place. 
Scientific thinking rose with the decline of religious, especially Catholic, impact. 
The concept of freedom of the press emerged.
This transformation affected the way in which the political criminal was 
viewed. The rise of the political offence exception was, in Bassiouni’s words: “due 
to the emergence of constitutionalism in the nineteenth century, when the right 
to freedom and to revolt for freedom became an active reality. Its mottos were 
set by the eighteenth-century philosophers, who drew largely on the humanism 
of their predecessors.”4
Samuel T. Spear, who authored Law of Extradition, International and Inter-
State in 1885 wrote:
The general sense of civilised nations, especially in modern times, is that 
merely political offenders are not proper subjects for extradition; and any 
nation that, having obtained the custody of a fugitive upon other grounds, 
should put him on trial for a political offence, would be deemed guilty of 
a gross act of bad faith, and that, too, whether the treaty under which the 
extradition was secured did or did not contain an express stipulation to 
the contrary.5
The nature of political crimes was now viewed as being progressive and rev-
olutionary or evolutionary, as opposed to the regressive and involutionary 
nature of ordinary crimes.6 Christine van den Wijngaert has talked about “an 
almost naïve identification of the political offender with the liberal revolution-
ary” and the exception being “drafted in an atmosphere of romanticism and 
glorification of political offenders.”7 Political criminals were seen as morally 
superior, as their motive was to benefit the whole society.8 What was not con-
sidered was the possibility that they might themselves turn against the liberal 
legal order.9
This study uses the concept of ‘romantic liberalism’ to describe the sentiments 
towards revolutionaries in the 1800s. The use of the concept is related to that of 
Gustavsson who has defined ‘romantic liberalism’ as “a romantic understanding 
of why we need a political system with extensive and universal individual liber-
ties.” Further, “romantic liberalism gives pride of place to dedicated and authentic 
4  Bassiouni, 1969, 244. See also García-Mora, 1956, 74.
5  Spear, 1885, 50.
6  Ferrari, 1920, 311.
7  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 14.
8  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 29.
9  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 14.
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self-expression, not to autonomous self-reflection.”10 According to her, romantic 
liberalism “does not stress temperance or agreement in public life. Conflict and 
strong sentiments are not disturbing elements, but welcome signs of authenticity, 
vitality and courage.”11 At the core of my definition of romantic liberalism is the 
understanding of political criminals as heroic figures. The romanticism relates to 
the idealisation of their goals which were perceived to outweigh and justify also 
the use of violence in pursuance of self-determination and liberty.
The turn in how the political offenders were viewed reflected a wider change in 
governance, where European countries one by one moved from autocracy towards 
liberal democracy. It made it possible to support those who were in the process of 
trying to overturn despotic regimes and spread the ideal of the democratic state.12 
It portrayed a revolution in the relationship between the state and the citizen.
A new liberal idea gained ground. According to this idea, the law limits the state. 
Thus the citizen now had the right to resist, in case the state violated the law or 
acted in an unjust or immoral way. The right to resist also applied when the state 
did not serve the society in the best possible way. This principle embraced the idea 
that crime was a concept which depended on the legitimacy of the government. 
If the government lost its legitimacy, what it defined as crime could sometimes be 
seen as justifiable.13 A similar viewpoint is reflected in the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948: “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppres-
sion, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.”14
The political criminal, before appraised a public enemy, now became appreci-
ated as someone in search for, and working on the front lines of, progress. Their 
crime lay in trying to hasten it by illegal and sometimes even violent means. As a 
result, the political criminal became to be seen as more ‘moral’ than the ordinary 
criminal.15
The more accepting treatment of political criminals has been especially linked 
with the political conditions in France. The Declaration of Human Rights created 
as a result of the French Revolution of 1789 underlined the political rights of 
men and the right to resist oppression.16 In the Jacobean Constitution of 1793, 
it was declared that the French people “grant asylum to foreigners banished from 
their countries for the cause of freedom.”17 As there had been many overthrows 
10  Gustavsson, 2014, 63.
11  Gustavsson, 2014, 64.
12  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 18.
13  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 146.
14  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), GA Res 217 A, 10 December 1948.
15  Ferrari, 1920, 311; Kirchheimer, 1961, 33; Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 146, 152; Pyle, 
2001, 82.
16  “Le but de toute association politique est la conservation des droits naturels et impre-
scriptibles de l’homme. Ces droits sont la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté, et la résistance à 
l’oppression.” Article 2, Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789.
17  Sofaer, 1986, 126; See also Pyle, 2001, 79–80.
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of government in France during the 19th century, it became easy to view politi-
cal criminals as people who had tried to gain power, but just did not have luck in 
it.18 Because only the outcome of the rebellion defined who was the criminal and 
who the legitimate ruler of a state, rebellion against suppression could be viewed 
as legitimate. For this reason, political criminals gained a new status where they 
were considered to deserve protection.19
A major turn in the treatment of political crime occurred after the French 
revolution of 1830. After the revolution, the liberals that rose to power wanted 
to prohibit governments from using the legal process against their political 
rivals.20 One of the most important cases underlining the need for the protec-
tion of the rights of political offenders concerned the extradition of Neapolitan 
officer Galotti, who was requested for his participation in the 1820 revolution. 
France granted Galotti’s extradition to Naples on the condition that he would 
not be prosecuted for political offences. Upon Galotti’s return to Naples, he 
was immediately sentenced to death for the participation in the revolution. The 
French threatened Naples with war and managed to get Galotti back to safety.21 
As the Galotti case had provoked a public outcry, the new French government 
established more lenient rules against political offenders, including milder penal-
ties in comparison to ordinary crimes. Around the same time, the principle of 
non-extradition in international treaties and the right of asylum in political mat-
ters emerged.22 According to Christopher H. Pyle, “Romanticism, couched in 
the language of social science, led countries like France to treat domestic political 
criminals with leniency.”23
Otto Kirchheimer has described the way political offenders were seen between 
the 1830s until the First World War in the following way:
The state, it was reasoned, had to safeguard itself against its foes, but this 
did not necessarily imply a need to stamp one’s foe as a dishonourable man 
and a scoundrel. Whatever part psychological and sociological optimism 
and romanticism played in this attitude, where it obtained it included the 
granting of special privileges to the political offender: a scale of so-called 
parallel punishments, including at times the abolition of the death penalty 
and the creation of some form of custodia honesta, lacking any dishon-
ourable connotation, was worked out; and there was a minimum special 
treatment under ordinary prison conditions and non-imposition of loss of 
civil rights.24
18  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 154.
19  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 3.
20  American Journal of International Law, Introductory Comment, Supplement, 1935, 45; 
Pyle, 2001, 81.
21  Deere, 1933, 250; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 12.
22  Ferrari, 1920, 311; Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 146, 152; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 12.
23  Pyle, 2001, 82.
24  Kirchheimer, 1961, 40.
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The political offence exemption was first codified in newly independent Belgium’s 
Extradition Act of 1833.25 The act was also the first to codify legal rules concerning 
extradition, as previously extradition had been handled at the executive level only.26
The emergence of the political offence exemption to extradition was con-
nected to a wider change of ideals. Belgium had gained its independence through 
a process that began with a violent revolt against the Dutch King William I and 
provided an example of a legitimate government being born from a rebellion.27 
The Belgian clause can be interpreted as a direct reaction to these historical devel-
opments providing a means to support rebels elsewhere.
Internationally, the clause was introduced in the Franco–Belgian treaty of 
1834, and added to the French bilateral treaties with the United States in 1843 
and England in 1852.28 The political offence exemption in extradition treaties 
had varying provisions and different wordings, but its contents remained essen-
tially unchanged: political offenders were to be excluded from the scope of man-
datory extradition the treaties provided for.29 Typically, the scope of political 
offences was not defined or in any way limited.
Because the typical extradition treaty contained a list of extraditable 
offences, which never included ‘pure’ political crimes, it can be claimed that 
the existence of the POE was based on the idea that offenders who commit 
relative political offences are worthy of protection. In other words, crimes 
listed in the treaty can be protected from extradition, provided they are con-
sidered political in nature.
As foreign political criminals were now considered to be heroes rising against 
tyranny, the exemption to extradition became a way of supporting their battles. 
Its coming into being was a result of both new political ideologies, as well as prac-
tical strategic views by the states. Based on the idea that the “enemy of my enemy 
is a friend,” it provided states with the possibility to support rebellious action in 
their enemy states without participating in a war themselves. It reflected the new 
view according to which democracies could be established through rebellion. In 
addition, the POE made diplomacy less complicated, because the protection of 
political offenders became standard practice. As a result, political offenders, who 
had been the cause for which the practice of extradition had originally been cre-
ated, now became sheltered from it.
Yet, the more lenient treatment of political criminals was not only a result of 
defending these ‘altruistic’ and ‘honourable’ criminals but also of the belief that 
they could not be deterred by punishment. As a result, the death penalty for 
political crimes was abolished in France in 1848. For the same reason, political 
25  See e.g. García-Mora, 1956, 75; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1231; Sofaer, 1986, 126; Pyle, 2001, 82.
26  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 12; Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 954.
27  See e.g. Mulligan, 2006, 405.
28  García-Mora, 1956, 75; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 13.
29  Other limitations were also included in the treaties, but this study concentrates purely on the 
political offence exception.
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criminals had milder imprisonment conditions; they were treated more respect-
fully and forced labour as punishment for political crime was eliminated. For 
instance, France, Italy, Germany and Japan favoured political criminals in their 
punishment systems.30
M. Cherif Bassiouni has underlined that the primary aim of the POE, as well 
as other restrictions and limitations to extradition, was not the protection of the 
individual, but of the advantages of the states involved. The requested state has 
always had discretion in deciding whether the POE is applied and could apply it 
based on its self-interests. For this reason, Bassiouni had proposed in 1969 that 
there should be a juridical standard for the application of the POE.31 According 
to Christopher H. Pyle, the laws created for the protection of political offend-
ers did not express sympathies for the political offenders but rather aimed at 
preventing them from becoming martyrs.32 This preferential treatment was first 
introduced on the domestic level and, only later, brought to international treaties 
on political asylum and the political offence exemption.
In some countries, the treatment of domestic political offenders differed notably 
from the treatment of foreign political offenders. If a political offence was com-
mitted within the state’s own borders, the perpetrator was punished according to 
the laws of the state, even harshly. In cases where the crime had been committed 
abroad, the perpetrator could be set free due to the political motives of the act.33
According to Ingraham and Tokoro, the idea of a separate concept of politi-
cal crime and toleration towards this type of criminals can only arise under very 
specific conditions:
(1) in which the dominant political philosophy was liberalism, (2) where 
the state’s claim to legitimacy was infirm and relativistic, (3) where there 
was a clear division between the concept of the state (as merely representa-
tive of those interests in society politically in the ascendant) and the society 
as a whole, and (4) where the government’s or the state bureaucracy’s 
conception of itself was not as the representative of all the people of the 
society, but rather as the custodian or protector of a constitutional order 
which ensured the institutions constituting the source of its political and 
economic power.34
These conditions were met by most of the European parliamentary and constitu-
tional–monarchical governments during the 19th century. Additionally, accord-
ing to Ingraham and Tokoro, the more lenient treatment of political criminals 
related to the status of these criminals as (former) members of the ruling class. 
30  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 147.
31  Bassiouni, 1969, 224, 227.
32  Pyle, 2001, 81.
33  Coudert, 1909, 140.
34  Article 3, United States–Mexico Extradition Treaty, 22 February 1899. See “Political 
Offence,” 1909.
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Thus the rebels could be seen as idealistic errant ‘sons’ and ‘brothers.’35 In 
addition, many revolutionary movements were initiated by students, and most 
political criminals represented the professional and intellectual segments of the 
bourgeoisie.36
The 19th century gave room to the development of a new political atmos-
phere in which participation in the field of politics was available to a larger crowd 
than before. This gave way to the protection of political criminals but also to 
issues such as the general vote. No longer was it only the ruling class that could 
have a say in politics, but more voices could be heard. As the rights of citizens did 
not evolve at the same pace as the ideological change in a more accepting view of 
political participation, the POE can be seen to have been a ‘vent’ through which 
the desire for change could go through. If expressing dissenting opinions was still 
a crime in one country, another state could offer protection to this person who 
was not considered a criminal.
As such, the POE also represented a means through which the distrust between 
states could be expressed. It was a seemingly neutral and apolitical practice, as it 
was applied by the courts instead of the executive in most states. As such, it 
represented a way to express diplomatic disagreements in a sophisticated matter.
As the POE is historically related to the rise of democracies and liberalism, 
according to some, it is not ideologically neutral and should not be applied as 
such. Others have, in contrast, been of the opinion that courts as neutral organs 
should not take part in evaluating the legitimacy of political goals. For instance, 
Noone and Alexander have been sceptical of naming specific violent tactics ‘ille-
gitimate.’ They have argued that the condemnation of specific violent tactics, 
which they understood to be a reaction to the threat of international terrorism 
could result in imposing an outsider’s point of view on how internal political 
conflicts should be managed.37
3.1.2  POE becomes widely accepted
The sheltering of political criminals for ideological reasons became a common 
practice during the 19th century. The political offence exception spread across 
the world and became a part of most extradition treaties during the 1800s.38
Conservative regimes in Europe were at first opposed to the idea that politi-
cal offenders needed protection and they attempted to pressurise smaller states 
to extraditing political offenders.39 In the 1830s, Prussia, Russia, Austria and 
35  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 154.
36  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 167, footnote 34.
37  Noone and Alexander, 1997, 96.
38  See e.g. Ecuador International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 28 June 1872; 
Convention between the United States of America and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
relating to Extradition for the Mutual Delivery of Criminals, Fugitives from Justice, in Cer-
tain Cases, 3 July 1856; Traité d’Extradition entre la France et la Grèce, 11 April 1906.
39  Pyle, 2001, 80.
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later also Spain agreed to extradite those political criminals who were plotting or 
acting against the crown. However, with the growing need to create extradition 
agreements with liberal states, autocratic states were also coerced to accepting the 
POE from the 1850s onwards.40
Since its independence in 1776, the newborn nation of the United States 
had come to be known as a site of political asylum for fugitives from around the 
world, especially Europe.41 The ‘old world’ was considered a nest for tyrants, due 
to which those fleeing it deserved protection.42 For instance, US President Tyler 
(1841–1845) made a public statement that persons engaging in revolutions for 
liberty would not be extradited.43 For this reason, the POE was consistently used 
in US extradition treaties.
The last ‘old fashioned’ US extradition treaty that did not contain the 
POE was the Webster–Ashburton Treaty of 1842 with Great Britain (United 
Kingdom).44 The aim of the Webster–Ashburton Treaty was in contradiction 
with the growing trend of protecting political offenders of the era. It specifically 
targeted politically motivated criminals who sought to escape justice by cross-
ing the vast US–Canada border. According to Christopher H. Pyle, Article 10, 
which contained the extradition provisions for serious crimes such as “murder, 
or assault with intent to commit murder, or Piracy, or arson, or robbery, or 
Forgery, or the utterance of forged paper”45 was “In modern parlance […] 
intended to end ‘terrorism.’”46
The collaboration in the capturing of political offenders could be related to 
the contemporary political conditions in the US and Great Britain. In the early 
decades of the 1800s, Britain had liberalised and, similarly to the US, turned 
into an asylum for political offenders who had partaken in liberal revolutions 
in Continental Europe. The political relations between the US and Britain had 
normalised, and the US supported Britain against the conservative regimes of 
Prussia, Austria and Naples. As the two nations had converging views over who 
deserved protection, the POE was not necessary. Additionally, the treaty left 
other possibilities to deny extradition for political offenders. Regardless, the lack 
of the POE was criticised in the US Congress.47
40  Pyle, 2001, 83.
41  Clark, 1909, 120. See also e.g. Deere, 1933, 268; Evans, 1969, 204; Stanbrook and Stan-
brook, 2000, vii–viii; Pyle, 2001, 115.
42  Pyle, 2001, 79.
43  McElrath, 2000, 8.
44  The Webster–Ashburton Treaty. Treaty to Settle and Define the Boundaries between the 
Territories of the United States and the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North Amer-
ica, for the Final Suppression of the African Slave Trade, and for the Giving Up of Criminals 
Fugitive from Justice, in Certain Cases, 9 August 1842. See Pyle, 2001, 68, for more details 
on this treaty.
45  Article 10, The Webster–Ashburton Treaty, 9 August 1842.
46  Pyle, 2001, 72.
47  Pyle, 2001, 67–75.
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The POE was introduced to US extradition conventions in the 1843 treaty 
with France.48 Since then, it was added to all US extradition treaties studied49 
except for the 1852 treaty with Germany (Prussia and Germanic Confederation).50 
The scope of the POE in the US–France treaty was more limited than in future 
US extradition treaties. It denied extradition only for crimes or offences “of a 
purely political character.”51 Such provision was actually unnecessary. As extra-
dition provisions of that era typically did, this treaty contained a limited list of 
extraditable offences, which did not incorporate any ‘purely political’ offences.52 
In other words, purely political crimes would not have been extraditable even if 
the POE would have not been included in the treaty.
Along with the US–Mexico treaty of 1899,53 the US–France treaty was the 
only US extradition treaty to limit the POE to pure political crimes. It is pos-
sible that between the then-liberal government of France and the US a wider 
exemption was not considered necessary.54 Interestingly enough, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1, the POE in the US–France treaty of 1996 covered a 
wide range of crimes that were connected with political offences as well as crimes 
inspired by political motives.
The fact that all US extradition treaties, except for one, since the French treaty 
of 1843 contained the POE can be seen to represent a quick breakthrough of the 
liberalist ideology that considered political offenders as a special class of criminals, 
worthy of protection. It is interesting that this solution became diplomatically 
acceptable, as invoking the POE is essentially a way of expressing distrust in the 
impartiality of the judiciary of the requesting state.55
48  Convention for the Surrender of Criminals between the United States of America and His 
Majesty the King of the French, 8 Stat. 580 (1844), 9 November 1843.
49  See Appendix.
50  Convention for the Mutual Delivery of Criminals, United States and Germany (Prussia and 
Germanic Confederation), 16 June 1852.
51  Article 5, Convention for the Surrender of Criminals between the United States of America 
and His Majesty the King of the French, 8 Stat. 580 (1844), 9 November 1843.
52  The offences extradition was granted for were: “murder, (comprehending the crimes des-
ignated in the French Penal Code by the terms, assassination, parricide, infanticide, and 
poisoning,) or with an attempt to commit murder, or with rape, or with forgery, or with 
arson, or with embezzlement by public officers, when the same is punishable with infamous 
punishment.” Article 2, Convention for the Surrender of Criminals between the United 
States of America and His Majesty the King of the French, 8 Stat. 580 (1844), 9 November 
1843. Even if a typical extradition treaty in the 19th century provided for a list of extradit-
able crimes which did not include pure political offences, for instance Samuel T. Spear saw 
it to be unclear whether the POE protected those who committed relative political offences. 
Spear, 1885, 50.
53  Article 3, United States–Mexico Extradition Treaty, 22 February 1899.
54  Pyle, 2001, 74. Also David Dudley Field in his well-known study “Outlines of an Interna-
tional Code” suggested that only pure political crimes should be exempted from extradition. 
Art. 215 (1), Field, 1876, 108.
55  Gilbert, 1985, 695.
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Coming to the 1860s, the POE had become a common feature in most extra-
dition treaties between Western states.56 The importance of the POE was also 
reinforced by the esteemed Institute of International Law at its Oxford meeting 
in 1880. In the resolution finalised at the meeting, it was suggested that political 
acts should be excluded from the scope of extradition.57 In 1892 its Geneva ses-
sion confirmed this view.58 The POE also received support from the First South 
American Congress on Private International Law held in 1889.59
The Institute of International Law (IIL) specifically discussed the need to pro-
tect both pure and relative political offences, “provided the crimes are not of the 
graver sort, from the point of view of morals and the ordinary penal law.” Such 
grave crimes were listed to include “assassination, murder, poisoning, mutila-
tions and severe wilful and premeditated woundings, attempts to commit crimes 
of these sorts, and attacks against property by burning, explosion, inundation, as 
well as grand larceny, especially those that are committed with weapons in hand 
and with violence.” Also, crimes committed during an insurrection or civil war 
were to be excluded from the scope of extradition, “unless these acts constitute 
acts of odious barbarity and of vandalism which are prohibited by the laws of 
war.”60 The limitations the IIL set for the POE only became more common after 
the threat of terrorism spread in the West since the 1970s, as argued in this book. 
The limitations with regard to damage to property only emerged on the legisla-
tive level at the beginning of the 2000s61 and are still not widely accepted.
Some states regard the POE as a rule established under international law.62 
The fact that the exception is incorporated into a vast amount of extradition 
treaties, especially in Western countries, would support this claim.63 However, 
this view is controversial.64 For instance, Oppenheim’s widely cited Handbook in 
56  Pyle, 2001, 83.
57  Article 13: “L’extradition ne peut avoir lieu pour faits politiques.” Justifia et Pace, Institut de 
Droit International, Session d’Oxford, Résolutions d’Oxford (Extradition), 9 September 1880.
58  Cited in Ferrari, 1920, 310–1. An agreement with a similar provision was soon concluded 
by the US and Mexico in 1899. Extradition Treaty with Mexico, 22 February 1899, Article 
III, para. 2, 31 Stat. 1818. Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1231.
59  Article 16, First South American Congress on Private International Law, Treaty on Interna-
tional Penal Law, 23 January 1889.
60  Article 2, Révision des articles 13 et 14 des Résolutions d’Oxford (Extradition) Justifia et 
Pace, Institut de Droit International, Session de Genève, 8 September 1892. Translation/
citation in Ferrari, 1920, 310–311.
61  See in more detail Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3.
62  Gilbert, 1985, 696.
63  See Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 1, for a list of treaties where this principle was incorporated in 
1980. See also the Appendix of this book with a list of US extradition treaties.
64  For instance, only recently, in 2010 Michael Abbell wrote: “In 1834, France introduced the 
political offence exception into its treaties, and by the 1850’s it had become a general prin-
ciple of international law incorporated in the extradition treaties of Belgium, England, and 
the United States as well.” Abbell, 2010, 115, italics added. Then again, Gilbert has noted 
that according to most commentators and cases, it seems that the POE is a matter of state 
practice, not international law. Gilbert, 1991, 117.
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International Law claims that “Political criminals are, as a rule, not extradited,”65 
but, at the same time, it comes to the conclusion that there probably is no rule of 
international customary law that prevents the extradition of political criminals.66
In 1935, a group of American legal scholars and jurists published a Draft 
Convention on Extradition, as a part of a wider series of drafts in key questions in 
international law organised by Harvard Law School. The League of Nations had 
attempted to create a draft convention on the matter in 1925, but failed. The aim 
of the 1935 convention was to provide for a starting point for a wider codification 
of international law. It contained the POE and gave the following description of 
political offences for the purposes of its application: 
As it is used in this Convention, the term ‘political offence’ includes trea-
son, sedition and espionage, whether committed by one or more persons; 
it includes any offence connected with the activities of an organised group 
directed against the security or governmental system of the requesting State; 
and it does not exclude other offenses having a political objective.67
A heated debate on whether the non-extradition of political offenders is a rule of 
international law was provoked by the European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism signed in 1977.68 The convention excluded terrorism from the scope 
of the political offence exception. Some experts argued that this was a derogation 
from a principle of international law. A conclusive answer to whether it actually 
was such was not found.69
Regardless of its widespread usage, the POE never became standard practice 
in all extradition treaties. For instance, the Commonwealth Fugitive Offenders 
Act of 1881, aiming at protecting persons against injustice, oppression and undue 
punishment did not contain the POE.70 Even if it could be explained by the 
political unity of the Empire, the lack of the POE was considered controver-
sial. Once the Commonwealth countries gained independence, the need for the 
creation of new extradition treaties incorporating the POE emerged. The new 
Commonwealth Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders of 1966 
65  Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 959.
66  Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 963.
67  Art. 5, Draft Convention on Extradition (Harvard Draft). See American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, General Introduction, Supplement, 1935, 1–14.
68  The details of this convention are discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.5.
69  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 43–44: “Briefly summarised, both parties based their conclusions 
on the following data in international extradition law: (i) the political offence exception 
is a generally accepted principle in extradition law. This can be deduced from the general 
incidence of the rule in extradition laws and treaties; (ii) may extradition laws and treaties 
have, however, provided for exceptions to the political offence exception; (iii) except for the 
Genocide Convention, such exceptions were never generally accepted, and several times, 
proposals to restrict the political offence exception in international treaties were rejected.”
70  Commonwealth Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881, 44 and 45 Vic. c. 69 (Imperial). See also 
Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 966.
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included all the standard features of modern extradition treaty practice, including 
the POE.71
Even if the POE became commonly used, its formulations were not consistent. 
Soon it also became subject to limitations. However, the formulations and the 
limitations did not make the POE lose its essence, at least not before the 1980s.
A notable amount of early extradition treaties used the British Extradition Act 
of 1870 as a model. The act contained the following formulation of the POE: 
“The provisions of this Convention shall not import a claim of extradition for 
any crime or offence of a political character, nor for acts connected with such 
crimes or offences; and no person surrendered by or to either of the Contracting 
Parties in virtue of this Convention shall be tried or punished for a political crime 
or offence.”72 This, according to García-Mora, “set the pattern for the standard 
treatment of relative political offences in Anglo-American law.”73
Other types of formulations were also widely used. For instance, according to 
the Montevideo Convention on Extradition, adopted by the American Republics 
in 1933, extradition could be denied “when the offence is of a political nature or 
of a character related thereto.”74 Article 4 of the Pan American Convention on 
Territorial Asylum of 195475 stipulated that the “right of extradition is not appli-
cable in connection with persons who, in accordance with the qualifications of 
the solicited State, are sought for political offences, or for common offences com-
mitted for political ends, or when extradition is solicited for predominantly politi-
cal motives.” The European Convention on Extradition from 1957 provides that 
extradition may not be granted for “political acts.” Another formula excludes a 
person from the scope of extradition “when the crime or offence for which the 
person’s extradition is requested is of a political character.”76 A common formula-
tion has been to exclude “political offences or acts connected therewith” (Actes 
connexes in the French version).77
The British Extradition Act of 1870 had repeated the inclusion of ‘connected 
offences’ in addition to crimes of a political character that had its roots already 
71  Commonwealth 1966: Rendition of Fugitive Offenders within the Commonwealth (Cm 
3008, 1966). Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 967; Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 
11.
72  s3(1) Extradition Act, 1870 (33 and 34 Vict. c. 52); Gilbert, 1991, 121; Abbell, 2010, 115. 
The POE was repeated in the same form in the s4(1)(a) Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 and in 
s2(2)(a) Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965. Gilbert, 1991, 121.
73  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1240. See also Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 954.
74  Article 3 (e) Convention on extradition adopted by the seventh International Conference of 
American States, 26 December 1933 (Montevideo Convention).
75  The Pan American Convention on Territorial Asylum, 28 March 1954.
76  See e.g. Extradition Treaty of 13 January 1961 between the United States and Brazil.
77  The concept of ‘connected offence’ was not generally accepted in common law countries, 
but it has persisted in the French language. For instance it has been included in the French 
version of the European Convention on Extradition. Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 5. 
Such a clause was included for instance in the Convention Concerning Extradition and Judi-
cial Assistance in Criminal Matters, between Israel and Italy on 24 February 1956.
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in the 1833 Belgian Extradition Act and the 1834 Belgian–French treaty.78 This 
widened the coverage of the exception and seems to have made it applicable also 
to a variety of offences.79
This feature was commonly used. For instance, the US–Belgium extradition 
treaty of 1882 stated: “The provisions of this convention shall not be applicable 
to persons guilty of any political crime or offence or of one connected with such 
a crime or offence.”80
However, even if this clause was codified in the British Extradition Act, it 
was not added to all UK treaties. For instance, it was not included in the UK–
Argentine treaty of 1889.81 By comparison, the United States incorporated the 
exclusion of connected offences to a fifth of its extradition treaties.82 No US case 
apparently ever dealt with connected offences, but according to Michael Abbell, 
the connection between the connected crime and the political offence would 
have needed to be straightforward. If a suspect was sought for different acts, 
some of political and some of common character, their extradition could have 
been denied for the offences of a political character, but still granted for the com-
mon offences.83
In addition to extending the POE to connected offences, the British 
Extradition Act of 1870 also provided for the denial of extradition in case it 
seemed that the motivation behind the request was to punish the fugitive for a 
political offence.84 The same clause was added to for instance the US–Colombia 
treaty from 1888: “If it be made to appear that the extradition is sought with 
the view of trying or punishing the person demanded for an offence of a political 
character, surrender shall not take place; nor shall any person be tried or punished 
for a political offence, committed previously to extradition, or for any offence 
other than that for which extradition was granted.”85 Similarly, almost a century 
later, the 1970 Spain–US treaty provided that extradition could be denied if 
“[the requested] Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for 
78  Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1240. It was also repeated in later French–Belgian treaties. Article 
2, Convention d’extradition France-Belgique 29 April 1869. See also Article 3, Conven-
tion d’extradition France-Belgique 15 August 1874; Article 4, Traité d’extradition entre la 
France et la Pologne, 30 December 1925; Treaty on extradition between France and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 14 August 1876.
79  The idea of “connected offences” was alive still after the Second World War. See e.g. Con-
vention on Extradition between the United States of America and Sweden, 24 October 
1961, Article 5. See also Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1232.
80  Article 4, US–Belgium extradition treaty, 13 June 1882.
81  Article 6, United Kingdom–Argentina Treaty for the mutual extradition of fugitive criminals, 
22 May 1889, as amended by the Protocol of 12 December 1890.
82  Twenty-five out of the 121 treaties studied. See Appendix with the listing of all US extradi-
tion treaties and their contents.
83  Abbell, 2010, 117–118.
84  s3(1) Extradition Act, 1870.
85  Article 5, Convention between the United States of America and Colombia for the reciprocal 
extradition of criminals, 7 May 1888.
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extradition has been made for the purpose of trying or punishing a person for an 
offence of the above-mentioned character.”86 The provision was also added to 
the so-called Bustamante code, which was an attempt to establish common rules 
amongst American states in 1928.87
This provision is closely related to the discrimination clause, as it requires 
the requested state to evaluate the motives behind the request. However, where 
the discrimination clause is applied when it is suspected that the fugitive cannot 
receive fair treatment in the requesting country, this clause necessitated that 
the fugitive was in fact wanted for another crime than the one the request was 
made for.
A less protective view was offered by for instance the treaty between the US 
and the UK from 1889, which stated that a “fugitive criminal shall not be surren-
dered if the offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded be of a political 
character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been 
made with a view to try to punish him for an offence of a political character.”88 
Similar or identical wordings can be found in many extradition treaties between 
different countries from the same period.89 As opposed to the Colombia treaty, 
where a suspicion that the fugitive was requested for other crimes than the ones 
they were sought for was enough, this provision left the burden of proof on the 
matter to the fugitive himself. This formulation was used in US extradition trea-
ties for a long time, and it was included in for instance the 1947 treaty with South 
86  Article 5/A/4, Spain International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 29 May 1970. 
A similar provision is in Article 7 of the Treaty on Extradition between the Kingdom of 
Denmark and the United States of America, 22 June 1972: “if the requested State has reason 
to assume that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or 
punish him for a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence.” Also see 
Article 4 of the Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 June 1978. 
Article 4 of the Japan International Extradition Treaty with the United States (3 March 
1978) allows the court to consider whether the request appears to be politically motivated.
87  Article 356, Código de Derecho Internacional Privado (Código de Bustamante) Conven-
ción de Derecho Internacional Privado, 20 February 1928.
88  Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for the Mutual 
Extradition of Fugitive Criminals, 12 July 1889. See also the identical provisions in other 
extradition treaties between the US and the UK. Article 6, Extradition Treaty between His 
Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of Amer-
ica, 22 December 1931.
89  See e.g. Article 5, Treaty on Extradition between France and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, 14 August 1876; Article 6 Treaty between the United King-
dom and Finland for the Extradition of Criminals, 30 May 1924; “L’extradition ne sera 
pas accordée si l’infraction pour laquelle elle est demandée, est considérée par la partie req-
uise comme un délit politique ou un fait connexe à un semblable délit, ou sit l’individu 
réclamé prouve que la demande d’extradition a été faite en réalité dans le but de le poursuivre 
pour une infraction de cette nature.” Article 6, Traité d’Extradition entre la France et la 
Grèce, 11 April 1906; Article 6, Convention d’extradition entre la France et les Etats-Unis 
d’Amérique, 6 January 1909; Article 6, Convention d’extradition entre la Bulgarie et la 
France, 29 December 1911; Article 6, Treaty between Great Britain and Latvia for the 
Extradition of Criminals, 16 July 1924.
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Africa,90 the 1971 treaty with Canada,91 the 1972 treaty with Argentina92 and the 
1973 treaty with Italy93 among others.94
Abbell has pointed out that this provision requires the requested state taking 
a position on the internal politics of the requesting country. As this is a foreign 
policy matter, courts have been reluctant to take a stance with regard to it.95
3.1.3  Exception to the exception: the attentat clause of 1856
The man in the street would recoil in horror should you ask him to class as 
equally entitled to asylum on American soil men like Lafayette or Carl Schurz 
and the Communists of 1870 who cruelly tortured and killed, General Breda, an 
honourable and distinguished officer, who, desiring to save useless bloodshed, 
presented himself with a white flag as a messenger of peace. The spontaneous dif-
ferentiation which the universal instinct of every civilised community would make 
between such cases, may not as yet correspond to any legal distinction […].96
As discussed earlier, the key problem of the political offence exception to 
extradition has been the definition of political offences and their varied nature. 
The concept has often seemed to cover a variety of deeds, more or less connected 
with politics, from non-violent resistance to the state to extremely violent attacks 
against civilians. Thus the category is open to many different types of offenders, 
but the special treatment considers them to be only one homogenous group.
The statement opening this section was given by Mr Frederic R. Coudert of 
New York City at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law in 1909. He continued: 
The query is: can some method be found, by which international law, keeping in 
touch with the moral requirements of the age, shall differentiate between those 
who have sought refuge here, after having honestly and fairly – although by 
revolutionary methods – sought to change or modify, a governmental system, 
and those who, although their acts may have been inspired by political motives, 
have yet been guilty of acts generally reprobated by all civilised nations?97
90  Article 6, Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa Relat-
ing to Extradition, 18 December 1947.
91  Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America, 3 December 1971.
92  Article 7, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Argentina, 21 January 1972.
93  Article 6, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Italy, 18 January 
1973.
94  Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Paraguay, 24 May 1973; Article 7, Extradition Treaty between the United States of America 
and Finland, 11 June 1976; Article 7, Extradition Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Kingdom of Norway, 9 June 1977.
95  Abbell, 2010, 118.
96  Coudert, 1909, 126.
97  Coudert, 1909, 127.
86 Rise and decline of romantic liberalism 
In the same meeting, J. Reuben Clark, assistant solicitor of the Department of 
State, also questioned whether there could not be a political act that was so bar-
barous that it should not be protected by the exception and whether the limits 
should be similar to the rules of war.98
Since its early days, the political offence exception created diplomatic prob-
lems. There is still no conclusive agreement on how to distinguish political crimes 
from common crimes and justified political crimes from non-justified ones. 
Creating exceptions to the political offence exemption has been an attempt to 
tackle at least part of the problem. With exceptions to the exception, some of the 
most violent crimes, sometimes including terrorism, have been more or less suc-
cessfully excluded from the scope of the protection.
Soon after the creation of the POE, it became obvious that it offered protec-
tion to persons who were able to destabilise the fragile new world order. These 
people were the assassins of heads of state. Two decades after the creation of the 
POE, the so-called Belgium clause, later better known as the attentat clause, was 
created to exclude this form of political violence from the scope of protection of 
the POE. The clause was the first where depoliticisation was used with regard to 
a specific violent act.
The attentat clause was introduced as a reaction to the Jacquin case, where 
France requested the extradition of Celestin Jacquin, who allegedly had attempted 
to kill Emperor Napoleon the III. The request was turned down by the Court 
of Appeal of Brussels, on account of the political offence exception. This deci-
sion caused a major diplomatic problem. Finally, France withdrew its request but 
pressured Belgium into adding a clause preventing the application of the POE in 
similar future cases.99 The text was as follows: 
Ne sera pas repute délit politique ni fait connexe à semblable délit, l’attentat 
contre la personne du chef d’un gouvernement étranger ou contre celle des 
membres de sa famille lorsque cet attentat constitue le fait, soit de meurtre, 
soit d’assassinat, soit d’empoisonnement.100 
In other words, this provision thus excluded attacks against the life of a head of 
state or their family members from the scope of the protection of the POE and 
thus depoliticised these acts.
The attentat clause became a widely accepted standard in extradition trea-
ties.101 Its use was recommended by the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 
98  Clark, 1909, 122–123. Raising the topic on the rules of war with regard to terrorist vio-
lence has been repeated quite often since then. Some have argued that terrorism should be 
punished under these rules, whereas others have stated that this is impossible as terrorism 
is a violent act committed during times of peace.
99  Deere, 1933, 252; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 15; Sofaer, 1986, 127.
100  Cited in Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 15.
101  See e.g. Oppenheim, Jennings and Watts, 1992, 969.
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1898,102 and according to Richard Bach Jensen, this led to its spread into most 
European countries before World War I.103
The contents of the clause have varied, sometimes covering only attacks against 
the lives of heads of state, but sometimes also those of their families or members 
of the government. In some cases, it has covered different types of violent acts, 
and sometimes only murders. Typical wording for the attentat clause can be 
found for instance in the US–Belgium treaty of 1882: “An attempt against the 
life of the head of a foreign Government, or against that of any member of his 
family, when such attempt comprises the act either of murder or assassination, or 
of poisoning, shall not be considered a political offence or an act connected with 
such an offence.”104
The Belgian treaty introduced the clause to US extradition treaties. It was 
drawn soon after the assassination of US President Garfield, so it is possible to 
interpret the adding of the clause as a reaction to this event. The same clause 
formed a part of many later treaties but was formulated a bit differently.105 
For instance, in the 1909 Honduras International Extradition Treaty with the 
United States,106 “When the offence charged comprises the act either of murder 
or assassination or of poisoning, either consummated or attempted, the fact 
that the offence was committed or attempted against the life of the sovereign or 
head of a foreign state or against the life of any member of his family, shall not 
be deemed sufficient to sustain that such a crime or offence was of a political 
character, or was an act connected with crimes or offences of a political char-
acter.” A similar provision was added by the United States to the 1911 Treaty 
102  Discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
103  Jensen, 1981, 330–331.
104  Article 4, US–Belgium extradition treaty, 13 June 1882. See also Spears, 1885, 49. The 
same provision was added for instance to the Extradition Treaty between Guatemala and 
the USA, 27 February 1903. In French, a nearly identical formulation can be found for 
instance in the Franco–Belgian treaty of 1869: “Ne sera pas réputé délit politique ni fait 
connexe à un semblable délit l’attentat contre la personne d’un souverain étranger ou con-
tre celles des membres de sa famille, lorsque cet attentat constituera le fait soit de meurtre, 
soit d’assassinat, soit d’empoisonnement” (Article 2, Convention d’extradition France-Bel-
gique, 29 April 1869). In the Franco–Belgian treaty of 1874, the formulation “souverain 
étranger” was changed to “Chef d’un état étranger.” See also e.g. Article 8, France–Saxe-
Weimar: Convention d’extradition, 7 August 1858; Article 4, Traité d’extradition entre la 
France et la Pologne, 30 December 1925.
105  See e.g. the extradition treaty between the United States of America and Turkey from 1923, 
where the formulation talks about “political crimes or offences” instead of just “political 
offences.” Article 3, Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Turkey, 
6 August 1923. The same provision was for instance in the Greece International Extradi-
tion Treaty with the United States, 6 May 1931, Article 3. However, the 1979 treaty 
with Turkey talks about offences of political character. Article 3, Treaty on Extradition 
and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Turkey, 7 June 1979.
106  Article 3, Honduras International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 15 January 
1909.
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of Extradition with El Salvador,107 to the 1923 treaty with Estonia,108 the 1925 
treaty with the Czech Republic,109 the 1927 treaty with Poland,110 the 1930 
treaty with Austria111 and the 1931 treaty with Greece.112 Also, the 1933 Inter-
American Convention on Extradition states that attempts “against the life or 
person of the Chief of State or member of his family shall not be deemed to be 
a political offence.”113
The difference between this provision and the earlier versions lay in the way 
the depoliticisation was done. The US–Belgium treaty of 1882 was the first one 
in US extradition treaties to depoliticise certain acts, but the later treaties had 
a much stronger formula of depoliticisation. Whilst the Belgian treaty along 
with others marked that an attempt against the life of a head of state or their 
family member “shall not be considered a political offence,”114 for instance, the 
Honduras treaty stated that such an attempt “shall not be deemed sufficient to 
sustain that such a crime or offence was of a political character.”115 
The first formulation used in the US–Belgium treaty merely suggests that for 
the purposes of the treaty, the crimes shall not be considered political; in other 
words, the formulation talks about how the crimes are treated. The formulation 
in the Honduras treaty, in turn, expresses that the nature of such crime is not 
political. Even if the outcome of these statements might be identical, the second 
formulation is interesting as it denies the political nature of a pronouncedly politi-
cal act: the killing of a head of state.116
107  Article 3, Treaty of Extradition between the United States of America and El Salvador, 18 
April 1911.
108  Article 3, Extradition Convention between the United States of America and Estonia, 8 
November 1923.
109  Article 3, Czech Republic International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 2 July 
1925.
110  Article 3, Treaty of Extradition between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Poland, 22 November 1927.
111  Article 3, Convention between the United States of America and Austria Regarding the 
Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, 31 January 1930.
112  Article 3, Greece International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 6 May 1931. See 
also Article 4, Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 June 1978.
113  Article 3(e), Article 3, Convention on Extradition Adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States, 26 December 1933.
114  See e.g. the 1933 Inter-American Convention on Extradition that states that extradition 
may not be granted when the offence is of a political nature or of a character related 
thereto. Article 3(e) of the Montevideo Convention 1933 also states that attempts “against 
the life or person of the Chief of State or member of his family shall not be deemed to be 
a political offence.” See also Article 5, Mexico International Extradition Treaty with the 
United States, 4 May 1978.
115  Article 3, Honduras International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 15 January 
1909.
116  For instance Colin Wight has argued that political assassinations should not be labelled ter-
rorism. “To claim that an action is not terrorism but political assassination is not to justify 
it, or excuse it. So to reiterate, groups that explicitly target only state actors should not be 
labelled terrorist.” Wight, 2015, 117.
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The application of the attentat clause was never consistent. In some cases, the 
POE was applied to protect those who had committed an attack against a head of 
state. For instance, an Italian court found in 1934 the murder of King Alexander 
of Yugoslavia to be a political offence.117 When the attentat clause was added to 
the European Convention on Extradition of 1957, the first multilateral conven-
tion on extradition in Europe, 5 out of the 19 signatory states of the European 
Convention on Extradition, formulated a reservation with regard to it, retaining 
the right to, in some cases, treat the killing of a head of state as a political crime.118 
The attentat clause persisted well over a century, during which period it typically 
remained the only limitation to the POE.119
In addition to excluding attacks against heads of state, some extradition trea-
ties depoliticised all crimes against life and thus excluded them from the politi-
cal offence exception. An example of this can be found in the aforementioned 
resolutions of the Institute of International Law Geneva meeting in 1892. This 
was however not common practice. Usually, other criteria were also invoked.120
The exclusion of all crimes against life, the so-called unqualified attentat 
clause, was added to the Model Draft of an Extradition Treaty prepared by a Sub-
Commission of the International Penal and Prison Commission in 1931, which 
excluded from the scope of the POE all murders and attempted murders “if they are 
committed with special barbarity or cruelty.”121 The Arab States and Arab League 
Extradition Agreement of 1952, excluded, in addition to “crimes of assault against 
monarchs, presidents of States, their spouses or their direct descendants,” “crimes 
of assault against crown princes” and “crimes of premeditated murder” as well as 
“terroristic crimes” from the scope of political offences.122 This treaty was the first 
multilateral extradition treaty to do such an exclusion. The agreement was signed by 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, and ratified by Egypt (with 
reservations concerning the limitations to the POE), Jordan and Saudi Arabia.123
The unqualified attentat clause was not typically used in US bilateral extradi-
tion treaties. However, the 1930 extradition treaty with Germany and the US 
contained the following version of it: “However, a wilful crime against human 
life, except in battle or an open combat, shall in no case be deemed a crime 
117  See Section 3.2.5 or a detailed discussion on the case. Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 136–37.
118  Article 3, European Convention on Extradition Paris, Treaty Series No. 24, 13 December 
1957.
119  See e.g. Article 3, Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning Extradition and Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, 27 June 1962.
120  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 139.
121  Cited in Green, 1962, 339. Green makes an interesting observation concerning the defin-
ing of political crime in this draft. Article 6 seems to suggest that also “ordinary” persons 
can thus be victims of political crime, but the same article seems to suggest that political 
crimes are such crimes that are directed against state authority only. Green, 1962, 340.
122  Article 4 (4), The Arab States and the Arab League Extradition Agreement, 14 September 
1952.
123  Shearer, 1971, 52.
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of a political character or an act connected with crimes of offences of such 
character.”124 The German Extradition Act of 1929 contained a similar provision.
Also the French–German treaty of 1951 excluded crimes against life committed 
outside of an open combat situation from the protection of the POE, but the for-
mulation in this treaty was different to that of the US–Germany treaty: “Le caractère 
politique de l’infraction ne fera pas de plein droit obstacle à l’extradition dés lors 
qu’il s’agit d’un attentat à la vie non commis en combat ouvert.”125 In other words, 
according to this treaty, the political character of the offences does not limit the pos-
sibility to extradite, while the US–German treaty depoliticised the mentioned crimes 
by saying that they were not be regarded as crimes of a political character.
An even more restrictive formulation of the POE can be found in two Finnish 
extradition treaties from the 1920s. In both the Estonia–Finland and the Austria–
Finland treaty, all predominantly common crimes were excluded from the scope 
of the protection of the POE.126 The same exclusion was done in the US–
Argentina treaty of 1972,127 but replaced with other, more common limitations 
in the renewed US–Argentina treaty of 1997.128 The US–Austria treaty of 1998 
also categorically excluded murders from the political offences protected by the 
POE.129 The same is true of the 1999 treaty with South Africa.130 Such a provision 
has become more common in the 2000s. For instance, the Canada–Italy treaty 
124  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between Germany and the United States of America, 12 July 
1930.
125  Article 4, Décret n 59-1352 portant publication de la Convention franco-allemande 
d’extradition du 29 novembre 1951, 29 November 1951.
126  Article 3, Extradition Convention between Estonia and Finland, 2 January 1925; Article 
3, Convention Relating to Extradition and Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters between 
Austria and Finland, 22 October 1928. Not all Finnish extradition treaties contained this 
clause, e.g. the UK–Finland treaty dating from the same period did not have such an exclu-
sion. See e.g. Article 6, Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Finland, 30 
May 1924.
127  Article 7, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Argentina, 21 January 1972: “Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following 
circumstances: e) When the offence in respect of which the extradition is requested is of a 
political character or is connected with an offence of a political character, or when the per-
son whose extradition is requested proves that the extradition is requested for the purpose 
of trying or punishing him for an offence of the abovementioned character. The allegation 
of a political motive or end shall not impede the extradition if the alleged offence consti-
tutes primarily a common offence, in which case the requested Party may request that the 
requesting Party give assurance that the political motive or end will not contribute to the 
aggravation of the penalty.”
128  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Argentina Republic and the United States of 
America, 10 July 1997
129  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Austria and the 
Government of the United States of America, 8 January 1998.
130  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Republic of South Africa (with annex), 16.9.1999. See also Article 
3 (1) (b) (c) and (d), Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa on Extradition, 12 November 1999, excluding for instance 
murder, inflicting serious bodily harm and sexual assault from the protection of the POE.
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of 2005 excludes crimes such as the unlawful killing of a human being, inflicting 
serious bodily harm and criminal conduct of a sexual nature from the scope of 
political crimes.131
The unqualified attentat clause provides a strong ideological statement: no 
crime against life should be considered political. The application of this limitation 
more widely would have ended the controversies that later rendered the whole 
POE almost extinct. Then again, its application would have also prevented the 
protection to a number of political offenders whose actions have been seen as 
legitimate by some or many.
3.1.4  Four reasons behind the political offence exception
As described, the political offence exemption was born during an era of political 
turmoil during the Age of Revolution. As a new liberal ideology emerged, the 
political criminal was now seen as someone worthy of protection. For the pur-
poses of this study, it is worth analysing the exemption a bit further. What did the 
political criminals deserve protection from? How was their status viewed?
Several considerations have motivated the creation of the POE. First, as their 
crimes target the institutional existence or structure of the state, political crimi-
nals are less likely to receive fair treatment than common criminals. For this rea-
son, one of the aims of the exception has been to protect political criminals from 
unfair treatment, due to the political passions of those involved in the judicial 
process.132
The protection from unfair trials is one of the main reasons for the pertinence 
of the POE.133 However, the efficiency of the exemption in serving this purpose 
is debatable. Other means, such as the discrimination clause, have been seen as 
more efficient and less problematic.
According to Miriam E. Sapiro, the exception is a “poor means” to accom-
plish the aim of protecting the political offenders from unfair trials. First, she has 
argued, it is wrong to assume that the political offender would necessarily receive 
arbitrary punishments. Second, non-political offenders who are not protected by 
the clause are at risk of being treated unfairly. Finally, other types of case-by-case 
protection mechanisms are available in cases where a political offence has been 
committed as a reaction to an illegal deed by the requesting state.134
Also, Bradley G. Kulman has been critical of the use of the POE in protect-
ing fugitives from retaliatory trials. According to him, the fact that the POE has 
been incorporated into the majority of extradition treaties with those including 
131  Article 3 (a) (ii) (iii) and (iv), Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of the Italian Republic Concerning Extradition, 13 January 2005.
132  See e.g. Deere, 1933, 250; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1226; Bassiouni, 1969, 232; Vallée, 1976, 
772; Petersen, 1992, 776.
133  See e.g. García-Mora, 1956, 75; Bassiouni, 1969, 232; Schlaefer, 1981, 642–643; Groarke, 
1988, 1543; Pyle, 2001, 119.
134  Sapiro, 1986, 663–65.
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dictatorships demonstrates its illogical use. Should the possibility of arbitrary trials 
be the main concern behind the exception, different countries should be treated 
differently in extradition treaties. This idea will be discussed in more detail, espe-
cially in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.5.
Second, the aim of the political offence exemption was to lessen international 
tensions. According to Kirchheimer, the consistent implementation of the POE 
protects courts from political pressure.135 Denying extradition for all political 
offenders ideally prevents situations that force the state of refuge to take a stand 
on the internal political conflicts of the requesting state. The aim for political 
neutrality hides an amount of cynicism, as it is partly based on the idea that the 
political offender might at some point become part of a legitimate government in 
the state she or he has targeted.136
Third, the POE has also been justified by the idea that political crimes lack 
some of the elements of ordinary crimes.137 Specifically, pure political crimes 
can be seen to lack malice, which is one of the essential elements of an ordi-
nary crime.138 Thus, the lack of personal motivation would abolish the criminal 
nature of the act. As discussed earlier, some view political crimes as acts deserving 
glorification.139
The aim of a political crime is to change the political situation and injure 
the public rights of an existing government. The motivations of the perpetra-
tor are not private but public concerns. Further, as they target the government, 
(pure) political crimes do not violate the private rights of individuals. However, as 
Antje Petersen and Manuel R. García-Mora have argued, this is only applicable to 
‘pure’ political offences, such as treason, sedition and espionage, as they generally 
are victimless because they only target governmental structures.140
Fourth, according to some, political offenders should be exempt from extra-
dition, as political offences do not cause a threat to the legal order globally. As 
they are motivated by local conflicts, their implications are also limited to a local 
setting. This idea, however, nowadays seems outdated because states are highly 
interconnected and because the modern terrorist threat cannot be understood 
as targeting only one specific government. Modern means of communications 
and transportation enable some political crimes to become threats to the entire 
international public order. States share an interest in suppressing these types of 
offences, especially those that target like-minded governments.141
Whether the political offence exemption, in fact, serves the presented four 
purposes remains debated. The political offence exception is based on rather 
135  Kirchheimer, 1961, 384.
136  See e.g. Deere, 1933, 249; Vallée, 1976, 772; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 2–3, 204–205; 
Petersen, 1992, 776.
137  See e.g. Vallée, 1976, 772.
138  Clark, 1909, 97–98; Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1237.
139  Clark, 1909, 97; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 29.
140  Petersen, 1992, 776.
141  Kulman, 1986, 772; Sapiro, 1986, 664.
 Rise and decline of romantic liberalism 93
complicated political considerations. On the one hand, it aims at protecting 
individuals against unfair trials and providing them with the opportunity to rise 
against tyrannical regimes. On the other hand, this cannot be done at the expense 
of the international public order.142 For instance, Sapiro has been critical of the 
possibility of the exception to actually serve these outspoken goals. She has sup-
ported the right of the individuals to promote political change, but simultane-
ously underlined the importance of extradition serving its function by not making 
“culpability to disappear miraculously at the border.”143
The most common and perhaps the most substantial critique of the POE 
has been expressed by Ivor and Clive Stanbrook who have called the POE as a 
legal minefield.144 They, along with Christine van den Wijngaert and David M. 
Lieberman, have pointed out that on the one hand, the exemption might end 
up sheltering those who have committed severe crimes, protected due to their 
political motivation, and on the other, it may fail to protect those who may face 
an unfair trial for a common offence if extradited. This reflects the reality of the 
political offence exemption; it is a balancing act between public order and safety 
on the one hand, and the human rights of both the offenders as well as their 
victims on the other.145
It is clear that the evaluation of a political crime will never be free from politi-
cal considerations. There are several reasons for which a state might either deny 
or accept an extradition request. It can have a concern for preserving the human 
rights of the offender; it may wish to confirm its dedication to certain ideals or 
values, or it can act on the basis of its own political interests or the interests of 
a specific group in power. The POE is weak even in protecting ‘pure’ politi-
cal offenders. When both the requesting state and the asylum state have similar 
political views or converging interests, extradition might still be granted regard-
less of the nature of the crime.146
In addition to the POE itself, scholars have criticised the scope of the atten-
tat clause excluding from the protection those targeting heads of state. The 
clause seems outdated as it only protects a limited category of people. Then 
again, the clause is also too wide when it applies to all cases of attacks on heads 
of state, even those of ‘tyrannicide,’ where the human rights of the citizens have 
been seriously violated by a tyrant. Moreover, it has been noted, heads of state, 
or tyrants themselves, if overthrown, could still be protected by the political 
offence exception and thus not be made responsible for crimes against their 
subordinates.147
142  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, IX.
143  Sapiro, 1986, 662.
144  Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 5.
145  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 19; Gilbert, 1991, 130; Lieberman, 2007, 182; Oehmichen, 
2009, 21.
146  Gilbert, 1985, 703.
147  Deere, 1933, 253; García-Mora, 1956, 84–85; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 135–136; Stan-
brook and Stanbrook, 2000, 82.
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The attentat clause has also been criticised for a lack of internal logic. If heads 
of state cannot be assassinated, perhaps other political leaders can?148 Or lower 
level public servants?149 And if some murders, even if not assassinations, can 
be seen as political crimes, why couldn’t stealing money for running a political 
party be a political crime as well? “If political murder, why not political theft?”150 
García-Mora has argued that the possibility to consider some murders political 
is not useful in “free societies” that respect human rights norms. In such socie-
ties, no justification for any uses of violence exists. However, in cases where the 
extradition request is done by a ‘tyrannical government,’ it does not make sense 
to apply the attentat clause.151 For this reason, he has suggested that the cases 
should be evaluated individually, and not categorically deny the protection of the 
POE for all attentats.152
This position is of sound logic, but its application is problematic. First, if the 
aim of the POE is to protect one nation from meddling in another one’s internal 
affairs, labelling the other state’s government ‘tyrannical’ will hardly serve this 
purpose. Second, if the task of applying the POE is in the hands of the courts, as 
it is for instance in the US, this idea would force the courts to make a decision 
whether another country’s government is ‘tyrannical.’
Furthermore, the attentat clause seems to be in conflict with the original pur-
pose of the political offence exception. An assassination of a head of state is a 
highly political act, and in many cases the most efficient means to ignite politi-
cal change. Due to the political nature of attentats, the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
and the Italian Court of Appeal of Turin have, for instance, exempted assassina-
tions from extradition.153 British law has, in fact, considered attacks against a 
sovereign in power as treason,154 the ultimate political offence. As a consequence, 
the attentat clause was not added to the UK Extradition Act of 1870.155 For 
this reason, the UK, amongst other signatories, made a reservation to the 1957 
148  Sometimes the attentat clause has been interpreted more widely, for instance so that it also 
covers diplomatic representatives. Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 82.
149  García-Mora, 1956, 83.
150  Following this question, the speaker, Coudert, at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law in 1909 described a case where a forger tried to invoke the 
political offence exception with no success. “Indeed, a man who had forged a will to get a 
succession, fled to Switzerland and when his extradition was demanded by Russia (1873), 
claimed that he had stolen the money to give it to a revolutionary society; but even Swiss 
sense of humor was aroused, and his defence was held insufficient.” Coudert, 1909, 131. 
As pointed out elsewhere in this study, murders are by no means the only crimes that have 
qualified as political offences for the purposes of the exception and, indeed, these crimes 
have also included financial crimes.
151  García-Mora, 1956, 84–85.
152  García-Mora, 1956, 86.
153  García-Mora, 1956, 83–84; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 136–137; Sapiro, 1986, 677.
154  See Treason Act 1351 c. 2 (Regnal. 25 Edw 3 Stat 5).
155  Deere, 1933, 253; Pyle, 2001, 91, 108.
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European Convention on Extradition, enabling it to regard assassinations as 
political offences.156
The main problem with the attentat clause is that it is a one-size-fits-all type of 
solution. It does not allow the courts to consider the motive or the target of the 
crime. If applied, it, in the classic example, would categorically exclude the assas-
sin of a latter-day Hitler from the scope of the protection of the POE.157
3.2  The anarchist threat at the turn of the 20th century
3.2.1  Crime against the whole humankind
In the last decades of the 19th century, anarchist terrorism became a major chal-
lenge to the POE. In the course of the 1890s, 60 people were killed and some 
200 wounded in incidents around Europe that were claimed to have been organ-
ised by anarchists.158 The US also felt the anarchist threat within its borders, as 
President McKinley was killed by an anarchist in 1901.159
In reaction, his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, declared: “Anarchism is a 
crime against the whole human race and all mankind should band against anar-
chist thought.” The president urged that the anarchist speeches, writings and 
meetings of its supporters be treated as seditious and that their activities be con-
stricted. All anarchists who already were in the country should be deported. The 
president drew a parallel between anarchism and piracy. Like piracy, it should be 
covered by international law.160 This rhetoric is close to today’s antiterrorist rhet-
oric. According to Richard Bach Jensen, “It is very little exaggeration to claim 
that anarchism was the terrorism of the era between the year 1878 and 1934. In 
the public mind, however erroneously, anarchism and anarchists became synony-
mous with terrorism and terrorist.”161
Many countries were dealing with their own anarchist problems. Turkey was 
confronted by the Armenian nationalist movements in the 1880s and 1890s. 
Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were the areas of operations of the Inner Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO). Italy was suffering from the fact that a large 
part of the attackers were of Italian background,162 including Luigi Lucheni, the 
murderer of Empress Elisabeth of Austria in 1898.163
156  Stanbrook and Stanbrook, 2000, 82.
157  Pyle, 2001, 185.
158  Deflem, 2002. See Liang, 1992, 157, for a list of anarchist incidents in the late 19th cen-
tury.
159  See e.g. Liang, 1992, 168.
160  Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919) stated this in 1901 about anarchists. Cited in Tuchman, 
1980, 107.
161  Jensen, 2014, 1, italics orig. See for the development of the anarchist movement in Europe 
and the emergence of anarchist terrorism in the late 19th century Jensen, 2014, 8–36.
162  Tamburini, 1997, 230; Tamburini, 2000, 45.
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Russia witnessed the capability of an anarchist plot in 1881 when Tsar 
Alexander II was murdered. The plan of the establishment of the ‘Anarchist’ or 
‘Black International’ was a result of the gathering of a group that openly praised 
the assassination of the tsar and looked to Narodnaya Volya as a model. The 
anarchist operations of the time were based on individual action or acts executed 
by small cells of radicals. The fact that the operations were not controlled by a 
central organ made the suppression and prevention particularly difficult for the 
police.164
The claimed existence of an anarchist conspiracy suited the press well, which 
got more sensational headlines and, also above all, the police and the govern-
ment that used it for the restrictions of civil liberties, the freedom of the press 
and the rights of association.165 Some states made attempts to rule anarchist 
deeds “against all social organisation” out of the scope of protection of the POE 
by depoliticising the acts. The purpose was to facilitate extraditions and police 
cooperation.
At first, the means to fight anarchist terrorism were sought for at the national 
level, but it soon became evident that international cooperation would be required 
in order to succeed in the suppression.166 Anarchists were an ‘easy’ enemy, as 
they aimed at harming the society, in addition to the particular government they 
attacked. For this reason, all states had an interest in capturing anarchists and 
not granting them political asylum.167 Governments were divided in two in their 
views of the way they thought anarchist terrorism should be encountered. Others 
considered repression as the best alternative for controlling anarchists. In con-
trast, other governments saw that repression actually laid the perfect breeding 
ground for anarchist terrorism.168
3.2.2  A world without rules: a political goal
Even if anarchism was often linked with terrorism it is not a terrorist philosophy 
by nature. Terrorism is a tactic used by some anarchists, but it is not necessi-
tated by the social philosophy of anarchism.169 Anarchists are often classified into 
two types: “the philosophical and the fighting anarchists, one believing in the 
attainment of anarchy by the peaceful process of evolution and the other by the 
employment of force and revolution.”170
There are differences in the way the action (propaganda by the deed) and 
the more passive ideology (propaganda by the word) have been emphasised in 
164  Hoffman, 1998, 19.
165  Tamburini, 2000, 45.
166  Jensen, 1981.
167  Deere, 1933, 270.
168  Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxv. See in more detail on the anarchist threat and the countering of 
anarchism Jensen, 2014.
169  Borum and Tilby, 2005, 202.
170  Charles Merriam, 1926, cited in Borum and Tilby, 2005, 204.
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different variations of anarchism. Some anarchists of the 19th century indeed 
could be seen as terrorists under most definitions, while others explicitly accen-
tuated that they did not have any role in the acts of terrorism. Hence referring 
to all anarchists as terrorists is not equitable. Even Peter Kropotkin, one of the 
most important anarchist theoreticians, disassociated himself from the policy of 
propaganda by the deed.171 Additionally, at the end of the 19th century, the word 
‘terrorism’ did not have the same sinister tone that it has nowadays. Some were 
indeed proud to be terrorists.172
Anarchism is first and foremost a political ideology, aiming at a world with-
out rulers.173 Regardless, some have claimed that anarchist or nihilist violence that 
aims at destroying life or property lacks political aims. In comparison to ‘textbook’ 
political violence with more limited goals, anarchists try to destroy all governments. 
As politics is about how governance should be organised, contemporary writers 
especially often claimed that anarchism cannot be considered political.
French professor of criminal law Georges Vidal argued in 1916 that anarchists 
and nihilists did not have political motives, as they were not acting against a par-
ticular government but “against the very bases of social existence.”174 An analo-
gous position was taken by the International Institute in Geneva in 1892 where it 
was argued that “Crimes directed to uproot the fundamental social institutions, 
irrespective of national divisions or of any given political Constitution, or form of 
Government, are not to be considered as political crimes.”175
A contemporary article “The Anarchist Beast” discussed the question of 
the political nature of anarchism. The article dealt with the prevailing situation 
in Britain, where anarchists were considered political criminals and were thus 
protected. The anonymous writer concluded that anarchists were not political 
criminals “in the ordinary sense.” Their victims could be democratically elected 
and “they make no pretence of removing hereditary tyrants or of overthrowing 
oligarchies.” “The anarchist is not a political assassin; he is merely a noxious 
beast.” However, the writer did see the political nature of anarchism itself: “To 
what extent anarchist propaganda or anarchist associations should be tolerated 
in civilised communities is a more difficult problem [than how anarchist crimi-
nals should be dealt with]. The chief difficulty lies in the fact, horrible as it is to 
confess, that a war against anarchism is to a certain extent a war against opinion 
(though it be the opinion of brutes), and that the repression of an opinion is to a 
modern Government an almost insuperable task.”176
171  Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxv.
172  Herrala and Puistola, 2006, 24.
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A well-known German scholar of law and politics, Carl Schmitt, writing in 
1932, was of the opinion that only those parties that did not aim at subverting 
the state could be given the right to compete for parliamentary and governmental 
power. This meant excluding extremists from both political sides from the sphere 
of open politics.177 The idea that anarchist acts should be excluded from the POE 
seems to reflect a related line of thought: the anarchists aimed at destroying the 
political structures themselves, and thus they could be considered non-political. 
Schmitt wrote in 1932 that “The equation state = politics becomes erroneous 
and deceptive at exactly the moment when state and society penetrate each other. 
[…] Heretofore ostensibly neutral domains – religion, culture, education, the 
economy – then cease to be neutral in the sense that they do not pertain to state 
and to politics.”178 However, in the 19th century, a strong distinction between 
state and society as well as between the political and the social was typically made. 
Fields such as religion, culture, economics, law and science were seen as antith-
eses to the political.179 In contrast, Robert Ferrari, a contemporary scholar did 
consider anarchists and nihilists as political offenders and saw that they should be 
excluded from extraditions as such.180
3.2.3  The depoliticisation of anarchism in 1898
The emergence of an international anarchist threat proved the political offence 
exception problematic. It provided for anarchists to find safe havens within 
Europe. One of the key states that sheltered anarchists was England. England 
held on to its role as a safe haven so strong that it had prevented the organisation 
of international conferences and joint actions against nihilists and anarchists in 
1881 and 1893.181 However, as the amount of violence grew, pressure from other 
states also intensified.
According to Christopher H. Pyle, “It had been politically easy for the United 
States and the United Kingdom, the Low Countries, and France not to surrender 
failed liberals or failed monarchists; it was much more difficult to shelter failed 
assassins, dictators or robbers. […] As political violence moved away from dis-
ciplined military and paramilitary revolts and toward random acts of indiscrimi-
nate killing, the political offence exception became harder to justify, except as an 
expression of the political neutrality of a country that still was not ready to accept 
sustained international responsibilities.”182
Before the anarchist wave, the revolutionaries of the mid-19th century had 
been members of the middle class, challenging the authority of corrupt nobil-
ity. In contrast, anarchists and communists were attacking the middle class 
177  See Schwab, 1996, 14.
178  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 22.
179  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 23.
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itself, which was not easy to tolerate for liberals. The middle class necessitated 
political stability provided by a government, and did not wish to undermine all 
authority.183
The change in Britain’s position was visible in the In re Meunier case of 1890. 
In this case, the anarchist nature of the act was considered a factor that excluded 
the fugitive from the protection of the POE and made granting his extradition 
possible. France wanted Meunier from Britain for committing an ‘anarchist’ 
bomb attack which had killed two people. Two criteria were used to establish 
that the event did not fall into the category of the political offence exception. 
The first one followed the traditional application of the incidence test: there was 
no ongoing political struggle in France. The second was a novelty: the anarchist 
nature of the act.184
The court declared, following the logic of aforementioned contemporaries, 
that as anarchism was not trying to create a new government, it was the enemy 
of all governments and as such, could not fall within the exception. One of the 
members of the court argued that
[I]n order to constitute an offence of a political character, there must be 
two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government 
of their own choice on the other, and that, if the offence is committed by 
one side or the other in pursuance of that object, it is a political offence, 
otherwise not. […] [T]he party with whom the accused is identified by the 
evidence, and by his own voluntary statement, namely, the party of anarchy, 
is the enemy of all Governments. Their efforts are directed primarily against 
the general body of citizens. They may, secondarily and incidentally, com-
mit offences against some particular Government; but anarchist offences are 
mainly directed against private citizens.185
In its decision, the Meunier court focused more on the ideology of anarchists, 
rather than on the indiscriminate nature of their crimes. According to Christopher 
H. Pyle, “This focus, which essentially opened the anarchists to extradition for 
their beliefs, expressed the rising conservatism of traditionally liberal govern-
ments at the turn of the twentieth century.”186 For this reason, it can be seen that 
the Meunier case represented a novel usage of the depoliticisation strategy against 
crimes of terroristic nature, in addition to the attentat clause.187 However, the 
Meunier decision cannot be interpreted as a sign of a consistent new court practice 
183  Pyle, 2001, 106.
184  In re Meunier, 2 Q. B. D. 1894. See e.g. García-Mora, 1956, 87; Green, 1962, 330; Epps, 
1979, 65; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 111; Sofaer, 1986, 127; Gilmore, 1992, 705; and 
Noone and Alexander, 1997, 64–65, for details on the case and decision.
185  In re Meunier, 2 Q. B. D. 1894, cited in Coudert, 1909, 132, and Hannay, 1980, 390.
186  Pyle, 2001, 108.
187  It is of course debatable whether the assassination of a head of state should be considered 
terroristic in nature.
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emerging. According to Geoffrey Gilbert, the decision was mostly related to the 
fact that Meunier’s political ideas were not considered acceptable in Britain.188
Two years after the In re Meunier case, in 1892 the International Institute in 
Geneva, which had wished to exclude all violent crimes from the protection of 
the POE, decided that anarchist deeds should be excluded from the scope of the 
exception.189
In 1893, anarchist bombings in Paris and Barcelona sparked a discussion on 
the need of an international police collaboration organisation. The idea was intro-
duced by Spain, France and England. Also, Austria and Germany showed interest 
but were concerned about domestic political repercussions of such a decision. 
What slowed down the process was the lack of a general definition and shared 
understanding of anarchism.190
Finally, in 1898, the murder of Empress Elisabeth of Austria caused, as 
Richard Bach Jensen has summed it, a “wave of hysteria” across Europe.191 
The Austrian foreign minister Count Goluchowsky referred to anarchists as 
“wild beasts without nationality,” who were a menace “not only to sovereign 
rulers but to all persons and all private property.”192 In 1898 it was also pre-
dicted that the next target for an anarchist attack would be the King of Italy.193 
As a reaction to the situation, Italy called for a European-wide Anti-Anarchist 
Conference.194 The conference was one of the attempts to fight the anarchist 
threat and is discussed here with the aim to describe the depoliticisation strat-
egy that was chosen by the conference.195
The secretly held ‘International Conference of Rome for the Social Defence 
Against Anarchists’ was opened on November 24, 1898, and it was attended by 
the representatives of 21 European countries.196 The secrecy was so total that 
some historians almost a century later have claimed that the conference was never 
organised.197
188  Gilbert, 1991, 129.
189  Coudert, 1909, 133.
190  Liang, 1992, 161.
191  Jensen, 1981, 325.
192  Cited in Liang, 1992, 160.
193  Jensen, 1981, 325; Tamburini, 1997, 230.
194  Jensen, 1981, 326; Liang, 1992, 161. The British Government also had been pressured to 
act by France and Russia, where the heads of state had recently been assassinated by indi-
viduals linked to London. Collyer, 2005, 287.
195  See for more details on the Rome conference Jensen, 2014, 131–84.
196  Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, 
Greece, Italy, the Principality of Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russia, Serbia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. PROPOSITIONS 
arretées par la Conférence internationale réunie à Rome sur l’initiative du Gouvernement 
Italien en vue d’étudier et d’établir les moyens les plus efficacies pour combattre la propa-
ganda anarchique et soumises par elle à l’appreciation des Gouvernements qui s’y trouvaient 
représentés. Rome, 21 December 1898. Published in Kinna, 2006, 328–329. (Henceforth 
referred to as the final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898.)
197  Tamburini, 1997, 227–28; Jensen, 1981, 323.
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The objective of the conference was to devise and to put into practice a com-
mon defence system against anarchist acts and against the propagation of anar-
chist theories.198 The participants were free to adopt any of the decisions and with 
any reservations they saw necessary.199 The formal depoliticisation of anarchism 
led to a comprehensive participation, but only a small number of countries took 
action based on the provisions of the conference.200 As Richard Bach Jensen has 
stated: “national self-interests and rivalries edged out international concerns.”201
The conference defined anarchist acts in the following manner: “II. Est con-
sidéré comme acte anarchique, au point de vue des resolutions de la Conférence, 
tout acte ayant pour but la destruction, par des moyens violents, de toute organi-
zation sociale. Est repute anarchiste celui qui commet un acte anarchique au sens 
indiqué ci-dessus.”202 In the final propositions of the conference, anarchism was 
formally depoliticised with one simple paragraph: “I. La Conférence estime que 
l’anarchisme n’a rien de commun avec la politique et qu’il ne saurait, en aucun 
cas, être considéré comme une doctrine politique.”203 Anarchism being usually 
understood as a political doctrine, this paragraph contradicts with most of the 
definitions of anarchism.204 By separating anarchism from politics, the conference 
depoliticised the ideology and criminalised it.
The conference aimed at removing anarchist safe havens by suggesting that 
an anarchist should be extradited subject to the principle of dual criminality, that 
is only if anarchism was considered a crime also in the receiving country. It also 
wanted to restrict the use of the political offence exception by stating that for 
the purposes of extradition, anarchist acts were not to be considered political but 
criminal acts.
Even if anarchism was depoliticised for the purposes of extradition, the con-
ference also dealt with it as a political problem, and thus used a strategy which is 
referred to as ‘repoliticisation’ in this study. The aim of the conference was not 
only to bring to justice those responsible for violent anarchist acts but also to pre-
vent the anarchist ideology from spreading. This was to be achieved by restrict-
ing their freedom of speech and, for instance, demanding that trial documents 
considering anarchist acts should be kept secret from the public, that reports on 
anarchism should be limited in the press, that the diffusion of anarchist thought 
should be constrained by seizing all material that would be banned at a later stage 
and finally that imprisoned anarchists should be isolated from other inmates.205
The conference was criticised by contemporaries. Socialists feared for strict 
measures against their thought. The anarchist critics wanted attention to be 
198  The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898.
199  Liang, 1992, 163.
200  Deflem, 2005; Tamburini, 1997, 253.
201  Jensen, 1981.
202  Paragraph II, the final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898.
203  The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898. Translation by the author.
204  See Jansson, 2008, 28–36.
205  Jansson, 2008, 41–42.
102 Rise and decline of romantic liberalism 
paid to the social conditions in Italy as the cause for the rise of anarchism. 
Characteristically, this critique was expressed and published abroad.206
The Anti-Anarchist Conference was balancing between criminalising anar-
chist thought and dealing with it as common crime. This rather strange bal-
ancing act has been typical to most de-/repoliticisation efforts of inherently 
political crimes. The depoliticisation of anarchism was perhaps an early effort 
to create an equilibrium between demands for more civil liberties, such as the 
freedom of speech on the one hand and the fight against anarchism on the 
other. The Anti-Anarchist Conference seemed to aim at merely fighting the 
most heinous anarchist crimes, but in fact, also wanted to suppress anarchist 
thought. The depoliticisation was done simultaneously to using apparently 
political measures, such as censorship, in the fight against the phenomenon.207 
This paradoxical depoliticisation–repoliticisation of anarchism is analogous to 
the treatment of terrorism in modern days. This idea will be developed further 
in the scope of this study.
Because the aim of the conference so clearly was the curtailing of a spe-
cific political phenomenon, but the method was its depoliticisation, it is fair to 
come to Deflem’s conclusion that “The fight against anarchism was evidently a 
matter of a decidedly political nature, especially because and when it included 
policies reaching beyond the control of criminal incidents inspired by anarchist 
motives.”208
As a result of the propositions made by the conference, the attentat clause 
spread to most European extradition treaties. This changed the policies of e.g. 
Italy, which had held sympathies for tyrannicides for historical reasons. By World 
War I the attentat clause had become standard practice. The most important con-
sequence of the conference was, however, the promotion of closer international 
cooperation and faster communication between the police forces in Europe.209
Considerations of political advantage played a key role in the outcome of the 
conference. Francesco Tamburini has argued that the several cases where a head 
of a state was murdered or his life was menaced by an anarchist between 1898 
and 1914 have symbolised the failure of the Rome conference.210 In 1900, King 
Umberto I of Italy was murdered, which hastened the drawing of anti-anarchist 
legislation.211 According to Tamburini, the lack of success was both on the dip-
lomatic and the practical level.212 The fact that England did not sign the final 
propositions was at least a practical failure since many of the anarchists dwelled in 
the safe and liberal Britain.213 Thus, the conference was at the same time a failure 
206  Tamburini, 1997, 234–35.
207  Jansson, 2008, 42–43.
208  Deflem, 2005.
209  Jensen, 2014, 171. See also 174–80.
210  Tamburini, 1997, 261.
211  Liang, 1992, 171–72.
212  Tamburini, 2000, 48.
213  Di Paola, 2007, 190.
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and a success. The later developments suggest that neither view provides a com-
prehensive picture of the totality.
The exclusion of anarchist acts from the scope of the POE, as recommended 
by the Anti-Anarchist Conference, never became widely used, even if some of 
the proposed changes were indeed implemented in conventions. These treaties 
include the Pan American Treaty of 1902,214 which was never brought into 
force;215 the Colombia-Panama treaty of 1927;216 and the Brazil–Bolivia treaty 
from 1938,217 which excluded from the scope of the POE acts that constituted 
primarily offences of common criminal law218 as well as acts of anarchism.219
Only much later did one of the US extradition treaties limit the POE in 
this regard. Article 5 of the US–Brazil treaty of 1961 states that “Criminal acts 
which constitute clear manifestations of anarchism or envisage the overthrow of 
the bases of all political organisations will not be classed as political crimes or 
offences.”220 Brazil used this clause in at least two other extradition treaties; how-
ever, it did not add it to all of its treaties.221
Even if the changes were not widely applied, it seems that most Western states 
eventually took the depoliticisation of anarchism seriously. Writing 11 years after 
the Anti-Anarchist Conference, Coudert made a strong statement: 
It is generally admitted that anarchistic crime does not fall within the cat-
egory of political crime. All nations recognise the absolute necessity for some 
kind of government. Persons whose mental and moral deficiencies lead them 
to commit acts of violence with the motive of destroying organised society, 
in the name of a Utopian dream, and of reducing civilisation to the condition 
of a primeval horde, obtain no sympathy from the nations.222
214  Article 2, Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for the Protection against Anarchism. 
Second International Conference of American States, Doc No 330, 22 October 1901–31 
January 1902.
215  American Journal of International Law, Introductory Comment, Supplement, 1935, 47.
216  “Los actos caracterizados como de anarquismo por las leyes de ambos Estados no serán 
considerados como delitos politicos.” Article 4, Tratado de extradicíon, República de 
Colombia y República de Panama, 24 December 1927. See also García-Mora, 1956, 87.
217  Article 3, Tratado de extradição entre o Brasil e a Bolivia, 25 February 1938. See also 
García-Mora, 1956, 86.
218  “A alegação do fim ou motivo político não impedirá a extradição, se o fato constitue prin-
cipalmente infração da lei penal comum.” Article 3, Tratado de extradição entre o Brasil e 
a Bolivia, 25 February 1938. See also García-Mora, 1956, 86.
219  Não serão reputados delitos políticos os fatos delituosos que constituirem franca manifesta??o 
de anarquismo ou visarem subverter as bases de toda organização social. Article 3, Tratado 
de extradição entre o Brasil e a Bolivia, 25 February 1938. See also García-Mora, 1956, 86.
220  Article 5, Extradition Treaty and Additional Protocol between the United States of Amer-
ica and Brazil, 13 January 1961.
221  See e.g. Tratado de extradição entre o Brasil e a Bélgica, 6 May 1953; Tratado de extradição 
entre o Brasil e a República Italiana, 17 October 1989.
222  Coudert, 1909, 131. An interesting point to be drawn from Coudert’s comment is the 
question of “mental deficiencies” he refers to. Where is the limit between madness and 
politics? How crazy must a political ideology be to represent madness instead of politics?
104 Rise and decline of romantic liberalism 
3.2.4  Why was anarchism depoliticised?
The late 19th century witnessed immense socio-economic changes. The rise of 
Marxism/Communism “born of the alienation and exploitative conditions of 
19th-century capitalism”223 occurred at the same time Europe was already gliding 
towards a war, later to be known as the First World War, between 1914 and 1918.
Until this era, religion had provided the only justification for terrorism. During 
the 19th century, the authority of the monarch as the one who derived from 
God was questioned. With the rise of nationalism, new nation states were born. 
Radical political thought such as anarchism, nihilism and Marxism assumed a lot 
of importance, and anti-state terrorism rose. Terrorism transformed to a secular 
phenomenon.224
Historians widely accept the view that the rise of terrorism during the 1880s 
and 1890s created insecurity and an interest in finding new measures to tackle the 
terrorist threat.225 Anarchism was perceived as an ideology that aimed at destroy-
ing the political, social and economic systems of the world. As the political sys-
tems of many European nation states were newly established, stability was vital 
for them. This is why the reaction to the anarchist threat was especially strict.
Nonetheless, the aims of the late 19th century anarchists were not extremely 
radical and uncompromising. Many were not after a revolution but merely wanted 
to get their voices heard. Further, many of the contemporaries not participating 
in the revolting agreed with the causes of the protesters. The protest was some-
times, however, expressed through extreme terrorist actions that were disapproved 
by most, even many anarchists.226 The anarchist movement eroded the romantic 
notions of the noble nature of revolutionaries that persisted in the 19th century.227
Anarchism ensued from the social conditions of the late 19th century. The 
officials did not understand it, and responded with inadequate legislative meas-
ures. The repression of anarchists by the police, together with the sad economic 
conditions, created an amount of hate that led up to even murders. The legisla-
tive measures reflected the fears of the leading class in Italy228 and presumably all 
over Europe.
As a result, the depoliticisation of anarchism can partly be explained by the 
shared will of the states that participated to the Anti-Anarchist Conference to 
obscure the underlying reasons, social inequalities, for this kind of radical political 
activity and to consider it as common criminality.
Another possible explanation for the depoliticisation of anarchism could have 
been the apprehension of a war among European states. An act of terrorism can 
223  Hoffman, 1998, 17.
224  See e.g. Hoffman, 1998.
225  Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxv.
226  Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxviii.
227  Pyle, 2001, 106.
228  Tamburini, 2000, 44; Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxviii.
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be used as a reason/excuse for war, as was witnessed later when Yugoslavian 
nationalist Gavrilo Princip killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. 
The act of a member of an extremist group (also called anarchist) was politi-
cised229 and led to the outbreak of World War I. Politicisation, in this case, means 
the fact that the act of one person was perceived as an act by the whole nation, 
in other words as a political act instead of a criminal act. Depoliticisation can, in 
contrast, be used to serve the opposite purpose. It can provide the states with the 
possibility to maintain peace, regardless of individual terrorist actions. Should 
the act have been depoliticised, it would have been considered a common crime, 
which would possibly not have fuelled the war.
Otto Kirchheimer made an interesting observation in 1961 with regard to how 
these isolated acts of violence were dealt with. While weight was given to improv-
ing collaboration in catching criminals committing isolated acts of violence, the 
POE was accepted as a means to protect actual revolutionaries participating in 
wider political movements, even if the first group was much less likely to create 
permanent change in society. However, according to Kirchheimer, this logic was 
sound in pre-1918 Europe. Serious revolts in the West had not occurred since the 
1871 Paris Commune, but individual acts of violence were common. For this rea-
son, international collaboration concentrated on two groups of political offend-
ers: anarchists, considered as enemies of all social order, and other perpetrators 
of particularly brutal and atrocious acts. However, as Kirchheimer pointed out, 
“Obviously, enemies of any social order is a vague enough category to permit 
broadened interpretations at any time to match the fashion of the day.”230
3.2.5  The 1937 convention
Since the attempts of barring the anarchist movement that spread in the West 
the late 19th to early 20th centuries and before the boom in antiterrorist con-
ventions and laws post-WWII, the most noteworthy attempt to tackle all ter-
rorism, regardless of its political motives, was done by the League of Nations in 
1937. The League of Nations created the world’s first antiterrorism convention, 
known as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism,231 
as a reaction to the assassination of the French statesman Jean-Louis Barthou 
and King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934, organised by a group of 
Croatian nationalists.232 The extradition of one of the perpetrators who fled to 
Italy was denied by Mussolini’s reign. The extradition would have been against 
229  The Serbian government was aware of the objectives of the extremist group Princip 
belonged to, but it is not evident that the government would have been committed to war 
with Austria. See in more detail for the political background of the assassination e.g. Clark, 
2012, 3–64.
230  Kirchheimer, 1961, 374–75.
231  League of Nations, 16 November 1937.
232  See e.g. Kirchheimer, 1961, 370; Bassiouni, 2001, 47; Jensen, 2014, 365.
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the country’s interests in the Balkans, as Italy hoped to weaken the South Slav 
Federation. For this reason, a wide definition of political crime was applied 
and extradition denied based on the POE. Otto Kirchheimer has pointed out 
that the political motive was distant in this case: “[The decision] also ignored 
the fact that the Croat terrorists did not have sufficient political reasons to kill 
a French statesman and wound a French general.”233 As this deed had no link 
to the anarchist movement, it demonstrated that terrorist acts could also be 
done by those other than anarchists. The convention made no reference to 
anarchism.234
The convention was signed by 24 states, but only India, which had not yet 
gained independence, ratified the convention before the Second World War 
began.235 During this period, the League of Nations was getting weaker and 
weaker after both Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany had left the organisa-
tion. All in all, the diplomatic importance of the organisation had never even 
come close to, for instance, that of the modern United Nations.
The convention is of interest to the present study because of its rather modern 
take on terrorism. It defined terrorist acts as “criminal acts directed against a State 
and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular 
persons, or a group of persons of the general public,”236 including
1. Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to: 
a) Heads of States, persons exercising the prerogatives of the head of the 
State, their hereditary or designated successors; b) the wives or husbands of 
the above-mentioned persons; c) persons charged with public functions or 
holding public positions when the act is directed against them in their public 
capacity. 2. Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or prop-
erty devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject to the authority of 
another High Contracting Party. 3. Any wilful act calculated to endanger 
the lives of members of the public. 4. Any attempt to commit an offence 
falling within the foregoing provisions of the present article. 5. The manufac-
ture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, ammunition, explosives or 
harmful substances with a view to the commission in any country whatsoever 
of an offence falling within the present article.237
Further, also the conspiracy, incitement, participation and assistance to these acts 
were to be criminalised.238 Thus the convention’s definition of terrorism covered 
233  Kirchheimer, 1961, 372.
234  Jensen, 2014, 365.
235  Bassiouni, 2001, 47.
236  Article 1, League of Nations: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
16 November 1937.
237  Article 2, League of Nations: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
16 November 1937.
238  Article 3, League of Nations: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
16 November 1937.
 Rise and decline of romantic liberalism 107
a wide variety of acts, including a wider scope for the traditional attentat clause. 
It also covered acts that only caused property damage as well as a variety of pre-
parative acts.
The aim of the convention was to get all contracting states to create national 
terrorism legislation and to criminalise acts committed on their own territory 
if aimed against another contracting party.239 The defined crimes were to be 
deemed as extradition crimes in all existing and future extradition treaties. 
Should it have been ratified, the convention would have made illegal almost 
all violent means of opposition. However, the obligation regarding extradi-
tion was “subject to any conditions and limitations recognised by the law or 
the practice of the country to which application is made.” This meant that the 
political offence exception would have remained applicable for terrorist crimes, 
should the requested state have seen it fit.240 As a result, the conference did not 
depoliticise terrorism or even aim at doing so, for the purpose of excluding it 
from the scope of the POE.
What is interesting and noteworthy is that the League of Nations conven-
tion did not mention political goals in its definition of terrorism. Instead of its 
motives, terrorism was defined by what it aimed at destroying. This is a rather 
modern definition, as present-day terrorism definitions often resemble it in this 
regard. However, the convention did not cover acts committed against the gen-
eral population.
According to Ondřej Ditrych, with the convention “the terrorist was depoliti-
cised into the ‘enemy of the human race’, to whom no protection should be pro-
vided abroad if he were to commit a ‘political crime’ (including assassination).” 
In the council debate, it was initially argued that terrorism never had political 
sense, but the French proposal underlined the need to repress “political crimes of 
international character.” According to Ditrych, “Eventually, however, the depo-
liticised character of the perpetrators of terrorist acts as professional assassins, 
criminals, malefactors, common murderers, thieves, incendiaries and paid agents 
carrying out certain instructions (presumably given by the revisionist state) would 
become a dominant pattern of subjectification.”241
Philip Jenkins has pointed to the political context in which the convention 
was made. In the 1930s, several regimes were such that they could be under-
stood as dictatorships, for instance, Germany, Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union. 
When ratified, the convention would have made the opposition to these regimes 
terroristic.242
239  Article 2, League of Nations: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
16 November 1937.
240  Article 8, League of Nations: Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 
16 November 1937.
241  Ditrych, 2013, 226.
242  Jenkins, 2003, 26.
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3.3  Conclusion
The 1800s witnessed the emergence of an ideal of a heroic political offender, 
fighting for liberty, democracy and nationalism. The POE grew out of a change 
in Western political thought. Political offenders, previously seen as the ultimate 
threat to the existence of the divine rule of governments, came to be viewed as 
heroic revolutionaries and possible future leaders of newborn nation states. It was 
no longer seen that subordinates of a state should also be subjugated. This idea is 
related to the origins of the concept of human rights.
The political offence exemption was designed to protect revolutionaries from 
unfair trials and severe punishments and to assist states in remaining somewhat 
neutral towards political changes in other states during an era of political turmoil. 
The protection of political criminals provided the states with more diplomatic 
flexibility in case revolutionaries managed to claim power and become diplomatic 
partners.
Soon after its creation, the exemption was challenged. First, it became clear 
that Western nations no longer considered assassins targeting heads of state as 
romantic and benevolent criminals deserving sanctuary and protection in neigh-
bouring states after their brutal acts. This led to the creation of the attentat 
clause.
As the methods, means and goals of perpetrators of political violence have 
changed, the attentat clause now seems outdated. It protects a very limited group 
of people: symbolic leaders with political power. The viewpoint that heads of 
state deserve extra protection did not take into account the current terrorist tac-
tics, where political violence has growingly targeted civilians.
The creation of the attentat clause, excluding these criminals from the protec-
tion of the POE, is a reactive strategy. The attentat clause was created only when 
it became obvious to states that their stability was undermined by individuals 
seeking to promote political change. More than an ideological choice, it thus was 
one of pragmatism. The same model was later repeatedly used when the POE 
proved to protect also the most brutal criminals.
The second challenge to the POE came from the rise of the anarchist threat at 
the end of the 19th century. Also, the anarchists typically targeted heads of state, 
but the threat they posed was unforeseen. The reaction to the anarchist threat 
proved to be rather problematic. Most extradition treaties were not modified as 
a result of the threat, even if this was considered highly important. However, 
some adjustments were attempted to improve intranation collaboration as dem-
onstrated by the case of Meunier. Nonetheless, the end result seems to have been 
very limited.
The period of romantic liberalism was thus not wrecked by anarchists, even 
if the grounds of liberal views were shaken. It is possible that the political cost 
of seriously going after anarchists would have been too great, especially within 
Europe, which had other, more burning political controversies to deal with. The 
era where the political offender was seen as a hero fighting for liberty thus lived 
until the end of the Second World War. The war tainted the image of a heroic 
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offender by the large-scale atrocities committed. However, the treatment of war 
criminals was separated from the treatment of other political criminals,243 and the 
liberal idea that other political offenders deserved protection persisted well into 
the 1960s.
In the following chapter, I concentrate on the tug of war between those who 
wished to limit the POE and those who still saw that there was a screaming need 
for the possibility to protect those who are motivated not by personal gain, but 
by higher, more noble causes.
243  For a long time, the POE also protected war criminals. See e.g. Extradition Treaty between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Swiss Con-
federation, 14 November 1990; Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States 
of America, 31 March 2003, Article 4. For the purpose of this book, the discussion on 
the notion of war criminals as political offenders is left out. Since the idea of international 
crimes emerged after the Second World War, war criminals have been dealt with differently 
in comparison to other political criminals.
44.1  Terrorism challenges the political offence exception
4.1.1  Gradual changes in US extradition treaties 1960s–1970s
After the end of the Second World War, Western states witnessed a number of 
cases where violent offenders managed to escape justice due to the application 
of the POE. However, this did not provoke immediate reactions. For instance, 
US extradition treaties remained largely unchanged during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Some new wordings emerged and some treaties started to limit the political 
offence exception, but typically in a modest and careful manner.
The US–Brazil extradition treaty of 1961 is an early example of a treaty that 
begun limiting the POE for the most serious types of offences. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, it excluded anarchist acts from the protection of the 
POE. Additionally, it made an interesting addition to the typical formulations 
of extradition treaties, echoing the Swiss proportionality or preponderance test. 
According to the treaty, extradition could be allowed “if the crime or offence for 
which his extradition is requested is primarily an infraction of the ordinary penal 
law.” Extradition in these cases was, however, subject to other types of protec-
tion: “In such case the delivery of the person being extradited will depend on an 
undertaking on the part of the requesting State that the political purpose or motive 
will not contribute toward making the penalty more severe.”1
The Brazil treaty is very interesting in two ways. First, the application of the 
predominance test has typically been a part of judicial decision-making, but not 
of the written text in extradition treaties except for the US–Argentina treaty from 
1972 which contained the following provision: “The allegation of a political 
motive or end shall not impede the extradition if the alleged offence constitutes 
primarily a common offence, in which case the requested Party may request that 
the requesting Party give assurance that the political motive or end will not con-
tribute to the aggravation of the penalty.”2
1  Article 5, Extradition Treaty and Additional Protocol between the United States of America 
and Brazil, 13 January 1961. Italics added. 
2  Article 7, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Argentina, 21 January 1972. Italics added.
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Second, as discussed, the exclusion of anarchist-like crimes in the US–Brazil 
treaty was never widely used in US extradition conventions. The principle was 
only applied by a US court much later in the Eain case in 1980 between the US 
and Israel,3 but, in that case, this consideration was not based on the text of the 
bilateral extradition treaty between the US and Israel.4
Since the 1960s the UN started to create new antiterrorism conventions. 
The contents these conventions were little by little incorporated into US extra-
dition treaties. The first of these conventions was drawn in 1963. The Tokyo 
Convention, relating to certain acts committed onboard an aircraft, intended to 
cover gaps related to piracy left by the Geneva Convention by taking into account 
acts onboard aircrafts.5 The criminalisation of piracy had a long history, and, for 
instance, M. Cherif Bassiouni has called aircraft hijacking “piracy of the air.” 
The creation of the Tokyo Convention brought a highly political issue onto the 
agenda of the international community. The acts covered by the convention were 
serious crimes, but simultaneously, they could be interpreted as political.6
Eventually, also the Tokyo Convention left gaps which the 1970 Hague and 
the 1971 Montreal Conventions were designed to cover.7 In 1970, the Hague 
Convention on the suppression of aeroplane hijackings8 made unlawful seizures 
of civilian aircrafts extraditable crimes. It was a reaction to the hijacking of four 
aeroplanes originally headed to New York in September 1970. The hijackers 
were part of the Palestinian commando group later known as Black September. 
The scope of the convention was left so wide that it not only covers politi-
cally motivated terrorism but also hijackings for other purposes, for instance 
for financial gain.9
The hijacking of 1970 has been identified as the first push for the move-
ment that aimed to limit or destroy the political offence exception. The US and 
the Soviet Union worked together in aiming to deny protection to all hijackers, 
regardless of motives. West European states wanted, in turn, to limit the provi-
sions to the idea of aut dedere aut judicare in hijacking cases. The wording in 
the Hague Convention seems to exclude all hijackers from protection, but it left 
room for the protection of future Kolczynskis.10
The Hague Convention was the first international convention to be reflected 
in US bilateral extradition treaties. For example, the 1970 US–Spain extradition 
treaty prescribed that aircraft hijackings were to “be presumed to have a predomi-
nant character of a common crime when the consequences of the offence were 
3  See in more detail Section 4.2.2.
4  Article 6, Israel International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 December 1962.
5  Lodge, 1981, 166.
6  Bassiouni, 1969, 218–219.
7  Lodge, 1981, 167.
8  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague Convention) 
UNTS 12325, 16 December 1970.
9  Cassese, 2006, 943.
10  Pyle, 2001, 186.
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or could have been grave. The fact that the offence has endangered the life or 
jeopardised the safety of the passengers or crew will be given special consideration 
in the determination of the gravity of such consequences.”11 An almost identical 
limitation was provided in the 1971 United States treaty with Canada12 and the 
1973 treaty between the United States and Italy.13 These thus depoliticised the 
treatment of aircraft hijackings by stating that these acts were to be considered as 
having “predominant character of a common crime,” but only for the purposes 
of the application of the POE. In other words, they did not stipulate that aircraft 
hijackings were not political by nature.
The application of the Hague Convention soon proved problematic for the 
US. Due to the political conditions of the Cold War era, hijackers were in some 
instances seen as heroes, especially when they escaped socialist states. Hijacking 
was also used in matters that caused difficult political scenarios. For example, in 
some instances, Americans sought asylum abroad by hijacking planes. One of 
the most diplomatically complicated incidents was the 1975 case where France 
granted asylum to two African Americans who had made vague references to their 
involvement in the Black Panthers and relations with Hanoi when requesting for 
non-extradition for their crimes.14
In 1971 the UN concluded another treaty that was linked with terrorism 
onboard aircrafts, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention).15 The provisions of the 
Montreal Convention were reflected in the US–Canada treaty concluded the 
same year which excluded a number of violent crimes aboard an aircraft of a com-
mercial airline and carrying passengers from the scope of the POE.16 The effect of 
the Montreal Convention was also visible in many other subsequent US extradi-
tion treaties17 but not all of them.18
Interestingly, the US–Canada treaty also excluded from the scope of the POE 
“(i) a kidnapping, murder or other assault against the life or physical integrity of 
11  Article 5(A)(4), Spain International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 29 May 1970.
12  Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America, 3 December 1971.
13  Article 7, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Italy, 18 January 
1973. The US–Italy treaty does not include the final sentence of the citation.
14  Pyle, 2001, 185.
15  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Mon-
treal Convention) 974 UNTS 177, 23 September 1971.
16  Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America, 3 December 1971.
17  See e.g. Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Paraguay, 24 May 1973, and, identically, Article 4, Treaty on Extradition and 
Cooperation in Penal Matters between the United States of America and the Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, 6 April 1973; Article 7, Extradition Treaty between the United States 
of America and Finland, 11 June 1976.
18  This seems to have depended on the other party’s participation in the conference; if the 
other party was a signatory of the Montreal Convention, the clause was included in the 
extradition treaty.
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a person to whom a Contracting Party has the duty according to international 
law to give special protection, or any attempt to commit such an offence with 
respect to any such person.”19 This was a provision that the UN only added in its 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents two years later, in 1973.20 
Similar provisions were added to a number of US extradition treaties, prior and 
after the creation of the UN convention.21
In 1978, the Mexico–US treaty, amongst other similar treaties, created a com-
pletely new provision that made direct reference to UN conventions. It categori-
cally excluded from the scope of the POE an “offence which the Contracting 
Parties may have the obligation to prosecute by reason of a multilateral interna-
tional agreement.”22 Christopher H. Pyle has interpreted the signing of this treaty 
a departure of the US from its dedication to the political offence exception.23
Thus, it has been shown that during the early years of the 1970s, terrorist 
actions had already provoked a reaction that was visible in both UN conventions 
as well as US bilateral extradition treaties. However, in most extradition treaties 
the POE still remained practically untouched. Additionally, even if the US law 
would have allowed for antiterrorist conventions to be used as the basis of extra-
dition, it never used this possibility.24
It can be argued that even if extradition treaties were not updated at a fast 
pace, the UN provisions should have affected the way in which the POE was 
interpreted. According to Geoffrey Gilbert, the crimes included in UN treaties 
were condemned by so many nations that they should never be protected by the 
POE. The application of the POE with regard to these crimes would contradict 
with an internationally agreed objective.25
4.1.2  The new revolutionary wave and the US draft convention of 1972
In the wake of the Second World War, a shared understanding of the necessity to 
globally condemn certain types of grave crimes emerged. The condemnation of 
specific criminal acts led to the creation of the aut dedere aut judicare principle 
19  Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America, 3 December 1971.
20  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1035 UNTS 167, 14 December 1973.
21  See e.g. Article 4, Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Paraguay, 24 May 1973, and, identically, Article 4, Treaty on Extradition and 
Cooperation in Penal Matters between the United States of America and the Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, 6 April 1973; Article 7, Extradition Treaty between the United States 
of America and Finland, 11 June 1976.
22  Article 5, Mexico International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 4 May 1978. See 
also Article 3, Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Turkey, 7 June 1979.
23  Pyle, 2001, 145.
24  Murphy, 1985, 43.
25  Gilbert, 1998, 296.
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establishing the duty to either extradite or prosecute certain international crimi-
nals. The protection offered to violent political criminals was limited for the first 
time since the attentat clause and the anarchist offence exceptions.
The decades after the Second World War saw a wave of revolutions and ‘wars 
of liberation’ in the developing countries as they, one by one, fought colonial 
regimes for their independence. These revolutionary movements typically utilised 
guerrilla-type action. Simultaneously, the rise of ‘terroristic’ violence growingly 
targeting members of the public within Western states provoked severe responses 
from political decision makers.
During the 1960s–1980s, terrorism became a major challenge to the applica-
tion of the POE. Terrorists committed serious acts that fell into the category of 
extraditable crimes, but their mentality diverged from that of the common crimi-
nal.26 For this reason, some courts categorised them as political offenders, subject 
to the protection of the POE. These solutions were motivated by a multiplicity 
of factors including internal politics and the fear of retribution and coercion from 
either the terrorists themselves or from countries that supported their cause. For 
instance, some Arab states had put pressure on a number of Western states to 
prevent the extradition of PLO members.27
The date 22 July 1968 has sometimes been named the birthday of post-Sec-
ond World War international terrorism. On this date, for the first time, a pas-
senger aircraft was hijacked for political purposes. The hijacking was intended 
as a symbol and an instrument to create direct communications between the 
Palestinian terrorists and the Israeli government.28 Since that year, the relatively 
small number of active international terrorist groups rose fivefold over the next 
ten years. Many believed that international terrorism was the key to gain world-
wide attention for their cause.29
In a world that was so used to protecting political offenders, dealing with 
revolutionaries using violence against civilians became a massive problem. As M. 
Cherif Bassiouni pointed out, in this kind of setting, the differentiation between 
‘common crimes’ and ‘political crimes’ was no longer useful as the link between 
the criminal action and the aim sought by it had disappeared.30
The push for the UN’s first serious post-WWII attempt to abandon the patch-
work approach and creating a comprehensive antiterrorism convention came 
from the United States in September 1972. The initiative was brought out three 
weeks after 11 Israeli hostages were killed in a terrorist attack at the Munich 
Summer Olympics. As a result of the attacks, President Richard Nixon established 
the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.31
26  Schaefer, 1981, 633.
27  Hannay, 1988, 116.
28  Hoffman, 1998, 67–69.
29  In 1968, there were 11 active international terrorist groups (3 ethno-nationalist/separatist 
and 8 radical leftist groups). Hoffman, 1998, 75.
30  Bassiouni, 1969, 218.
31  Fields, 1988, 279.
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In the US draft convention, a terrorist was defined as “[a]ny person who 
unlawfully kills, causes serious bodily harm or kidnaps another person, attempts 
to commit such an act, or participates as an accomplice of a person who commits 
or attempts to commit any such act.” The convention required the act being of 
international nature, and not committed by or against members of the armed 
forces or during military hostilities, and that it was “intended to damage the 
interests of or obtain concessions from a State or an international organisation.”32 
The draft also contained the aut dedere aut judicare principle.33 Terrorism was 
thus understood as an act with a clear political goal.
What is telling of the international political atmosphere at the time is the pre-
amble of the draft convention stating: “Measures to prevent international terror-
ism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises fundamental 
freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts 
of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause 
some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect 
radical changes.”34 This demonstrates that terrorism was understood as a highly 
political phenomenon and that fighting it necessitated means that would not only 
try to stop the perpetrators but would also affect its root causes.
Even if these concerns were spelled out in the draft, the attempted conven-
tion also received strong opposition. A majority of UN member states wanted 
the organisation to condemn the Munich attacks, but many Arab, African and 
Asian states argued that “people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign 
oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, 
including force.”35
The reasoning behind the ‘underlying causes’ discourse can be linked to 
internal rules that Ditrych has called the ‘two logics of exception.’ According to 
this viewpoint, national liberation movements could never be seen as terroristic, 
because their causes were just, to the extent that they were defensive/restitutive 
and because those that participated in their activities had previously been the ones 
suffering.36 Additionally, according to many developing and socialist states, anti-
colonial violence was justified because state terrorism was performed by imperial 
powers.37 They also contended that the causes of terrorism had to be examined 
before acting against its effects.38
32  Article 1, Report of the Special Committee of the United Nations on International Terror-
ism, G.A.O.R., Supp. No. 28 (XXVII); United States’ Draft Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism. UN Doc. A/C.6/L850, 25 
September 1972.
33  Article 3, US Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Acts, 25 
September 1972.
34  US Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Acts, 25 September 
1972.
35  Schaefer, 1981, 633; Schmid, 1984, 100; Hoffman, 1998, 31.
36  Ditrych, 2013, 228.
37  Saul, 2006, 2.
38  Hannay, 1980, 381.
116 Taking the political out of the political 
First World countries, in turn, saw that the motives should have been consid-
ered irrelevant in the evaluation of the crimes, as non-state terrorism used violent 
means that went beyond the conventional limits of violence. This type of violence 
could never be legitimate, regardless of the causes. “because [it] represent[s] vio-
lence outside of institutions that constitute ‘the very nature of our civilisation’.”39 
For instance, the United States argued that an international consensus should 
have existed with regard to protecting civilian lives and the international order 
from anarchy, ignoring the possible political apologia for such behaviour.40
As a direct reaction to the Munich events of 1972 and the attack at the Lod 
airport near Tel Aviv that had taken place earlier in the same year,41 the 27th 
session of the UN General Assembly dealt with terrorism under a headline cop-
ied from the aforementioned preamble of the US draft convention.42 The UN 
Secretariat had recently completed a study on terrorism, underlining the limits 
to the legal and moral justifications of the use of force in all human conflicts.43
In discussing the nature of terrorism, the UN study suggested that terroristic 
methods could be used both for political as well as criminal purposes. For this 
reason, “It seems difficult to delimit a legal topic on the basis of motives, which 
often lie deep in the minds of men.”44 A similar idea later formed the basis of the 
depoliticisation of terrorism.
The study also argued that the “subject of international terrorism has, as the 
Secretary-General has already emphasised, nothing to do with the question of 
when the use of force is legitimate in international life.” However, the limit of 
legitimate violence remained blurred. According to the study, national libera-
tion movements “are not and cannot be affected” by the findings of the study. 
Further, “But even when the use of force is legally and morally justified, there 
are some means, as in every form of human conflict, which must not be used; 
the legitimacy of a cause does not in itself legitimise the use of certain forms of 
violence, especially against the innocent.”45
According to the study, there was a difference between international terrorism 
and “revolutionary mass movements, which are directly aimed at, and capable of, 
39  Ditrych, 2013, 228.
40  Schaefer, 1981, 636.
41  Norton Moore, 1988, 437; Cassese, 1989, 7.
42  2114th plenary meeting, 18 December 1972.
43  UN Secretariat study: “Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers 
or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the 
Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Mis-
ery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human 
Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes.” Study prepared by 
the Secretariat in accordance with the decision taken by the Sixth Committee at its 1314th 
meeting, on 27 September 1972, UN Doc. A/C.6/418, 2 November 1972. Cited in Nor-
ton Moore, 1988, 439.
44  Chapter II (I), Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/418, 2 
November 1972.
45  Saul, 2006, 10, 22.
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effecting radical changes in society, involving changes of conduct and attitude on 
the part of large numbers of people.” In contrast, according to the study, “The 
terrorist act, on the other hand, even if its main purpose is to draw attention to 
a political cause or situation, has as its immediate aim something comparatively 
limited, although important, such as the acquisition of funds, the liberation of 
prisoners, the spread of general terror, the demonstration of the impotence of 
Government authorities, or the provocation of ill-judged measures of repression 
which will alienate public opinion. Thus the terrorist act usually lacks any imme-
diate possibility of achieving its proclaimed ultimate purpose.”46
This rationale seems to relate to the reasoning behind the so-called incidence 
test in the application of the POE. According to this view, a revolutionary move-
ment had the means and the possibility of making a change, whereas a terrorist 
actor did not have popular support. This separation is highly problematic because 
it merely suggests that the acquisition of power turns a terrorist movement into 
a more ‘legitimate’ revolutionary movement. Additionally, this separation proved 
to be problematic in hindsight, as, for instance, the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) was a highly organised paramilitary movement, but still, it was con-
sidered a terroristic organisation by the United Kingdom.47
There was a clear shift between the focus of the UN study which condemned 
violence in clear words and the final General Assembly session conclusions. The 
underlining of the importance of international legal action against terrorists 
changed to a lengthy study of the causes that provoke terrorism.48
4.1.3  Politics overrule legal concerns 1970s–1980s
The UN attempts to unite against terrorism mostly failed during the 1970s and 
1980s.49 Creating an extensive definition of international terrorism proved unfea-
sible, as the member states’ views on what terrorism was varied. This was due to 
disagreements concerning politically motivated violence between the West and the 
‘Third World’ and Communist states. States disagreed on issues such as who was an 
innocent victim; how the actor’s motivation could affect the legal consequences that 
fell upon him; and the concepts of national liberation, colonisation and occupation. 
Western states aimed at excluding acts committed by states from the definition of 
terrorism, while others wanted to include these.50 Western states thought that the 
aim of ‘Third World’ states was to hinder the legislative action against terrorism, thus 
making it practically impossible to universally ban terrorism in a single convention.51
46  Chapter II (II), Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/418, 2 
November 1972.
47  The PIRA is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.1.
48  See Chapter I (II), Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/C.6/418, 2 
November 1972.
49  Hannay, 1980, 381.
50  See Bassiouni, 2001, 3.
51  DeSchutter, 1975, 378–379.
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Additionally, separate antiterrorism instruments were not effective, because 
they lacked ratifications52 and the means of enforcement. If a state that had rati-
fied the Hague or Montreal Conventions refused to extradite a fugitive, no means 
existed to enforce the conventions. For instance, in the case of the Lockerbie 
bombings, Libya refused to extradite the accused. Regardless of the UN Security 
Council resolutions53 coercing action, it took over ten years for Libya to finally 
allow the extradition.54
Even if UN treaties attempted to make the extradition of certain types of 
offenders a rule rather than an exception, and thus distance it from political con-
siderations, extradition was continuously used for political purposes. For instance, 
the Holder decision of 1972 demonstrates the effect political considerations had 
on legal matters. In this case, the United States sought the extradition of Holder 
who had, together with an accomplice, hijacked an aeroplane in the US and 
forced it to land in Paris. The hijackers had extorted half a million dollars from 
the airline and made vague references to known American radicals. According 
to Thomas Carbonneau, it was clear that the French court’s decision to regard 
the offences as political was strongly affected by the government’s criticism of 
the United States’ policy in Vietnam. The political motivation of the offenders 
was fickle, and the gravity of the offences should have outweighed the political 
element in the act. In this case, the court did not attempt to remain neutral, but 
instead, it voiced the executive’s political views.55
Comparably, in the case of Abu Daoud of 1977 courts also allowed politi-
cal considerations to prevail over taking into account the extreme severity of 
the crime in question. Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) member 
Daoud was wanted by West German and Israeli authorities for his participation 
in the organisation of the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972. This case did 
not involve the application of the POE, but France denied Daoud’s extradition 
based on legal technicalities in the fear of an oil embargo or possible terrorist 
reprisals.56
France also denied the extradition of several Basque nationalist and separatist 
group ETA members. France had a strong dislike of Francoist Spain and simul-
taneously, there was a mass of Basque people within the French borders.57 As a 
result, France denied extradition of several offenders who, should they have been 
52  Gilbert, 1998, 299. 
53  UN Security Council Resolution on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/731, 21 January 1992; 
UN Security Council Resolution on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/748, 31 March 1992; 
UN Security Council Resolution on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/883, 11 November 
1993; UN Security Council Resolution on the Lockerbie case, S/RES/1192, 27 August 
1998.
54  Gilbert, 1998, 301; Emerson, 2004.
55  Carbonneau, 1983, 215.
56  See for a detailed evaluation of the case Carbonneau, 1977. See also Carbonneau, 1983, 
216.
57  Carbonneau, 1983, 229; Gilbert, 1998, 304.
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West German nationals, most likely have been extradited.58 France’s policy with 
regard to the ETA was named the sanctuary doctrine. Its aim was to keep terror-
ism outside the borders of the country.59
After the death of Franco, extradition requests from Spain started to pro-
duce diverse results.60 French courts growingly adopted the Swiss proportionality 
test when evaluating whether separatists could be protected by the POE.61 For 
instance, in the 1984 case that concerned three Basque separatists – Galdeano, 
Ramirez and Beiztegui – extradition was granted on account of the gravity of the 
crimes committed, depriving the offences of any political character.62
In 1986, France finally abandoned the policy of protecting ETA activists and 
started to collaborate with Spain by extraditing the fugitives. The following year, 
France ratified the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 
1977,63 which obliged it to extradite violent offenders.64 Interestingly, around 
the same time, a new French doctrine with regard to political offenders from 
Italy emerged. Upon his election in 1981, the first socialist president of France, 
Francois Mitterand, made a promise to deny the extradition of foreigners moti-
vated by political factors, whereas his predecessor Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had 
had an opposite paradigm: he had been strongly in favour of collaborating with 
Italy in matters of extraditing political criminals. The so-called Mitterand doc-
trine categorically excluded former militants of the extreme leftist group Brigate 
Rosse (Red Brigades) from extradition. This protection, at least in theory, came 
with the provision that the fugitives had seized their violent activities and were 
not responsible for any deaths. However, unlike its name suggests, the practice 
was never an actual doctrine as it was not based on legislation or any public docu-
ment. This meant that the offer of asylum could at any time have been cancelled. 
It has been estimated that around 300 members found refuge on the French side 
of the border.65
In comparison to the French reluctance to extradite members of the ETA 
or the Brigate Rosse, France was willing to collaborate with West Germany in 
apprehending fugitives accused of terrorist acts. Carbonneau has linked the extra-
ditions of West German nationals to French foreign policy interests.66
One example of such cases was the case of Croissant. It was a highly politi-
cal case, where France granted the extradition of the fugitive. Klaus Croissant 
58  Carbonneau, 1983, 231.
59  Oehmichen, 2009, 297.
60  Carbonneau, 1983, 231.
61  Gilbert, 1998, 304.
62  Gilbert, 1991, 149.
63  Discussed in detail in Section 4.1.5.
64  Oehmichen, 2009, 297.
65  See in more detail on the politics behind the doctrine Lanzoni, 2017. See also e.g. Le Par-
isien, 14 January 2019, “Battisti arrêté: quel avenir pour les militants italiens qui vivent en 
France?”
66  Carbonneau, 1983, 221–222.
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had been the attorney of the Baader-Meinhof gang. He fled West Germany and 
landed in France. West Germany requested his extradition based on his complic-
ity in a terrorist group. More accurately, Croissant was accused of having done 
propaganda work for the terrorists. The French court gave a ‘partially favourable’ 
opinion to his extradition, stating that the gravity of the offence would overrule its 
political elements. The request and, subsequently, the court decision faced pub-
lic outcry. Many legal scholars and journalists deemed the request to have been 
against democratic values such as the freedom of political speech. Additionally, 
it represented an infringement of the privilege between attorney and client. The 
extradition of Croissant clashed with the long dedication of France in the pro-
motion of human rights and in its acting as a safe haven for political dissidents.67
This application of the Swiss predominance test used in the Croissant case 
soon formed the basis of many subsequent decisions by the Paris Cour d’Appel 
(the Court of Appeal of Paris), including the Piperno and Pace case. In this case, 
Italy requested the extradition of Piperno, who was suspected of participating in 
the kidnapping and murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. The court 
ruled that because the crime was extremely grave, the offence could not be con-
sidered political. As such, this decision partly applied the Swiss predominance 
test.68 Van den Wijngaert has linked this approach also to the Belgian court prac-
tice, where the seriousness of the crimes is evaluated against how closely associ-
ated the crimes were with attempting to change the political institutions. The 
more serious the acts, the closer the connection needed to be.69
In the case of Winter of 1978, an interesting reference was made to the exclu-
sion of anarchist crimes from the scope of the protection of the POE. Similar to 
the Croissant case, the Winter case was also a matter of an extradition request by 
West Germany from France. Winter was accused of assisting in creating a terrorist 
group amongst the Nuremberg accused. The aim of the group was to eliminate 
the “established order of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany].” The court 
ruled that acts that aimed at complete social destruction had, since the anarchist 
acts at the turn of the century, been excluded from the protection of the POE. 
According to the court, “The social crime, born at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, is distinguished, in criminal law, from the political offence and is considered 
both by the decisional law and by doctrinal writers, as a common law crime.” 
This doctrine was also applied to a second case of Ingrid Barabass and Sieglinde 
Hofmann.70 However, as discussed, the division between common and social 
crimes was not as straightforward as the court suggested.
In most cases that concerned the extradition of West German nationals accused 
of terrorism, the Court of Appeal of Paris ended up granting the request. Court 
67  Croissant, Court of Appeal of Paris, 16 November 1977, 2nd decision, 93 J.Trib. (1978). 
See also Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 123–124; Carbonneau, 1983, 218; Murphy, 1985, 54.
68  See e.g. Murphy, 1985, 54; Gilbert, 1998, 233.
69  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 125.
70  Cited in Carbonneau, 1983, 221.
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decisions narrowed the concept of political crime by excluding particularly seri-
ous crimes and anarchist crimes aimed against the social structures, as opposed to 
crimes aimed at harming the political order of the state.
However, the courts did not systematically use the narrowed criteria for the 
application of the POE. In the case of MacCann, the fugitive was accused of, 
as a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), planting two bombs in areas 
open to the public in the English sector of West Germany. This time, the Court 
of Appeal of Paris ruled that the acts were indeed of a political character and thus 
not extraditable, as the explosions had only caused property damage and not 
resulted in fatalities. According to Carbonneau, this ruling was “totally incon-
sistent” with the other cases that concerned extraditions to West Germany in 
the late 1970s. The act was particularly serious and could have been classified 
as wanton, which would have made it an anarchistic crime instead of a political 
offence. According to Carbonneau, the court’s ruling was related to the fear of 
IRA retribution in France.71
These developments distinctly show that the matter of applying the POE can-
not be considered without a link to political issues. While clearly there was a will 
to not allow terrorists to continue their actions, the question of who is a terrorist 
was not solved in the 1970s or 1980s. Neither was the depoliticisation trend still 
evident.
4.1.4  Interpol’s incapability towards terrorism
Similar to the United Nations, which found its hands tied when trying to create 
binding antiterrorist provisions, the work of the International Criminal Police 
Organisation (Interpol) was shadowed by incapability. Since its reorganisation 
in 1946,72 the focus of the work of Interpol has been combating ordinary law 
crimes. It was tied by Article 3 of its constitution: “It is strictly forbidden for the 
Organisation to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, 
religious or racial character.” The aim of this article was to ensure the independ-
ence and neutrality of Interpol, “to reflect international extradition law” and to 
protect individuals from persecution. In determining which crimes fell into the 
category of ordinary law crimes and which did not, Interpol adopted a case-by-
case approach to determining whether the political, military, religious or racial 
elements dominated.73
It seems that Interpol’s constitution was modelled on the political offence 
exception and that the organisation has adopted, or at least intended to adopt, 
a similar approach to the one applied in the Swiss predominance test when 
determining the political nature of the crimes. Its 1951 resolution contained 
the following reference to the predominance test: “[Interpol] recommends to 
71  Carbonneau, 1983, 223–224.
72  See e.g. Fooner, 1989, on the history of Interpol.
73  Interpol: Neutrality, Article 3, Interpol Constitution I/CONS/GA/1956.
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its members and to the Heads of the National Central Bureaus to see that no 
request for information, notice of persons wanted and, above all, no request for 
provisional arrest for offences of a predominantly political, racial or religious 
character, is ever sent to the International Bureau or to the National Central 
Bureaus, even if – in the requesting country – the facts amount to an offence 
against the ordinary law.” The evaluation of the nature of the crime was left 
to the Chief of the International Bureau “in agreement with” the Secretary-
General, who were authorised to suspend any request that related to an offence 
of such nature.74
According to Green, this limitation was created due to the unclarity of the 
nature of political offences and the scope of the POE.75 In 1962, Green criticised 
Interpol for taking a role in policymaking, rather than assisting the police organi-
sations of its member states. According to him, the political nature of the crime 
should have been decided by either a governmental or a judicial organ, not an 
administrative police authority.76
Regardless of the commitment to the predominance test, Interpol was criti-
cised for not assisting in capturing war criminals and for a too wide interpretation 
of article 3.77 For instance, the Council of Europe argued that too many predomi-
nantly common crimes had been protected by the article.78
As a consequence of the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, Interpol took, 
like the UN, a condemning stance against terrorism. Three weeks after the events 
at Munich, it formulated the resolution ‘Hostages and Blackmail.’79 The resolu-
tion did not specifically make reference to what had happened in Munich, but it 
was obvious that it was motivated by the events. The resolution condemned the 
holding of hostages, constituting a menace to the lives and security of persons 
involved. However, as the organisation was still mindful of the limitations in its 
constitution, and the restraints of Articles 2 and 3 were underlined.80
74  Interpol resolution AGN/20/RES/11, Requests for international enquiries, Lisbon, 1951. 
Italics orig. 
75  Green, 1962, 330.
76  Green, 1962, 354.
77  Green, 1962, 329.
78  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation of the Committee of Minis-
ters to Member States Concerning International Co-operation in the Prosecution and Pun-
ishment of Acts of Terrorism. No. R (82), Adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the 
342nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 15 January 1982. The changes in the relationship 
of Interpol and political crimes are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
79  AGN/41/RES/7 Hostages and blackmail, Frankfurt, 1972.
80  Article 2: The aims of the International Criminal Police Organisation-INTERPOL are: (a) 
To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police 
authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of 
the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”;(b) To establish and develop all institutions 
likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes. 
Article 3: It is strictly forbidden for the Organisation to undertake any intervention or activi-
ties of a political, military, religious or racial character.
 Taking the political out of the political 123
According to Fenton Bresler, the reason for a wary stance towards terrorism 
was the fear that any actions against such a politically loaded phenomenon taken 
by Interpol could have led to its disintegration, as countries such as Syria and 
Libya might have abandoned it as a result.81
The cautious conservatism together with the outdated technology Interpol 
was using, led to frustration among European police officials. Some wanted 
the organisation to modernise itself, while some adduced the possibility of the 
European police collaboration under an organisation named Europol.82 A more 
effective approach to combating terrorism in Europe was needed, and as the first 
step in 1976, a collaboration group in the fight against violent crimes, TREVI, 
was founded to tackle this problem.83
The dissatisfaction towards Interpol might have been one cause for the switch 
of attitude in the organisation during the following decade. Coming to the late 
1970s, international terrorism had proved to be one of the most imminent or 
most publicised threats for Western states. The late 1970s witnessed notable 
changes in how terrorism was viewed and dealt with within European states, as 
well as globally.
4.1.5  Terrorism alerts Europe in the 1970s
The perceived growth in the terrorist threat in the 1970s engaged the Council of 
Europe as well as the European Economic Community (EEC) in the fight against 
terrorism. This had become a political necessity, as a growing number of terrorist 
events that involved European states took place during the decade.84
Both the EEC as well as the Council of Europe took a wide variety of forms 
of action against terrorism. This section does not attempt to cover all the relevant 
policies but points to some of the key developments.
The European Convention on Extradition of 1957, which aimed at facilitat-
ing extradition between signatory states, forms the basis of European extradition 
agreements. It is the extradition regime with the widest application still today, 
as it has been ratified by 47 Council of Europe members and 3 non-members: 
Israel (1967), South Africa (2003) and South Korea (2011). The convention 
contains the political offence exception and the discrimination clause, with the 
limitations of the Belgian clause.85 Similarly, the 1959 European Convention on 
81  Interpol documentary, 2007.
82  Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 100. Europol was officially formed in 1998. Europol Con-
vention, 95/C 316/01, 26 July 1995.
83  TREVI was either named after the famous fountain in Rome or as a French acronym for the 
subject of its mandate – terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence (Terror-
isme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Politique). Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 101. 
TREVI is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
84  See e.g. Lodge, 1981, 172.
85  Article 3, para 1, European Convention on Extradition, European Treaty Series No. 24, 13 
December 1957.
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Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters provides that assistance can be refused 
if the offence in question is a political offence or connected therewith.86 The 
fact that the UK took many years to ratify these treaties87 has been interpreted 
as a demonstration of the difficulty in bringing together common and civil law 
countries.88
Similar to the UN and Interpol, the Council of Europe was forced to quickly 
react to the events in Munich in September 1972. This resulted in the creation 
of the Recommendation on International Terrorism, which aimed at improv-
ing collaboration against terrorist activities. The recommendation did not discuss 
the political nature of terrorism.89 As the name suggests, the council’s recom-
mendations are not binding on member states.90 The following year, a new 
Recommendation on International Terrorism was created. This recommendation 
“Condemn[ed] international terrorist acts which, regardless of their cause, should 
be punished as serious criminal offences.”91 The recommendation called for the 
establishment of a common definition of ‘political offence’ “in order to be able 
to refute any ‘political’ justification whenever an act of terrorism endangers the 
life of innocent persons.”92
It is interesting to note that the recommendation called for a common defini-
tion of ‘political offence’ instead of a common definition of terrorism. It seems 
that at this stage, the Council of Europe considered it easier to create a definition 
of political offences, which would exclude a variety of violent acts, rather than 
open Pandora’s box and trying to create a definition of terrorism instead.
Since the 1972 recommendation, terrorism has become a common topic dis-
cussed amongst members of the Council of Europe. In 1973, Recommendation 
703 on International Terrorism suggested that the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe should create “a joint European front to combat 
terrorism” and invite the governments of member states inter alia, again, “to 
establish a common definition for the notion of ‘political offence’, in order 
to be able to refute any ‘political’ justification whenever an act of terrorism 
86  Article 2, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg, 20 
April 1959.
87  It signed and ratified both treaties only at the beginning of the 1990s. Signatures and ratifica-
tions, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg, 20 April 
1959. https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/030/
signatures Signatures and ratifications, European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 
1957. https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/024/
signatures?p_auth=S9oLjL3Y. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
88  Freestone, 1981, 206.
89  Recommendation 684 on International Terrorism, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, 23 October 1972.
90  Lodge, 1981, 169.
91  Para 1, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 703 on Interna-
tional Terrorism, 16 May 1973. Italics added. 
92  Para 6(i)(c), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 703 on 
International Terrorism, 16 May 1973.
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endangers the life of innocent persons.”93 The common definition was never 
created.
In 1974, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism. While it urged member states to 
either extradite or prosecute crimes mentioned in the UN Hague and Montreal 
Conventions of the previous years, it, again, made note of the political nature 
of terrorism. It urged states to “take into consideration the particularly serious 
nature of these acts, inter alia: when they create a collective danger to human life, 
liberty or safety; when they affect innocent persons foreign to the motives behind 
them.”94 It thus encouraged member states to extradite those accused of these 
crimes but did not fail to remind of the motives behind the violence.
In 1975, as a reaction to Interpol’s incapability in the fight against terror-
ism, the so-called TREVI group was established to improve European collabora-
tion against international terrorism, radical extremism and international violence. 
The TREVI collaboration was an intergovernmental forum where Ministers of 
Interior and Justice of the European Communities met regularly. TREVI started 
out as a measure to counter the terrorist threat, but soon its mandate widened to 
other forms of cross-border crime. It ended up creating a system of liaison officers 
and a common information sharing mechanism.95 The TREVI group’s activities 
slowly evolved more and more towards structures that would later form the basis 
of the European Police Office (Europol).96
In 1976, after the liberation of the Entebbe hostages, who had been on a 
hijacked aeroplane originally headed to Tel Aviv but forced to fly to Uganda,97 
all the party groups of the European Parliament wanted to dedicate themselves 
to the fight against terrorism and adopted a resolution to combat international 
terrorism.98 The Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament wanted 
terrorism to be considered as a crime “similar to, if not worse than, the old inter-
national crime of piracy,” and one that, like piracy, should be dealt with differ-
ently from other crimes.99
The same year, a meeting brought together the Ministers of the Interior and 
of Justice of the member states of the European Council with the primary goal 
to “deal with issues arising out of international terrorism and the desire to appre-
hend and prosecute fugitive terrorists.” This meeting initiated the process that 
93  Recommendation 703 (1973) on International Terrorism, para 6(i)c. See also Lodge, 1981, 
167; and Müller-Rappard, 1988, 395.
94  Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
24 January 1974 at its 53rd Session). Italics added.
95  Hebenton and Thomas, 1995, 70–71.
96  Hebenton and Thomas, 1995, 84.
97  See in more detail e.g. The Guardian, 25 June 2016, “‘We thought this would be the end of 
us’: the raid on Entebbe, 40 years on.”
98  Lodge, 1981, 173. See in more details the political debate surrounding the development of 
the EEC’s antiterrorism policy in the 1970s. Lodge, 1981.
99  Cited in Lodge, 1981, 177.
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led to the creation of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
(ECST) in 1977.100 The ECST was the first international antiterrorist convention 
that was ratified by several European states.101 The ECST was also the first inter-
national convention to depoliticise terrorism as a phenomenon. The depoliticisa-
tion was enabled by the Council of Europe Member States’ mutual confidence in 
each other’s legal orders.
The aim of the ECST was to fill the gap created by the POE, which had, on 
certain occasions, resulted in the protection of terrorists. However, when it was 
planned, it proved too difficult to accept that all political offences would amount 
to obligatory extradition. Instead, it was seen that each case could be examined 
separately.102 One of the fears related to the establishment of an antiterrorism 
policy in Europe was that the same measures could be used against civil liber-
ties.103 For this reason, the decision-making remained cautious.
The ECST excluded a variety of violent offences from the scope of political 
offences. Article 1 listed the offences that would not be considered as political 
offences or connected offences, or acts inspired by political motives for the pur-
poses of extradition.104 The ECST made reference to the Hague and Montreal 
Conventions and excluded crimes committed against internationally protected 
persons. In addition, the ECST depoliticised kidnappings, hostage takings and 
other serious unlawful detentions, as well as offences involving the use of a bomb, 
grenade, rocket, automatic firearm, or a letter or parcel bomb, if lives were endan-
gered. It also excluded any attempts to commit such offences or participation as 
an accomplice from the POE.
The ECST did not depoliticise the acts themselves, but did so only for the 
purposes of extradition between contracting states: “For the purposes of extradi-
tion between Contracting States, none of the following offences shall be regarded 
as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an 
offence inspired by political motives.”105 The aim was to eliminate the possibil-
ity of invoking the POE when facing an extradition request. However, as the 
ESCT was not an extradition treaty as such, this elimination did not mean that 
100  Hebenton and Thomas, 1995, 4.
101  European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS No. 90, 27 January 1977. See 
in detail also Müller-Rappard, 1988.
102  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 
No. 90, 27 January 1977.
103  Lodge, 1981, 175.
104  Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, ETS No. 86, 15 October 
1975. Prior to this, a similar limitation had been set – “political offences shall not be con-
sidered to include the following” – by the UN Genocide Convention as well as Article 1 
of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition for certain crimes 
against humanity and for violations of the laws and customs of war, as well as in Article 
VII of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. 
105  Article 1, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS No. 90, 27 January 
1977. Italics added. 
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other exceptions could not be invoked. In addition, Article 1 was subject to 
reservations.106
Altogether eight states reserved “the right to refuse extradition in respect of 
any offence mentioned in Article I which it considers a political offence.” Italy 
went so far to state that it would not extradite for a “political offence, an offence 
connected with a political motive or an offence inspired by political motives.”107 
Ireland took the controversial position that it was against customary international 
law to extradite political offenders.108 According to Geoffrey Gilbert, this “effec-
tively sabotage[d] the fundamental purpose of the ECST.”109
Article 2 of the ECST made it possible for a contracting state not to regard 
as political or as connected offences a number of serious offences against persons 
or property. However, this was already possible under any traditional extradition 
rule. States had always had the right to consider acts of terrorism as common 
crimes. Thus, the ECST merely confirmed this right.110
Article 5 of the ESCT contained the so-called discrimination clause, which 
further allowed a state to deny extradition in case it considered the request to be 
ideologically or politically motivated. Gilbert has pointed out that such a provi-
sion should not have been considered necessary between states which had dedi-
cated themselves to the provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR).111 Klabbers has argued that this article is, in fact, contradictory to the 
depoliticisation of terrorism done in Article 1 as it brings out attention to the 
political nature of terrorism. Additionally, he has argued that the request for the 
extradition of a terrorist is, by nature, of political nature, as terrorists themselves 
are political actors and can be persecuted for their political opinions.112 This argu-
ment is of interest, especially because some have claimed that the political offence 
exception could be replaced by the discrimination clause.113 The two, however, 
provide different protection: while the POE acknowledges the political motiva-
tion of the crime, the discrimination clause does not make a difference between 
political and so-called common crimes but instead looks at the motivation of the 
requesting government. As such, it does not repoliticise the committed crime, 
but instead, looks at why the request has been made.
Article 7 created the obligation to either extradite or prosecute. This did not 
mean that the convention contained the principle aut dedere aut judicare. The 
ECST gave priority to extradition, meaning that prosecution was a subsidiary 
106  Article 13, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS No. 90, 27 Janu-
ary 1977.
107  Gilbert, 1991, 142. Italics orig. 
108  Murphy, 1985, 15.
109  Gilbert, 1998, 287. A similar note was made by Murphy, 1985, 14.
110  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 48; Müller-Rappard, 1988, 399; Explanatory Report to the 
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS No. 90, 27 January 1977.
111  Gilbert, 1991, 141. 
112  Klabbers, 2004, 306.
113  See in more detail Chapter 5, Section 5.2.5.
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means to be used in case an extradition request was turned down.114 Additionally, 
there was no requirement for the case to be tried (judicare), but only that the case 
would be submitted for prosecution.115
Finally, Article 8 of the ECST removed the right for a state to refuse mutual 
assistance for political offences. This obligation was subject to reservations.
The role of the ECST was to complement and, where necessary, modify pre-
existing extradition treaties between member states.116 The legal basis of extradi-
tion still remained the relevant extradition treaty or other law. This meant that 
states could still refuse extradition for crimes in the convention if other condi-
tions of extradition were not filled.117 The only legally binding element in the 
convention is that the countries that ratified it were committed to collaborat-
ing in the matter of serious offences that were covered by international conven-
tions.118 There are plans to further amend the ECST to exclude a wider list of 
terroristic crimes and to strengthen the discrimination clause.119 However, these 
plans have not gone forward.
Alex P. Schmid has criticised the ECST for inconsistency. Acts mentioned in 
the ECST can be terroristic under some circumstances and not under others.120 
“[It] can place a hijacker who is attempting to escape from a terror regime in 
the same category as a ‘real’ (i.e. triadic) terrorist.” Further, according to, for 
instance, Müller-Rappard, the ECST failed at eliminating the possibility of con-
sidering terrorist crimes political offences or offences connected with political 
offences.121 However, its political importance has been underlined.122
According to Geoffrey Gilbert: “The ECST is, thus, clumsy and inelegant, 
even incoherent, from an academic legal viewpoint, but justifiable and under-
standable if seen within the context of a socio-legal viewpoint.”123 Also accord-
ing to Juliet Lodge, the ECST gave a clear signal: “the plea that a terrorist act 
is politically inspired, justifiable and defensible is no longer to be regarded as 
justifying non-prosecution of a terrorist.”124
It is clear that the ECST represented a major change in the way in which the 
link between the POE and terrorism was viewed. Because of the initial steps of 
European unification had taken place, it became easier for European states to 
114  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 
No. 90, 27 January 1977.
115  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 
No. 90, 27 January 1977; Müller-Rappard, 1988, 403–404.
116  Müller-Rappard, 1988, 399; Gilbert, 1991, 141.
117  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 
No. 90, 27 January 1977.
118  Müller-Rappard, 1988, 402.
119  Harrington, 2015, 161.
120  Schmid, 1984, 101.
121  Müller-Rappard, 1988, 395.
122  Freestone, 1981, 214; Schmid, 1984, 103.
123  Gilbert, 1998, 289.
124  Lodge, 1981, 171.
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join forces against evil and deny the protection for political offenders, even if not 
completely.
As a follow-up to the creation of the ECST, President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
began promoting the l’Espace Judiciare Européen, the European Judicial Area, 
which aimed at tightening the net around fugitives of law, especially terrorists, by 
creating a European extradition system. This idea formed a part of a larger plan 
to strengthen the independence of the European Economic Community and to 
secure French leadership in it.125
The ratifications of the ECST were slow, which has been interpreted as a 
sign of distrust between the signatory states.126 After the killing of Italian Prime 
Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, the European Parliament tried to push EEC mem-
bers to ratify the ECST. The same year, the EEC Ministers of Justice agreed to 
observe a common stance on extraditing or prosecuting EEC nationals accused of 
terrorist acts, even if most member states did not have specific antiterrorist legisla-
tion. However, the ministers wanted to guarantee more freedom in comparison 
to the Council of Europe’s approach in the application of the POE. They decided 
that extradition could be denied based on the political nature of the crime in 
question, but in such a case accused terrorist acts were to be submitted to the 
national authorities for prosecution.127 Lodge has noted that during this time, 
the European Parliament kept stressing the need to determine and eliminate the 
causes of terrorism.128
The Dublin Convention, or the Agreement Concerning the Application of 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism among the Member 
States of the European Communities, of 1979 also aimed at improving the appli-
cation of the ECST. The goal was to make Articles 1, 8 and 13 of the ECST 
applicable between all member states of the European Communities, regardless 
of whether they were a party to the ECST or had ratified it. However, the Dublin 
Convention also ended up not being ratified in spite of being signed by all mem-
bers of the European Communities.129
Even if the ECST was not as efficient as hoped for, it had implications to other 
extradition treaties, even outside Europe. For instance, the UK–India extradition 
treaty of 1993 was modelled on it.130 This treaty excluded from the scope of the 
125  Carbonneau, 1983, 217.
126  Gilbert, 1991, 142.
127  Lodge, 1981, 179–182.
128  Lodge, 1981, 190–191. Nonetheless, Lodge argued in 1981 that the focus of governments 
was more on creating antiterrorist measures rather than in investigating the causes of ter-
rorism. Lodge, 1981, 226–227.
129  Agreement Concerning the Application of the European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism among the Member States of the European Communities (the Dublin Con-
vention), Assembly Document 4460, 17 December 1979. See also Müller-Rappard, 1988, 
408–409; and Murphy, 1985, 15–16.
130  Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 30 December 1993.
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POE for instance murder, or “the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a 
person who intends either himself or through another person to endanger life.” 
In addition to excluding a long list of violent crimes as well as the UN conven-
tions which related to terrorism,131 the UK–India treaty specifically mentioned 
“any other offence[s] relating to terrorism under the law of the Requested Party” 
which were “not to be regarded as [an] offence[s] of a political character.”132
The Council of Europe, which drafted the ECST, is an organisation dedicated 
to specific values: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. For this reason, 
its statements are more openly ideological than those of any of the other organi-
sations studied. Even if it had dedicated itself to countering terrorism within 
Europe, it still had a controversial take on the matter.
In 1979, it created Recommendation 852 on Terrorism in Europe, which is espe-
cially interesting. First, it claims that the Assembly of the Council was “Convinced 
that there is no justification for politically motivated violence in a democratic soci-
ety where legal provision is made for change, improvement and development by 
means of political persuasion, and that, consequently, terrorism is an attack against 
the constitution and the democratic stability of the state.”133 In the following para-
graph, however, it still acknowledged the political roots of the terrorist problem 
and urged its member states to enhance their democratic structures for the purpose 
of removing these “sociological conditions” behind these acts.134
In its 1981 Recommendation 916 on the Conference on “Defence of 
Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe – Tasks and Problems,” the Assembly of 
the Council of Europe made note “that it was generally agreed at the conference 
that in Council of Europe member countries the aim of terrorist movements, 
whatever their names or origins, is to overthrow and destroy democracy and 
parliamentary institutions, as well as stifle the free political, economic and social 
development that only a democratic system permits.”135 The conference also 
underlined the importance of studying the role of culture, education and mass 
media on the phenomenon as well as, following the lines of the UN: “a study and 
documentation centre of the causes, prevention and suppression of terrorism.”136
131  As mentioned, these have only later been named the antiterrorism conventions.
132  Article 5(2)(e)(j)(o), Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India 
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 30 
December 1993. See also e.g. Article 5, Extradition Treaty between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of India, 6 February 1987, containing similar provisions.
133  Para 4, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 852 on Ter-
rorism in Europe, 31 January 1979.
134  Para 5, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 852 on Ter-
rorism in Europe, 31 January 1979.
135  Para 5, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe Recommendation 916 on the Confer-
ence on “Defence of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe – Tasks and Problems,” 26 
March 1981.
136  Para 13(h), Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe Recommendation 916 on the Con-
ference on “Defence of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe – Tasks and Problems,” 
26 March 1981.
 Taking the political out of the political 131
These recommendations demonstrate that the tackling of terrorism was not in 
any way simple in Europe during the 1970s and in the early 1980s. The political 
roots of terrorism made it a difficult topic to agree upon, even within member 
states committed to democratic values and rejecting the use of violence as a tool 
for political change.
Since the early years of the 1980s, there was a clear shift in European poli-
cies. Little by little, less attention was paid to the grievances motivating terror-
ist acts. Pushing aside the politics behind terrorist acts in the early years of the 
1980s is a noteworthy change in the way in which terrorism was understood. 
In 1982, Recommendation 82 no longer mentioned the political nature, causes 
or motivations of terrorism.137 In 1984, the Assembly of the Council argued 
that what made terrorism so reprehensible was its totalitarian character and 
the threat it poses to democracy and its violation of human rights. For this 
reason, the measures used against it should never violate human rights or be 
antidemocratic. According to the council in Recommendation 982, “the fight 
against terrorism cannot justify the establishment of regimes – or the adoption 
of measures – of a fascist nature, which are as hateful as terrorism itself and for 
the same reason.”138
4.1.6  The Iranian hostage crisis provokes a global reaction in 1979
Based on the findings of the current research, the year 1979 is an important 
turning point with regard to global views on terrorism. The hostage crisis in Iran 
opened a new era of state-sponsored terrorism as a deliberated instrument of 
foreign policy. Typically, the major terrorist organisations from the 1960s until 
the 1990s were ideological, ethno-nationals and separatist organisations.139 The 
hostage crisis, however, brought terrorism onto the field of international power 
politics. For this reason, it made terrorism a more pressing problem than it had 
even been globally, and particularly to the US.
During the widely publicised siege, 52 Americans were held hostage in the 
embassy in Tehran by militant Iranian ‘students,’ who were perceived as acting 
on behalf of the newly established Iranian regime. This was the starting point of 
an anti-American terrorist campaign by Iran.140
The events in Iran provoked a new type of reaction from the UN. As an 
immediate counteraction to the hostage crisis, the UN General Assembly drafted 
137  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation of the Committee of Min-
isters to Member States Concerning International Co-operation in the Prosecution and 
Punishment of Acts of Terrorism. No. R (82), Adopted by the Committee of Ministers at 
the 342nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 15 January 1982.
138  Para 3, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 982 on the Defence 
of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe, 9 May 1984.
139  Hoffman, 1998, 200.
140  See e.g. Trager (ed.), 1986, 4; Hoffman, 1998, 186. See contemporary news stories docu-
menting the hostage crisis Trager (ed.), 1986, 4–21.
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the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, or Hostages 
Convention, in 1979. The convention condemns “all acts of taking hostages as 
international terrorism.”141 This was the first UN instrument that openly labelled 
the threat as terrorism. Several previous instruments are classified as antiterrorist 
instruments, but they did not mention the term.
The aim of the Hostages Convention was to close the gap between humani-
tarian law and law that related to individual terrorist acts so that all cases of 
hostage-taking would either be covered by the convention or by the law of armed 
conflict.142
The Hostages Convention, like many other sectoral antiterrorist UN con-
ventions, contained the aut dedere aut judicare principle as well as the dis-
crimination clause. The Hostages Convention, however, does not depoliticise 
hostage-taking. In fact, Article 15 of the convention specifically mentions that 
treaties on asylum would not be affected. As noted by Ben Saul, because these 
treaties were not specified, it is unclear if they include the Refugee Convention 
of 1951, which excludes from its scope persons who have committed serious 
non-political crimes.143 According to Saul, some acts of hostage-taking could, for 
this reason, be considered non-political under both international refugee law and 
certain national extradition laws.144 For instance, Australia went beyond what the 
convention necessitated and depoliticised the crimes covered by the convention 
in its national extradition law.145
In addition to the UN, the year 1979 was also an important watershed for 
Interpol. The resolution of the 1979 Acts of Violence Committed by Organised 
Groups, created as a reaction to the siege, argued that there were criminal groups 
claiming to be ideologically motivated.146
This is a minor choice of words but a major policy change. Earlier, a claim 
of ideological motivation had been taken at face value. The Acts of Violence 
Committed by Organised Groups marked the first time when the motivation and 
the act were separated from each other. Thus, the Iranian embassy crisis became 
the first milestone for a new, stricter global view on terrorism.
The developments of the 1980s continued to challenge previous views of 
treating terrorism as a political threat and of understanding its causes.
141  The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages [Hostage taking Con-
vention], UN Doc. A/Res/34/146; 1316 UNTS 205; 18 ILM 1456, 17 December 
1979.
142  Murphy, 1985, 11.
143  Article 1 F(b), United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951.
144  See for a detailed analysis of the Hostages Convention e.g. Saul, 2014.
145  Australia, Extradition Regulations (1988), Reg. 2B(1)(d) cited in Saul, 2014.
146  Interpol resolution AGN/48/RES/8, Acts of violence committed by organised groups, 
Nairobi, 1979. Italics added.
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4.2  Reagan, Thatcher and the narrowing of the exception 
in the 1980s
4.2.1  Legislative war against terrorists
As the United States was itself built on rebellion, it was for a long time sym-
pathetic towards revolutionaries. It had since its independence in 1776 been 
known as a safe haven for political dissidents and criminals.147 This view gradually 
changed in the 1970s and 1980s, as the US started to alter its interpretation of 
the POE.
In the 20th century, the US became an ‘old nation’ and established its posi-
tion as a great power. It had a growing amount of political and business interests 
around the world, which led to its defending stability over ideology. Foreign 
conflicts that had previously been seen as distant distractions now became part 
of US interests. With the end of its isolationist ideology, its interests were more 
and more attached to the rest of the world. The bureaucratisation of the US by 
the end of the 20th century led to its sympathising with foreign law enforcement 
agencies instead of rebel groups. The core interest of the US was now to recover 
fugitives, not to protect foreign rebels. Additionally, arms trade tied the US with 
other established regimes rather than with revolutionist groups. Rebels against 
nations that were connected to US interests were considered terrorists. Rebels 
against Communist regimes were still treated as freedom fighters.148
A number of highly publicised terrorist events confirmed the Reagan adminis-
tration’s dedication to the fight against terrorism. The commitment to this cause 
was not only visible in US foreign and domestic policies, but it was also reflected 
by the changes in US courts’ interpretation of the POE. Additionally, some of 
the key US extradition treaties were re-formulated in order to facilitate the return 
of fugitive terrorists.149 According to Christopher H. Pyle: “The effort to strip 
alleged terrorists of political offender status was as much a propaganda war as 
it was a legal one.”150 One of the main catalysts of this change was the political 
companionship between the UK and the US.
4.2.2 Eain v. Wilkes of 1980 as a departure from the incidence test
During the 1980s, several US court decisions denied extradition for criminals 
who had committed violent acts. This provoked a call for reform of the law and 
the application of the exception both from politicians as well as scholars.151 This 
publicity and criticism pushed governments to use alternative methods to return 
fugitives so that they could avoid dealing with the exemption. Terrorists did not 
147  Pyle, 2001, 77.
148  Pyle, 2001, 142–143.
149  Groarke, 1988, 1515; Petersen, 1992, 773.
150  Pyle, 2001, 168.
151  See e.g. Lubet, 1982; and Sofaer, 1986.
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find safe haven in the US in masses. On the contrary, the majority of those who 
had committed terrorist crimes were in fact extradited, but the focus remained 
on those who were not.152
US courts gradually started to apply the POE in a more restrictive way, even 
if the new interpretation was not consistent and no overnight transformation 
took place. A landmark decision was that of Eain v. Wilkes, where the Seventh 
Circuit court rejected the incidence test traditionally applied in cases concerning 
allegedly political crimes. Upon appeal of the case, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals employed a new stricter interpretation of the POE and concluded that a 
direct political effect needed to follow an act for it to fall into the political offence 
category.153
Eain was accused of bombing a marketplace in Israel, resulting in the deaths 
of two young boys. Given that Eain was a member of the Al Fatah faction of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation,154 involved in an ongoing conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, and the motivation of the bombing was political, 
the traditional incidence test would have most likely resulted in the refusal of his 
extradition.155
The court tried to overcome the problem that had previously presented itself 
in the Artukovic case156 by underlining the difference between acts targeted 
against the “political order of the state,” which were considered as truly politi-
cal, as opposed to those that were targeted against the “social structure.” The 
latter ones were deemed as “anarchist-like,” and thus excluded from the scope 
of the political offence exception.157 The decision reflected the British case In re 
Meunier of 1894158 in which the court concluded that anarchist acts could not 
be protected by the POE.159 Nonetheless, after Eain’s extradition as a common 
criminal, Israel classified him as a prisoner of war.160
The Eain reasoning has been labelled the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
‘wanton crimes’ exception to the political offence doctrine.161 If the crime 
152  Gilbert, 1991, 135.
153  Schlaefer, 1981, 641; Gilbert, 1985, 700; Kulman, 1986, 768–769.
154  Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
155  Schlaefer, 1981, 642. However, Noone and Alexander have argued that the application 
of the incidence test would have not resulted in protection, as the members of the PLO 
entered the territory of a different state. According to them, the exception was aimed at 
protecting those attempting to change their own government or to drive out occupying 
forces. Noone and Alexander, 1997, 98.
156  See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.
157  See e.g. Hannay, 1980, 402–406; Schlaefer, 1981, 638–641; Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 185; 
Kulman, 1986, 769; Sapiro, 1986, 676–677; Lampo, 1988, 243–245; Pyle, 1988, 189; 
Noone and Alexander, 1997, 84–90; Pyle, 2001, 155– 158; and Lieberman, 2007, 194–
195, for details of the decision.
158  See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.
159  Lieberman, 2007, 195.
160  Pyle, 2001, 158.
161  Lampo, 1988, 244; Pyle, 2001, 156.
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was ‘wanton,’ the perpetrator was not entitled to protection from extradition. 
According to Christopher H. Pyle, the wanton crimes exception was a more effi-
cient way to respond to the same problem the attentat clause, the Meunier excep-
tion for anarchist offences and the multilateral antiterrorist conventions since the 
1970s had attempted to solve. Writing in 2001, Pyle was hopeful that the Eain 
decision could have set a “precedent that might, in time, bring the law of extradi-
tion for at least some non-international conflicts into line with the law governing 
international wars.” The wanton crimes exception matched the original humani-
tarian purposes of the POE. However, some of the government attorneys were 
not satisfied with the reasoning and still hoped to get rid of the POE or transfer 
it to the executive to decide.162
The Eain decision did not prevent the application of the POE to ‘wanton 
crimes,’ as only courts within the Seventh Circuit were bound by the Eain prece-
dent.163 The decision was in fact not followed by other jurisdictions. Additionally, 
it never excluded all attacks against civilians from the POE, and did not take a 
stance on whether attacks on individual military or other government personnel, 
such as policemen, constituted political acts, meaning acts that “disrupt the politi-
cal structure of a state” or non-political acts that “disrupt the social structure.” In 
Eain, the decision of the court was based on the lack of direct links between the 
specific crime, its perpetrator and the goals of a political organisation.164 Thus, it 
was no solve-all solution to the problem of terrorists and the POE.
The reasoning behind the Eain decision was widely criticised. For instance, the 
court in the famous case of Quinn165 was critical of the reasoning behind the Eain 
decision. It stated: “[T]here is no justification for distinguishing […] between 
attacks on military and civilian targets. The ‘incidental to’ component, like the 
incidence test as a whole, must be applied in an objective, non-judgmental man-
ner; it is for revolutionaries, not the courts, to determine what tactics may help 
further their chances of changing the government.”166 Additionally, the judges’ 
own political preferences could easily affect the way in which they interpreted the 
cases.167 Others have blamed the Eain decision for an “emotionalism.” The disa-
greement on the Eain decision proved that there was a division of views regard-
ing the application of the POE, especially with regard to acts of terrorism.168 In 
some years’ time, the ‘wanton crimes limitation’ proved to be inefficient as the 
criteria for its application remained unclear.169 Further, the division between anar-
chist crimes and other types of political offences was considered unrealistic and 
162  Pyle, 2001, 157.
163  Lampo, 1988, 244.
164  Sofaer, 1986, 131.
165  Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986). The Quinn case will be discussed 
in detail in this chapter later.
166  Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1986). Cited in Kulman, 1986, 769.
167  Lieberman, 2007, 197.
168  Lampo, 1988, 244–245.
169  Kulman, 1986, 779.
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has been interpreted as a sign of the courts’ frustration with terrorist acts passing 
as political offences in the application of the POE.170
It has been argued that the Eain decision reflected a wider understanding in 
US courts concerning extraditions to the Middle East. Steve Lampo has claimed 
that in comparison to requests that came from Britain, demands for extradition 
from Middle Eastern states were accepted more often.171 This is a very interesting 
remark. Both Britain and Israel have typically been seen as US allies but, addition-
ally, British legal culture is widely shared with the US due to the inheritance of 
the common law tradition. The reason why the US ended up denying extradition 
for political offenders that escaped Britain had to do with wider internal political 
concerns relating to the political power of the Irish minority in the country. This 
topic is discussed in more detail later.
A similar case to that of Eain was that of Ahmad v. Wigen of 1989. Israel 
accused Ahmad of attacking a bus in Tel Aviv with Molotov cocktails and machine 
guns.172 The US court reasoned that the attack was not incidental to any political 
uprising. Additionally, in its decision, the court made a surprising reference to the 
Additional Protocol I of 1977 of the Geneva Conventions, a treaty not ratified by 
the US, Israel, PLO or most other nations of the world. Extradition was finally 
denied on the basis that Ahmad’s acts violated the laws of armed conflict.
Interestingly, Ahmad tried to claim that he would not receive a fair trial if returned 
to Israel. However, the US–Israel extradition treaty did not contain the discrimi-
nation clause.173 The rule of non-inquiry prevented US judges from evaluating the 
Israeli justice system, and the court put the burden of proof on the accused to dem-
onstrate that he would receive unfair treatment upon his return. Regardless of reports 
concerning human rights violations within the system, the petition was denied. It has 
been suggested that the decision was based on foreign policy concerns rather than 
judicial: the court did not want to get meddled into foreign politics. As such, the case 
demonstrates the dangers of case-by-case decision-making and giving the judiciary a 
(very limited) role in the evaluation of other countries’ judicial systems.174
After Eain, American courts still, for the most part, continued to apply a more 
liberal approach to the incidence test compared to their British counterparts and 
kept following the reasoning introduced in the Ezeta case in 1894.175 Eain was 
the only case in the first part of the 1980s where the morality of the conduct was 
examined.176 The trend of narrowing the scope of the POE did not otherwise 
seem to affect the actions of US courts during the first part of the 1980s and vio-
lent offenders continued to successfully use the POE as a defence.177
170  Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 186.
171  Lampo, 1988, 247.
172  Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff ’d, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990). 
See for more details on the case e.g. Pyle, 2001, 164–167.
173  Israel International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 December 1962.
174  Petersen, 1992, 793–794. See also Pyle, 2001, 167.
175  See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5.
176  Banoff and Pyle, 1984, 188.
177  Kulman, 1986, 766.
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Valerie Epps has linked the US courts’ doctrine with the increase in inter-
national communication and interdependence. The courts followed US foreign 
policy goals in their application and interpretation of the POE.178 Also, Geoffrey 
Gilbert has connected the outcomes of court decisions more to foreign policy 
goals than to solid legal reasoning. Court decisions were often affected by bilat-
eral policy concerns. A fugitive trying to escape a Communist country received a 
different decision than a fugitive on the run from a state with which the US had 
important trade relations or which policies received support within the country.179
4.2.3  Terrorism starts to affect the US in the 1980s
The 1980s witnessed an encompassing metamorphosis in US antiterrorism and 
extradition policies. The threat of terrorism, the growth in drug trafficking and 
the attempts to retrieve war criminals from the Holocaust, together with a steady 
rise in the number of extradition requests slowly started to affect US extradition 
treaties.180 Extradition was growlingly used as a weapon in ‘wars’ against crime.181
Still, in the late 1970s and 1980s, terrorism was understood as mostly a politi-
cal threat. For instance, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers (1969–1973) 
acknowledged the political goals behind terrorist actions, but underlined that 
“political passion cannot justify criminal violence against innocent persons.”182 
Similarly, President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) stated in his 1986 radio address: 
In our world, there are innumerable groups and organisations with griev-
ances, some justified, some not. Only a tiny fraction has been ruthless 
enough to try to achieve their ends through vicious and cowardly acts of 
violence upon unarmed victims. Perversely, it is often the terrorists them-
selves who prevent peacefully negotiated solutions. So, perhaps the first step 
in solving some of these fundamental challenges in getting to the root cause 
of conflict is to declare that terrorism is not an acceptable alternative and will 
not be tolerated.183
Thus, unlike with the current depoliticisation trend, the political goals and 
motives were still acknowledged.
Before the 1990s, terrorism was mostly seen as an organised movement that 
was led by the Soviet Union and supported by Middle Eastern states such as 
Syria, Iran and Libya. Terrorism started to be understood as a foreign, mostly 
178  Epps, 1979, 68.
179  Gilbert, 1991, 114. In addition to terrorists, Gilbert also contested that war criminals were 
testing the limits of the exception. See also Gilbert, 1991, 136.
180  Extradition requests to the US: prior to the 1970s, less than dozen; by 1978, about 100; 
by 1987, 239. Pyle has linked this development with the growth in international police 
cooperation. Pyle, 2001, 143.
181  Pyle, 2001, 144.
182  Cited in Schaefer, 1981, 634–635.
183  Reagan, 1986.
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Islamist phenomenon. Crimes committed by, for instance, the far right were not 
seen as terrorist.184
As discussed in the previous chapter, the growth of international terrorism 
had an important effect on Western policies, including those of the US. The first 
push had already come from the Munich Olympics attacks. Since the mid-1970s, 
Libya’s growing role in international terrorism created alarm in the US. In 1976, 
the Office for Combating Terrorism was set up. The 1970s also laid the founda-
tion for the future US policy of not negotiating with dealing terrorists.185
Even if terrorism seemingly was a new threat, the US actually had a long his-
tory of dealing with violent dissidents. According to Philip Jenkins, there had 
been a wave of domestic terrorist attacks in the US from 1973 to 1977 which 
did not generate a crisis. This period had witnessed atrocities committed by intel-
ligence agencies, which resulted in public distaste for these organisations and 
scepticism with regard to the information they provided.186
Terrorism made its first appearance in US bilateral extradition treaties in 
1978, when a new treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West 
Germany)187 was signed. The treaty contained a new jurisdictional provision 
aimed at facilitating the combat against terrorism which allowed for extradition 
when the offence has been committed outside the territory of the requesting state 
by a national of the requesting state.188 However, terrorism was not excluded 
from the scope of the POE, even if the application of the exemption was limited 
by UN antiterrorist conventions.189
184  Jenkins, 2003, 38.
185  Fields, 1988, 282–283.
186  For instance in the 1920s, there was a terrorist wave in the US, known as the Red Scare. 
Bombings and bank robberies by anarchists and Communist militants were committed 
around the country. Jenkins, 2003, 33–36. See Jenkins, 2003, 61–66, for tables with 
domestic and international terrorist events in the US since the 1940s. See also e.g. Patter-
son, 2005, 71–73, for a discussion of the distrust of Americans in their security services and 
76–107 for a general discussion on US domestic politics in the 1970s.
187  United States Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 June 1978.
188  Letter of submittal, United States Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 20 June 1978. Interestingly, the treaty between the FRG and Canada of 1977 did 
not contain such provisions. The only limitation to the POE in this treaty was the provision 
excluding attacks against internationally protected persons from the POE. Treaty Between 
Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Extradition, E101275, CTS 
1979 No. 18, 11 July 1977.
189  Article 4, para 3, “For the purpose of this Treaty the following offences shall not be deemed 
to be offences within the meaning of paragraph (1) [political offences]: (a) A murder or 
other wilful crime, punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by a penalty of at 
least one year, against the life or physical integrity of a Head of State or Head of Govern-
ment of one of the Contracting Parties or of a member of his family, including attempts 
to commit such an offence, except in open combat; (b) An offence which the Contracting 
Parties or the Requesting State have the obligation to prosecute by reason of a multilateral 
international agreement.” It has to be noted, however, that these legal documents have 
later been classified under UN antiterrorism conventions. United States Extradition Treaty 
with the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 June 1978.
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West Germany had ratified the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism of 1977 just one month before the signature of the US–FRG treaty.190 
As West Germany had just recently committed to the suppression of terrorism 
and had its own terrorism problem, it seems likely that it would have been inter-
ested in giving more focus to the phenomenon in the treaty. The terrorism prob-
lem was not yet, however, of pressing concern to the US.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, it eventually became clear that the 
nature of terrorism had changed. Cindy Schaefer wrote in 1981: “No longer are 
the victims limited to ‘local tyrants, symbolic ambassadors, or errant politicians’ 
whose deaths guaranteed publicity.” The mass communication and mass trans-
port systems made it possible to attract an unprecedented amount of attention 
to the deeds and to create an unparalleled amount of damage. The concept of 
perceived irrationality in the attacks was a new element. “Spectacular terrorism 
simply requires a willingness to take a disproportionate risk with lives” and these 
lives often included the terrorist’s own life.”191
Towards the end of the 1970s and in the early years of the 1980s, the US 
witnessed a growing amount of terrorist attacks targeting its own citizens. These 
included the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, which gained worldwide attention. 
The rise of religious terrorism opposing the United States192 combined with 
the anti-Americanism of fundamentalist Muslims were presumably reasons why 
the United States became more interested in the global fight against terror-
ism. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 provided an example to Muslims 
around the world, encouraging them to resist the advance of the West, espe-
cially that of the United States.193 In addition, the emergence of anti-American 
state-sponsored terrorism at the beginning of the 1980s and the unsuccessful 
(or even counterproductive) economic and military countermeasures against 
state sponsors of terrorism194 created more reasons for the US to participate in 
the then mainly European efforts of coordinating international collaboration 
against terrorism.195
The year 1983 emerged as the new high in terrorism against America. Over 
250 people were killed in attacks against the American embassy and US Marine 
Headquarters in Beirut. The following years, international terrorist incidents 
increased by 30 percent in 1984 and by 45 percent in 1985. Most of these inci-
dents included bombings. In 1985, there were 12 international terrorist incidents 
that involved US citizens. Two of these were highly publicised: the skyjacking 
190  European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 90, 27 January 1977. See in 
more detail Section 4.1.5.
191  Schaefer, 1981, 634.
192  Hoffman, 1998, 93. However, it has to be noted that even in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
majority of terrorist incidents took place in areas not considered of special interest to the 
US. See more in Tilly, 2002.
193  Hoffman, 1998, 96; Patterson, 2005, 198.
194  In 1998, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Hoffman, 1998, 191–192.
195  See e.g. Fields, 1988, 282.
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of the TWA flight 847 in June 1985 and the Achille Lauro affair in October the 
same year.196
In June 1985, two terrorists hijacked TWA Flight 847 travelling from Athens 
to Rome. The incident lasted for over two weeks, and during the course of the 
events, US Navy diver Robert Stethem was killed. The US sought the extradition 
of one of the hijackers but the Federal Republic of Germany decided to prosecute 
him instead. He was convicted of murder, hostage-taking, assault, and hijacking, 
and sentenced to life in prison but was released in 2005.197
Abraham Sofaer, a US judge and legal adviser to the State Department, sug-
gested that the killing of Stethem, who was off duty, would not have been an 
extraditable offence. This was highly criticised by Christopher L. Blakesley who 
wrote that the “distinction between the killing of an off-duty, civilian-clothed 
military person during the hijacking of a civilian aircraft, and a firefight during a 
civil war seem significant enough for courts to distinguish.”198
In the Achille Lauro case, four armed men of the Palestine Liberation Front 
(PLF) hijacked an Italian cruise ship of 400 passengers off the coast of Egypt. 
During the hijacking, an American passenger was murdered. The Egyptian gov-
ernment, unaware of the death of the passenger, let the perpetrators flee as a result 
of negotiations with the hijackers. Soon, American planes forced the Egyptian 
aeroplane with the terrorists on board to land. The plane landed in Italy, with 
which the US had an extradition treaty. The Italian government prevented the 
American representatives from boarding the Egyptian aircraft or arresting the 
perpetrators. When the United States requested the extradition of the said per-
petrators, Italy assisted the perpetrators in fleeing to a safe haven in Yugoslavia, 
regardless of the conditions of the US–Italy extradition treaty. The attempts of 
the US to seek the extradition of the hijackers’ commander, Mohammed Abbas, 
failed. The POE, however, was not invoked in the Italian refusal to extradite the 
hijackers.199
The US had established a counterterrorism policy that aimed at making 
sure terrorists would not escape justice, and the Achille Lauro case was the first 
one where it used military force to capture international terrorists.200 The case 
196  Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, February 1986. Fields, 1988, 286; 
Cassese, 1989, 55. According to Cassese, an estimated number of terrorist attacks around 
the world which involved “American officials, citizens or property” was as high as around 
860. Cassese, 1989, 56. However, the definition must be paid attention to, as these attacks 
also involved crimes against property.
197  FBI History, Famous Cases and Criminals, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/
hijacking-of-twa-flight-847, retrieved 27 February 2017. See contemporary news stories 
documenting the hijacking of the Trans World Airlines (TWA) jet from Athens. Trager 
(ed.), 1986, 68–73.
198  Blakesley, 1986, 123.
199  See in detail Cassese, 1989. See also Sofaer, 1986, 125; Allan, 1993, 334–336; Pyle, 2001, 
273–274. See contemporary news stories documenting the Achille Lauro hijacking Trager 
(ed.), 1986, 82–87.
200  Fields, 1988, 285.
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has been seen as a symbol of all the problems that relate to the question of extra-
dition. Interstate relations, even between countries of a common ideological and 
political background, or of a joint political or military alliance, can still result in 
decisions that contradict the common interest and allow national concerns to 
prevail.201
Also in 1985, in December, yet another terrorist attack involving US citi-
zens took place. Eighteen people, including 5 Americans, were killed and 114 
wounded in terrorist incidents at the Rome and Vienna airports.202 All these 
events resulted in President Reagan ordering the setting of a new task force to 
combat terrorism.203
The following year, 1986, 2 American soldiers and a Turkish woman lost their 
lives and more than 200 others were wounded at the bombing of a disco in West 
Berlin. The bombing had been organised by the Libyan secret service and the 
Libyan Embassy in East Berlin, and the court that dealt with the case in 2001 
referred to it as state-sponsored terrorism. As retaliation to the attack, President 
Reagan ordered airstrikes on the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.204
Two months after the Berlin disco bombings, Reagan gave the following radio 
address: “History is likely to record that 1986 was the year when the world, at 
long last, came to grips with the plague of terrorism. For too long, the world 
was paralysed by the argument that terrorism could not be stopped until the 
grievances of terrorists were addressed. The complicated and heartrending issues 
that perplex mankind are no excuse for violent, inhumane attacks, nor do they 
excuse not taking aggressive action against those who deliberately slaughter 
innocent people.” He continued, “Terrorists are always the enemies of democ-
racy. Luckily, the world is shaking free from its lethargy and moving forward to 
stop the bloodshed.”205 The same year, a study was conducted that showed that 
Americans viewed terrorism as one of the most serious problems that the govern-
ment had to deal with, equal to such issues as the budget deficit and strategic 
arms control.206
The decade of terrorism witnessed its most infamous attack in 1988, when Pan 
Am flight 103 was bombed over Lockerbie in Scotland. The attack resulted in 
the deaths of 270 people. The role of the Libyan government, namely Muammar 
Gaddafi, was not proven in the court case that followed, but his involvement in 
the event was presumed. The surrender of the Libyan men wanted for trial in 
Scotland was unsuccessful. Eventually, in 1992, the UN Security Council adopted 
201  Cassese, 1989, 145.
202  See e.g. L.A. Times, 27 December 1985, “16 die in terrorist attacks at Rome, Vienna air-
ports: 117 hurt in raid aimed at Israeli.” See more contemporary news stories covering the 
Rome and Vienna airport attacks Trager (ed.), 1986, 103–105.
203  Fields, 1988, 286. Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, February 1986.
204  See e.g. Fields, 1988, 285; Erlanger, 2001. See contemporary news stories covering the 
bombing at a disco in West Berlin Trager (ed.), 1986, 109.
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Resolution 731, calling on Libya to accept the joint request by the United States, 
United Kingdom and France for the surrender.207 As Libya failed to return the 
men, the UN passed two other resolutions which imposed mandatory sanctions 
on Libya in 1992 and 1993.208
Concurrently with the rise of the terrorist threat, there was also a notable 
rise in the number of extradition requests to the US that related to the use of 
the POE.209 The protection of pure political offenders had continuous public 
support, but an increasing amount of debates concerned the application of the 
POE to relative political crimes.210 Echoes of the old Whig–Tory division in the 
Anglo-American context could be seen in the debates concerning the POE. The 
traditional Whig perspective was that courts of liberal republics should be neutral 
with regard to foreign rebellions. This reflected the Lockean view of the right 
to revolt.211 According to this view, most political criminals deserved protection 
from being extradited to regimes they had risen against. The Tory perspective, 
in turn, was critical of rebellions. According to this outlook, nations with similar 
ideologies should support each other in suppressing revolutions.212 Christopher 
H. Pyle has written: “For the Whigs who championed the political offence excep-
tion during the mid-nineteenth century, the image that inspired their law-making 
was of liberal revolutionaries who fought militarily (like Bolivar, Mazzini, and 
Kossuth) to overthrow autocracies that the Whigs despised. For the Tories who 
subsequently sought to limit the exception, the image that provoked their law-
making was of radical socialists, anarchists, war criminals, and terrorists whose 
political hatreds were not admired and whose attacks recklessly or deliberately 
killed bystanders.”213
4.2.4  The POE loses its justification
As discussed, the first push towards a stricter approach against terrorism came 
after the American embassy hostage crisis in Iran in 1979. President Jimmy Carter 
failed in his attempts to resolve the crisis, which fuelled the victory of Reagan in 
the wake of the incident in 1981. Like Carter, also President Ronald Reagan 
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swore his devotion to the battle against terrorism.214 However, the Carter admin-
istration had underlined its dedication to the promotion of international human 
rights, while, in January 1981, the Reagan administration’s Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig (1981–1982) made a public statement that the battle against 
international terrorism would overrule human rights concerns “because it is the 
ultimate abuse of human rights.”215 Notwithstanding its commitment to fighting 
terrorism, the Reagan administration was reluctant to introduce a definition of 
the term.216
The new administration was convinced that the POE was a legal loophole 
terrorists could use and sought to close it.217 The POE had never fit well with 
US traditions, but its humanitarian basis had appealed to the state. However, 
the rule of non-inquiry to the motives behind the requests applied by US courts 
undermined the humanitarian element of the exemption, which made it more 
difficult to justify.218 The application of the POE proved even more difficult when 
it became obvious that its traditional application by the US courts protected so-
called terrorists.
The Reagan administration started a campaign against the POE. Attention 
was drawn to the POE as a number of violent offenders had managed to escape 
justice due to the courts’ application of the exemption. The most publicised of 
these cases concerned members of the IRA and strained the USUK relationship. 
The establishment of the Office of International Affairs (OIA) in the Department 
of Justice Criminal Division in 1979 had made it easier for federal and state 
prosecutors to seek extradition for offenders fleeing the country. The office’s col-
laboration with foreign authorities also raised the willingness of other states to 
cooperate with the US in extradition matters.219
In 1982, the Reagan administration sought to reform the Extradition Act 
and exclude a variety of offences from the scope of the protection, in line with 
the European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism of 1977. The Senate 
bill issued provided that unless circumstances were extraordinary, violent crimes, 
including homicide, rape, kidnapping, taking hostages and the use of firearms, 
ought not to be considered political offences. The House bill provided that crimes 
of “wanton or indiscriminate” violence should be exempted from the protection 
of the POE. The outspoken purpose of these additions was to better enable the 
combatting of terrorism. However, the list of excluded offences in the ECST was 
much shorter than the one proposed in the Senate bill. Additionally, the ECST 
was subject to reservations, which in practice safeguarded the POE. The Senate 
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bill still suggested to leave the decision-making concerning the application of the 
POE to the judiciary but provided guidelines for its application.220
The legislation was never put into place, as Congress had concerns over its 
implications. The legislation would have made all killings extraditable, including 
those occurring during rebellions and for a rebellious cause. This meant that also 
those who maimed despotic leaders, or fought for a friendly regime that was later 
overthrown, would have been extradited.221
Banoff and Pyle argued in 1984 that these limitations would essentially have 
meant the evisceration of the POE.222 As the bill did not define what constituted 
a political offence, the courts would have been likely to proceed with the applica-
tion of the political uprising test laid down in 1894 in the In re Ezeta case. As the 
Ezeta requirement was that the defendant ought to have participated in a revolu-
tion or other violent political disturbance, a requirement that no weapons could 
be used and no deaths caused, and no prisoners taken for this purpose seemed 
to exclude all offences previously understood as political offences from the scope 
of the exemption. Or almost all: “While the line between terrorism and wars of 
liberation may, on occasion, be difficult to draw, the proposed statute appears to 
draw that line at pillow fights.”223 Further, Banoff and Pyle expressed their con-
cern that “In the Administration’s rush to condemn terrorism, the human rights 
concerns inherent in the concept of political asylum have been largely ignored.”224
It soon proved impossible to remove the POE from US legislation. Instead, 
the Reagan administration turned its hopes to eliminating the POE from all US 
extradition treaties. As this proved unworkable, it made an attempt to abolish it 
treaty by treaty. As this attempt also failed, the administration wished to “per-
suade the courts to interpret it out of existence” or, optionally, to make its appli-
cation an executive rather than a judiciary decision. The administration attacked 
the courts for being too soft on terrorism, as proven by the decisions in the 
Artukovic case and the cases of IRA members who had committed violent acts, 
as well as in the delays in the extradition of Eain. For this reason, it was claimed, 
courts could no longer be given the right to apply the POE.225
As the reform of the Extradition Act was unsuccessful, other means to close 
loopholes in the POE letting terrorists through were created. In 1986, the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act was passed by the US 
Congress. President Reagan saw that the act constituted a forward step in the 
“bipartisan effort to eradicate international terrorism.” The act spelt out the US 
dedication to the need for an international convention for the prevention and 
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control of all aspects of terrorism.226 In 1986, the Vice President’s Task Force on 
Combatting Terrorism hoped for a revision of extradition treaties “with countries 
with democratic and fair judicial systems to ensure that terrorists are extradited to 
the country with legal jurisdiction.”227
Regardless of the changes in US policies concerning extraditions, the extra-
dition treaties the US entered in the 1980s continued to contain the typical, 
unlimited POE or the POE with the attentat clause.228 The discrimination clause 
was first introduced to US bilateral extradition treaties in the 1983 treaty with 
Jamaica,229 but never became a common feature of US extradition treaties. The 
US–Italy treaty from the same year contained the POE and the limitation that 
concerned obligations with regard to multilateral conventions to which both 
countries were parties to. A particularity of the treaty was a detailed attentat 
clause. The clause specified that 
an offence against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a Head of State 
or Government or a member of their respective families, or any attempt to 
commit such an offence, will be presumed to have the predominant character 
of a common crime when its consequences were or could have been grave. In 
determining the gravity of the offence and its consequences, the fact that the 
offence endangered public safety, harmed persons unrelated to the political 
purpose of the offender, or was committed ruthlessness shall, in particular, 
be taken into account.230 
Similar to the US–Brazil treaty of 1961 and the US–Argentina treaty of 1972, 
the US–Italy treaty also considered the predominance of the common crime ele-
ment of the crime in question. Thus the model of the Swiss predominance test 
was brought to the treaty text itself. This left room for the court to determine 
whether the “consequences [of the act] could have been grave” and with regard 
to the “ruthlessness” of the crime but seems to categorically provide for the 
exclusion of terroristic offences from the scope of the protection of the POE.
This new treaty with Italy reflected a ‘fixing of loopholes’ approach in bilateral 
treaties. The United States had completed a previous treaty with Italy only ten 
years earlier. This treaty did not explicitly refer to the 1971 Montreal Convention, 
but it limited the POE with a clear reference to the it: “For the purposes of the 
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application of the present paragraph, the seizure or exercised of control by force 
or violence or threat of force or violence committed on board an aircraft in flight 
carrying passengers in scheduled air services or on a charter basis will be presumed 
to have a predominant character of a common crime when the consequences of 
the offence were or could have been grave.”231 This approach where bilateral trea-
ties were edited as the terrorist threat grew bigger, demonstrates the turbulence 
in this field of law during the 1970s and 1980s.
4.2.5  US–UK controversies with regard to terrorism in the 1980s
One of the most important US reforms that concerned the POE and terrorism 
was the 1985 revised extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. The revision 
of the treaty was a reaction to controversies between the US and the UK with 
regard to the US courts categorically denying extradition to revolutionary mem-
bers of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), offenders that the UK 
considered terrorists.232
In fact, since the 1860s rebellions in Ireland, the United States had not granted 
extradition to a single Irish political resistor to the United Kingdom.233 The rejec-
tion was validated with the incidence test applied since the late 1800s. There 
was undeniably an ongoing political disturbance in Northern Ireland and PIRA’s 
violent attacks were incidental to its political objectives. Thus crimes by the PIRA 
were considered of political nature, which in turn made them non-extraditable.234
During the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, Irish rebels gained an important 
share of their financial backing from the US as well as private individuals and 
groups. Due to the important majority of Irish descendants in the US, it was 
politically difficult for the US to take a stance against the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) or the PIRA.235 However, due to the importance of US–British political 
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relations, the support was not given openly and the US administration sought to 
remain neutral vis-à-vis the Irish cause.236
The US take on the matter was in stark contrast with the British view. In 
1976, the British had started to treat the conflict in Northern Ireland as an inter-
nal security problem, instead of an insurgency that required a military solution. 
This meant introducing new counterterrorist legislation and treating insurgents 
as criminals instead of prisoners of war.237 The criminalisation of the IRA’s activi-
ties produced miscarriages of justice.238
The US was forced to change its political position after two IRA attacks that 
occurred in 1979, one killing Lord Mountbatten and 3 others, and another kill-
ing 18 British soldiers in an explosion at army barracks. The Carter adminis-
tration essentially showed its support to British policies in Northern Ireland in 
remaining “neutral” towards the situation, and officially declaring its trust in the 
British holding on to human rights.239
During this period, the US started to deport, deny access to the country and 
extradite political criminals. This historical policy did not only concern Irish polit-
ical offenders, but became a general US policy.240 However, the changes in the 
administration’s position were not instantly mirrored in courts.
Amongst the most important of the US cases that concerned members of the 
IRA were the Mackin and McMullen cases.241 In the McMullen case (1979)242 the 
US court deemed the bombing of military barracks by IRA member McMullen a 
political offence and denied extradition. Similarly, in the Mackin case (1981)243 a 
US court invoked the protection of the POE for an attempted murder of a plain-
clothes intelligence British patrol soldier.
The McMullen case was the first where a US court had to consider whether 
terrorism was a legitimate political tactic and whether it could be protected by 
the political offence exemption.244 The decision outraged some of the officials 
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of the Carter administration, who had openly declared a war on terrorism. The 
protection of McMullen as a political offender was seen as unacceptable, as some 
considered him a terrorist. The McMullen case was one of the decisions that 
fuelled the calls to change the law.245 As a result, the US Justice Department 
began its campaign to abolish the POE.246 McMullen was extradited in 1996 and 
was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment.247
In the case of Mackin, incriminating evidence was lacking, but Mackin was 
repeatedly and publicly called a terrorist by the US Justice Department. At the 
same time, pro-IRA groups in the US considered him a hero. According to 
Christopher H. Pyle, the Mackin case was just the type of case for which the POE 
had been originally developed.248
Regardless of the outcome of the extradition case, the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Services of the US decided to deport Mackin. As the deportee can 
decide his or her own destination, Mackin ended up in Ireland. The UK never 
requested his extradition. According to McElrath, this was most likely due to 
the fact that his extradition would not have been granted because of the political 
nature of the crimes.249
The rejection of the extradition request proved politically problematic, as the 
court ruled that the IRA was a disciplined and highly organised guerrilla army 
and not a group of terrorists. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
an ally to the new Reagan administration,250 considered the violent attacks by the 
IRA as terroristic and was under great pressure end the violence.251 Magistrate 
Buchwald, upon deciding the case, underlined the importance of not creating 
safe havens for terrorists in the US, but still viewed Mackin’s crimes as relative 
political offences, instead of offences committed for personal motivations.252 
Magistrate Buchwald concluded that Mackin’s actions were aimed against a sol-
dier and they followed the logic of the traditional goals and strategies of the IRA. 
Magistrate Buchwald did not evaluate whether the discrimination clause could 
have been applied to the Mackin case.253
The American courts’ application of the POE in the McMullen and Mackin 
cases caused political worry. Some were convinced that using a similar approach 
to other terrorist cases could turn the country into a safe haven for fugitive terror-
ists. This would have not only compromised national security but also negatively 
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affected the country’s foreign relations.254 The cases were seen to prove that the 
POE had been outdated. As a result, the US saw a need to revise the laws and 
treaties so that they would no longer protect terrorists, but at the same time 
would safeguard the protection for ‘legitimate dissidents.’255 The terrorist cases 
raised both scholarly and political discussion on the concept of the POE and of 
the domestic extradition process of political offenders as discussed above.
In addition to the cases In re McMullen and In re Mackin, the US also denied 
extradition in the case of In re Doherty (1984).256 Doherty was a member of the 
PIRA accused of the murder of a British army captain when attacking a convoy of 
British soldiers in Northern Ireland.257
In the Doherty case, the court, after a thorough consideration of the history and 
nature of the PIRA, came to the conclusion, similar to the Mackin and McMullen 
decisions, that the PIRA had “both an organisation, discipline, and command 
structure that distinguishes it from more amorphous groups such as the Black 
Liberation Army or the Red Brigade.” For these reasons, Doherty’s offences were 
political and his extradition was denied. The court discussed whether the crimes 
were purely political because no civilians were maimed in the attack. Finally, the 
court also concluded that a seemingly political crime could also be excluded from 
the scope of the POE if it became clear that personal reasons were the main moti-
vation for the crime.258
The British and American governments made an effort to portray Doherty as a 
terrorist and a criminal instead of a paramilitary, and to depict the British role in 
Northern Ireland as law enforcement. The Doherty case was the first where a fed-
eral judge tried to estimate whether the accused could receive a fair trial upon his 
return. Judge Sprizzo set a precedent by arguing that if evidence demonstrated 
clear injustices in the courts of the requesting regime, extradition would not be 
allowed. The decision, which was in line with precedents denying extradition, 
was highly debated. It provoked more discussions on the need to eliminate the 
POE. Margaret Thatcher took a personal stand against the decision, which was 
made the same year as the IRA attacked her and her cabinet, killing altogether 
eight people.259
The Doherty decision confirmed the wanton crimes exception which was 
endorsed by Judge Sprizzo. Additionally, it strengthened the humanitarian func-
tion of the POE, as Sprizzo examined the ability of Northern Irish courts to 
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provide a fair trial. In doing so, the judge breached the traditional rule of non-
inquiry and claimed judicial administration of the discrimination clause.260
The same strictness in the interpretation of the incidence test that had protected 
Doherty resulted in the extradition of William Quinn in Quinn v. Robinson.261 
Quinn, a US citizen, was wanted by the UK for the murder of a police constable, 
conspiracy to send explosive devices through the mail, and conspiracy to cause 
a number of explosions in which a security guard and a crown court judge were 
injured. Quinn later became the first IRA member to have been extradited to 
Northern Ireland. His extradition was first denied by the District Court based on 
the POE. Later, however, the Ninth Circuit Court allowed for his extradition, 
concluding that the crime had taken place in England rather than in Northern 
Ireland where the political uprising existed. Thus Quinn’s crimes ensued in a dif-
ferent location than the Republican rebellion. This was the sole reason the court 
accepted the extradition.262 Abraham Sofaer called this decision ‘remarkable’: 
Thus, Quinn merely chose the wrong location for his acts. Under the Quinn 
decision, he, and other PIRA terrorists, would be free to murder and bomb 
without losing the potential benefits of the political offence exception, as 
long as they did so in Northern Ireland.263 
Also, Lieberman has pointed out that the geographical limitation is a forced 
interpretation and could limit the POE in unwanted ways.264
However, as noted by Kathleen Basso, the statement could be read with the 
emphasis on the words “own government.” The court questioned whether the 
protection given by the POE should apply even when the accused was not a citi-
zen of the location of the uprising. She has pointed out that the original purpose 
of the POE was not to protect volunteers in foreign conflicts, but rather revolu-
tionaries battling against oppressive regimes.265
Quinn’s crimes could potentially have also fulfilled the wanton crimes limi-
tation.266 Interestingly, the court had acknowledged the status of Quinn as a 
political criminal. Quinn had been imprisoned in Ireland as a “special category 
prisoner,” a status equivalent to that of a prisoner of war. McElrath has criticised 
the decision for being illogical, as the court, with this acknowledgement, seemed 
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to accept that the conflict extended to Southern Ireland. This was in contrast 
with the McMullen case, where the POE was applied even if the acts took place 
on British soil.267
The decision, and the incidence test in general, drew the judges’ attention 
away from the individual to the political circumstances that surrounded them.268 
For this reason, the incidence test is sometimes seen as a more neutral way to 
apply the POE. However, the strict application of the incidence test also made 
the judges lose the possibility to make nuanced decisions.269
In allowing Quinn’s extradition, the court limited the concept of political 
uprising. It defined ‘uprising’ as “a revolt by indigenous people against their own 
government or an occupying power.” Thus, the POE was limited to protecting 
those whose field of action was inside the borders of the specific geographical area 
in which the struggle for political power was taking place.270
The court in Quinn applied what it called a ‘liberal’ standard of the political 
incidence test, necessitating “neither proof of the potential or actual effectiveness 
of the actions in achieving the group’s political ends […] nor proof of the motive 
of the accused.” The aim was to objectively determine the nature of the crime and 
thus unify the applications of the political incidence test.271
The Quinn decision has been criticised as “incoherent.”272 According to 
Murphy, the decision was correct in establishing that the shooting of a police 
constable was a political offence. However, the planting of bombs targeting civil-
ians would also in times of armed conflict be considered criminal. For this reason: 
“That the violence directed against the general civilian population was incidental 
‘to the political goals of seeking an end to British rule in Northern Ireland,’ a fac-
tor cited by the court in support of its decision in Quinn, seems clearly inconsist-
ent with the ruling in Abu Eain.”273 Thus, it seems that also Murphy promoted 
the wanton crimes exception. According to Pyle, Quinn’s surrender reflected the 
decreasing support for the Irish cause within the US government and judiciary 
and did not follow due process of law.274
4.2.6  Creation of the Supplementary Treaty of 1985
The categorical refusal of extradition of wanted terrorists resulting from the 
strict application of the political incidence test created a public outcry, with some 
arguing that the United States had become a safe haven for terrorists. It also 
weighed heavily on the US–UK relationship. The political pressure resulted in a 
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supplementary extradition treaty being drawn between the United States and the 
United Kingdom.275 As the Irish influence on the Democratic Party lessened in 
the 1970s and 1980s, it became easier to enhance collaboration with the UK.276 
Additionally, the creation of the PIRA had provoked a change in Irish republican 
policies which, in turn, affected US policies. The British claimed that the PIRA 
received support from Communist states and had ideological links to Marxism. 
As a result, Communism being the US ultimate enemy, the Irish republican cause 
received less support from the country.277
The terrorist attacks during the first part of the 1980s that had killed and 
wounded US citizens started to affect the way in which the international extradi-
tion process was viewed by Americans. “Crime as an extension to politics” came 
all too close to the interests of the country.
The US–UK extradition treaty of 1972278 that had not restricted the POE 
at all caused political worry.279 It was patched up with the 1985 Supplementary 
Treaty, which limited the POE in a drastic way.280 According to the Reagan 
administration, the aim of the treaty was to improve the combatting of interna-
tional terrorism by limiting the scope of the POE and close the loopholes that let 
terrorists escape justice.281
The new treaty was partly modelled on the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977, which the United Kingdom had ratified in 
1978.282 The creation of the treaty was fuelled by the attempted assassination of 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984. The final push to the creation 
of the treaty was the UK support for the US attacks against Libya, which made 
it politically difficult to not accept the suggested treaty.283 One of its aims was to 
retroactively allow the extraditions of McMullen and Doherty.284
The contents of the treaty resembled that of the planned and failed US 
Extradition Act of 1982. As many extradition treaties since the US–West Germany 
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Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, 8 June 1972.
279  Article 5, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, 8 June 
1972.
280  Supplementary Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America signed at Wash-
ington on 25 June 1985 as amended by an Exchange of Notes signed at Washington on 19 
and 20 August 1986 concerning the Extradition Treaty signed at London on 8 June 1972 
with an Exchange of Notes concerning Hong Kong, 23 December 1986.
281  See e.g. Kulman, 1986, 755, 775; Petersen, 1992, 767.
282  European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Strasbourg, 27 January 1977, ETS 
No. 90; Petersen, 1992, 781.
283  Pyle, 2001, 202.
284  Pyle, 2001, 204.
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treaty of 1978, it incorporated the recent UN conventions by narrowing the pro-
tection of the POE, so that it would not cover crimes one of the parties had an 
obligation to extradite or prosecute based on their multilateral treaty obligations. 
The 1985 Supplementary Treaty also categorically excluded a long list of offences 
from the scope of protection of the POE, with the wording “none of the follow-
ing shall be regarded as an offence of a political character.“285 In other words: 
“the Supplementary Treaty provides that all fugitives accused of committing vio-
lent acts can be extradited even if their acts are politically motivated.”286 Bradley 
G. Kulman has called this “depoliticisation” of these mentioned crimes.287 More 
specifically, this can be seen as a way to depoliticise the treatment of these crimes, 
not of the crimes themselves. The political motivation of the crimes did not need 
to be denied for them to be extraditable.
The offences excluded from the POE in the 1985 treaty concerned crimes 
such as murder, assault causing grievous bodily harm, kidnapping, offences 
“involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or 
any incendiary device if this use endangers any person” and aiding and abetting 
to these crimes.288
The mandatory extradition was limited by the discrimination clause, a rar-
ity in US extradition treaties, allowing the competent judicial authority to deny 
extradition in a case where the fugitive could persuade them that the extradi-
tion request was made “with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be 
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by 
reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.”289 It is clear that this 
provision was in contrast with the rule of non-inquiry that bound the US courts 
and it is quite interesting that it was added to a treaty joining together two close 
allies with highly similar legal systems.
The adoption of the discrimination clause was a reaction to the vast amount 
of criticism the US–UK treaty received. According to Pyle, it was not expected 
285  Article 1, US–UK Supplementary Treaty of 1985.
286  Groarke, 1988, 1516. Italics added.
287  Kulman, 1986, 756.
288  Some crimes that were included in the draft treaty were left out from the final version, such 
as a conspiracy to cause explosions, “possession or making of an explosive substance by a 
person who intends to endanger li[ves]” strongly criticised by for instance Kuhlman. He 
noted, “As these are intent crimes, the requesting state must produce some evidence that 
the accused possessed the requisite intent.” Kulman, 1986, 781. It has to be noted that 
these kinds of intent crimes have later been criminalised in European context. Additionally, 
the draft included the crimes such as the possession of a firearm when a person intends to 
“endanger life” and the use of firearms by a person who intends to resist or prevent the 
arrest of himself or another person. These kinds of broad and unspecific clauses were criti-
cised by many. One criticism stated that the ownership of a firearm could not in itself prove 
malicious intent. Kulman, 1986, 781. As a result, none of these provisions were included 
in the final treaty.
289  Article 3, US–UK Supplementary Treaty of 1985.
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to be used by an extradition court.290 Additionally, the burden of proof over 
receiving unfair treatment upon extradition lay with the accused. It was not con-
sidered enough evidence that the requesting state, for instance, used torture, 
but the fugitives had to show that they themselves were in jeopardy to face tor-
ture, should they be returned.291 The discrimination clause was, in fact, applied 
by the US District Court for the Northern District of California in the case of 
Smyth in 1993.292 However, the decision was overruled by the Court of Appeals. 
Smyth had been convicted of the attempted murder of a prison officer in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, in 1978. He was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. He 
escaped prison in 1983 and landed in San Francisco. He was sought by Northern 
Ireland to serve the remainder of his prison term. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that there was not enough evidence to show that Smyth 
would receive retaliatory punishment upon his return or be otherwise treated in 
a discriminatory manner.293
After the Supplementary Treaty was drawn, McMullen, whose extradition had 
been denied seven years earlier, was finally extradited in 1986. The basis for the 
extradition was that the persecution McMullen had claimed to suffer if extra-
dited, did not relate to his political opinions. McMullen had claimed that his 
collaboration with the US officials upon arrival to the country had made him a 
traitor in the eyes of the PIRA. Additionally, the court stated that asylum could 
not be granted, as it was reasonable to believe he had committed serious crimes 
of non-political character.294 It is interesting that the court applied asylum law in 
its decision, while previously McMullen had been protected by the POE.
4.2.7  Evaluating the 1985 treaty
The Supplementary Treaty of 1985 excluded from the scope of the POE offences 
that were, as Kulman pointed out, “often highly publicised acts, likely to arouse 
public indignation in the requesting state.” Refusing to extradite criminals 
accused of such acts, would no longer have been seen as politically neutral.295 
The treaty was seen to put an end to similar cases to the ones involving the PIRA, 
which resulted in non-extradition.296
290  Pyle, 1988, 188. See also Dugard and Van den Wijngaert, 1998, 190.
291  Pyle, 2001, 203–204.
292  Extradition of Smyth 820 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
293  In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711 (USCA, 9th Cir., 1995).
294  “The BIA [The Board of Immigration Appeals] also found that McMullen was statutorily 
ineligible for asylum as a refugee under section 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)
(42)(A), which excludes from refugee status; any person who ordered, incited, assisted, 
or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See 788 F.2d 
591, USCA 9th Circ. McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalisation Service, No. 84-7468, 
25 April 1986.
295  Kulman, 1986, 779.
296  Kulman, 1986, 777.
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Christopher L. Blakesley noted that crimes excluded from the scope of the treaty 
were crimes that terrorists commit against ‘innocent’ civilian targets. However, 
simultaneously, some of these crimes were also such that the winning side of a civil 
war or insurrection could prosecute, even if they took place in open battle against 
military targets. The categorical exclusion of such crimes from the POE removed 
the decision-making from the courts. As a result, it exempted the courts from 
deciding under which conditions the crimes actually occurred, as well as whether 
the conduct, for instance, constituted self-defence. Regardless of his criticism, 
Blakesley was supportive of limiting the coverage of the POE for certain types of 
violent crimes but recognised that the POE provided for such exclusions in itself.297
Since the adding of the POE into US extradition treaties in the mid-19th 
century, extradition decisions had always been in the hands of the judiciary.298 In 
addition to making drastic limitations to the POE, the Supplementary Treaty of 
1985 also narrowed this role.299 Similar limiting provisions had, however, already 
been included in the 1979 treaty with Colombia300 and the 1980 treaty with 
the Netherlands,301 both of which allowed the executive decision-making powers 
concerning the application of the POE and the military offences exceptions.
The narrowing of the role of the judiciary was widely discussed amongst pol-
icymakers and academics. Some supported it, as they considered the judiciary 
incapable of making a separation between acts of wanton terrorism and political 
offences,302 even if the wanton crimes exception had recently started to receive 
support in the US courts.303 Some argued that the determination of the political 
nature of an offence was a question of politics and diplomacy, and as such, it was 
an executive decision.304
The opponents of the new provision were concerned with its political and 
human rights implications. The extraditability of the accused between the US and 
the UK now depended on the current definition of ‘political offence’ adopted 
by the executive. This made the decision-making more volatile and potentially 
arbitrary, potentially leading to human rights violations.305 Some feared that the 
executive could be affected by pressure from terrorists.306
297  Blakesley, 1986, 120–122.
298  However, sometimes this was questioned by fugitives. Pyle, 2001, 96–104.
299  See on the relationship between the executive and the judiciary in US extradition before the 
Supplementary Treaty e.g. Epps, 1979, 74.
300  Article 4, Colombia International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 14 September 
1979.
301  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United 
States of America, 24 June 1980.
302  This argument was made by e.g. the US Department of State Legal Advisor Abraham 
Sofaer. See Blakesley, 1986, 118–119.
303  Pyle, 1988, 189; Pyle, 2001, 202.
304  This was the opinion of e.g. Special US Attorney Thomas H. Belote. See Pyle, 2001, 172. 
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The new treaty was also criticised for being against the principle of the sepa-
ration of powers, as the application of the extradition treaties was traditionally 
understood as a legal decision.307 For instance, the US Congress criticised the 
treaty for this reason.308 Early lawmakers in the US had seen extradition as a judi-
cial rather than political matter.309 This principle had been already confirmed in 
the 1842 Webster–Ashburton treaty between the US and Great Britain (UK).310
According to Blakesley, the new treaty gave the constitutional role of courts to 
the executive for political reasons. Further, it deemed the courts incompetent due to 
the dissatisfaction of the executive and the British government with the outcomes of 
some of the court cases. Blakesley expressed his concern for the possible erosion of 
the foundation of the extradition process, laid on the principle of rule of law.311
Many writers have argued that the treaty essentially eliminated the POE.312 
Some maintained that the treaty violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth 
Amendment by offering protection to some political offenders (those requested 
by states other than the United Kingdom), while denying it to others (those 
requested by the United Kingdom).313 Additionally, the retroactivity of the 
Supplementary Treaty was considered unconstitutional.314
The categorical exclusion of violent crimes in the US–UK Supplementary 
Treaty, and also in the ECST, has been criticised for protecting those in power, 
no matter how bad the system.315 John Patrick Groarke has pointed out that even 
many of the respected ‘Founding Fathers’ of the United States had employed 
violent tactics in their struggle against the British colonial rule. Should the 
Supplementary Treaty have been applied to their actions, they as well would have 
been delegitimised. However, since the revolutionary period, both the UK and 
the US had developed into democracies within which it was hard to imagine the 
need for political violence. Groarke continued: “It is by no means certain, how-
ever, that such circumstances will not occur sometime in the future.”316
A number of contemporaries criticising the Supplementary Treaty considered 
the Northern Irish judicial system an imbalanced forum for a trial of an accused 
terrorist.317 In the so-called Diplock courts, set to deal with violent crime and 
307  Blakesley, 1986, 120.
308  Friedlander, 1988, 19–20.
309  Nadelmann, 1993, 846; Pyle, 2001, 67.
310  Pyle, 2001, 70.
311  Blakesley, 1986, 120–124.
312  Blakesley, 1986; Petersen, 1992, 767, 779; DeFabo, 2012, 87.
313  Basso, 1989, 315.
314  Political criminals, whose extradition had already been denied, would possibly be extradited 
once the treaty came into force, should the United Kingdom make a new request. Basso, 
1989, 316.
315  Pyle, 1988, 200.
316  Groarke, 1988, 1528.
317  Groarke, 1988, 1532; Hoffman, 1989; Petersen, 1992, 786. However, for instance Kul-
man has called the British judicial system “fundamentally fair” and argued that anyone 
accused of crimes excluded from the scope of the POE in the Supplementary Treaty would 
receive a fair trial. Kulman, 1986, 779.
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specifically terrorism, no jury trial was used. According to the European Court of 
Human Rights, this could amount to degrading or inhumane treatment.318 This 
was also of concern in the US Congress, which additionally expressed its concern 
about the status of so-called freedom fighters.319
The proponents of the Supplementary Treaty argued that judicial collabora-
tion with a country with a democratic system of government and a fair judiciary 
did not require retaining the POE for violent offenders.320 The critics, in turn, 
worried that offering diverse treatment to different countries could lead to simi-
lar limitations with less democratic allies321 and would be a potential source of 
diplomatic problems.322 President Reagan argued that the treaty would not set a 
precedent to others that could be used against people fighting their oppressors.323
Regardless of Reagan’s claims, the United States did later try to negotiate 
similar treaties with a number of other countries. Since 1986, the Supplementary 
Treaty was used as a model for treaties with allied democracies. West Germany 
and Canada agreed, Australia refused, and the Belgium treaty never went into 
force.324 According to Christopher H. Pyle: “By these agreements, the US gov-
ernment decided, in effect that it could not imagine a circumstance under which 
it would ever be legitimate to assert a right of revolution against these favoured 
governments. George Washington would never have been so naive.”325
The Supplementary Treaty represented, in fact, just a part of the new extradi-
tion treaty policy that had begun in the early years of the 1980s. The new policy 
had already been visible in 1981 in the Reagan administration’s attempt to nego-
tiate an extradition treaty with the Philippines. The US offered assistance to the 
former dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, in the extradition of his opponents dwelling 
in the US. The proposed treaty with a country president Reagan called ‘demo-
cratic’ resulted in a public outcry and the treaty was never taken into the Senate 
for final approval.326 The State Department worried that the treaty could jeopard-
ise the attempt to eliminate the POE and for this reason, it was not put forward.327 
Similar treaties that were equally problematic were planned with South Korea, 
South Africa and El Salvador. These states were of strategic importance to the US, 
318  Petersen, 1992, 786. See in more detail on the courts e.g. Bonner, 1988.
319  Friedlander, 1988, 19–20.
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but also were criticised for their lack of democracy and foul treatment of political 
enemies.328
Regardless of the criticism, the Supplementary Treaty was thus not the only 
one of its type, and it did draw on the ECST, which had previously received lots 
of support. The ECST similarly restricted the POE, but as it was drawn up in a 
different context, it was received differently.329 Additionally, for instance, Canada 
later negotiated treaties with similar restrictions,330 however not systematical-
ly.331 In 1987, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism openly condemned ter-
rorism and depoliticised crimes covered by UN treaties such as the Hague and 
the Montreal Conventions. The convention also excluded from the protection of 
the POE a long list of violent offences such as murder, hostage-taking and crimes 
relating to weapons, “when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence 
involving death or serious bodily injury to persons or serious damage to property.” 
Such a provision is relatively novel and atypical for the period, especially because 
it included the provision relating to property. This convention not only depoliti-
cised the treatment of terrorist crimes but also the crimes themselves. The defini-
tion offered does not make any reference to motivations but separates terrorist 
acts from other types of violent crimes by their indiscriminate nature.332
Pyle concluded in reaction to the 1986 Supplementary Treaty:
In the late twentieth century, Locke and Hobbes appear to be giving way to 
a combination of Max Weber and right-wing anti-Communism. The result is 
a powerful assault on the idea that the political offence exception to extradi-
tion should be administered in an evenhanded fashion to political fugitives of 
all stripes. This assault is not just on the idea of a neutral refusal to extradite 
fugitives from both sides of foreign uprisings. It is an assault upon the inde-
pendence and impartiality of courts. The US-UK treaty, for example, actually 
strips the courts of both nations of their 140-year-old authority to block the 
extradition of revolutionaries against the other regime. The power to grant 
political asylum and to refuse to surrender persons declared extraditable by 
the courts will be retained by the executive of both nations, to be exercised 
according to political, rather than strictly legal criteria. Neither the Reagan 
nor Thatcher administrations opposes shielding from extradition fugitives 
that they do not favour. They simply want to prevent courts from shielding 
fugitives that they do not favour. Like most emergency law, the US-UK 
treaty represents a very short-term view of law.333
328  Blakesley, 1986, 122.
329  Petersen, 1992, 784–786.
330  Article 3, Treaty of Extradition Between Canada and Spain, 31 May 1989.
331  See e.g. Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
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Interestingly, regardless of the problems the political nature of terrorism had 
caused the UK in its intranational relations, in its 1989 law, it still defined ter-
rorism as “the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence 
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”334 It is 
also noteworthy that even with the new treaty, the policy change was not com-
pletely straightforward. As a follow-up to the second IRA ceasefire in 1997, the 
US dropped the deportations of several members of the IRA, and, according to 
McElrath, the government recognised, although not openly, the political nature 
of the offences of (former) IRA members by declaring its support for the politi-
cal peace process. Simultaneously, it was underlined that the dropping of the 
deportation did not mean that the US would approve of previous terrorist activ-
ity. McElrath, who has been very critical of the overall deportation policies of the 
US, has interpreted this policy change as a negation of the British criminalisation 
policy. However, not all Irish deportations were dropped.335
4.3  Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the changes in the nature of terrorism since the 1970s 
affected global antiterrorist conventions and policies. Also, the way in which the 
notion of terrorism was understood underwent changes during this period. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, terrorism was typically considered a political threat and 
the grievances of terrorists were discussed, alongside measures of collaboration in 
fighting against it. However, this view gradually changed as terrorism became a 
more acute threat for Western states.
With the rise in the threat of terrorism, the POE started to change. Many 
of the UN reforms were stalled or watered by those states that wanted to keep 
protecting revolutionaries. Interpol was even more incapable of acting against 
the terrorist threat as it was limited by its constitution, but it started to change its 
position in the early years of the 1980s.
The United Nations chose a ‘patchwork’ approach, where it created treaties 
on specific types of violent conduct that states were to criminalise. The incor-
porated aut dedere aut judicare principle was intended to abolish criminal safe 
havens. Terrorism was still mainly considered a political problem, but slowly the 
organisations started to take a clearer stance against violent means in promot-
ing political change. The most important changes, however, only took place in 
the coming decades. Progressively, UN treaties and resolutions started to affect 
national laws and bilateral extradition treaties.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Europe encountered an unforeseen wave of terror-
ism which left its mark on the political offence exception. Terrorist movements in 
334  Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 c. 4, Part V, 20. Similarly, in its 
Terrorism Act 2000, the definition of terrorism included the concept of an ideological pur-
pose: “(c) the use or threat [of terrorism] is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause.” Part I, 1(c), Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11).
335  McElrath, 2000, 41–42. Italics orig. 
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Germany and Italy evoked a European response in the form the 1977 European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, which depoliticised terrorist acts 
for the purposes of extradition, however leaving room for reservations.
During the ‘Troubles,’ a period of an open battle between the IRA and the 
British regime, IRA members were able to find refuge in the US, creating diplo-
matic problems and later leading to the supplementary extradition treaty between 
the US and the UK in 1985. The 1985 treaty was the first bilateral extradition 
treaty to have made serious restrictions to the POE. Its creation was a result of 
converging political interests between the Reagan and Thatcher regimes. Ronald 
Reagan was president of the United States from 1981 to 1989 and Margaret 
Thatcher was prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990. The 
two conservative regimes were dedicated to the fight against terrorism and thus 
formed a logical alliance. Collaborating in the matter of IRA fugitives was a 
necessity for a credible and functioning partnership in the matter of transnational 
terrorism. The Supplementary Treaty depoliticised terrorist acts and removed the 
tension between the countries, which had resulted from the repeated non-extra-
ditions from the US to the UK of claimed IRA terrorists.
The debates of this era clearly present the problematic and political nature 
of extradition procedures. Even if in the early days it was seen that the POE 
protected states from meddling in the internal affairs of another state, the US–
UK diplomatic problems demonstrate that protecting political offenders is by no 
means less political than not sheltering them. Even if the POE was an ‘automatic’ 
system applied to all cases by the courts, it was affected by political concerns and 
it provoked political reactions. For this reason, it was put under closer scrutiny, 
until it eventually suffocated to death within Europe.
55.1  Changes in global views on terrorism
5.1.1  A new understanding of terrorism in the United States
In the 1990s, terrorism underwent important changes in the 1990s and became 
recognised as a global threat. The number of casualties in terrorist attacks rose 
together with a change in motivations and nature of the attacks. Simultaneously, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union altered the balance of power in the world. At a 
very fast pace, the world transformed from a bipolar system to a system where the 
United States represented the sole great power. As a consequence, the biggest 
threat to the security of the United States, the possibility of a nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union, had also vanished. For this reason, the focus of the United States 
was increasingly on fighting terrorists.
From the 1960s until the 1990s, most major terrorist organisations were ide-
ological, ethno-nationalistic or separatist1 with tactical and instrumental aims. 
Since the 1990s, terrorism has more commonly been motivated by religion. In 
1995, half of the identifiable international terrorist groups were religiously moti-
vated. The transformation of Iran into an Islamic republic in 1979 had a role 
in the rise of religiously motivated terrorism, but cannot be seen as the unique 
reason for it. Even if religious terrorism has especially been associated with the 
Islamic world, the use of terroristic means has not been limited to Islam.2
The rise of religion as a motivation for terrorist acts seems to reflect the failure 
of old ideologies: the Soviet Union had collapsed but capitalism was not benefit-
ting all. Societal changes such as accelerated population growth and urbanisa-
tion, combined with the breakdown of local services, increased a sense of public 
insecurity.3 The turn towards religion for a vision of a better world was partly 
a result of the failure of secular ideologies in their promises of modernisation. 
1  Hoffman, 1998, 200.
2  It must be noted that religion as a motivation for acts that would be labelled terrorism in 
modern days was not a novel phenomenon, but it had existed for thousands of years. Hoff-
man, 1998, 87–91.
3  Hoffman, 1998, 92.
Dedication to the fight against 
terrorism since the 1990s
5
162 Fight against terrorism since the 1990s 
In addition, the emergence of religious terrorism has also been associated with 
the emigration of radicalised Mujahedin from Afghanistan.4 However, nationalist 
and revolutionary terrorism did not extinguish with the surfacing of religiously 
motivated terrorism on the public agenda.5
Religious motives changed the nature of terrorism. In religious terrorism, the 
basis of the use of violence is not constrained by political, moral or practical con-
cerns since it is legitimised by a belief in a higher power. Political terrorists rarely 
aim at the largest amount of victims possible, whereas religious terrorists typically 
see their victims as enemies to their beliefs. Secular terrorism seeks approval also 
from outsiders, whereas religious terrorism does not need it. As a result, all others, 
except for the members of the community, are labelled as enemies, for example, 
‘infidels.’ Additionally, political terrorists typically want to correct or replace the 
existing system, but religiously motivated terrorists see themselves as outsiders and 
thus are not committed to the developing of the existing order.6 As religious terror-
ists are unpredictable and difficult to identify, traditional counterterrorist measures 
employed against secular terrorists are not useful when confronting them.7
The notion of the major differences between religiously motivated and politi-
cally motivated terrorism has, however, been contested. Colin Wight has argued 
that “contemporary Islamic terrorism is political through and through, and, 
indeed, rests on a fundamentally different conception of sovereignty.”8
The aforementioned changes had an effect on the US, which emerged as one 
of the key targets of terrorists. Several terrorist incidents, many of which tar-
geted the US, received worldwide publicity, including the World Trade Center 
bombing on February 26, 1993, and the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998. In the embassy bombings, two car bombs planted by 
Al Qaeda exploded simultaneously and killed more than 200 people. Al Qaeda 
also bombed the warship USS Cole in 2000, killing 17 sailors and wounding 35. 
The bombing in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted by Timothy McVeigh 
and Terry Nichols as a reaction to perceived misconduct by the state, targeted 
US citizens on its own soil. Additionally, the 1995 nerve gas attack by members 
of the cult movement Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway system was initially 
planned to be carried out in the US.9
4  Aldrich, 2004, 750; Patterson, 2005, 196.
5  Wight, 2015, 195.
6  Hoffman, 1998, 94–95.
7  Hoffman, 1998, 128.
8  Wight, 2015, 113. Further, “Whilst it has often been thought that contemporary terrorism is 
irrational, nihilistic and essentially evil, contemporary Islamic terrorists do have very specific 
aims. These are: 1) to pull states within the system into unnecessary and costly conflicts (Iraq, 
Afghanistan, possibly Iran); 2) one of the spin-offs from these costly wars, the terrorists hope, 
will be pressure on the international financial system; and 3) that in attempting to secure their 
populations from attack and safeguard the system as a whole the values the system purports to 
uphold will be overturned and ignored in the search for security.” Wight, 2015, 201.
9  Hoffman, 1998, 93, 199; Aldrich, 2004, 750; Patterson, 2005, 380–381.
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US antiterrorism policies were also affected by other major political changes 
such as the dismantling of the Soviet Union, which meant the disappearance of 
the biggest and most obvious political adversary, as well as of the election of a 
liberal Democratic administration in 1993. These alterations created a completely 
new political situation.
One of the most noteworthy novelties in the Clinton administration poli-
cies was that the Democratic Party made an attempt to separate the notion of 
terrorism from the Middle Eastern context. Instead, it aimed at focusing more 
on domestic rather than international terrorism.10 This could have been affected 
by the role of the US as an intermediary in the Middle East peace process,11 but 
such a claim would require further study. However, the Clinton administration 
was also fighting terrorism on all fronts. According to one estimate, spending on 
counterterrorism, including military means used to fight terrorists, actually rose 
by 50 per cent between 1998 and 2001.12
The means to fight terrorism, however, changed. The liberal approach was to 
combat terrorism using legal and constitutional measures to underline the value 
of human rights.13 Extradition is a legal tool, which acknowledges the human 
rights of the fugitive, and as such was a fitting method for the fight against ter-
rorism for the purposes of the Clinton administration. In this context, it is under-
standable that extradition treaties were slowly being modified to work better 
against the terrorist threat.
The political offence exception (POE) had already earlier proved a stumbling 
block for the purposes of the fight against terrorism, especially because of the 
liberal administration’s focus on the legal, rather than military, fight against the 
threat. Even if problematic, the political offence exception persisted in US trea-
ties under the Clinton administration. The ‘multilateral treaty clause’ and the 
attentat clause were commonly used, but other limitations remained rare. The 
multilateral treaty clause meant that offences regarding which one of the treaty 
parties had an international duty to either prosecute or extradite would “not to 
be considered [a] political offence[s]”14
10  Jenkins, 2003, 43–44, 49.
11  See e.g. Patterson, 2005, 335–336; and BBC News, “History of Mid-East peace talks,” 29 
July 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11103745.
12  Patterson, 2005, 381–383.
13  Jenkins, 2003, 47.
14  See e.g. Article 3, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines and the Government of the United States of America, 13 November 1994. Article 
4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Malaysia, 3 August 1995. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago, 4 March 1996. Another wording was in the USA–Bolivia treaty: “offences 
as to which there is an obligation to establish criminal jurisdiction pursuant to multilateral 
international treaties in force with respect to the Parties.” Article 5, Treaty between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia 
on Extradition, 27 June 1995. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the 
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Almost all US extradition treaties since the beginning of the 1990s contained 
the Belgian clause,15 with the exception of the US–Swiss treaty of 1990.16 In addi-
tion, many treaties, such as the 1994 US–Philippines and the 1995 US–Bolivia 
treaties, provided that conspiracies to commit the excluded crimes, or aiding or 
abetting the commission of these crimes, would not be protected by the POE. 
However, protection to the fugitive was facilitated by providing for the denial of 
extradition, should the executive authority of the requested state consider the 
request as politically motivated.17
A typical US extradition treaty of the 1990s still made no reference to terror-
ism. The first treaty since the one signed in 1978 with West Germany to use the 
concept of terrorism was the 1995 treaty with Jordan. The letter of submittal, 
signed by US President Bill Clinton, stated that “The Treaty further represents 
an important step in combatting terrorism by excluding from the scope of the 
political offence exception serious offences typically committed by terrorists, e.g., 
crimes against a Head of State or first family member of either Party, aircraft 
hijacking, aircraft sabotage, crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomats, hostage-taking, narcotics trafficking, and other offences for 
which the United States and Jordan have an obligation to extradite or submit to 
prosecution by reason of a multilateral international agreement or treaty.” The 
treaty text itself was not, however, in any way atypical and did not contain any 
United States of America and the Government of Grenada, signed at St George’s, 30 May 
1996. For instance, the treaty with Sri Lanka lists some of these treaties by title, but con-
tains the “multilateral treaty” exclusion similar to the mentioned one. Article 4, Extradition 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 30 September 1999. Article 3, Extradition 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Swiss Confederation, 14 November 1990.
15  See e.g. Article 3, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines and the Government of the United States of America, 13 November 1994. Poland 
International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 July 1996. Extradition Treaty 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Grenada, 
signed at St George’s, 30 May 1996. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the United States 
of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 1 October 1996. Article 4, Extradition 
Treaty between the Argentina Republic and the United States of America, 10 July 1997.
16  Article 3, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Swiss Confederation, 14 November1990.
17  See e.g. Article 3, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philip-
pines and the Government of the United States of America, 13 November 1994. Article 5, 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Bolivia on Extradition, 27 June 1995. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 4 March 1996. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of Grenada, signed at St George’s, 30 
May 1996.The USA–Malaysia treaty also excluded “an attempt or conspiracy, or aiding or 
abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of or being an accessory before or after 
the fact to, such offences.” Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of Malaysia, 3 August 1995.
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novelties. The terrorism reference of the letter of submittal covered only violent 
crimes that had been excluded from the protection of the POE already in previ-
ous treaties.18 After the Jordan treaty, similar provisions were used in the treaty 
texts of the 1997 treaty with Argentina19 and the 1998 treaty with South Korea20 
as well as the 2001 treaty with Peru.21
The concept of terrorism was not commonly used in non-US extradition trea-
ties. However, at least international treaties excluded terrorist acts from the POE. 
For instance, the Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile treaty of 1998 excluded from the 
scope of the POE attacks on the lives of heads of states, international crimes, 
as well as terrorist acts, consisting of crimes covered by United Nations (UN) 
Conventions, such as hostage-taking, attacks against diplomats, bombings and 
other crimes.22 Also, the Brazil–Spain treaty from 1988 and the Brazil–Canada 
treaty from 1995, for instance, have excluded terrorist crimes from the scope of 
the POE.23
In 1996, the US agreed upon a new extradition treaty with France to replace 
a treaty dating from 1909.24 The 1996 treaty, as one of the few US treaties of the 
period, specifically mentioned terrorism as one of the reasons why the treaty was 
created in the letter of submittal: “The treaty represents part of a concerted effort 
by the Department of State and the Department of Justice to develop modern 
extradition relationships to enhance the United States ability to prosecute serious 
offenders including, especially, narcotics traffickers and terrorists.”25
In addition to the specific mention of terrorism, the 1996 treaty is of special 
interest due to its provisions with regard to the POE. The previous treaty had 
contained a traditional political offence clause: “A fugitive criminal shall not be 
surrendered if the offence in respect of which his surrender is demanded to be 
of a political character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, 
in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a politi-
cal character.”26 The POE in the new US–France treaty atypically differentiated 
18  Jordan International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 28 March 1995.
19  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Argentina Republic and the United States of 
America, 10.7.1997.
20  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the United States of America, 9 June 1998.
21  Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Peru, 26 July 2001.
22  Article 5, Acuerdo sobre extradición entre el Mercosur, la República de Bolivia y la Repub-
lica de Chile, 10 December 1998.
23  Article 3, Tratado de extradição entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o 
Governo do Canada, 27 January 1995; Article 4, Tratado de extradição entre a República 
do Brasil e o Reino da Espanha, 2 February 1988.
24  Convention d’extradition entre la France et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 6 January 1909.
25  The same provision was also added to the US–Poland treaty of 1996. Letter of submittal, 
Poland International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 July 1996.
26  Article 6, Convention d’extradition entre la France et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 6 January 
1909.
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between the ways in which the two states interpreted the exemption: “Extradition 
shall not be granted by France when the offence for which extradition is requested 
is considered by France as a political offence or as an offence connected with a 
political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Extradition shall 
not be granted by the United States when the offence for which extradition is 
requested is considered by the United States to be a political offence.”27 Thus 
the French took a much wider stance towards which crimes could be considered 
political offences. This is in sharp contrast with France’s historically narrow take 
on the concept of political offence.28
The US–France treaty of 1996 also included the attentat clause, the multilat-
eral treaty clause, and several other exclusions from the scope of the POE, such as 
“a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty 
of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents,” kidnapping, 
the taking of hostages, or “an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, 
rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons” 
as well as attempts or conspiracies to commit any of these crimes.29
Additionally, the US–France treaty contained a specific provision providing 
that the requested state could still refuse to extradite crimes excluded from the 
political offence exception, but “In evaluating the character of the offence, the 
Requested State shall take into consideration the particularly serious nature of 
the offence, including: (a) that it created a collective danger to the life, physical 
integrity or liberty of persons; (b) that it affected persons foreign to the motives 
behind it; or (c) that cruel or treacherous means have been used in the commis-
sion of the offence.”30
Thus the treaty text seems to include a reference to the Swiss predominance 
test. The formulation of the treaty text is curious, as the same goal of introducing 
the predominance test to the treaty would have sufficed without listing the limi-
tations to the POE. A simpler version of the text would have excluded political 
offences, with a limitation to cases where they created collective danger, affected 
innocents or used cruel means.
The US–France treaty used the depoliticisation formula, “the following 
offences shall not be considered to be political offences,” but it was limited to 
the purposes of the treaty in question.31 In other words, the offences were not 
27  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between France and the United States of America, 23 April 
1996.
28  See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5.
29  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between France and the United States of America, 23 April 
1996. The 1996 treaty with Luxembourg contained almost identical provisions. Article 4, 
Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg, 1 October 1996.
30  Article 4(3) and 4(4), Extradition Treaty between France and the United States of America, 
23 April 1996.
31  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between France and the United States of America, 23 April 
1996.
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claimed to be non-political, but they would be treated as such in applying the 
treaty. The same phrasing was used in the US–Poland treaty.32 The French treaty 
also used the discrimination clause,33 which was otherwise used only seldom in 
US extradition treaties: in the 1983 treaty with Jamaica,34 in the 1998 treaty with 
South Korea,35 the 1999 treaty with South Africa36 and the 2005 treaty with 
Israel.37
As the scope of the POE was evidently progressively narrowed in US extra-
dition treaties during the 1990s, the courts had fewer opportunities to inter-
pret terrorist deeds as political offences. Court practice started to slowly change. 
Previously, courts had heavily leaned on the incidence test, meaning that all 
crimes committed during a political uprising or unrest had automatically been 
covered by the POE. Now they started to apply the test in a more restricting 
manner.
One of the most noteworthy cases where the new take on the incidence test 
was visible was that of Singh in 2001. Singh was wanted for several murder, 
attempted murder and robbery charges. The crimes had taken place in the early 
1990s when Sikh militants sought to establish Khalistan as a sovereign nation 
separate from India.38
The US–India extradition treaty of 1997, on which the extradition was 
sought, contained the political offence exception. The exemption was limited 
by the attentat clause as well as by the multilateral treaty clause. Additionally, 
according to its provisions, the POE could not be applied to conspiring to com-
mit any of such offences, or aiding or abetting their commission.39
32  Article 5, Poland International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 July 1996.
33  “L’extradition n’est pas accordée si les autorités compétents pour la France ou si le Pouvoir 
exécutif des Etats-Unis ont des raisons sérieuses de croire que la requête a pour but de pour-
suivre ou de punir une personne pour des considérations de race, de religion, de nationalité 
ou d’opinions politiques.” Article 4(2), Extradition Treaty between France and the United 
States of America, 23 April 1996.
34  Jamaica International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 14 June 1983.
35  Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government 
of the United States of America, 9 June 1998.
36  Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of South Africa (with annex), 16 September 1999.
37  Protocol between the Government of the State of Israel and Government of the United 
States amending the Convention on extradition signed at Washington D.C. on December 
10, 1962, 6 July 2005.
38  In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982 (E.D. Cal. 2001). See in more detail Rog-
ers, 2003.
39  Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and India, 25 June 
1997: Article 4: Political offences: 1. Extradition shall not be granted if the offence for 
which extradition is requested is a political offence. 2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the 
following offences shall not be considered to be political offences: (a) a murder or other 
willful crime against the person of a Head of State or Head of Government of one of the 
Contracting States, or of a member of the Head of State’s or Head of Government’s fam-
ily; (b) aircraft hijacking offences, as described in The Hague Convention for the Suppres-
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India argued that attacks against police officers should be considered as attacks 
against civilians. According to the court, however, Indian police forces were par-
amilitary in nature and attacks against them thus were political or military in 
nature. Both types of offences were exempted from extradition according to the 
US–India extradition treaty.
In August 2001, the District Court made a thorough investigation of the 
political conditions in India. The court acknowledged the political nature of the 
Sikh movement. It pointed out that the new antiterrorist law in India sought to 
punish terrorism and “disruptive acts” that included “speech or actions that dis-
rupt or challenge the sovereignty or territorial integrity of India.” Additionally, 
the crimes occurred during “the highest period of militancy and armed conflict 
with casualties on all sides.” However, the court also underlined, in reference to 
the Ahmad decision, that “Political motivation does not turn every crime into a 
political offence.” Thus, according to the court, regardless of the political upris-
ing that existed in India at the time of the crimes, some of the crimes Singh was 
wanted for were not incidental to the political uprising and therefore they were 
extraditable. These crimes consisted of attacks against civilians committed sepa-
rately from the uprising.40 Rogers has pointed out that this case demonstrated 
“the ongoing ambiguity enveloping the political offence exception.”41
5.1.2  Interpol adopts a new take on terrorism since the 1980s
Even if dedication to the fight against terrorism started to grow in the 1980s, the 
1990s can be viewed as a global turning point in the way in which terrorism was 
viewed and treated globally. For the UN and Interpol, the major transition with 
regard to terrorism took place in the mid-1990s.
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at the Hague on December 16, 1970; (c) acts of 
aviation sabotage, as described in the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on September 23, 1971; 
(d) crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomats, as described 
in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York on December 14, 
1973; (e) hostage taking, as described in the International Convention against the Tak-
ing of Hostages, done at New York on December 17, 1979; (f) offences related to illegal 
drugs, as described in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, done at New York 
on March 30, 1961, the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961, done at Geneva on March 25, 1972 and the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, done at Vienna on Decem-
ber 20, 1988; (g) any other offence for which both Contracting States have the obligation 
pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to 
submit the case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; and (h) a 
conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, or aiding or abetting a 
person who commits or attempts to commit such offences.
40  Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, U.S. Dept. of State, 1031 1394. See 
In re Extradition of Singh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 982 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
41  Rogers, 2003, 486.
 Fight against terrorism since the 1990s 169
The influence of the interests of the United States on both organisations can 
only be speculated within the confines of this study, but perhaps due to US 
administrations liberal values, the eyes of the US turned towards the use of inter-
national organisations in countering terrorism. According to David Held, the 
UN was susceptible to the agendas of the most powerful states, especially due 
to its financial dependence on its member states.42 Similarly, the role of member 
states in affecting the agenda of Interpol cannot be underestimated.
The turnaround in the policies was especially clear with regard to Interpol, 
which had been unable to react to terrorism during previous decades. Interpol’s 
new stance against terrorism was gradually formed between the years 1982 and 
1985. Terrorism became an open concern of the organisation and the limitations 
provided by its constitution were steadily overruled by a new policy which put the 
fight against terrorism in a central position for the organisation during the 1990s.
Many Third World nations had wished Interpol to act in a more determined 
way against terrorism and to change its interpretation of the binding Article 3 
of the constitution43 that forbade Interpol to undertake matters of a political, 
military, religious or racial character, and the necessity of distancing the organisa-
tion from political matters. The Executive Committee of Interpol did not want 
the organisation to take up this task. Developed nations were also reluctant. 
Unexpectedly, the United States changed its attitude dating from the 1950s 
and stated that Interpol had an obligation to address terrorism.44 While Western 
European countries interpreted the causes of terrorism to be wider problems in 
the international system, the United States began to view some specific countries 
as the sources of terrorism.45
The resolution from 1983 titled Terrorism was the first Interpol resolution to 
make open reference to the phenomenon but it still emphasised the importance of 
Article 3. The following year, the resolution Violent Crime Commonly Referred 
to as Terrorism made it possible for the organisation to engage in, under certain 
circumstances, cases related to terrorism. According to Interpol’s own website: 
“This position, adopted despite the fact that terrorism remains inherently politi-
cal, is aligned with developments in international extradition practice: Terrorism 
is no longer considered a political offence for purposes of extradition, thereby 
falling outside the political offence exception in international extradition law.”46
It is interesting that the organisation noted the change in extradition practices 
already at a very early stage when states like the US were still balancing between 
protecting some violent offenders and extraditing others. The fight against terror-
ism by means of extradition was not yet a confirmed practice. The statement was 
42  Held, 1995, 88.
43  Interpol Constitution I/CONS/GA/1956, 13 June 1956.
44  Fooner, 1989, 43.
45  Aldrich, 2004, 750.
46  Interpol resolution AGN/53/RES/7, Application of Article 3 of the constitution, Luxem-
bourg, 1984.
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most likely made to reference UN antiterrorism conventions and the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST), which had limited the 
application of the POE to terrorism-related offences.
With this change of policy, it became possible for Interpol to collaborate in 
cases that related to political terrorism outside conflict areas, which essentially 
meant that the organisation could be used as a means to coordinate efforts in 
capturing Irish Republican Army (IRA) members accused of terrorist acts that 
took place on mainland Europe. The limitation still persisted with regard to those 
acts committed domestically on the territory of the UK. The role of Interpol was 
that of an important active point of collaboration because it provided a formalised 
forum for low-level contacts between police officers.47
The change in the antiterrorist policy of Interpol reflected, at least in part, the 
growth of the US influence on the organisation. According to Anderson, the re-
interpretation of Article 3 was the result of “a combination of American pressure, 
sensitivity to sections of western public opinion alarmed by terrorism, and fear 
that the Organisation could be marginalised.”48 According to Fooner, a turn in 
the organisation’s leadership had taken place in 1984 as a result of American pres-
sure.49 By 1985 a new policy toward terrorism was widely accepted and member 
countries could deal with it from a law-enforcement perspective.50
Interpol had been under different dominations since its creation. When it was 
established, it was mostly a Central European organisation. During the Second 
World War, it was taken over by Nazis. As the headquarters was moved to France 
after the war in 1946, French domination over the organisation began.51 Only 
in the 1980s, new leading members emerged: the US, West Germany, Britain, 
Canada and Japan.52 This raises the question of the control of the organisation in 
the 2000s. As Andreas and Nadelmann have claimed, “international crime con-
trol is one of the most important – and one of the most overlooked – dimensions 
of US hegemony in world politics.”53 For this reason, the question of dominance 
is very important.
The devastating attacks against the US embassies in Eastern Africa in 1998 
provoked reactions from both the UN and Interpol. Interpol confirmed its com-
mitment to combatting international terrorism by depoliticising terrorist acts in 
1998, which was the same year that witnessed a turnaround in the UN policies. 
A formal set of New Guidelines for Co-operation in Combating International 
Terrorism54 more explicitly addressed the relationship of terrorism to the previ-
ously problematic Article 3 of the constitution. Basically, with the help of the 
47  Gilbert, 1991, 34. See also Gilbert, 1998, 61–62.
48  Quoted in Deflem, 2005.
49  Fooner, 1989, 164.
50  Fooner, 1989, 43.
51  Fooner, 1989, 91.
52  Anderson, 1989, 92.
53  Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 10.
54  Interpol resolution AGN/67/RES/6, Cairo, 1998.
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new policy, terrorist incidents were broken down into their constituent parts, 
so that their criminal elements could then be identified and subjected to police 
investigations.55
The Interpol “Cairo declaration on terrorism” dating from October 1998, two 
months after the attacks against the US embassies, was an open condemnation 
of terrorists around the world, and as such, it was unlike any previous Interpol 
resolution had been. It presented as key fields of joint action: “the extradition of 
fugitive terrorists, the sharing of information essential to criminal investigations 
and to terrorism prevention measures, the detection of all types of traffic in weap-
ons, explosives or other items directly or indirectly connected with the activities 
of organised terrorist groups, and the adoption of specific criminal charges relat-
ing to the use of new technologies for terrorist purposes.”56
Basically, these were the same fields of action in which Interpol had striven for 
intensive cooperation throughout its existence. Now they were specifically related 
to terrorism. According to this new point of view, terrorism could no longer be 
separated from other types of international crime, since terrorism always con-
stitutes crimes such as murder or arson, which are considered crimes globally. 
This meant that Interpol had acquired a means to fight terrorism which was not 
in conflict with the basic principle of Article 3 of its constitution. Terrorist acts 
were now divided into their criminal elements, and thus they were excluded from 
the scope of political crimes. Mathieu Deflem has seen this as the reason why the 
cooperation of the police forces of ideologically very different countries can now 
be managed through Interpol.57
It is worth noting that the year 1998 was also the same year when the role 
of Europol in the fight against terrorism was confirmed. Terrorism had already 
been mentioned in the Europol Convention of 1995,58 but officially terrorism 
became a part of Europol’s mandate in 1998, the year before it commenced its 
full activities.59
In 1999 Interpol, like the UN, tackled the question of the financing of terror-
ism and reconfirmed its dedication to the battle against terrorism. The 1999 reso-
lution on terrorism financing stated that to provoke a state of terror could not 
be justified under any circumstances “irrespective of considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them.”60
55  See also Deflem, 2004, 86.
56  Interpol resolution AGN/67/RES/12, Cairo, 1998.
57  Deflem, 2005.
58  Council Act drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), 26 July 
1995. (95/C 316/01)
59  Deflem, 2006; Marotta, 1999, 16; Europol official website, www.europol.europa.eu, 
retrieved on 17 April 2013.
60  Interpol resolution AGN/68/RES/2, The financing of terrorism, Seoul, 1999.
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Since the structure of Interpol is collaborative, the traits of the participating 
police institutions are visible in its actions. The police agencies of the United 
States have increasingly been affecting multilateral antiterrorist efforts. They have 
also contributed to the development of Interpol. Mathieu Deflem has argued that 
the concerns of the United States, and other parts of the Western industrialised 
world, became visible in the counterterrorism of Interpol. The heed paid on the 
fundamentalist Islamic groups is an indication of this.61
5.1.3  The UN and terrorism as unacceptable violence
During the 1980s and 1990s, similar to Interpol, the UN was forced to take a 
clearer stand on terrorism. In the early 1980s, the UN General Assembly was 
still balancing between condemning international terrorism and underlining its 
causes, as well as the right to self-determination and independence for all peoples 
“under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination.”62
Slowly, the discussions on underlying causes were pushed to the side and the 
UN started to more openly condemn terrorism. The emerging of terrorism on 
the UN agenda and the involvement of the Security Council in the fight against it 
have been linked to the end of the Cold War, making international collaboration 
in the field of peace and security issues easier. Since then, more and more Security 
Council resolutions were created, while the permanent members decreasingly 
used their veto power.63
61  Deflem, 2004.
62  See e.g. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages [Hostage Taking 
Convention], UN Doc. A/Res/34/146, 1316 UNTS 205, 18 ILM 1456, 17 Decem-
ber 1979. Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent 
human lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of 
the forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and 
despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an 
attempt to effect radical changes, A/RES/36/109, 10 December 1981. Measures to pre-
vent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises 
fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and 
acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some 
people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes, 
A/RES/38/130, 19 December 1983. Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which 
Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives of Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, and 
Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which 
Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacri-
fice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, UN GA 
resolution A/RES/40/61, 9 December 1985. Measures to Prevent International Terrorism 
Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives of Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, 
and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence 
Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to 
Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, A/
RES/42/159, 7 December 1987.
63  Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 20.
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In 1985, the UN Security Council and General Assembly unanimously 
adopted important resolutions condemning terrorism. These resolutions were 
reactions to recent attacks, including those against the Achille Lauro and those 
committed at the Rome and Vienna airports.64 The UN Security Council reacted 
to the Achille Lauro matter with its first antiterrorist resolution, denouncing all 
acts of hostage-taking as international terrorism, without making any reference 
to possible political motives.65 The General Assembly resolution also condemned 
“all acts, methods and practices of terrorism where and by whomever commit-
ted.” However, the resolution’s headline still underlined the need for the states to 
“contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes underlying international 
terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, including colonialism, 
racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and those involving alien occupation, that may give rise to 
international terrorism and may endanger international peace and security.” It 
Reaffirm[ed] also the inalienable right to self-determination and independ-
ence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of 
alien domination, and up[held] the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular 
the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.66
Writing in 1991, Geoffrey Gilbert claimed that the UN was more interested in 
discussing the backgrounds of terroristic acts than actually condemning these 
acts. However, it is clear that the UN had started to acknowledge that the POE 
should have limits with regard to the protection of terrorists. The problem in 
limiting the exception, however, lay in the fact that terrorism was not a legal 
concept.67 From the late 1980s onwards, the UN antiterrorism conventions had 
started to constantly apply the aut dedere aut judicare formulation. According to 
Gilbert, this seemed to prove that a wider policy change was taking place and a 
new norm of international criminal law was possibly developing.68
In 1987, the General Assembly reconfirmed its condemnation of terrorism 
by declaring that states should cooperate internationally and bilaterally in the 
64  Cassese, 1989, 9; Bassiouni, 2001b, Pt. 1, 1. See also Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.
65  Resolution 579 (1985) on Hostage Taking, UN Doc. S/Res/579, 18 December 1985.
66  Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human 
Lives of Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those 
Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and 
Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, 
in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, UN GA resolution A/RES/40/61, 9 December 
1985. Italics added. 
67  Gilbert, 1991, 133–134.
68  Gilbert, 1991, 8.
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prevention and the combatting of international terrorism, but also that states 
shall contribute “actively to the elimination of the causes underlying international 
terrorism.”69 The General Assembly also drafted a resolution that recommended 
the organising of a conference to create a definition of terrorism. The US and 
Israel voted against the proposition because they were concerned that the activi-
ties of national liberation movements would be excluded from the definition. 
Many Third World states, as well as countries of the socialist bloc, still considered 
it legitimate to use all available means in a fight for self-determination.70
In 1989, the General Assembly called attention “to the growing connection 
between terrorist groups and drug traffickers.”71 The linking of terrorism and 
other forms of organised crime was a step towards untangling terrorism from 
its causes and tying it more closely together with its side effects and funding. 
However, the resolution, including its title that was left intact, still made refer-
ence to the causes of terrorism.
In 1990, the UN General Assembly created a Model Treaty on Extradition 
and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, both of which 
contained the POE. In the Model Treaty on Extradition, this was limited by 
the ‘multilateral treaty obligation.’ Both treaties contained the discrimination 
clause.72 In neither instance did the UN make an attempt to further separate the 
concept of terrorism from the notion of political crime.
In 1991, the UN General Assembly stencil for the antiterrorism resolution 
titles was finally altered. The previously used long title, underlining the causes 
of terrorism, was shortened to Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.73 
The 1991 resolution discussed the connection between terrorists and drug traf-
fickers “and their paramilitary gangs.” However, the underlying causes of terror-
ism were still discussed.
In 1994, the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism74 
was the first UN General Assembly resolution not to mention the causes of ter-
rorism. It linked terrorism with other forms of international criminal activities, 
such as unlawful arms trade and money laundering. The same resolution also 
69  Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from 
the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, A/RES/42/22, 18 November 1987. 
Annex, Pt. II, 23.
70  Cassese, 1989, 7.
71  Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human 
Lives of Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those 
Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and 
Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in 
an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, A/RES/44/29, 4 December 1989.
72  UN Model Treaty on Extradition, Annex: A/RES/45/116, 14 December 1990; UN Model 
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Annex: A/RES/45/116, 14 December 
1990.
73  Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/46/51, 9 December 1991.
74  UN GA Resolution Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed 
to the Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994.
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interpreted “Acts, methods and practices of terrorism, constitut[ing] a grave 
violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may pose 
a threat to international peace and security, jeopardise friendly relations among 
States, hinder international cooperation and aim at the destruction of human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases of society.”75
This declaration demonstrates a reversal in UN policies. Until the 1980s, ter-
rorism was viewed as a method to promote political change in a society, especially 
in ‘colonial’ or ‘racist’ regimes. It could thus be used to further the UN’s goal 
of promoting the right of self-determination. Now the method was denounced 
as being against UN principles. Further, the same declaration was the first to 
condemn all terroristic methods irrespective of their possible “political, philo-
sophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or any other nature” motivation that might be 
considered to justify them.76 The following General Assembly resolutions contin-
ued with a similar approach.77
It is, however, noteworthy that still in the 1994 Declaration, the UN General 
Assembly called terrorism political: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”78 It thus did not depoliti-
cise the acts themselves but their treatment.
In 1995, the UN General Assembly concluded a new resolution concerning 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.79 In this resolution, the General 
Assembly expressed that it was “Firmly determined to eliminate international ter-
rorism in all its forms and manifestations.” This resolution was an open condem-
nation of all terroristic methods, “wherever and by whomever committed.” The 
resolution considered terrorist acts criminal but also recognised their political 
purposes.80 In 1997, in the second resolution concerning Measures to Eliminate 
75  Pt. I (2), UN GA Resolution Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
annexed to the Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/49/60, 9 Decem-
ber 1994.
76  Pt. I (3), UN GA Resolution Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
annexed to the Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/49/60, 9 Decem-
ber 1994.
77  See e.g. Pt. I (2), UN GA Resolution Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/
RES/51/210, 17 December 1996; para (2), Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
UN Doc. A/Res/51/210, 16 January 1997; para (2), Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, A/RES/54/110, 9 December 1999; para (2), Measures to Eliminate Interna-
tional Terrorism, A/RES/58/81, 9 December 2001; para (2), Measures to Eliminate Inter-
national Terrorism, A/RES/57/27, 19 November 2002.
78  Article 1, Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to the Meas-
ures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994. Italics added. 
79  Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, 17 February 1995.
80  Annex, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, 17 Feb-
ruary 1995. See also Nuotio, 2006, 1003.
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International Terrorism, terrorism was again condemned and the thought that any 
political or other justifications do not condone terrorism repeated. Additionally, 
this resolution made note that the 1951 Refugee Convention did not protect 
those that had committed terrorist acts. Further, it underlined the importance of 
prosecuting all terrorists and not providing them with asylum.81
After the 1998 terrorist attacks in Tanzania and Kenya, the UN created 
the Terrorist Bombings Convention,82 which reaffirmed the General Assembly 
Resolution 49/60 denouncing “all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as 
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed.”83 As terror-
ist bombings, qualified acts where “Any person commits an offence within the 
meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, 
places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or 
against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transporta-
tion system or an infrastructure facility: (a) With the intent to cause death or seri-
ous bodily injury; or (b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such 
a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result 
in major economic loss.” Assistance or participation in such acts was also con-
demned.84 The Terrorist Bombing Convention made a point to underline that 
the acts in question were “under no circumstances justifiable by considerations 
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.”85 The 
discrimination clause was still used.86
The Terrorist Bombings Convention was the first UN convention to depo-
liticise specific acts of terrorism. I make this claim based on three different ele-
ments present in the text of the convention. First, the convention did not make 
reference to the grievances causing the acts, unlike so many UN conventions in 
the earlier decades. It is clear that the UN still acknowledged the political moti-
vations of terrorism, but such motivations no longer meant that the acts would 
have been considered legitimate. Second, political motivations did not form part 
of the constituent elements of the acts. Thus this convention was the first to use 
the term terrorist with regard to violent acts without an evident political motiva-
tion. Finally, the convention excluded terroristic bombings from the scope of the 
POE, being the first UN convention to do this. In other words, the depoliticisa-
tion was done by (1) pushing aside the political motives behind terrorist acts, (2) 
defining a terrorist act without reference to political motives and (3) excluding 
81  Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/51/210, 16 January 
1997 and Annex.
82  Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention), 
UN Doc. A/RES/52/164, 9 January 1998.
83  Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to the Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994.
84  Article 2, Terrorist Bombing Convention, UN Doc. A/RES/52/164, 9 January 1998.
85  Article 5, Terrorist Bombing Convention, UN Doc. A/RES/52/164, 9 January 1998.
86  Article 12, Terrorist Bombing Convention, UN Doc. A/RES/52/164, 9 January 1998.
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the defined terrorist acts from the scope of the POE. However, the convention 
did not openly depoliticise the acts by stating that they would not by nature be 
political, but that they would not be considered political only “for the purposes 
of extradition or mutual legal assistance.”87
The year 1999 confirmed the policy change. The UN Security Council con-
demned terrorism as a threat to peace and security of mankind.88 The Terrorism 
Financing Convention89 of the same year was the first UN convention to have 
defined terrorism, even if the definition has not, to date, been accepted as the 
official UN terrorism definition. Debate over whether the definition represented 
a consensus between member states persists.90 Terrorism, according to the UN, 
constitutes acts covered by previous multilateral conventions, as well as “Any 
other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any 
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.”91 Here, the special intent requirement did not 
necessitate a political motivation as such: terrorising a population or coercing a 
government for an entirely private reason, for instance, extortion is also possible. 
However, as pointed out by Saul, the definition would still typically relate to vio-
lence committed for ideological reasons.92 Cohen has argued that the definition 
acknowledges the political nature of the acts without using the term political. 
Furthermore, it does not limit terrorist acts to known types of violent behaviour 
but is wide enough to encompass for example cyberterrorism and other possible 
future manifestations of terrorism.93
Additionally, the treatment of these acts was depoliticised: Article 6 of the 
convention requires parties to adopt domestic legislation “to ensure that criminal 
acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable 
by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious 
or other similar nature.”94 Additionally, Article 14 addressed the political offence 
exception and declared that none of the defined crimes “shall be regarded for the 
purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an 
offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political 
87  Article 11, Terrorist Bombing Convention, UN Doc. A/RES/52/164, 9 January 1998.
88  UN Security Council Resolution 1269 On the Responsibility of the Security Council in 
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN Doc. S/RES/1269, 19 October 
1999.
89  Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, UN Doc. A/54/109, 9 
December 1999.
90  Cohen, 2012, 235.
91  Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, UN Doc. A/54/109, 9 
December 1999.
92  Saul, 2007, 2.
93  Cohen, 2012, 234.
94  Article 6, Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, UN Doc. 
A/54/109, 9 December 1999.
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motives.” Thus the convention denied the possibility to refuse extradition on the 
basis that the offence in question was a political offence.95 The 1999 convention 
thus followed the convention of the previous year in its depoliticisation of terror-
ism and also restricted the depoliticisation of the said offences to the application 
of extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties.
In 2000, the UN made a new attempt at creating a comprehensive convention 
on international terrorism. The draft was never ratified. In the draft, terrorism 
was defined in similar terms as in the Terrorism Financing Convention, but also 
“Serious damage to a State or government facility, a public transportation system, 
communication system or infrastructure facility with the intent to cause extensive 
destruction of such a place, facility or system, or where such destruction results or 
is likely to result in major economic loss.” As in the 1999 convention, the motiva-
tions or the acts were not mentioned, but the purposes were to either “intimidate 
a population or to compel a Government or international organisation to do or 
abstain from doing any act.”96 Similar to the Terrorism Financing Convention, 
the Draft Comprehensive Convention excluded terroristic crimes from the scope 
of the POE.97 It also excluded the crimes previously dealt with in UN conven-
tions from the scope of the POE.98 The obstacle for the creation of a comprehen-
sive definition persistently has been the disagreement between states on whether 
to include violence conducted by states against their own citizens and whether 
an exception in cases of opposition to foreign occupation could be acceptable.99
In contrast, for instance the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in its 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999 excluded 
those fighting for liberation or self-determination, “including armed struggle 
against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination,” from being terror-
ists, “subject to provisions of international law.”100 Otherwise, the OAU conven-
tion was akin to other antiterrorist conventions of the time. It underlined the 
need to reject “all forms of terrorism irrespective of their motivations.” Further, 
“Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives 
shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act.”101 The OAU defined 
terrorism without an outspoken reference to political goals, but similar to, for 
95  Article 14, Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [Terrorism 
Financing], UN Doc. A/54/109, 9 December 1999.
96  Article 2, Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/55/1, 28 August 2000.
97  Article 14, Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/55/1, 28 August 2000.
98  Annex I, Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/55/1, 28 August 2000.
99  Cohen, 2012, 231–232; Saul, 2015, 399. See for a commentary of the Draft Convention 
Ambos and Timmerman, 2014, 32–35.
100  Article 3 (1), Organisation of the African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Com-
bating of Terrorism, 1 July 1999.
101  Article 3 (2), Organisation of the African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Com-
bating of Terrorism, 1 July 1999.
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instance, the later drafted 2002 European Union (EU) definition, it classified as 
terrorist a number of violent acts with the intention to “(i) intimidate, put in fear, 
force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or 
any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon 
a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any 
public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a pub-
lic emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State.”102 The articles deal-
ing with extradition of the OAU Convention did not discuss the POE at all.103
Similar to the OAU, the Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference on Combating International Terrorism of 1999 excluded from its 
definition “armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, 
and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination,” similarly, which is 
noteworthy, “in accordance with the principles of international law.” This con-
vention contained a long list of crimes which “In the implementation of the 
provisions of this Convention […] shall not be considered political crimes even 
when politically motivated.” These included the traditional Belgian clause cov-
ering government members other than heads of states and the internationally 
protected persons clause. Interestingly, the following acts were also considered 
non-political: “4. Murder or robbery by force against individuals or authorities or 
means of transport and communications; 5. Acts of sabotage and destruction of 
public properties and properties geared for public services, even if belonging to 
another Contracting State; 6. Crimes of manufacturing, smuggling or possessing 
arms and ammunition or explosives or other materials prepared for committing 
terrorist crimes.”104
In comparison, the preamble of the 1998 Mercosur extradition treaty stated: 
“Teniendo presente la evolución de los Estados democráticos tendiente a la 
eliminación gradual de los delitos de naturaleza política como excepción a la 
extradición.” Considering that the treaty was drawn in 1998, it is interesting to 
see such a statement. In the treaty text itself, the political offence exception is 
still acknowledged but limited by the multilateral treaty clause, the Belgian clause 
and references to specific UN antiterrorist conventions. Additionally, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide are excluded from the POE. In addition 
to these more common exclusions, the Mercosur treaty also excluded “en gen-
eral, cualquier acto no comprendido en los supuestos anteriores cometido con el 
propósito de atemorizar a la población, a clases o sectores de la misma, atentar 
contra la economía de un país, su patrimonio cultural o ecológico, o cometer 
102  Article 1 (3) (a), Organisation of the African Unity Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, 1 July 1999.
103  Articles 8–13, Organisation of the African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Com-
bating of Terrorism, 1 July 1999.
104  Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism, Annex to Resolution No: 59/26-P, 1 July 1999.
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represalias de carácter político, racial o religioso.”105 In other words, threatening 
the economy of a country, for instance, could be considered terrorism.
A very wide understanding of terrorism was held by the 1999 Treaty on 
Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States in Combating Terrorism, which defined the aims of terrorism as “commit-
ted for the purpose of undermining public safety, influencing decision-making by 
the authorities or terrorising the population.” The definition offered by the treaty 
included, for instance, property damage that could endanger human lives, threats 
to the lives of any public figures for a reason relating to their official position or 
to those of representatives of foreign states, and “other acts classified as terrorist 
under the national legislation of the Parties or under universally recognised inter-
national legal instruments aimed at combating terrorism.” In addition, the treaty 
considered “technological terrorism” which involved the use of different weap-
onry such as chemical or biological weapons if the acts in question were “commit-
ted for the purpose of undermining public safety, terrorising the population or 
influencing the decisions of the authorities in order to achieve political, mercenary 
or any other ends.”106 Finally, it was agreed that “In cooperating in combating 
acts of terrorism, including in relation to the extradition of persons committing 
them, the Parties shall not regard the acts involved as other than criminal.”107 
This formulation is of interest because it seemingly aims at depoliticising terrorist 
acts but does not openly do it, while at the same time the potential political ends 
are acknowledged in the definition. All in all, the definition does align with other 
new definitions of the same period.
It is worth noting that the developments within the Arab League were in 
stark contrast with those of other international organisations. The Arab League 
has already excluded terrorism from the scope of political offences in 1952, but 
in 1983, the Riyadh Arab Convention on the Judicial Co-operation no longer 
mentioned terrorism specifically. It, however, held on to the unqualified attentat 
clause by not considering as political crimes: “1. Assault on kings and presidents 
of the contracting parties or their wives or their ascendants or descendants; 2. 
Assault on heirs apparent or vice-presidents of the contracting parties. 3. Murder 
and robbery committed against individuals, authorities, or means of transport 
and communications.” This was done “In the application of the provisions of 
105  In other words, the treaty claims that democratic states are gradually eliminating crimes 
of a political nature as exceptions to extradition and excludes “in general” acts that aim at 
frightening the population [NB! Without an overt mention of terrorism] or specific groups, 
threatening the economy of a country or its cultural or ecological heritage and acts that 
serve as reprisals of a political, racial or religious nature. Article 5 (2) (c), Acuerdo sobre 
extradición entre los estados partes del Mercosur, 10 December 1998. 
106  Article 1, Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 4 June 1999. Italics added.
107  Article 4, Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 4 June 1999.
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this Agreement” and “even when [these crimes] have a political purpose.”108 In 
other words, for some reason, the Arab League decided to discard the notion of 
terrorism just as the rest of the world started to use it.
5.1.4  Why was terrorism depoliticised?
It has thus been demonstrated that the depoliticisation has been (close to) a 
worldwide strategy for encountering terrorism, especially since the late 1990s. 
What purposes does the depoliticisation of terrorism then serve? Why has it been 
so commonly employed? Does it stem from an intrinsic thought that the motive 
of the crime would make a difference to how the deed is judged? Earlier in the 
chapter, I state that terrorism has in fact often been seen as more wrongful due 
to its political intentions. Would it be possible to see it as less wrong due to its 
political motives?109 Is there still an underlying notion regarding the heroism of 
the political offender?
According to Ondřej Ditrych, in the early 21st century: “Terrorism has been 
successfully depoliticised by the near-exclusive focus on means rather than ends, 
which can be traced back to previous First World discourse, and also through the 
transformation of ‘root causes’, once a discourse of resistance, into a progressivist 
yet not revolutionary discourse of development and poverty eradication, based 
on the normalising premise that there is no place for terrorism in the ‘developed’ 
world.”110
It seems that the depoliticisation of terrorism has become the most acceptable 
global strategy, as it helps to ignore the causes that fuel acts of terrorism and 
facilitates international collaboration against it, removing the need to disagree on 
the political goals sought.
In the 1970s, when the political nature of terrorism was widely discussed, 
international collaboration against it was difficult or even implausible. For this 
reason, writing in 1975, Bart DeSchutter argued that more pertinent than the 
analysis of the motives of terrorism was the creation of legal measures against it. 
He argued, “It is unlikely that the very roots of terrorism will ever be agreed upon. 
Every effort must be made to avoid reducing the issue to a political question.”111
When the definition of terrorism does not require a political motive, it is pos-
sible to avoid the debate over what the term ‘political’ means. The only common 
108  Article 41, League of Arab States, Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, 6 
April 1983.
109  For instance Michael Freestone has argued that both views are possible: “Terrorist acts will 
generally be clear violations of national criminal laws, but the explicit political motives of 
the offender render them different in kind from other offences. The difference will plainly 
depend upon the observer’s stance: the political motive may make the offence excusable 
or it may make it appear more heinous than a comparable ‘common’ offence.” Freestone, 
1981, 195.
110  Ditrych, 2013, 230.
111  DeSchutter, 1975, 379.
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understanding seems to be that indiscriminate or atrocious violence, violence that 
is too remote from, or disproportionate to, a political end, should not be under-
stood as a political crime for the purposes of applying the POE.112
The depoliticisation also serves another purpose, which is to diminish the 
offenders and to make severe actions against them seem natural and necessary. 
Carl Schmitt argued in 1932 that the adversary can be described as non-political to 
make them sound harmless, “or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce 
him as political in order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of purely 
scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on 
the basis of similar purities) and thereby superior.”113 Depoliticising terrorism 
turns the battle against it into a ‘technical’ matter and removes it from the sphere 
of public debate because it makes the acts against it non-political as well.
Schmitt, who was critical of liberalist tendencies, linked all depoliticisation 
with the rise of liberalism. He saw depoliticisation as the goal of liberalism. In 
fact, he saw liberalism as characterised by the negation of the political.114 It is 
possible to understand that the less there is ‘political’ in the society, the more 
‘manageable’ the society becomes, as the lack of political also means the lack of 
the friend–enemy antagonism.
The depoliticisation and ‘trivialisation’ of terrorism can be seen as a way to 
diminish the goals of terrorists. Even outspoken political goals can be weakened 
by claiming that the people aiming at these goals are mere criminals. This can 
lead to the disappearance of the whole notion of political terrorism. The political 
goals of terrorists have not disappeared, but these goals are not acknowledged or 
accepted as political by the decision makers.115 For instance, when discussing the 
US–UK supplementary extradition treaty of 1985, it was argued that turning the 
extradition of a terrorist into a political matter seemed to prove that they were 
acknowledged as political actors.116
For police cooperation purposes, depoliticisation facilitates collaboration, as 
the political nature of the deeds can be forgotten. This allows for the police to 
concentrate on the ‘technical’ side, capturing criminals. This viewpoint is visible 
in the English delegation’s statement at the Rome Anti-Anarchist Conference of 
1898: “Une définition n’est pas nécessaire et serait inutile. Nous ne poursuivons 
pas l’opinion. Pour nous, la seule question est celle-ci: y a-t-il crime, oui ou non? 
Si l’acte est criminel, tel que meurtre ou l’exitation au meurtre, il ne le devient pas 
davantage par le fait qu’il provient de l’anarchisme. S’il n’est pas criminel, in ne le 
devient pas par le fait qu’il est anarchique.”117 What difference does the political 
motivation make if the crime committed is, for instance, a murder?
112  See also Saul, 2006, 42–43.
113  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 32.
114  Strauss, 1996, 84.
115  Stohl, 1988, 12–13.
116  Gilbert, 1991, 163–164; Gilbert, 1998, 332.
117  Cited in Tamburini, 1997, 242; and in Di Paola, 2007, 90.
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Also Alex Conte and Boaz Ganor have justifiably posed the question why to 
even talk about terrorism at all: “An act of ‘terrorism’, after all, will comprise a 
series of acts that, in and of themselves, constitute various criminal offences. To 
take an example, a bombing of an Embassy will likely involve the unlawful pos-
session of explosives, the wilful destruction of property and the wilful injury to or 
killing of persons. Each element is a criminal offence in most jurisdictions and, 
as such, is capable of being dealt with by the relevant municipal jurisdiction.”118
According to some, the depoliticisation is useful from a human rights point 
of view, as concentrating on motives can easily lead to law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies racially, religiously or politically profiling people, leading 
to discrimination and suspicion. Additionally, concentrating on motives brings 
politics to investigations and to trials, and contradicts with freedoms so dearly 
valued in democratic societies such as the freedom of expression, association and 
religion.119 Then again, if terrorists indeed attack the heart of democratic values, 
why is there a need to act ‘neutral’ when bringing them to justice? Is the rule 
of law not based on certain outspoken values, not on some ‘natural’ principles 
completely separate from all political concerns?
As shown in this book, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the interpretation of 
the POE has been left to the courts. Even if the historically applied incidence test 
has been the starting point for the courts’ interpretations, they have developed 
flexibility towards its application both in a restrictive and an expansive manner. 
The Kolczynski case involving the Polish seamen is an example of the expansive 
interpretation, whereas the cases of Meunier, Cheng and Ornelas v. Ruiz repre-
sent the restrictive interpretation, in which the political agenda of the offenders 
has been judged unacceptable. This flexibility of the courts proved to be prob-
lematic, as there were both supporters and opponents of each political cause in 
the US.120 This can be seen as one reason for the depoliticisation of terrorism: 
dealing with all terrorist acts in the same way, regardless of their perpetrators’ 
political motivations, could lessen internal and international tensions.
One of the ways in which it is possible to use the depoliticisation strategy 
without denying the political nature of terrorism is to use the ‘exception to the 
exception’ formula. As described earlier, the formula is as follows: crime X, not-
withstanding its political character, and in derogation from the political offence 
exception, will always be liable to extradition. The use of this formula does not 
deny the political nature of the acts, it merely states that extradition is still possi-
ble. The problem with this formula is naturally the lack of a definition of terrorism 
that would be accepted worldwide, so that the concept ‘terrorism’ could simply 
replace the ‘crime X’ in the formulation. Until a definition exists, the exception 
to exception formula can only be used with a listing of specific offences that are 
typically considered terroristic. An easier and an apparently more viable way to 
118  Conte and Ganor, 2005.
119  Saul, 2008, 1.
120  Epps, 1988, 205.
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exclude acts of terrorism from the scope of the exception would be to deny the 
protection of the POE for ‘wanton acts’ of violence or to use the predominance 
test. Both of these have successfully been applied by courts.
The reason for the reluctance to call terrorists political criminals may be the 
fear that if one is known to accept the existence of the political goals of terror-
ists, they could be viewed as a supporter of these goals or even the terroristic 
methods. According to Ben Saul, many states have been concerned that labelling 
offenders as political could be interpreted as a legitimisation of their actions.121 
For this reason, taking away the political label from terrorism reduces them to 
mere criminals. For instance, Kelly Anne Moore of the New York Times argued 
that “Those who commit terrorist acts should be tried as the criminals they are, 
instead of the ‘warriors’ they claim to be. If the Guantánamo detainees were pros-
ecuted in federal courts instead of being designated as ‘combatants,’ most by now 
would be serving prison time as convicted terrorists, instead of being celebrated 
as victims or freedom fighters.”122 A similar view was presented by Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Denmark Villy Søvndal, EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator 
Gilles de Kerchove and UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson in their article 
published in Le Monde in 2012. They argued that once terrorists are treated as 
criminals instead of combatants, resorting to terrorism will lose its attraction.123
According to Jan Klabbers, “there is, in the end, something rather unsavoury 
about subjecting political adversaries to criminal law: that may be what dictators 
and tyrants do, but it is far from commendable.”124 Additionally, Klabbers has 
pointed out that “international law has great difficulty in deciding whether ter-
rorists should be treated as ordinary criminals or as political actors.”125 The prob-
lem is an eternal one: “Today’s terrorist is tomorrow’s freedom fighter.” This is 
true as contexts of judgment, can and do change.126 Klabbers’s statement is sup-
ported by the views of Martti Koskenniemi. Koskenniemi argues that in today’s 
politically and religiously divided world it is easier to not bring out the ideological 
side of issues, but to rather treat the opponent as a criminal. Thus a political state-
ment is shaded with the seemingly impartial cloak of justice.127
Klabbers interestingly notes that “Th[e] political element facilitates a curious 
symbiosis between the terrorist and the political authorities on the other side of 
the fence, in two ways: both the terrorist and the authorities have an interest both 
in playing down the political element and in blowing it up; therewith, terrorists 
ultimately reinforce the state and the state ends up reinforcing terrorists.” From 
the point of view of the terrorist, according to Klabbers, the depoliticisation of 
121  Saul, 2006, 39.
122  New York Times, 21 August 2007, “Take Al-Qaeda to court.”
123  “Dés lors que ces derniers sont traités comme des criminels et non comme des “combat-
tants,” le terrorisme perd de son attrait.” Søvndal, de Kerchove and Emmerson, 2012.
124  Klabbers, 2003, 302.
125  Klabbers, 2003, 299.
126  Klabbers, 2003, 301.
127  Helsingin Sanomat, 12 August 2014, “Oikeutta käytetään myös sodankäynnin strategiana.”
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their acts means that they are less sought for and may receive a less severe pun-
ishment. Then again, at the same time, the recognition of a criminal as a terror-
ist brings out their political considerations. For state authorities, the problem 
is essentially the opposite. The depoliticisation of terrorism makes the act less 
public and thus reduces the impact of the desired message. Treating terrorism 
as common criminality also makes it a domestic matter, instead of bringing it to 
the international sphere. Then again, the search for common criminals means 
that less severe means can be used when they are sought for. As Klabbers writes: 
“Surely, one does not throw bombs on other nations to find a common criminal: 
the language of terrorism is necessary in order to justify a large scale response.” 
For these reasons, there is an interesting interdependence between the terrorist 
and the state, which makes it difficult to create suitable legal instruments.128
The depoliticisation of terrorism is not an easy solution that would solve 
all problems relating to encountering the terrorist threat. Christine van den 
Wijngaert has criticised the depoliticisation of terrorism from a criminological 
point of view and called it “legal fiction.” Should political criminals be punished, 
they typically see themselves as more like “prisoners of war” of the system, instead 
of as people who are held responsible for their crimes against society. This is an 
important issue to acknowledge when planning the prevention and punishment 
of political crime. For this reason, according to Van den Wijngaert, the “fictive 
assimilation” of political and common offenders is not useful.129
In contrast to the international trend of defining terrorism based on the physi-
cal or objective acts, some have argued that the motive element should be a part 
of definitions of terrorist offences as it helps to distinguish terrorism from other 
kinds of serious violence that can also spread terror. It would also correspond 
with the general understanding of what terrorism is. There is a moral difference 
between acts committed for ideological reasons and with acts committed for pri-
vate ends. For this reason, this difference should also be visible in criminal law.130
For instance, Saul has suggested that there could be a way of depoliticising acts 
of terrorism for the purposes of extradition while still holding on to the thought 
that the act consists of terrorism due to its political motive.131 This would allow 
the delegitimisation of the use of terrorist means, together with the condemna-
tion the terrorists’ anti-democratic goals.
Considering terrorism political seems to put some weight, or even legitimacy, 
to the grievances that are seen to promote terrorist actions.132 Some writers have 
indeed seen terrorists as the oppressed, even if their actions are criminal and 
condemnable.133 This view should not be banned from debates that concern ter-
128  Klabbers, 2003, 307–308.
129  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 32, 36.
130  See Saul, 2008, 2.
131  Saul, 2006, 43–44.
132  Bassiouni, 2001, 25; Wight, 2015, 3.
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rorists. It is and should be possible to accept that terrorists also need their voices 
heard, or even to sympathise with their goals, without accepting the violent means 
they use.134 Naturally, as in any normal political debate, it should also be possible 
to hear the grievances of terrorists, and either agree or disagree with them.
Even if requiring a political motive is in many ways problematic from a legal per-
spective, this would allow for the society to express its values through its legislation 
and underline the wrongfulness of the acts. Presumably, the final aim of depoliti-
cisation has not been to suggest that actions of terrorism have nothing to do with 
politics, but to underscore the idea that no ideology justifies the use of terrorist 
tactics. However, it could be argued that just the opposite is true. In Colin Wight’s 
words: “Yet, the modern state also embodies a particular account of politics and of 
sovereign authority that is itself a reflection of a particular European, and largely 
secular, way of thinking about political order. Given this, it is not difficult to see 
contemporary international terrorism, particularly in its Islamic form, not as an 
expression of religious fanaticism, but of a competing vision of what politics is and 
should be. Thus contemporary international terrorism represents a challenge not 
just to particular states, but also to the very understanding of politics itself; as such 
it is also a challenge to the very idea of the modern state.”135
Saul has underlined the expressive function of criminal law. According to him: 
“a conviction for political violence sends a symbolic message that certain kinds 
of violence, as such, cannot be tolerated and reinforces the ethical values of the 
political community.”136 Similarly, according to Murphy, even if terrorists are not 
likely to be deterred by the prospect of punishment, criminalising terrorism serves 
the purpose of condemning such acts and can be used as a tactic of ‘ideological 
warfare’ against terrorism.137 In contrast, treating political offenders as criminals 
without ideological motivations seems to put aside the idea of a nation built on 
specific political ideas. Why has this strategy then be used with regard to those 
offenders democratic nations most would wish to condemn, terrorists?
5.2  Dismantling the political offence exemption
5.2.1  Terrorism as an ‘evil ideology’ since 2001
The attacks against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the US on 11 
September 2001 constituted one of the most momentous terrorist events of all 
times. They provoked a widespread wave of condemning reactions from around 
the world. The Interpol Secretary General Ronald Noble argued that they “con-
stituted attacks against the entire world and its citizens.”138
134  See also Wight, 2015, 8.
135  Wight, 2015, 21.
136  Saul, 2006, 39.
137  Murphy, 1985, 2.
138  Cited in Deflem, 2006.
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The attacks caused a narrowing of the debates on terrorism. Terrorism was 
now explained by the ‘evil mindset’ of the perpetrators. According to Arun 
Kudnani, “Terrorism became an ‘evil ideology’ that did not require further 
analysis.”139 The radicalisation discourse focuses on the individual, and to some 
extent, the ideology and the group the individual associates with, rather than 
the ‘root causes’ of terrorism,140 which used to be the focus of terrorism-related 
debates in the past. The radicalisation debate no longer left room to consider ter-
rorism as a form of political action.141
The terrorist acts of September 2001 also generated an unforeseen flow of 
antiterrorist legislation and tools, and pushed international antiterrorist coopera-
tion to a new high. They also, as claimed by this book, gave, by proxy, a deadly 
blow to the POE within EU states. At the same time, the number of Interpol 
resolutions and UN conventions on terrorism grew substantially.142 Resolutions 
drafted by both organisations in the wake of the attacks confirmed a new policy 
that had gradually started to form since the mid-1980s. The Interpol General 
Assembly meeting confirming the new attitude towards terrorism took place just 
two weeks after the attacks (24–28 September). This is perceptible, as the resolu-
tion concentrated on honouring the victims and declaring the attacks as a violent 
mass murder and a crime against humanity. The possibility of the crimes being 
of political nature was not mentioned in the resolution; Article 3 was no longer 
central.143
Similarly, the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1368 on 12 September 
2001, only a day after the attacks took place, condemned all terrorist acts as 
“threats to international peace and security” and called for all states to join the 
effort of fighting terrorism.144 Just two weeks later, Resolution 1373 was adopted 
unanimously. This resolution gave a new, quasi-legislative and highly controver-
sial role to the Security Council, as it contained detailed and legally binding obli-
gations to the legislators of member states. It also created the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC) aimed at strengthening the counterterrorism capacities of 
member states. The CTC consists of the fifteen member states of the Security 
Council.145 In November, the Security Council Resolution 1377 condemned all 
acts of terrorism “regardless of their motivation” as “contrary to the purposes and 
139  Kudnani, 2012, 4.
140  Kudnani, 2012, 6.
141  Kudnani, 2012, 21.
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principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”146 It was thus immediately clear 
that these attacks turned out to be a crisis for the whole world and for the way in 
which terrorism was fought.
5.2.2  The EAW of 2004 and the annihilation of the POE
As described in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.5, changes within the European collabora-
tion structures with regard to the POE had begun with the creation of the ECST 
in 1977. Finally, it was the new type of terrorist threat since the early years of the 
2000s that brought the practice of protecting political offenders to an end.
After the attacks against the US in 2001, a variety of European organs started 
to reformulate their stance against terrorism. The EU reaction was quick and 
comprehensive. Together with the explosions of bombs on passenger trains in 
Madrid in 2004 and London 2005, the events of September 11 put the fight 
against terrorism on top of the EU agenda.147 Some have even argued that they 
created a shift in the whole governance of the EU.148
The European Council adopted an Action Plan, and the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council formed conclusions that set the main lines of action for the EU 
only ten days after 9/11. Altogether 68 measures, mostly regarding collaboration 
in criminal matters, were listed in the so-called road map that was to be updated 
on a regular basis.149 These included the framework decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW), the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, and 
the EU–US agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance.150
In addition to the EU, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
condemned the terrorist attacks and began consideration for specific actions that 
could be taken to counter “such monstrous acts.”151 A Multidisciplinary Group 
on International Action against Terrorism (GMT) working under the authority 
of the Committee of Ministers was established, and the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe adopted two texts in 2001: Resolution 1258152 and 
Recommendation 1534153 on Democracies Facing Terrorism, showing the dedi-
cation of the Council of Europe in the international fight against terrorism. In 
2002, the Council of Europe adopted two important texts for the functioning 
146  Declaration on the Global Effort to Combat Terrorism, S/RES/1377, 12 November 
2001.
147  Wouters and Naert, 2001, 5.
148  Kaurnet, 2010, 253.
149  See Wouters and Naert, 2004, 909.
150  Wouters and Naert, 2001, 4.
151  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 
No. 90, 27 January 1977.
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of the GMT, Recommendation 1550 on Combating Terrorism and Respect for 
Human Rights,154 and the Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against 
Terrorism.155
The terrorist attacks of 2001 also brought about the creation of new forms of 
collaboration such as the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG). The CTG was initi-
ated by members of the ‘Club of Berne,’ bringing together heads of the security 
and intelligence services across Europe. It provides for cooperation in terrorism 
matters on the basis of an extralegal memorandum of understanding. Also, the 
Counter-Terrorism Task Force agreed upon already in 1998, became fully opera-
tional after the attacks. It brings together EU member states’ police and intel-
ligence service terrorism experts.156
In addition to strengthening EU organs and creating new ones for the pur-
poses of the fight against terrorism, the attacks of 2001 also fuelled legislative 
reforms. On the 21 September 2001, the European Council agreed that it was 
necessary to create a European definition of terrorism. In less than a year, the 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism157 of 13 June 2002 was finalised 
and later in December its provisions were already meant to be transposed into 
national laws.
The Framework Decision defined terrorism for the first time. The definition 
contains two elements: the objective and the subjective. The objective element 
of a terrorist act is a serious, typically violent crime such as murder, the inflic-
tion of bodily injuries, hostage-taking, extortion or a threat to commit any of 
these crimes. The subjective element is the aim of the act, which is to seriously 
intimidate a population, destabilise or destroy structures of a country or inter-
national organisation, or make a government abstain from performing actions. 
The definition also included property damage, but it was limited to “extensive 
destruction” or crimes “likely to endanger human life or result in major eco-
nomic loss.”158
The subjective element in the European Council definition could be inter-
preted as a political aim, as affecting the government’s structures or decision-
making is typically understood as a political act even if it can also be done for 
other, personal reasons. Going back to the classical definition of ‘political crime,’ 
an illegal act with the intent to oppose the state,159 the EU definition of terrorism 
154  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1550 on Combating 
Terrorism and Respect for Human Rights, 24 January 2002.
155  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the 
Fight Against Terrorism, H (2002) 4, 11 July 2002.
156  Deflem, 2006.
157  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, 
OJ L 164, 22 June 2002, pp. 3–7. See for a more detailed discussion on the Framework 
Decision e.g. Wouters and Naert, 2004.
158  Article 1(1), Framework Decision on Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, OJ L 164, 22 June 
2002.
159  See Chapter 2, Section 2.1. See also e.g. Garcia-Mora, 1962, 1226.
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would fit the category well. However, the motivations of the terrorist acts are not 
discussed in the definition, possibly because they would be difficult to prove in 
court, but also possibly because of the existence of the POE.
Interestingly, in the Proposal for the Framework Decision, it was underlined 
that a terrorist offence differs from an ordinary criminal offence by its motivation 
and thus by which legal rights are affected. For this reason, different penalties 
were also considered justified.160 Thus, instead of making the political motiva-
tions and the grievances behind the acts a mitigating factor offering justification 
to them, the ideology aggravated the crimes. This seems to contrast the global 
attempts to exclude terrorism from the scope of the POE by concentrating on its 
material elements instead of the mental element. This ‘repoliticisation’ of terror-
ism is discussed in Section 5.3.
Before the creation of the Framework Decision, only six EU member states 
(France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, UK) had separately incriminated 
terrorist acts. Their criminal law definitions, however, varied notably.161 The 
Framework Decision, which was aimed at replacing national definitions, has been 
seen as a relatively successful attempt to define terrorism in a way that is precise 
enough from the point of view of legal safety.162
Post-2001, the European Council also made an effort to improve its means 
to battle terrorists within Europe. In 2003, the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism from 1977 was amended by a new protocol.163 The 
new convention made all crimes covered by UN antiterrorism conventions and 
protocols extraditable between European Council member states. Article 13, 
providing for signatories to make reservations to the provisions of the ECST, 
had been problematic since its creation. The new protocol notably narrowed the 
possibility for states to make reservations concerning the POE.164 The convention 
was edited based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 
September 2001, which “calls upon all States […] to ensure, in conformity with 
international law, […] that claims of political motivation are not recognised as 
grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.”165
The discrimination clause was retained in the 2003 protocol,166 for the pur-
pose of “safeguard[ing] the traditional right of asylum.” As maintained in the 
Explanatory Report to the Convention, discrimination by member states of the 
160  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terror-
ism, COM (2001) 521 Final, 2001/0217 (CNS), 19 September 2001, 7–8.
161  Dumitriu, 2004, 590.
162  Dumitriu, 2004, 602.
163  Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, European 
Treaty Series No. 190, 15 May 2003.
164  Article 12, Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 
European Treaty Series No. 190, 15 May 2003.
165  Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS 
No. 90, 27 January 1977.
166  Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, European 
Treaty Series No. 190, 15 May 2003.
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European Council which had ratified the European Convention on Human 
Rights was “unlikely”: “it was considered appropriate to insert this traditional 
provision […] in this Convention also, particularly in view of the opening of the 
Convention to non-member States.]”167
In 2004, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was created to replace tradi-
tional extradition agreements within the EU.168 It aimed at improving and sim-
plifying a variety of judicial procedures; extradition being one of them. Since the 
1957 European Convention on Extradition, there had been several attempts to 
improve collaboration between European states. In 1992, with the creation of 
the European Union, crime-related matters had been incorporated into the Third 
Pillar of the Maastricht treaty. One of the aims of this intensified collaboration 
was to improve the battle against terrorism amongst member states.169
The Schengen acquis that abolished internal borders within the contracting 
states in 1985 had been adopted with compensatory measures, including mutual 
assistance in criminal matters. As a result, in 1995 and 1996, the EU simpli-
fied extradition procedures between member states by replacing the European 
Convention on Extradition of 1957, the ECST, the Schengen Agreement and 
the Benelux Treaty with the new convention.170 The 1996 convention seem-
ingly abolished the POE between member states. Its Article 5 stated: “1. For 
the purposes of applying this Convention, no offence may be regarded by the 
requested Member State as a political offence, as an offence connected with a 
political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.” However, it left this 
open for reservations. The discrimination clause was also still used in the text of 
the convention.171
The adoption of the treaty was influenced by pressure from Spain to abolish the 
POE as a follow-up to a foiled extradition request two Spanish nationals, García 
and Moreno, from Belgium. They were accused of providing logistic support for 
the ETA. Extradition was denied as the Spanish court concluded that the crimes 
were not serious enough to constitute terrorist offences under the 1977 treaty. 
García and Moreno had also requested asylum, but this request was denied.172
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The EAW aimed at improving collaboration and streamlining extradition pro-
cedures between EU members, as these were still, regardless of the new conven-
tions, considered lacking in the early 2000s. According to Wouters and Naert, the 
EAW was created “under great political pressure and its scope largely exceeds the 
fight against terrorism.”173 It substituted all bilateral and multilateral European 
extradition treaties.174
The EAW abolished the political offence exception and the dual criminality 
requirement for a number of serious crimes by making all judicial decisions within 
the EU mutually recognisable. It introduced a list of 32 offences for which dou-
ble criminality was no longer required. The only criterium was that the offence 
had to be punishable with a sentence of a maximum period of at least three 
years.175 In a way, the EAW brought back the list system that had been widely 
used in extradition treaties from the 1800s until the mid-20th century.
Terrorism is mentioned as the second item in the EAW treaty text, the first 
being “participation in a criminal organisation.” No purely political crimes are as 
such mentioned, but there is nothing that prevents them from becoming extra-
ditable: “For offences other than those covered by paragraph 2 [the listed 32 
offences], surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts for which the 
European arrest warrant has been issued constitute an offence under the law of 
the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is 
described.”176
The EAW represents a wider paradigm shift in the legal collaboration between 
member states. The traditional mistrust between states in each other’s judi-
cial decisions had now changed to a high level of confidence among the EU 
members.177 With the EAW, extradition was transformed from a semi-political 
173  Wouters and Naert, 2004, 916.
174  European Convention on Extradition, European Treaty Series No. 24, 13 December 1957; 
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decision, where it had been up to each state to decide how the question of the 
extradition of political offenders was to be treated, to a purely judicial procedure, 
where all judicial decisions became mutually recognised between member states.
Wouters and Naert, writing in 2004, maintained that the abolishment of the 
POE between EU members was a welcomed change, as it ended the era of sym-
pathy with politically motivated rebellion. According to them, the rights of justi-
fied rebellions still remained protected by other legal mechanisms, such as the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).178
However, not all have agreed that these mechanisms suffice in protecting the 
rights of all fugitives. Writing in 2016, Michaël Meysman stated: 
Over the course of the past years, it appears the focus has moved from swift 
prosecution to European cooperation in criminal cases in which (more) 
attention is given to fundamental and procedural rights. It appears that the 
cause for this change in attitude is the realisation that the envisioned and pre-
supposed mutual cooperation between member states based on mutual trust 
is not working as smoothly as initially hoped. […] The quintessence of the 
legitimation for the mutual recognition and cooperation between the mem-
ber states was based on the supposition that all of them endorsed a mutual 
commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy, and respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. The collective membership 
of the member states to the European Convention on Human Rights con-
stituted the main supporting argument in this respect. This legitimisation, 
however, was dealt a couple of hard blows over the ensuing years.179
As Meysman has pointed out, the EAW did not make all political disputes over 
extradition matters disappear. The Belgian denial of the extradition of an ETA 
member, Maria Natividad “Jaione” Jauregui Espina, to Spain in 2016 seems to 
show that the application of a similar provision to the discrimination clause in the 
preamble of the EAW is a realistic option even between EU member states.180 The 
court deciding the case made reference to a report by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 
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of the Council of Europe and refused extradition.181 Whether this provision will 
realistically be applicable in all cases necessary remains unclear. However, deny-
ing extradition for the fear that the requested person might not get a fair trial is a 
difficult foreign policy decision, especially between tightly allied nations. It thus 
remains to be seen what the status of political offenders will be in the future.
5.2.3  The POE in modern days
The political offence exception remains a characteristic of most modern extradi-
tion treaties. It seems that no state has made a systematic decision on whether 
the POE should form part of its new extradition treaties. For instance, in the case 
of the UK, its extradition treaty with the United Arab Emirates from 2006 does 
not contain the POE,182 but its 2013 treaty with Morocco does. Additionally, 
the POE in the Morocco treaty is not even limited by the attentat clause.183 A 
completely different provision is provided by the 2006 treaty with Algeria, which 
provides that extradition shall be refused for political offences “with the excep-
tion of terrorist offences.”184 The treaty provides a clause that seems like the 
discrimination clause: “1) Extradition shall be refused if final judgment has been 
passed in the requested State: e) where the extradition would breach the inter-
national principles of human rights and in particular those provided for in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New York on 16 
December 1966.”185 Whether or how the POE is limited is never evident based 
on the nations party to the treaty in question. For instance, the Canada–Sweden 
extradition treaty of 2000 does not limit the POE at all,186 but the Canada–South 
Africa treaty does.187
It is not surprising that the US position with regard to terrorism, which had 
been changing since the 1980s, got a push after the events of 2001. In addi-
tion to legislative and policy changes that had been enacted since the 1980s, 
the country’s need to enhance antiterrorist collaboration became reflected in its 
181  See Meysman, 2016.
182  Grounds for refusal of extradition: Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Arab Emirates on Extradition, 
Treaty Series No. 6 (2008), 6 December 2006.
183  Article 3, Convention on Extradition between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of Morocco, 15 May 2013.
184  Article 4 (1)(f), Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Algeria on Extradition, Treaty Series No. 15 (2010), 11 July 2006.
185  Article 4, Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
on Extradition, Treaty Series No. 15 (2010), 11 July 2006.
186  Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government of Swe-
den, E103414, CTS 2001, No. 28, 15 February 2000.
187  Article 3, Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa on Extradition, E103348, CTS 2001, No. 20, 12 November 1999.
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extradition treaties. However, still in modern days, all US extradition treaties still 
contain the POE, even if limited in different ways. These include the extradition 
treaty with its close neighbour Canada.188
Several US extradition treaties from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s 
excluded a variety of violent crimes from the protection of the POE.189 These 
treaties did not typically mention the term terrorism, but listed offences that have 
typically been considered terroristic. For instance, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations report on the treaty with Lithuania, signed 23 October 2001, spe-
cifically mentioned that during the negotiations, the Lithuanian delegation had 
confirmed that extraditable offences included terrorist offences.190 However, the 
word terrorism was not mentioned in the treaty text. Instead, the treaty listed 
several offences that are typically linked with terrorism as exceptions to the POE. 
These included: 
(a) murder, manslaughter, malicious wounding, or inflicting grievous bodily 
harm; (b) an offence involving kidnapping, abduction, or any form of unlaw-
ful detention, including the taking of a hostage; […] (e) placing or using 
an explosive, incendiary or destructive device capable of endangering life, of 
causing substantial bodily harm, or of causing substantial property damage; 
and (f) a conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, 
or aiding or abetting a person who commits or attempts to commit such 
offences. 
Similar or identical provisions were also included in the US–Latvia 2005, US–
Israel 2005, US–Estonia 2006 and US–Romania 2007 treaties.191 Thus, even if 
these treaties still contain the political offence exemption, it is practically limited 
to cover only pure political crimes.
188  Article 4(1)(iii), Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, 3 December 1971.
189  See e.g. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Republic of South Africa (with annex), 16 September 
1999; Poland International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 July 1996; Extra-
dition Treaty between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
1 January 1996; Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, 
31 March 2003.
190  107th Congress, 2nd Session, Executive report, Committee on Foreign Relations, 107-13, 
21 October 2002.
191  Latvia International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 7 December 2005; Arti-
cle 4, Protocol between the Government of the State of Israel and Government of the 
United States amending the Convention on extradition signed at Washington D.C. on 
December 10, 1962, 6 July 2005; Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the Government 
of the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the United States of America, 8 Febru-
ary 2006; Article 4, Romania International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 
September 2007.
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It is noteworthy, that all of the aforementioned treaties excluded causing 
property damage from the POE, a provision rarely used in US treaties.192 C.A.J. 
Coady has argued that destruction of non-combatant property justifiably is often 
interpreted as terrorist, as such property is not considered as a legitimate target.193 
However, the US treaties which mention property damage do not limit the dam-
age to non-legitimate targets or non-combatant property. The idea of ‘causing 
substantial property damage’ is very encompassing. As the scope of excluded 
offences in these treaties is very wide, they essentially rule out all forms of relative 
political crimes from the scope of the POE.
These treaties, like most treaties since the mid-1980s, included the possibil-
ity to deny extradition, should the executive authority of the requested state 
consider the request politically motivated.194 However, between states such as 
Estonia and the United States, allies and members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), it seems unlikely that this option would ever be used.
In 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom renewed their extradi-
tion treaty dating from 1972, including the Supplementary Treaty of 1985. The 
2003 treaty contained most of the same limitations to the POE set already in 
1985. However, in the letter of submittal, the terrorist threat received an impor-
tant role: 
The United Kingdom is a key law enforcement and counterterrorism partner 
of the United States. Recent events, including the foiling of a terrorist plot 
targeting civil aircraft scheduled to fly between the United Kingdom and the 
United States, have underscored the importance of this relationship. 
According to the new treaty provisions, extradition could not be denied when 
the fugitive had committed a crime that the requested party had an obligation 
to either prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicare). Additionally, against 
British tradition, the attentat clause was reintroduced, covering both heads of 
states, as well as their family members of the two parties of the treaty. The list 
of crimes that could not be protected by the POE otherwise remained the same, 
except for provision (f) “possession of an explosive, incendiary, or destructive 
device capable of endangering life, of causing grievous bodily harm” had the addi-
tion of “or of causing substantial property damage” and provision (g) concerning 
the aiding and abetting to the mentioned crimes that now included a conspiracy 
to commit, as well as the “counselling or procuring the commission of, or being 
192  See also Article 5, Poland International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 10 July 
1996; Article 4, Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Hungary on Extradition, 18 March 1997; and Article 4, 
Bulgaria International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 19 September 2007.
193  Coady, 2008, 160.
194  See e.g. Article 4, Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Lithu-
ania, 23 October 2001; Article 4, Estonia International Extradition Treaty with the United 
States, 8 February 2006.
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an accessory before or after the fact to any of the foregoing offences.”195 Thus the 
provisions that relate to terrorist tactics were growingly excluded from the scope 
of the exception. However, the concept of terrorism was still not mentioned in 
the treaty text itself. The possibility to turn down the extradition request, should 
it be politically motivated, was preserved. In the US, the decision was now done 
by the Secretary of State.
There were concerns that the treaty was created to provide for the extradition 
of individuals who had taken part in the conflict over Northern Ireland prior to 
the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement of April 1998. The Belfast Agreement 
was linked to an early release for those convicted of offences relating to terrorism 
before the signing of the agreement. Nonetheless, the United States Committee 
on Foreign Relations underscored that the aim of the 2003 treaty was to mod-
ernise the extradition process between the UK and the US and strengthen law 
enforcement collaboration for serious offences; it was “not intended to reopen 
issues addressed in the Belfast Agreement or to impede any further efforts to 
resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland.”196
In July 2003, an extradition agreement between the European Union and 
the United States was signed. The role of the treaty was partly to replace exist-
ing extradition treaty provisions and partly to include new provisions. Its aim 
was to improve and enhance coordination and collaboration between the par-
ties. However, previous and new bilateral treaties between the US and each EU 
member state were still valid. For instance, parties to the treaty could still invoke 
existing grounds of refusal to the new provisions.197
The 2003 agreement between the EU and the US made no mention of the 
political offence exemption. It required double criminality, meaning that the 
offence the fugitive was sought for needed to be a punishable crime under the 
laws of both nations and that the punishment for the crime would in both coun-
tries be a maximum period of more than one year or a more severe penalty. The 
treaty also covered the attempt or conspiracy to commit, or participation in the 
commission of, an extraditable offence.198 It seems that without the contents of 
bilateral treaties, the treaty would have abolished the political offence exemption. 
However, solely based on this agreement it cannot be deduced that all protection 
for political offenders between the US and the EU would have ceased, as such 
protection is still used in bilateral extradition treaties.
195  Article 4 of the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, 
31 March 2003.
196  The Committee on Foreign Relations Recommendation and Comments regarding the Extra-
dition Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, 20 September2006.
197  Article 3, Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States 
of America Official Journal (OJ) L 181/27, 19 July 2003. See Wouters and Naert, 2004, 
for a detailed discussion on the agreement.
198  Article 4, Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States 
of America, Official Journal (OJ) L 181/27, 19 July 2003.
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5.2.4  Applying the POE in the 2000s
The POE, even if severely limited, still remains problematic for the US and its 
foreign policy. To illustrate this, a few recent cases concerning the extradition 
of wanted terrorists are presented. In addition, I will point out that other forms 
of political crimes are alive and well, and open a discussion of the cases of Julian 
Assange, Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden. The aim is not to give a thor-
ough analysis on these recent developments but to indicate some particular cases.
In 2005, the US was faced with an extradition request that concerned a Cuban 
national, Luis Posada Carriles. Posada was wanted by Cuba, as he had been fight-
ing a battle to overthrow Fidel Castro. Posada was a prime suspect in the 1976 
bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner, killing 73 people. In a New York Times 
article, he took responsibility for attacks in Havana, killing an Italian tourist in 
1997. Later he renounced the confession.199
Posada was convicted in 2000 in Panama for a bomb plot against Fidel Castro. 
In 2005, he appeared in Florida, seeking political asylum for having served as a 
Cold War soldier on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1960s. 
Soon, he was sought for extradition by the Venezuelan government for the 
Cuban airline bombing. In 2005, the New York Times stated that “Mr. Posada’s 
case could create tension between the politics of the global war on terrorism and 
the ghosts of the cold war on Communism.” As the then-in-power Bush adminis-
tration had sworn its dedication to the global fight against terrorism, not granting 
extradition of a wanted terrorist would have been difficult. Then again, to extra-
dite an anti-Castro figure would have caused domestic disputes, especially within 
the Cuban exile community in Florida, from which the administration received 
an important amount of support and where the president’s brother served as 
governor. To extradite or to try Posada would have offered an important amount 
of good publicity for Castro, who had called Posada the worst terrorist in the 
Western hemisphere. Additionally, Venezuelan President Chavez was no ally to 
the United States.
Several people took Posada’s side in the media, suggesting that the US govern-
ment should offer him protection. The government had been faced with a similar 
dilemma before, in the case of Orlando Bosch, who had also been a part of the 
violent anti-Castro movement. The Justice Department had called Bosch “a ter-
rorist, unfettered by laws or human decency, threatening and inflicting violence 
without regard to the identity of his victims,” in the words of Joe D. Whitley, 
then an associate US attorney general. However, the first Bush administration 
decided to overrule the return of Bosch, who stayed in the US.200
Finally, both Cuban and Venezuelan extradition requests for Posada were 
refused by the US, as the US claimed Posada would not receive a fair trial in 
either country. This resulted in both countries accusing the United States of 
being hypocritical, as it sheltered a known terrorist while claiming to fight a war 
199  Weiner, 2005; Carroll, 2011.
200  Weiner, 2005; Carroll, 2011.
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on terror.201 The US later charged Posada with some relatively minor immigra-
tion-related offences and his role in the bombings in Havana. He was swiftly 
acquitted on all charges. The Venezuelan response was that the trial had been 
‘theatre’ and that the US had granted protection to a mass murderer.202
Another relatively recent case concerning the application of the POE was 
that of the Honduran Carlos Yacaman Meza, who allegedly killed Luis Rolando 
Valenzuela Ulloa, a former member of the Honduran presidential cabinet fol-
lowing a military coup d’état in 2010. The District Court rejected the petition of 
Meza when he requested the denial of the extradition. The most important factor 
in making the decision was the fact that the crime was committed only when the 
political insurgency had cooled off in Honduras.203
Christina Piemonte argued in 2013 that there appeared to be a growing 
trend in the US of excluding relative political offences from the scope of the 
POE. These include the extortion of a political figure and financial crimes 
including embezzlement by a public officer, as well as murder and conspiracy. 
One reason behind this change in court practice could have been the need 
to promote more friendly relations and reciprocity with foreign countries. 
However, there is still no clear standard considering which crimes fall within 
the scope of protection and which do not. Consistent court practice on the 
matter is yet to emerge.204
When applying the political incidence test, the courts are put between a rock 
and a hard place: remaining neutral towards the most abhorrent crimes and pos-
sibly protecting the people that commit them. In the case of Meza, the court 
followed the logic set in Quinn with regard to the requirement of the political 
incidence. According to Piemonte, the Quinn decision can prevent the courts 
from considering the subjective element of the crime. However, the court also 
made note that Meza’s motivation was, instead of politics, his personal anger 
towards Valenzuela. Further, even if Meza indeed had political motivations, they 
would not have sufficed to characterise the crime as political.
According to Piemonte, the motives of the offenders are considered where 
the court sees fit to do so. This happens regardless of the requirement that these 
should be left out of the scope of consideration, “even setting aside international 
law,” as well as the current situation in the US, committed to law and precedent. 
However, there seems to be a trend of moving away from the Quinn test towards 
a test that would also take into account the motives of the crime. The incidence 
test has proved to be unpredictable in its application.205
201  See also Resolución No. 8, Extradición de Luis Posada Carriles XXIII Asamblea Ordinaria 
del Parlamento Latinoamericano Ciudad de Panamá, República de Panamá, 6–7 December 
2007.
202  Carroll, 2011.
203  Meza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 693 E3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2012). See in detail Piemonte, 
2013, 617–633.
204  Piemonte, 2013, 630.
205  Piemonte, 2013, 631–633.
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The importance of the POE is still highly visible in current days. More 
recently, very high-profile cases that have at least partially concerned the applica-
tion of the POE have been those of known whistle-blowers Assange, Manning 
and Snowden.
It is the political offence exception to extradition that has kept Julian Assange, 
the founder and director of WikiLeaks wanted by the US for leaking diplomatic 
and military communications, hiding in the Ecuadorian embassy.206 The US–
Ecuador extradition treaty dates from 1872 and contains the classical form of the 
POE: “The stipulations of this treaty shall not be applicable to crimes or offences 
of a political character.”207
Otto Kirchheimer wrote in 1961:
As an essential factor in extradition cases, the governmental machine’s striving 
for self-preservation and survival may not be as tangible as considerations of 
foreign policy strategy. In countries with unstable governmental system given 
to frequent revolutionary removal of rulers, physical survival often hinges on 
strong asylum safeguards reinforced by an iron-clad rule of non-extradition 
for political offences. Reciprocal recognition of such protective services, which 
saves lives in revolutions, junta uprisings, and other instances of government 
selection through bloodshed have established a kind of supranational cartel of 
the ruling elite. The tacit understanding that unites South America’s regimes is 
an illustration. Non-extradition for political offences is supplemented by ‘dip-
lomatic asylum’. Instead of escaping across the border, endangered individu-
als seek refuge behind the walls of a foreign embassy, extraterritorial on the 
national territory, and the regime from which they escape respects the sanctity 
of such refuge and even provides safe-conduct provisions for those willing to 
leave the protection of diplomatic immunity in the homeland and go abroad. 
Too frequent use of this device has been vehemently attacked. It obviously 
handicaps the ferreting out of political offenders, as it ensures their safety too 
close to the locale of their rebellious activities.208
Regardless of the non-violent character of the leaks, Fox News, known for its 
sympathies for the US Republican Party, has called WikiLeaks a terrorist organi-
sation. It wrote in 2010: 
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange isn’t some well-meaning, anti-war protes-
tor leaking documents in hopes of ending an unpopular war. He’s waging 
cyberwar on the United States and the global world order. Mr. Assange and 
his fellow hackers are terrorists and should be prosecuted as such.209 
206  See e.g. Newsweek, 29 March 2017, “Will Julian Assange be sent to the U.S.? Ecuador elec-
tion results could decide extradition case.”
207  Ecuador International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 28 June 1872.
208  Kirchheimer, 1961, 372.
209  Fox News, 30 November 2010, “Yes, WikiLeaks is a terrorist organization and the time to 
act is NOW.” 
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It is telling that a criminal whose deeds210 are clearly and purely political, no mat-
ter how they are judged,211 is called a terrorist by one of the main news channels 
in the US.
The case of Edward Snowden, former employee of the National Security 
Agency (NSA) who leaked US intelligence documents, is also interesting.212 
Snowden resides in Russia, a country with no current extradition treaty with 
the US.213 According to a document written by the Swiss prosecutor’s office, 
“Edward Snowden could be assured of free movement by the federal prosecutor 
if he cooperated with a criminal investigation” into US spy activities he says he 
learned about while working in Geneva. In this hypothetical scenario, extradition 
to the US would not be granted due to the political nature of the crime.214 The 
US–Swiss extradition treaty of 1990 contains the POE, limited by the multilateral 
treaty clause.215 Thus the nature of Snowden’s crimes would allow for his protec-
tion under the treaty clauses.
These recent cases, including the case of Chelsea Manning, who is accused of 
leaking hundreds of thousands of US classified documents,216 demonstrate that 
political criminals whose actions can be judged in different ways still exist, even 
within Western states.
5.2.5  “Ballot rather than the bomb”:217 fixing the POE
Due to its problematic nature, the political offence exemption has been a subject 
of scholarly dispute. Many writers have, since the end of the Second World War, 
been trying to come up with solutions to problems that relate to the application of 
the POE. According to some, the POE protects too many categories of fugitives, 
has been outdated for decades, and needs to be annihilated or at least limited. The 
wishes to dismantle the POE have been connected to, at least in part, the intensi-
fied fight against terrorism, sometimes impeded by the application of the POE.
According to some, the POE is not necessary for the protection of political 
offenders from unfair and retaliatory trials. Additionally, it is problematic because, 
210  Notwithstanding accusations of rape in Sweden unrelated to his work as the founder of 
WikiLeaks.
211  There is a growing amount of information regarding the role of Julian Assange in meddling 
in with the US election. Without a value judgement, these are still non-violent, political 
acts. See e.g. The Washington Post, 27 September 2018, “The image of Julian Assange 
grows darker by the day,” for more information on the most recent developments in the 
Assange case.
212  See e.g. The Guardian, 21 August 2013, “Edward Snowden and the NSA files – timeline.” 
213  See e.g. New York Times, 18 January 2017, “Russia extends Edward Snowden’s asylum.” 
214  Reuters, 15 September 2014, “Switzerland would shield Snowden from ‘political’ extradi-
tion to US.” 
215  Article 3, Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Swiss Confederation, 14 November 1990.
216  New York Times Magazine, 12 June 2017, “The long, lonely road of Chelsea Manning.” 
217  Petersen, 1992, 791.
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without the invocation of the aut dedere aut judicare principle,218 it protects the 
fugitive from all judicial consequences.219 As such, the denial of extradition dis-
rupts world public order, because it causes turmoil in relations between states 
and allows states not to prosecute offenders regardless of their existing duty to 
do so.220
Many would contend that in liberal democracies that guarantee individual 
rights, violence is no longer a legitimate tool to promote political reform. As 
such, the wish to eliminate the POE is linked to a wider ideological change, 
maintaining there is no longer a justification for the use of political violence to 
create political change.221 According to Antje Petersen: “A traditional political 
offence exception contradicts the international, nonviolent approach by sanction-
ing violence as a means to bring about political change.” The complete annihila-
tion of the POE seems to necessitate the idea that there is no longer a need or 
justification for extralegal or illegal political dissidence. As Petersen put it, “At 
the end of our century, this attitude has dramatically changed in the community 
of democratic nations who believe in political change through the ballot rather 
than the bomb.”222 In the context of the European Union, the shared values and 
political structures seem to be considered enough for the ‘no questions asked’ 
policy in extradition.
The role of the POE in the US context has been challenged because of the 
lack of logic in protecting foreign offenders attacking even democracies while 
the country never offered such protection to any domestic political criminals. 
Epps, for instance, was in 1988 supportive of the elimination of the POE, pro-
vided that the US only entered extradition treaties “with countries with whom 
it was politically aligned and whose judicial systems were roughly equivalent 
in terms of the protections offered criminal defendants.”223 A similar choice 
had been made by the Soviet Communist bloc countries.224 Two years earlier, 
Bradley G. Kulman had also suggested that democratic nations worried about 
218  Even the aut dedere aut judicare principle is not without problems. Its application would 
necessitate universal jurisdiction for politically or ideologically motivated crimes. See in 
more detail Gilbert, 1998, 320–329; and Sambei, Du Plessis and Polaine, 2009, 422. See 
Blakesley, 2007, 126–140, for a discussion on the universal jurisdiction of terrorist crimes.
219  Kulman, 1986, 770.
220  Bassiouni, 1969, 234
221  Gilbert, 1991, 139.
222  Petersen, 1992, 791.
223  Epps, 1988, 215. See also Epps, 1979, 87.
224  Epps, 1988, 215; Epps, 1979, 85. See also Epps, 1988, 206:In earlier eras the exception 
[POE] made some sense. Any attempt to topple a foreign and therefore unenlightened, 
government might be welcomed as striking a blow for freedom […]. But today when coun-
tries perceive themselves aligned in major political blocs, it hardly makes sense to retain the 
exception in treaties with states who share a fundamentally similar political outlook and 
have broadly similar governmental structures. This point is even more emphatic when it is 
recognised that generally countries only enter into extradition treaties with those countries 
with whom they maintain more or less cordial relations. The United States, for example, 
has no extradition treaties with Soviet bloc countries. 
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unfair trials could only draw extradition treaties with democracies with strong 
independent judiciaries.225
Epps further argued that the POE was not required even if there was a need 
to enter into an extradition treaty with a non-aligned state for the purposes of 
international travel. For her, the short notice termination provision typically used 
in extradition treaties represented a sufficient safeguard for the rights of the fugi-
tive. Additionally, the Secretary of State, overviewed by the American public, had 
a review mechanism of courts’ extradition decisions that could be used to evalu-
ate the political justification of the fugitive’s actions.226
Today the idea of entering extradition treaties only with democratic allies 
seems impossible. Even if it were a viable alternative, it has rightfully been pointed 
out that there are no guarantees that a once-democratic ally could not one day 
become a non-democratic state or a non-ally.227 Political conditions are bound to 
change. Regardless of the short termination provisions, extradition treaties are in 
practice not renewed often. This means that the process of trying to renegotiate a 
treaty based on an evaluation of the other party’s domestic policies can prove dip-
lomatically impossible. Further, as discussed, denying the extradition of a political 
offender on the basis that their cause is justified is no easy foreign policy decision. 
Exterminating a whole extradition treaty for the protection of one offender is 
definitely not a more sensitive foreign policy decision.
A less radical option in safeguarding the original purposes of the POE and 
restricting its application with regard to terrorist crimes is limiting the POE itself. 
This has been suggested by John Norton Moore, who supported the exclusion 
of all violent crimes from the exception ”in extradition treaties with the princi-
pal democracies in the world.”228 Similarly, for instance, Gilbert has suggested 
that the exemption should not be used to protect those who wish to replace an 
elected government dedicated to the protection of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, where other political remedies instead of the use of violence are 
available.229 For this reason, he argued that a partial or regional restriction of 
the POE could be acceptable within Western industrialised nations, adhering to 
liberal democratic principles and the ECHR.230 Such a method has been applied 
for instance in the US–UK relations, as discussed earlier.
Gilbert has also noted the many problems relating to this approach. Such limi-
tations would require set criteria of ‘stable democracy’ and of ‘political crime.’ 
Additionally, regime changes would complicate the situation.231 Having differ-
ent policies with regard to the POE with different states might also create safe 
havens for terrorists by alienating those states that are excluded from joining such 
225  Kulman, 1986, 773.
226  Epps, 1988, 216.
227  Blakesley, 1986, 122; Lampo, 1988, 249; Gilbert, 1998, 270; Gilbert, 1991, 140.
228  Norton Moore, 1988, 442.
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230  Gilbert, 1998, 269.
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treaties. Additionally, it can be seen as a reactionary move, diminishing the cred-
ibility of the fight against terrorism diminish.232
In practice, the US has never restricted the signing of extradition treaties to 
democracies. Extradition treaties were commonly used as gestures of friendship, 
for instance with newly established regimes in the early 20th century. Further, 
even when parliamentary regimes were overthrown and replaced by dictatorships, 
extradition treaties were not abrogated or suspended. According to Christopher 
H. Pyle, this related to diplomats’ and administrators’ valuing order over liber-
ty.233 Once these treaties were signed, due to the rule of non-inquiry, the courts 
did not take a stand on whether the requesting regime had a fair judicial system. 
It was typically assumed that if the US had an extradition treaty with the request-
ing state, the system had to be fair.234
During the last decades, there has been a complete turnaround in the way 
in which the American public perceives political offenders. Whereas before, it 
was considered that political offenders from the old world crossing the Atlantic 
escaped despotic governments and took their chance to reinvent themselves in 
the new world would cause no trouble upon arrival. Furthermore, as the US 
initially did not really have a government to rebel against, these former criminals 
seemed less threatening. In contrast, since the Second World War, most politi-
cal fugitives have not been considered trustworthy, and nowadays they are often 
perceived as terrorists. Non-Communist governments have been assumed to be 
democratic, especially if they refer to themselves as such and their legitimacy of 
has typically not been questioned.235
As a way to fix the POE, Pyle has suggested that different legal systems could 
be given an accreditation based on assessments provided by NGOs and human 
rights groups. These groups would evaluate whether the fugitive would receive 
unfair treatment upon their return. Should a requesting nation deny this evalu-
ation, it would be placed in an ‘unaccredited regimes’ list.236 This would mean 
ending the rule of non-inquiry of US courts.237
However, even in a country with a fair judicial system, it is possible for political 
offenders to be punished for their motives. Further, as it is for the state of asylum 
to decide whether the fugitive would receive fair treatment upon their return, the 
fugitive’s rights remain dependent on the way in which the asylum state under-
stands the concept of procedural fairness. Additionally, denying extradition based 
on the unfairness of the requesting state’s judicial system, especially between 
friendly nations, is a diplomatically very difficult decision, as it represents an overt 
condemnation.238 ‘Fair trial’ is a vague concept even if its requirements are deter-
mined in Article 6 of the ECHR. Further, these rights are not of assistance in a 
232  Gilbert, 1991, 139; Gilbert, 1998, 269.
233  Pyle, 2001, 126, 319.
234  Pyle, 2001, 128.
235  Pyle, 2001, 130; 302.
236  Pyle, 2001, 315.
237  Pyle, 2001, 321.
238  Gilbert, 1991, 154; Gilbert, 1998, 311.
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terrorist case, where the suspect can be denied access to a regular court based on 
national security concerns. For this reason, Gilbert has argued that the abolishing 
of the POE and replacing it with a fair trial requirement does not function when 
the offenders have intended to challenge the authority of the same state that is 
organising the trial.239 Further, applying a test to determine whether the offender 
can receive a fair trial can create antagonism, which can result in discouraging 
international collaboration.240
Then again, the non-surrender of political offenders is equally biased vis-à-vis 
another state’s internal issues as granting every request would be. In fact, the non-
extradition of a suspect is a highly political decision.241 The discrimination clause 
could serve the purpose of protecting those who might end up being discriminated 
based on their beliefs or personal qualities,242 but its application is even less neutral 
than that of the POE. The application of the POE can be used to provide a ‘legal 
cloak’ to a political judgment and it allows for the political decision-makers to 
evade diplomatic collision.243 Thus the application of the POE is, paradoxically, also 
a way to depoliticise the political nature of an extradition decision.
The denial of extradition of a political offender gives support for the politi-
cal adversary of the requesting state. As Van den Wijngaert has maintained, this 
practice is highly illogical between allied states which have agreed upon protect-
ing each other with regard to an external threat, but by invoking the POE would 
offer protection to those trying to disrupt this safety.244 Likewise, Epps argued in 
1988 that the POE was “strangely contradictory when it forbids extradition from 
the United States of the fugitive Briton who blows up the Houses of Parliament 
in an attempt to replace Mrs Thatcher with a Communist regime.”245
One suggested ‘fix’ for the POE would be to limit its application to cases 
where the fugitive would also be eligible for asylum,246 as states still hold the 
right to decide upon providing asylum to those persecuted for political beliefs.247 
Such a take has been advocated by a number of judges.248 This would essentially 
mean introducing the application of the proportionality test. The criteria pro-
vided by the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status define a comparable evaluation to the Swiss test:
In determining whether an offence is ‘non-political’ or is, on the contrary, 
a ‘political’ crime, regard should be given in the first place to its nature and 
purpose, i.e. whether it has been committed out of genuine political motives 
239  Gilbert, 1998, 309–315.
240  Gilbert, 1998, 311.
241  Sapiro, 1986, 663–664; Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 204–205.
242  However, the discrimination clause is so general in nature that for instance the US Con-
gress did not pass it as legislation. Gilbert, 1991, 144.
243  Lieberman, 2007, 190.
244  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 204–205.
245  Epps, 1988, 206.
246  Gilbert, 1991, 137, 150.
247  Hannay, 1980, 411; Epps, 1988, 215; Petersen, 1992, 791.
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and not merely for personal reasons or gain. There should also be a close 
and direct causal link between the crime committed and its alleged political 
purpose and object. The political element of the offence should also outweigh 
its common-law character. This would not be the case if the acts committed 
are grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective. The political nature 
of the offence is also more difficult to accept if it involves acts of an atro-
cious nature.249
According to Gilbert, a combination of adopting the proportionality test, the 
safeguarding of the discrimination clause and the application of the aut dedere 
aut judicare principle to all politically or ideologically motivated offenders, with 
the exclusion of all crimes covered by UN multilateral conventions would serve 
all the original purposes of the POE. Using such methods would maintain inter-
national public order, bring fugitives to justice and safeguard human rights.250 
Christopher H. Pyle, in turn, has been supportive of the ‘wanton crimes’ 
approach applied by some US courts. According to him, it is important to leave 
the judges enough “wiggle room” to “do the right thing.”251 In order to find 
the appropriate balance between order and liberty, Pyle has suggested that the 
use of the criteria of the wanton crimes approach would provide the courts with 
the means to evaluate the nature of the crime against the nature of the regime 
attacked.252 There are many similarities between the proportionality test and the 
wanton crimes approach. Neither is a one-size-fits-all solution but both seem to 
lead to similar conclusions regarding who is worthy of the protection of the POE 
and who is not.
Some attempts to limit the POE in multilateral treaties and conventions have 
been successful. Limitations concerning war criminals and the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention have, for instance, been widely accepted. Furthermore, 
typical extradition treaties now contain the multilateral treaty clause.253 However, 
as discussed, this process is far from finalised. There is no agreement upon what 
kind of conduct would automatically be exempted from the scope of the POE.254 
For instance, Cindy Schlaefer has called upon a treaty defining those acts of 
249  Para 152, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/
REV.1 UNHCR 1979, reedited January 1992. Italics added.
250  Gilbert, 1991, 162. The predominance test has also been supported by e.g. Van den Wijn-
gaert, 1980; and Perry, 1989, 734.
251  Pyle, 2001, 195.
252  Pyle, 2001, 315–317.
253  See e.g. Costa Rica International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 4 December 
1982; Jamaica International Extradition Treaty with the United States, 14 June 1983; 
Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of South Africa (with Annex), 16 September 1999; Extradition 
Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the United States of America, 31 March 2003.
254  Tulkens, 1979, 231; Norton Moore, 1988, 442; Cassese, 1989, 11; Lieberman, 2007, 212.
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terrorism which would always be subject to extradition regardless of their politi-
cal motivations.255 Also, Gilbert has been supportive of the use of the “positive 
approach,” which allows for judicial discretion.256 Françoise Tulkens, writing in 
1979, suggested the depoliticisation of certain offences.257 As established, this has 
been the most common global approach, used by for instance the UN. However, 
specified multilateral treaties are partly problematic as it is impossible to predict 
all future cases where the POE might be invoked.258
Scholars have also suggested that acts in peacetime against civilians that are 
against the laws of war by analogy should be excluded from the scope of the pro-
tection. This would protect legitimate dissidents. However, the direct application 
of the laws of war could prove difficult, as their provisions are limited to non-
international armed conflicts.259 Most acts of international terrorism would most 
likely not fall under the scope of this definition.
The problem with the exclusion of terrorism from the scope of political 
offences is akin to the problem of trying to create an antiterrorist resolution. For 
instance, John Patrick Groarke has been of the opinion that with a global defini-
tion of a political offence, it would be possible to exclude those that have attacked 
civilians from the protection of the POE, meaning that the most “offensive type 
of terrorist acts” would not go unpunished.260 A similar stance was taken by the 
courts in the Eain and Quinn cases.
However, the definition of ‘civilian’ has in itself always proved problem-
atic. For example, is violence against the police forces of a state legitimate?261 
In Antje Petersen’s words: “uncertainty clashes with uncertainty when terror-
ism has to be located on a scale of acceptable political struggle in the con-
text of deciding on protection from extradition.”262 In my view, considering, 
for instance, police officers or soldiers patrolling the streets of a major city 
‘civilians’ would not be an accurate description. These people are and should 
be protected by different laws that ordinary citizens. For this reason, acting 
against them could be seen as a political act. Whether such an act is legitimate 
is a separate question.
What does it mean if due to the terrorist threat, the political offence exception is 
eliminated on a global scale? The purpose of the POE was never to protect terrorists. 
However, the wider trend of excluding all violent crimes from the scope of the POE 
seems to be against its original purposes. The justification for the use of violence 
for political ends is disputable, but it is always possible to consider some revolutions 
255  Schaefer, 1981, 643.
256  Gilbert, 1991, 148.
257  Tulkens, 1979, 231.
258  Lieberman, 2007, 205.
259  Epps, 1988, 211.
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1988, 1543.
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legitimate.263 For instance, Bassiouni has considered the use of the POE vital in situ-
ations where the fugitive lacked lawful means of redress or remedy. However, the 
denial of extradition could be subject to limitations relating to the violation of rights 
and the means of redress chosen by the individual in question.264 Bassiouni wrote 
in 1969: “This theory of ideological self-preservation is not advanced as a means 
to warrant or justify lawlessness, or anarchy, but is intended to relate an otherwise 
nebulous concept, which has been the subject of nefarious political manipulations, 
to the sphere of a legally or judicially manageable theory of law.”265
As maintained by Christopher H. Pyle: “It is nonsense to say that the politi-
cal offence exception is no longer needed because yesterday’s freedom fighters 
have been replaced by today’s ‘terrorists’. However, it is equally important to 
recognise that the exception should not be used to shield a person who indis-
criminately kills and maims innocent people.”266
In general, states tend to consider that killing can sometimes be permissible 
for the furtherance of a political goal. For this reason, they do not want to entirely 
ban this option but wish to control who uses this method and against whom. 
Some states have, however, previously excluded crimes of special cruelty from the 
scope of protection of the POE in their national laws.267
In 1970, Martin E. Gold estimated that as ideological differences between 
nations would increase, so would the practice of granting political asylum.268 
In the West, it seems that the opposite has happened. Is the eradication of the 
exception, then, a logical development arising from the so-called ‘end of history,’ 
the victory of liberal capitalism from all other political systems?269 Hardly. The 
elimination of the POE does not seem to reflect the rise of mutual trust even if 
some have made this argument.270 Instead, it can be seen to express an end of an 
optimist phase of liberalism, where political change was still seen capable of mak-
ing the world better, not worse. For this reason, it manifests the end of the era of 
a romantic view towards political offenders more than anything else.
Scholars have been concerned with the possible implications of the complete 
evisceration of the POE. For instance, Ivor and Clive Stanbrook stated in 2000: 
“There is now a danger that detestation of political violence may lead governments 
to depoliticise so many offences, leaving no scope for the political offence exception 
or for political asylum at all. That would be a tragedy for human liberty.”271 Ben Saul 
263  Petersen, 1992, 791.
264  Bassiouni, 1969, 256.
265  Bassiouni, 1969, 257.
266  Pyle, 2001, 315.
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has been concerned about the status of those resisting oppressive governments by 
means of discriminate and proportionate violence.272 Similarly, Christopher H. Pyle 
has underlined the possible unwanted consequences of the exclusion of all violent 
crimes from protection. “It loads the law of extradition wholly against revolution-
aries and wholly in favour of established regimes, whose indiscriminate killing can 
always be characterised as law enforcement and who, with their superior firepower 
and organisation, are most likely to prevail.”273 Geoffrey Gilbert, after a thorough 
discussion about the acceptability of violence in a democracy, concluded that even 
in a so-called stable democracy, there can be room for justified violence. For this 
reason, the POE forms a necessary feature of extradition treaties.274 Christopher L. 
Blakesley has pointed out that the evisceration of the POE is not a desired or even 
efficient means of fighting terrorism.275
Philosopher C.A.J. Coady has also maintained that it is not possible to defini-
tively argue that violence in a democratic society would never be acceptable.
It may be said that a moral case for revolution against a dictatorship can exist, 
but never against a democracy. As a convinced democrat, I am sensitive to 
the force of this rejoinder but find its force blunted by two considerations. 
The first is that many basically non-democratic political societies have demo-
cratic trappings. The second is that ever since Tocqueville, political theorists 
have been aware of the problems posed by majority tyranny over minorities 
and by the deep and serious injustices that democratic legal machinery can 
countenance – the historic background to the struggle in Northern Ireland 
is not irrelevant here. In any event, a good deal of revolutionary activity has 
taken place in countries, like several of those in South America in the not-
so-distant past, which made small pretence of being democratic, or whose 
democratic practices tolerated extensive human rights abuses.276
Instead of restricting extradition treaties or the scope of the POE itself, alterna-
tive means have been suggested for the protection of the principle. Bassiouni 
has, for instance, suggested an international definition of a political offence or, 
alternatively, the application of the aut dedere aut judicare principle to all politi-
cal crimes, potentially using the laws of the jurisdiction against which the accused 
committed the alleged offence. However, the ideal for Bassiouni was that the 
offender could be tried in an international court and imprisoned in an interna-
tional institution.277
Many scholars have agreed that the jurisdiction over political crimes could 
be partly or completely given to an international court capable of judging the 
272  Saul, 2015, 402.
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acts merely on the common element and not on their political motives.278 This 
seems like a plausible option but would potentially necessitate the international 
definition of concepts such as political crime or terrorism, which have, previously, 
eluded such attempts.
It is interesting to note that the idea of an international court was brought up 
at the 1937 League of Nations Conference where the Suppression of Terrorism 
Convention was signed. In addition to the main Convention, a Supplementary 
Convention was signed by ten of the signatories of the principal convention on the 
same day. The parties agreed to the creation of an International Criminal Court 
where terrorists who were not extradited or tried in the parties’ own courts would 
be sent. This convention, as the main convention, never entered into force.279
Epps has been doubtful of the neutrality an international court. According to 
her, it would be extremely difficult to create a court that would grant the political 
offence exception to some political offenders without it expressing a particular 
political philosophy, “which would be anathema to some nations.” Furthermore, 
many countries could refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of such a court.280
Based on the case examples presented in this study, it has become clear that 
courts have, actually, been equipped with the solutions to apply the POE so that 
it does not protect terrorists. The predominance test combined with the Belgian 
view weighing the severeness of the crime against its political goals would suf-
fice in applying the POE. Another option would be the application of the exist-
ing criteria for asylum on political offenders.281 This would serve the purpose of 
protecting those who deserve protection and punishing those who use excessive 
means to pursue their political goals. It is noteworthy that the cases where the 
application of the POE has resulted in terrorists escaping have had more to do 
with foreign policy issues than with problems in the application of the exemption.
The option that has not yet been widely deliberated in this context would be to 
give terrorism a definition and to exclude these clearly defined offences from the 
protection of the POE internationally. In Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4, I suggested 
that terrorism could be defined as “violent criminal action aimed at persons used as 
symbolic targets with the objective of generating extreme fear in the general popula-
tion, for the purposes of advancing political or ideological goals.”282 Should such a 
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formulation be accepted, it would be possible to retain the POE while excluding 
terrorists from its protection. It is clear that no definition is without problems and 
that all choices have the potential of underinclusiveness and/or overinclusiveness. 
This definition would, at least, catch the most serious terrorist offenders.
Excluding the defined acts from the POE would be a way to depoliticise the 
treatment of terrorists, as their acts would be separated from other forms of politi-
cal crime. However, as the definition implies that terrorism always has a political 
or ideological goal, it does not attempt to hide its inherently political nature by 
depoliticising it and thus does not make an attempt to reduce it to common crime.
5.3  The repoliticisation of terrorism
5.3.1  Do bad motives make worse criminals?
While the key argument in this study is that terrorism has been depoliticised, 
this chapter hopes to open a window for further study discussing a contradictory 
notion: that concurrent to the depoliticisation of terrorism, the trend of repoliti-
cisation is slowly emerging. This means that terrorists are growingly separated 
from the ‘common criminal’ category by creating terrorism-specific laws, con-
taining harder punishments for crimes committed for terrorist purposes.
The aim is not to present an all-inclusive analysis on the phenomenon but merely 
to provide a starting point, hopefully opening new ground for further research on 
the topic. Additionally, the goal of this section is to provide an antithesis of my claim 
of depoliticisation. Political developments are by no means simple and harmonious, 
especially around such a complex phenomenon as terrorism, constituting of a variety 
of elements that include violence, politics, fear and unpredictability. For this reason, 
it is possible for two seemingly contradictory trends to exist side by side.
The repoliticisation of terrorism relates to its political motives. Does the 
motive of the crime make a difference to how the deed is judged? Is terrorism 
more wrong because its motivations are political? Robert Ferrari contemplated in 
1920 that motive matters a great deal when measuring the right punishment for 
a specific act: “Do we not in our ordinary affairs of life consider motive, and does 
not that motive change the aspect of acts? Blind punishment for acts, applied 
indiscriminately to all who commit those acts, is worse than a crime of society; it 
is, as the French say, a blunder. And blunders are sometimes conducive to more 
startling, revolutionary results than crimes are.”283
Ferrari’s view has not been prevalent. In contrast, the motives of criminals 
have traditionally been kept out of courtrooms and considered irrelevant to crim-
inal responsibility.284 If one begins to discuss the right-/wrongfulness of a moti-
283  Ferrari, 1920, 316.
284  See e.g. Kaufman, 2003, 317–318; Hessick, 2006; Saul, 2008, 1–3. However, as pointed 
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vation, the ideal objective nature of law is bent, and law and punishment become 
personalised according to each wrongdoer.
A criminal act is typically evaluated on two grounds only: first, whether the act 
committed was indeed illegal and whether it was the accused who committed the 
act in question. The second criterion is whether the accused had the necessary 
intent. In other words, their mental state, mens rea, is evaluated. After these two 
issues have been established, the question is whether they committed the act on 
purpose or by accident, for instance. An evaluation of motives is not part of this 
process.285
Because the evaluation of the person’s motives necessitates understanding the 
reasons behind the commission of the crime, motivation is difficult to prove in 
court.286 In addition, the consideration of motives could lead towards treating 
some ideologies criminal. It could also undermine the role of the legal system 
as an (arguably) neutral system.287 If the only difference between the two acts is 
their motivation, treating the motivation as an essential element in the evaluation 
of the crime seems to lead to creating so-called thought crimes. The difficulty 
with this logic is that it necessitates the evaluation of the quality of the motive. 
What is a ‘good’ motive? Would an unselfish reason and motive make terrorism 
less wrong?288
An affirmative answer to this question would follow the logic of the political 
offence exemption, where the motive of doing ‘greater good’ has been one of the 
reasons why political criminals have been seen to deserve different treatment in 
comparison to common criminals.
With the repoliticisation of terrorism, the current take on political offenders 
seems to be opposite to that which emerged at the dawn of liberal democracies. 
Why has there been a change in the view a political motivation is looked at, why 
have political offenders again become villains instead of heroes?
Political crimes, and terrorism in particular, have throughout history received 
different treatment in comparison to ‘common’ crimes. At the lenient end of the 
spectrum of this special treatment of political crime, there is the political offence 
exception to extradition, discussed at lengths in the context of this book. The 
exception allows states to protect fugitives, regardless of the existence of extra-
dition treaties. In addition to the POE, there have been other ways to provide 
political offenders with preferential treatment, for instance issuing them milder 
sentences or better imprisonment conditions.
285  See for a discussion between the differences between motive and intention, Husak, 1989, 
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At the stricter end of the range, political criminals are sometimes considered 
as dangerous to the whole society, resulting in more severe measures against 
them. For instance, in the United States, political crime was traditionally viewed 
as more immoral than common crime, as it challenges the whole society, which 
is viewed as the guarantor of liberties.289 For instance, US President Warren 
Harding (1921–1923) claimed that there was no difference between political and 
common crime, and if such a difference did exist, political criminals would have 
been the ones deserving more serious punishments, as they threatened American 
institutions.290
Following English legal traditions, the United States has held a custom to 
depoliticise ‘mixed’ or ‘relative’ political crimes. These crimes were treated as 
common crimes, and their political motivations ignored. The ignorance of motive 
typically kept political ideologies out of American courtrooms. Even if in general, 
in the US, political criminals have been considered the most dangerous types 
of criminals, political offenders could still receive lesser penalties than common 
criminals. The juries used to be reluctant to convict political criminals, amnesties 
and pardons and suspended sentences were frequently used, and political prison-
ers have been able to get better treatment in federal prisons.291
Nowadays, terrorists, for example, have sometimes received harsher punish-
ments than common criminals even when the material element of the act is the 
same.292 Both the lenient and the strict approach to political criminals have a long 
historical background. In this study, I refer to the treatment of terrorists as special 
cases and punishing terrorist acts more severely as the ‘repoliticisation’ of terrorism. 
The repoliticisation of terrorism seems to lead back to Ferrari’s logic by making a 
murder committed with a terrorist intent a graver crime than a ‘regular’ murder.
It is noteworthy that in addition to terrorism, motivation has been added to 
some of the most recent criminalisations. For instance, a racist motivation for an 
act of violence can, in some jurisdictions, turn the crime into an entirely different 
crime, not just aggravate the sentence.293
Saul has noted that the motive requirement can target those acts that most 
bluntly are attacks against the society’s core values.294 He has argued that instead 
of denying the political element included in criminal law, criminal law can and 
should be used to defend democratic values by condemning certain types of vio-
lence. This would send a symbolic message that regardless of political motiva-
tions, serious violence is not acceptable in a democratic society. Such violence 
cannot be used to further political goals at the expense of other citizens’ safety 
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290  McElrath, 2000, 14.
291  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 149.
292  For instance, the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for stricter limitations to 
crimes that “involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” Hessick, 
2006, 104–105.
293  See e.g. Blakesley, 2007, 169–171.
294  Saul, 2008, 4.
214 Fight against terrorism since the 1990s 
and security. Criminal law can thus be used to underline the inherent values of 
a democratic society.295 Interestingly, this is the opposite deduction to the one 
made in the 19th century, when it was thought that by offering political offenders 
more protection, it was possible to limit sympathies for them and prevent them 
from becoming martyrs of their cause.296
The problem with necessitating a specific motivation in the criminalisation of 
an act is that the motivation is difficult to prove. As such, these types of criminali-
sations may hinder effective prosecution.297 In the case of terrorism or hate crime, 
for instance, the role of the motive is to play a partially inculpatory role. The 
crimes themselves, regardless of motive, provoke criminal liability, but motive 
merely determines which crime the perpetrators are liable for.298 In other words, 
the motive’s “role is to distinguish between the relative blameworthiness of indi-
viduals who are liable for the same criminal offence.”299 According to Smith and 
Damphousse, in hate crime legislation the motive of the perpetrator is required 
as an element of proof.300 Kaufman has noted that the fact that hate crimes neces-
sitate a specific motive does not make the idea of the motive being generally 
irrelevant wrong; in these crimes, it has been the legislature that has defined the 
motives of the crimes. In other words, the courts do not make their decisions 
based on how right/wrong they see the crimes to be.301
Many have argued that motive has, in fact, never been irrelevant in courts. In 
addition to some criminal offences, such as the mentioned hate crimes, that have 
motive as an element, certain motives have in some cases been accepted defences 
and sometimes considered during sentencing.302 As put by Kaufman: “the crimi-
nal law does not depart from morality so as to ignore motive altogether.”303 For 
instance, Smith and Damphousse have shown that terrorists are punished more 
severely than common criminals even when they are prosecuted as such.304
5.3.2  Do terrorists have human rights?
A terrorist deed is always a shock to a society. As such, it creates a sudden need 
to react politically. As Anna Oehmichen has shown, a legislative reaction to a ter-
rorist act is often one that curtails human rights, even in societies that are known 
to promote them.305
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At least for the last 30 years, it has been questioned whether terrorists can get 
fair treatment in court. Wadie E. Said has argued that federal courts will stretch 
the boundaries of what is legally permissible when faced with a defendant charged 
with terrorism. According to Said, the criminal process is not necessarily an impar-
tial forum when faced with non-state political violence.306 Concerns about terror-
ists not getting a fair hearing have been also expressed by, for instance, Gilbert. 
Because terrorist acts are extremely serious in nature and/or they aim at the state 
apparatus itself, they will most likely not get treated in the same way as ordinary 
crimes. Terrorists may end up getting punished for their political motives in addi-
tion to the act itself.307
When terrorists are taken into court as common offenders, they are not nec-
essarily or even presumably treated in the same way as the average criminal. For 
instance, in England, ‘safety’ or ‘urgent’ interviews have been used mainly in 
cases that relate to terrorism. For the purpose of these interviews, the suspect’s 
right to legal advice can be delayed. The police can use these interviews to receive 
information that might help them to protect life and/or prevent serious dam-
age to property. The use of the information received during these interviews 
endangers the key rights of the suspect: the right to a fair trial, access to legal 
advice and against self-incrimination.308 There are known cases, where presumed 
terrorists have been denied access to a lawyer. In these cases, it has been argued, 
the European Court of Human Rights has not taken a strong stance towards the 
protection of the human rights of the presumed terrorists.309
There have been lots of discussions on how terrorists should be tried and 
whether there is a need for special courts and processes. Developments towards 
the extending of jurisdiction regarding terrorist crimes were seen already in the 
1970s in relation to the Irish troubles. The UK Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975310 
and the Irish Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976311 allowed courts in one 
country to try offenders in the other. The specific offences concerned were typi-
cally linked to what is generally understood as terrorism. As the Irish had refused 
to extradite members of the IRA due to the political offence exemption to extra-
dition, the Acts were created to avoid this problem.312
Special rules and procedures have been supported for a variety of reasons. 
In the United States, the claim has been that regular processes could endanger 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives abroad. This is due to the ‘dis-
covery’ rule, which grants the accused the right to know what evidence is used 
against them in court. This rule has proved to create problems in many interna-
tional terrorism trials, as information used against the accused might have been 
306  Said, 2012, 176. See Said, 2015, for more details regarding terrorism prosecutions in the US.
307  Gilbert, 1985, 710; Gilbert, 1991, 156; Gilbert, 1998, 313–315.
308  See in more detail Wallerstein, 2013.
309  Dickson, 2013, 189–190.
310  Extraterritorial Offences, S. 4, Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975 (c. 59).
311  S. 3, Irish Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976, No. 14.
312  Gilbert, 1985, 718–719.
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obtained through paid informants or undercover operations by the CIA. The 
discovery process would have in many cases necessitated the release of names of 
intelligence agents. Because of this, a number of charges have been dropped.313 
Also, the special security needs of terrorist trials have led to a questioning of 
whether terrorism trials can be organised in regular courthouses. The most com-
mon debate has concentrated on whether terrorist cases are too complicated to 
be tried by federal prosecutors.314
The debate about whether terrorists should be tried by military tribunals 
instead of ordinary courts seems to reflect a longer development towards treat-
ing terrorism as a more ‘politicised’ issue. As explained, traditionally in Anglo-
American law, political crime and political criminals are not separated from 
non-political criminals. Motive has not had relevance in court, only intent.315 For 
example, from the 1970s onwards, terrorists in the US were brought to ordinary 
courts as a demonstration that they were nothing more than ordinary criminals.316 
The prosecutions of terrorists in regular courts have been relatively successful.317
Research conducted by Smith et al. has demonstrated a shift in antiterror-
ism policy in the US since the 1990s. Since then, international terrorism court 
cases have been growingly politicised. Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) has since 1983 applied specific guidelines and rules to terrorism investiga-
tions. Even if terrorists were still treated as common criminals in courtrooms, 
the shift in the FBI’s procedures was the first indication of the coming change. 
The ‘politicising’ development continued throughout the 1980s. In court cases, 
a visible change took place towards the end of the decade, when three major 
terrorism trials took place in the United States. All of them were explicitly politi-
cised, as they were brought to trial as seditious conspiracies. While the cases were 
politicised by calling them ‘terrorism trials’ or charging the accused with seditious 
conspiracy charges, the changes in the federal criminal code assisted in avoiding 
the discussion on the motivations for terrorism by incorporating a chapter called 
‘terrorism’ into the code. The chapter allows for harsher sentencing for terrorist 
crimes. However, it does not define these by motivation, but instead by naming 
specific ‘terrorist’ targets.318 Thus, curiously, the ‘politicisation’ of terrorism court 
cases is partly in line with the tendency to ‘depoliticise’ the phenomenon, as the 
politicisation allows for stricter sentencing, while the depoliticisation makes it 
possible to ignore the motives behind terrorists’ acts.
According to Smith et al., especially after the 1993 attacks against the World 
Trade Center in New York City, terrorism trials were explicitly politicised by 
the prosecutors. The bombers were labelled as terrorists throughout the tri-
als. The charges, such as seditious conspiracy, openly linked a political motive 
313  Smith et al., 2002, 327–328.
314  Smith et al., 2002, 313.
315  See e.g. Hagan, 1997, 4; and Saul, 2008, 1. See also Section 5.3.1. 
316  Jackson, Damphousse and Smith, 2002, 314.
317  Smith et al., 2002, 329.
318  Smith et al., 2002, 313–316.
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with the acts. The attackers got convicted, which proved that the politicisation 
strategy could be efficient when bringing terrorists into trial. They did not need 
to be shrouded as common criminals. Notably, in the United States, the term 
‘terrorism’ was a charge almost exclusively used against international terrorists. 
Domestic terrorists were consistently linked to other motives, whereas interna-
tional terrorists motives were said to be ‘terroristic’ and thus political.319
A possible explanation for this partial paradox in the re- and depoliticisa-
tion trends is that domestic prosecutors are able to pursue more severe sen-
tences for terrorists than to common criminals due to new antiterrorism laws. 
Internationally, on the other hand, the term terrorism is still debated and coop-
eration is easier to organise around less touchy matters.
Saul has argued against the common claim that including a motivational element 
to criminals could “legitimise them or transform them into cause célèbres, lightning 
rods for dissent or martyrs for the cause.” In such a case, political claims brought to 
the judicial process would give these views more publicity and would force the law 
to take them seriously.320 Further, according to Saul, “Requiring proof of a politi-
cal motive would expose fringe political claims to the judicial process, inevitably 
requiring the law to take serious notice of them and bringing them greater public 
attention. It was thought preferable to focus on the physical harm resulting from 
terrorist acts and, accordingly, to treat offenders as ordinary criminals.”321 Jenkins 
has pointed out that arresting and imprisoning terrorists can, in fact, be useful for 
terrorists themselves, as courtrooms can be used to spread political ideas and cap-
tured terrorists can become martyrs for new generations.322
Regardless, for instance in Australia, terrorist acts are defined as certain vio-
lent criminal acts done “with the intention of advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause,” coupled with the intention of (1) “coercing, or influencing 
by intimidation” a government, or (2) “intimidating the public” or a section of 
it. Requiring a political, religious or ideological cause is widely understood as a 
motive requirement. In other words, there has to be a specific emotion or belief 
that prompts the violent act.323
Even with these problems linked with attaching political meaning to terrorists’ 
actions, pushing the political element aside does not necessarily provide a simple 
solution. Terrorists’ political demands usually get attention either through the 
media or the Internet, regardless of whether they are discussed in the court.324
In sum, some features that concern the special treatment of terrorists in com-
parison to common criminals have been listed earlier. These have included the 
creation of special tribunals, the (de)politicisation of terrorism cases and addi-
tional punishments for crimes with terrorist intent. In addition to these, there is 
319  Smith et al., 2002, 316–325.
320  Saul, 2008, 8.
321  Saul, 2006, 39.
322  Jenkins, 2003, 73.
323  Division 101 of the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995.
324  Saul, 2008, 8.
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a recent development that further separates terrorism from the sphere of ordinary 
criminality. This is the ongoing tendency of criminalising the ‘glorification’ of 
terrorists or ‘provocation to terrorism,’ which is connected with the wider idea 
of the repoliticisation of terrorism. This development was already visible earlier, 
but it got accelerated with the 2002 EU Framework Decision on combating 
terrorism,325 amended in 2008 by another EU Framework Decision.326 These 
decisions require states to criminalise public provocation to commit a terrorist 
offence, as well as the intentional recruitment and training for terrorist purposes.
The (re)politicisation trend visible in United States court cases can also be 
noted in European legislation. In the United Kingdom, a new offence of inciting 
terrorism was introduced in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000).327 This was later 
followed by the Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006), which includes controversial 
offences, such as ‘encouragement of terrorism’ and the ‘preparation of terrorist 
acts,’ as well as the dissemination of terrorist publications.328 The encouragement 
or glorification of terrorism, for instance through public statements, has been 
criticised for clashing with the freedom of expression, as the act uses uncertain 
terms to define such deeds.329 The act does not sufficiently clarify what kind of 
statements are considered to encourage terrorism. Thus the final defining process 
falls into the hands of juries.330
The need for terrorism-specific laws in the United Kingdom has been a subject 
of debate, as similar acts could already be prosecuted under a provision such as 
incitement to murder. These were successfully used for instance in the case of the 
Imam Abu Hamza, who received a seven-year sentence.331 Nonetheless, the TA 
2006 did introduce new criminalisations, but these have only been used on rare 
occasions.332
In France, it is possible to punish for the preparation and incitement to ter-
rorism under non-terrorism specific statutes. The French criminal law has since 
1881 contained an article333 that relates to the glorification of terrorism, but very 
few cases have been prosecuted under this provision.334 The Spanish criminal law, 
325  Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, 13 June 2002.
326  Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, 28 November 2008, amending Frame-
work Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002/475/JHA, 13 June 2002.
327  Part 2, S. 3, 5, Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11). See also incitement of terrorism overseas. Part 
4, S. 59–61, Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11).
328  Part 2, S. 3, 5A Terrorism Act 2006 (c. 11).
329  Oehmichen, 2009, 174; Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 87–88; Galli, 2013, 113–116.
330  Galli, 2013, 116.
331  R v. Abu Hamza [2006] EWCA (Crim) 456.
332  Galli, 2013, 115–116.
333  “Seront punis des peines prévues par l’alinéa 1er ceux qui, par les mêmes moyens, auront 
provoqué directement aux actes de terrorisme prévus par le titre II du livre IV du code 
pénal, ou qui en auront fait l’apologie,” Ch. 4, Para 1er, Art 24(4) Loi du 29 juillet 1881 
sur la liberté de la presse.
334  Galli, 2013, 117–118.
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in turn, contains an offence of ‘justifying or glorifying’ terrorist acts,335 but in 
Spain, this has been applied also to the glorification of terrorists themselves. This 
has resulted in scrutiny over speeches at terrorists’ memorial services and of rock 
lyrics. Additionally, a wide variety of groups have been declared as terrorist, includ-
ing youth organisations and prisoner support organisations. Further, Spain’s 
laws are also very strict on terrorism, providing with a maximum prison term of 
40 years for terrorism. Because of the unclear and encompassing nature of these 
new criminalisations, it has been argued that supporting terrorist organisations 
has become a so-called thought crime.336 Terrorism has also been repoliticised in 
Germany. After the EU Framework Decision of 2002, Germany added into its 
criminal code provisions of terrorism a description of political objectives.337 Prior 
to this, it was sufficient to have committed certain listed offences without any 
further subjective requirement.338
The UN Security Council also condemned “incitement to terrorism” in its 
Resolution 1624 following the terrorist attacks in London,339 and the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism signatories agreed to crimi-
nalise “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence,” which in the context 
of the treaty “means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message 
to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence.”340
The criminalisation of inchoate offences is not without problems.341 The new 
offences have made the boundaries of criminal liability flexible and blurred. The 
link between the actual commission of a criminal act with criminal liability is fee-
ble. They tend to emphasise the mens rea over the actus reus.
The repoliticisation has also been visible in terrorist sentencing. For instance, 
in Finnish law, the criminal use of explosives can be punished with a fine or with 
335  “El enaltecimiento o la justificación por cualquier medio de expresión pública o difusión 
de los delitos comprendidos en los artículos 571 a 577 de este Código o de quienes hayan 
participado en su ejecución, o la realización de actos que entrañen descrédito, menosprecio 
o humillación de las víctimas de los delitos terroristas o de sus familiares.” Article 578. 
Ley Orgánica 7/2000, de 22 de diciembre, de modificación de la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, 
de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal, y de la Ley Orgánica 5/2000, de 12 de enero, 
reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores, en relación con los delitos de ter-
rorismo.
336  Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 89–90. See more details on the Spanish antiterrorist 
legislation, Oehmichen 2009, 164–212.
337  For instance, with regard to the Associations Act, Vereinsgesetz, foreign associations could 
now be banned if they used violence in furtherance of political or other ideological causes. 
“Gewaltanwendung als Mittel zur Durchsetzung politischer, religiöser oder sonstiger 
Belange unterstützt, befürwortet oder hervorrufen soll.” Article 9, Terrorismusbekämp-
fungsgesetz (TerrorBekämpfG k.a.Abk.) G. v. 09.01.2002 BGBl. I S. 361, 3142.
338  Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 102–103.
339  UN Security Council Resolution 1624, UN Doc. S/RES/1624, 14 September 2005.
340  Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, CETS No. 196, 16 May 
2005.
341  See for a discussion on the tension between criminalisation of inchoate offences and the 
freedom of speech Ronen, 2014.
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up to two years imprisonment.342 Someone who commits the same crime with a 
terroristic intention can be sentenced to imprisonment of four months up to four 
years.343 Thus the purpose344 of the act will affect its sentencing.
It is interesting to note that like the depoliticisation strategy, the repoliticisa-
tion of terrorism is nothing new. For instance, as explained in Chapter 3, Section 
3.2, the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 also aimed at depoliticising 
terrorist acts in order to improve international collaboration against them and 
facilitate extradition procedures. At the same time, however, it created provi-
sions that aimed at restricting the political liberties of anarchists and restraining 
the spread of anarchist thought. Punishment for crimes such as provocation or 
glorification seems to reflect the fear of the spread of the terrorists’ ideas; not only 
the means they use.
Some traditional criminal lawyers have been alarmed by the creeping of motive 
into terrorist cases.345 Anna Oehmichen has, for instance, questioned the useful-
ness of such provisions and claimed that the prosecution of those that sympathise 
and glorify terrorists can, in fact, result in gaining more attention and sympathy 
for their cause. Additionally, it is simplistic to consider that terrorism could be 
curtailed by limiting freedom of speech.346 Furthermore, the definitions of terror-
ism used in these cases are broad. Thus it is possible that these criminalisations 
actually breach the lex certa principle. The additional problem with introduc-
ing inchoate offences is that they seem to allow the use of preventive powers 
and police powers long before an actual crime has occurred. In some cases, an 
ideological adherence to criminal purposes has been enough to trigger a criminal 
prosecution.347
The recent criminalisations of inchoate offences and preparatory acts have been 
justified by claiming that they only target terrorists and their activities. They have 
also been labelled temporary, which has made them easier to accept. However, 
as pointed out by Francesca Galli, these kinds of ‘temporary’ measures have a 
tendency to eventually become normalised and applied in a wider scope that was 
originally planned for.348
342  Tahallinen räjähderikos, translated by author, Finnish Criminal Law, Ch 44, §11, 16 
December 2016/1143.
343  Finnish Criminal Law, Ch 34a on Terrorism, 24 January 2003/17, §1.
344  The terroristic purpose is defined in the following manner: “An offender has a terrorist 
intent if it is his or her intent to: (1) cause serious fear among the population, (2) unlaw-
fully force the government of a state or another authority or an international organisation 
to perform, allow or abstain from performing any act, (3) unlawfully overturn or amend the 
constitution of a state or seriously destabilise the legal order of a state or cause particularly 
harm to the state economy or the fundamental social structures of the state, or (4) cause 
particularly extensive harm to the finances or other fundamental structures of an interna-
tional organisation.” Finnish Criminal Law, Ch 34a, §6.
345  Saul, 2008, 1.
346  Oehmichen, 2009, 174.
347  Galli, 2013, 121–122.
348  Galli, 2013, 124.
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The rule of law can be understood as a systemic trait of a democratic state. 
In a democratic state, fundamental and human rights are considered core values 
and the legality of the actions the representatives of the state are held dear. As a 
concept, the rule of law is often seen to incorporate the ideal of fair trials to all 
citizens.349 It also contains the principle of legality: no crime without law and no 
punishment without a crime.350 With such an ideal in mind, it is clear that the new 
antiterrorist provisions do not fit the traditional understanding of the rule of law, 
as they limit basic freedoms and curtail the rights of subjects.
5.3.3  A threat to democracy
It has become evident that a safeguard to the human rights of terrorism suspects 
is not guaranteed. Individuals can be punished before they have committed a 
crime, rather than only after the occurrence. Terrorists seem to have been placed 
in a special position, where they are not protected by the same boundaries of 
criminal law as other offenders. The German author Gunther Jakobs has named 
this ‘Feindstrafrecht,’ enemy criminal law. He supported the exceptional treat-
ment of non-law abiding citizens, the enemies of the society.351
As the material act in a murder with a terroristic purpose is the same as in 
a ‘common’ murder, it is clear that there is a political difference between the 
two acts. Terrorists threaten the foundations of Western societies, democracy 
and the respect for human rights, and as a result, they are seen to deserve 
more severe treatment in comparison to other criminals. In this respect, the 
treatment of political criminals has gone full circle; as discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.1, before the 19th-century political criminals were seen as the ulti-
mate enemy that deserved the most severe treatment. As pointed out, according 
349  Some of the most know definitions of the rule of law include Lord Bingham’s criteria: “1. 
The law must be accessible, clear and predictable. 2. Questions of legal rights should be 
resolved by the law and not the exercise of discretion. 3. The law should apply equally to 
all, except where objective differences justify differentiation. 4. Ministers must act within 
their powers and not exceed their limits. 5. The law must afford adequate protection of 
fundamental human rights. 6. The law should provide access to justice, especially where 
people cannot resolve inter-personal disputes themselves. 7. Courts and tribunal processes 
should be fair. 8. The state should comply with international law.” Bingham, 2006. The 
Treaty on European Union set the following criteria for the rule of law in Article 49 and 
Article 6(1) for countries wishing to join the European Union. These criteria are called the 
Copenhagen criteria and they were established in 1993 and strengthened in 1995. They 
are: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; ability to take on the obli-
gations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards 
and policies that make up the body of EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. See also e.g. Hallberg, 2004, for a detailed study 
on the concept of rule of law.
350  Shkar, 1986, 152.
351  Galli, 2013, 123–124.
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to Ingraham and Tokoro the lenient treatment of political criminals is possible 
only when certain societal conditions are met.352 Have today’s Western socie-
ties in one way or another returned to the conditions that existed 200 years 
ago? Or is the terrorism of today just such an exceptional threat that it deserves 
exceptional treatment?
Van den Wijngaert has raised an interesting question. “Assuming that there 
could be a difference in criminal responsibility between political and criminal 
offenders, how is this difference to be viewed? How should it be reflected in the 
penalty? Is the political motive to be considered as a mitigating or as an aggravat-
ing element? Are political offenders to be punished in the same way as common 
offenders, and, if not, which are the possible alternatives?”353
The current day choice of punishing terrorists more gravely than common 
criminals who have committed similar acts seems to point to an idea that the 
political nature of the crime is what makes it more grave. This relates to the idea 
that political terrorists attack the whole democratic system, which, of course, 
makes them all the more dangerous. Terrorists do not only consider their actions 
as legitimate, but they also regard the whole system condemning them as illegiti-
mate. This means that they are not deterred by punishment, which makes them 
a wild card in society.
For instance, Manuel Cancio Melia and Anneke Petzsche have argued that 
to some extent it is justified to punish terrorists more severely in comparison to 
‘ordinary’ crimes. This is because the victims of terrorist attacks are not chosen 
because of their personalities, but because of what they represent. They are dep-
ersonalised and interchangeable, a mere means to an end.354 However, if a person 
shoots a random taxi driver in order to steal their car, the killer is not punished 
more severely because the killing of the driver only served the purpose of getting 
the car.
Some have suggested that terrorist acts should be considered crimes of war. 
This would mean that there would be no attempt to resocialise the perpetra-
tors, but, instead, they would be interned until the ‘war’ was over. According 
to Van den Wijngaert, in some cases this could work, when there are periodic 
coups d’état and revolutions, but more generally this would typically mean life 
imprisonments.355 This is something we have witnessed with the treatment of the 
prisoners at Guantánamo Bay.
The preceding discussions have shown that actions against terrorists are often 
justified by the idea that terrorists are a threat to democracy as their fight is against 
democratic values, liberalism and freedom. Claiming to be acting for democracy 
is a powerful statement. It is so powerful that it can be used the wrong way. As 
Carl Schmitt wrote in 1932: “The worst confusion arises when concepts such as 
352  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 154.
353  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 35.
354  Cancio Melia and Petzsche, 2013, 101.
355  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 35–36.
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justice and freedom are used to legitimise one’s own political ambitions and to 
disqualify or demoralise the enemy.”356
It has been demonstrated that there is a contradictory trend of repoliticising 
terrorism nationally, while there are international efforts to strip it from its politi-
cal connotations. The paradox is obvious; while terrorism is called non-political 
on the global arena, on the national level there is a growing amount of legislation 
against issues such as the glorification of terrorism. I suggest that the concept of 
repoliticisation could be useful in conducting further research on more current 
day notions of terrorism.
Regardless of the evident paradox with the strategies of de- and repoliticising 
terrorism, they do not represent entirely contrasting phenomena. Both share the 
goal to condemn terrorists’ acts in the strictest way possible. The depoliticisation 
strategy aims at doing this by facilitating antiterrorist cooperation internationally 
and diminishing the political goals behind terrorists’ deeds, while the repolitici-
sation strategy aims at guaranteeing the harshest possible sentences and strong 
condemnation to terrorists domestically.
5.4  Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that the turnaround in Western antiterrorism policies 
took place in the 1990s and early 2000s. The developments described can be 
traced to the changes in the social and political conditions in the world, among 
the most important being the growth of the US influence and its increasing role 
as a world police. In the 1990s, terrorism was becoming more anti-American and 
religiously motivated, and the United States no longer faced the threat of the 
Soviet Union after its dispersal. This left room for the US to act more efficiently 
against terrorism. It partly channelled these efforts through the rewriting of its 
extradition treaties as well as through intensified collaboration within Interpol 
and the UN.
Coming to the latter part of the 1990s, the UN and Interpol embraced a view 
on terrorism as criminality more than as political action and depoliticised terrorist 
acts. Several motivations for the depoliticisation exist, including the diminishing 
of the adversary’s political goals as well as the facilitation of international collabo-
ration against terrorism, an inherently political phenomenon. The role of the US 
in affecting these changes can only be speculated within the confines of this study.
The POE had already received weakening blows since the 1970s with the 
coming into force of UN resolutions limiting its scope. After the creation of 
the 1985 Supplementary Treaty between the US and the UK, it was suggested 
that the POE had been annihilated. However, even if the treaty proved to be an 
important step towards that direction, the complete evisceration of the POE from 
treaties with allied states other than the UK did not occur, as the critics of the 
treaty had feared would happen.
356  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 66.
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The most important blow to all relative and most pure political offences 
between Western nations was finally given by the limitations created in the 2000s 
as well as the removal of the POE from dealings amongst member states of the 
EU. Limitations that have been added to, for instance, treaties between the US 
and many EU member states exclude acts such as damage to property from the 
scope of the exception. As a result, no extralegal means of opposing a govern-
ment, except to completely non-violent ones such as protests, can be protected 
by treaty partners. The political opponents of the ruling government are left 
armed with pens and pillows.
The case of pure political offenders is more complicated. It seems that the 
discrimination clause could offer them some protection. However, the applica-
tion of the discrimination clause is, as previously concluded, foreign policy suicide 
between allied states. It has been used with non-allies, for instance in the Posada 
case, where the US refused Cuban and Venezuelan extradition requests based on 
the claim that Posada would not receive a fair trial in these countries.
My initial hypothesis, based on my previous research on Interpol, suggested 
that the role of the US was of major importance in the change that took place 
with regard to the POE. This seems to be partly true. The terrorist acts consum-
mated against US citizens since the 1980s acted like triggers for the country, 
which had not been so much touched by Europe’s terrorist problem in the previ-
ous decade. Especially the Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings in 1998 seem 
to have made a major difference to US views on the terrorist threat. They also 
caused major changes within Interpol and the UN. However, the development 
had begun earlier and it seems to be linked to the UK as much as to the US.
This chapter has also touched upon the repoliticisation of terrorism. I feel that 
this development is worth more attention. It seemingly contrasts with my views 
on the depoliticisation, but, simultaneously, it points to an important underlying 
development. Both the de- and the repoliticisation of terrorism demonstrate that 
terrorism became perceived as such a massive threat to democratic nations that 
new means were necessitated in the fight against it. These means have included 
dealing with terrorism as an ‘ordinary’ crime, regardless of its motivations, but 
also criminalising acts that would, in liberalists’ views, fall into the scope of the 
freedom of speech, for instance. Desperate times necessitate desperate means, it 
seems.
66.1  The demise of the political offence exception
Recent developments concerning how the political nature of terrorism is dealt 
with have run two opposite ways. On the one hand, there is a growing crowd that 
argues in favour of the treatment of terrorists as common criminals. The basis for 
this argument lies in the trivialisation of terrorist acts. The aim has been to depict 
terrorists as rogues instead of heroes. On the other hand, the development has 
been the opposite. Terrorists are separated from the normal sphere of justice, spe-
cial laws are applied to them and terrorist court cases are increasingly politicised. 
This has led to a contradictory situation, where terrorists are not subject to and 
protected by the same laws as common criminals, but their political goals are still 
swept under the carpet.
It seems that this development is due to the extremely political nature of ter-
rorism. If politics is understood in Schmittian terms, where the political opponent 
represents the enemy, the stranger,1 and “[t]he political is the most intense and 
extreme antagonism,”2 it becomes clear that terrorists are in fact the ultimate 
political enemy. As discussed throughout this book, the political offence excep-
tion (POE) was created to protect all kinds of political criminals, from activists to 
violent offenders. It was a result of the rise of a liberal ideology in the spirit of the 
revolutionary period in the 1800s and its purpose was to support those fighting 
for liberal ideals. The exemption was a child of its own time, and when faced with 
growingly complicated situations, as well as criminal methods and means unheard 
of in the 19th century, its relevance was subjected to tests.
Throughout its existence, the political offence exemption has created diplo-
matic problems. The first difficulties arose with revolutionaries attempting to cre-
ate political change by assassinating heads of state. As a result, such acts were 
excluded from the scope of political offences, a development led by Belgium. 
This provision that was added to a majority of extradition treaties was to be 
known as the Belgium clause, or, more commonly, the attentat clause. The limi-
tations to the POE were further extended to cover acts of genocide, wars crimes, 
1  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 27.
2  Schmitt, 1996 (1932), 29.
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apartheid and finally acts of terrorism, which proved to be the most problematic 
issue the exemption had faced during its history.
Regardless of the highly ideological, even idealist, background of the POE, 
states have, for some reason, been trying to apply it in a neutral manner. It has 
been considered a principle that is free from ideological considerations and that 
could be applied neutrally to political offenders, based on specific ‘tests.’ Because 
of the legislator’s hesitancy to attach any ideological criteria to the principle, 
courts have been left with the task to blindly apply the said tests to offenders of 
different political backgrounds. This aim to stay neutral with regard to the appli-
cation of the POE has led to problems.
Despite the growing amount of limitations excluding a variety of violent acts 
from the POE, it still has sometimes been used to protect those who commit ter-
rorist acts. This is in contrast with the original aims of the exception. According 
to Geoffrey Gilbert, the original purpose of the POE was to protect those who 
aspired to establish liberal democratic governments. For this reason: “To try and 
apply the doctrine to the late twentieth century, especially to the issue of transna-
tional terrorism, results in the confusion and injustice so prevalent. The exemp-
tion was aimed to protect people fighting for liberal democracy, yet the same 
language is still applied today to persons intent on destroying liberal democracy. 
It is evident, therefore, that the exemption may be in need of reassessment and it 
may need to be redrafted, insofar as this is possible.”3
Similarly, Manuel R. García-Mora, writing in 1956, underlined the impor-
tance of not sheltering those he called ‘subversives,’ that is anarchists, terrorists or 
communists, who were the enemies of all governments. He contrasted the inten-
tions of these people with those of genuine political offenders who act against a 
particular government. For this reason, subversives did not need to be protected 
in democratic states.4 Abraham Sofaer, writing 30 years later, agreed: “If civilised 
society is to defend itself against terrorist violence, some offences committed in 
or against stable democracies must fall outside the scope of the exception, even 
though they are politically motivated.”5
As noted by Christopher H. Pyle, there has been a long struggle with trying 
to balance the political offence exception with the philosophical idea of the right 
to revolt.6 Attempts have been made to exclude wanton acts against civilians 
from the scope of the protection. Some examples of such an approach have been 
represented in the attentat clause, the Meunier case and the Eain case as well as 
in multilateral treaties. Nonetheless, there has not been a consistent approach to 
this issue and it has not always been successful.
Nowadays, there is a rather wide consensus that terrorist deeds should not be 
protected by the POE, especially when committed in democratic countries. The 
3  Gilbert, 1991, 115. See also Gilbert, 1991, 122; and Gilbert, 1998, 205.
4  García-Mora, 1956, 88.
5  Sofaer, 1986, 128.
6  See e.g. Pyle, 2001, 157.
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exclusion of terrorism from the scope of the political offence exemption can be 
seen to reflect the idealistic view of liberal democratic revolutionaries fighting for 
a just cause. If the POE is understood to serve the purpose of spreading liberal 
democratic ideas, neither the radical leftist terrorists of the 1960s and 1970s 
nor the Islamist terrorists of the 2000s would fall under the protection of the 
exemption.
Even if the POE was originally built on a rather clear ideological basis, aiming 
at protecting liberals, states have been reluctant to apply it based on these ideas. 
Evaluating political crimes based on the legitimacy of their goals leads to a politi-
cal decision. In many countries, extradition was originally created as a judicial 
function, which was meant to be unaffected by political considerations. For this 
reason, there have been attempts to deny the political nature of the POE and 
attempts to consider it a politically neutral judicial principle, i.e. a template that 
could be applied in a neutral fashion.
The claimed neutrality in applying the POE served a foreign policy func-
tion. As discussed, the POE assisted states in acting in a seemingly impartial way 
towards other states’ political struggles. The condemning of specific political 
causes openly, no matter how transparent and true, could result in later political 
problems.
As the POE was created based on specific ideological considerations, it seems 
strange that democratic nations are not able to stand by their beliefs and values in 
supporting liberalist causes. As noted by for instance Shkar, the law is never neu-
tral. In fact, she has argued that the “deliberative isolation of the legal system – 
the treatment of law as a neutral social entity – is itself a refined political ideology, 
the expression of a preference.”7 Why is there an attempt to hide the democratic 
principles the law intends to serve?
Without a political decision of what political crime is and what constitutes an 
acceptable political cause, with a shared view on which methods are acceptable 
for furthering such a cause, it is impossible to make ‘ideal’ extradition decisions 
which would be independently applied by the judiciary based on laws the legis-
lature has created. A simple solution to this would be to open up the ideological 
motivations for holding on to the POE: who do we wish to protect and under 
which circumstances?
Regardless of the limitations to the POE, states have been suspicious of 
whether these are sufficient to exclude all terrorists from its protection. For this 
reason, the POE has continuously been limited by states in their extradition trea-
ties as well as by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) 
and Interpol. Some have claimed that the POE no longer serves any purpose, 
especially between democratic states abiding by the rule of law. Such a conclu-
sion led to its annihilation within the European Union (EU). However, it is 
questionable whether such a claim is well founded. As discussed, the leap from 
democracy to dictatorship is not massive and the step from the rule of law to 
7  Shkar, 1986, 34.
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limiting citizens’ rights is even smaller. For this reason, it seems too optimistic to 
claim that there is no longer need for any protection of political offenders within 
the EU or amongst a wider group of states.
6.2  The delegitimisation of terrorism
One of the strategies used to exclude terrorist acts from the scope of the POE has 
been the depoliticisation of specific terrorist acts. The aim of the depoliticisation 
has been for instance to end discussions over terrorists’ goals by defining terror-
ism without making reference to their political motives. It should also automati-
cally exclude terrorist acts from the protection of the POE, even if this has not 
proven to work this simply.
In the context of international treaties, the depoliticisation of terrorism has 
been common. One of the main research questions presented in the introductory 
chapter of this book was “How and when did the current trend of depoliticising 
terrorism emerge?” It has been shown in this study that terrorism has been depo-
liticised growingly and globally since 1977 when the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism was created. This convention used the same strategy as 
the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome of 1898 and depoliticised offences that 
typically relate to terrorism. The aim in both instances was to exclude terrorists 
from the protection of the political offence exception to extradition. Even if the 
1977 convention was a clear step away from considering terrorism a political phe-
nomenon, and towards treating it as common crime, it is telling that in its state-
ment regarding the convention, France noted, “Furthermore, taking action against 
terrorism does not absolve us from tackling the political problem of the causes of 
terrorism. For in many respects the real struggle against terrorism is a struggle for a 
just peace which guarantees everyone’s legitimate rights.”8 Nowadays, this kind of 
statement would be unlikely due to the fear of unintentionally legitimising violent 
acts. The motivations of terrorism are not brought up or discussed.
Later, the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) depoliticised 
terrorism by separating the specific criminal offences from the concept of terror-
ism. This way, perpetrators of terrorist acts could be subject to criminal investi-
gations without the need to discuss their political motivations. Also, the United 
Nations has, especially since the 1990s, focused on the material elements of ter-
rorist acts and left aside the motivation of these acts, thus depoliticising them. 
Several UN conventions have been created, which include acts that are most 
commonly seen as terrorist. The depoliticisation in the case of the UN has been 
done due to difficulties in agreeing on a definition of terrorism.
The depoliticisation strategy is, as discussed, problematic in many ways. Most 
important, it is problematic because it essentially denies the political nature of 
8  Statements, reservations and declarations: France. European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism Strasbourg, European Treaty Series No. 90, 27 January 1977.
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certain acts and for this reason, seems illogical. As established, terrorism is in 
its essence and by definition political crime. In order to understand and fight a 
phenomenon that is so strongly connected with ideologies, it is important that 
its motivations are not forgotten. Considering terrorist acts common crimes and 
ignoring their political motivations will result in avoiding the discussion on the 
terrorists’ goals and ideologies. Nevertheless, it should be possible to discuss the 
roots of terrorism and where this inherently political phenomenon stems from. 
Denying the political nature of terrorism is not a way of repressing the use of ter-
roristic methods.
The ‘false’ and very much illogical depoliticisation of terrorism served as a 
19th-century solution to a 20th- (and later 21st-) century problem. When deal-
ing with anarchist crimes, this strategy had a bit more logic in it: anarchism was 
contra all governments and organised methods of ruling. It was thus possible to 
consider this ‘apolitical.’ Saying anarchism has nothing to do with politics seems 
to make some sense, even if in the general understanding anarchism is inherently 
political.
However, terrorism is a label put on a method used by violent criminals driven 
by ideological thought. As it has been defined as such for decades, the idea that it 
can be depoliticised seems to be unreasoned. Why does there need to be a specific 
definitional category for terrorism if there is no specific element that separates it 
from common criminality, mass murders and wanton bombings?
The second research question was “Was the political offence exception to 
extradition affected by terrorism?” As demonstrated, the depoliticisation strat-
egy is closely linked to the existence of the political offence exception. As the 
POE was created for the purpose of defending those that fight for liberal ideas, 
it turned out to be problematic once it became clear that also others might end 
up being protected by it. Nowadays, extradition is an important tool in securing 
trials for fugitives such as former political leaders, military generals, and terrorists. 
What these crimes and extradition requests have in common is their connection 
with political questions. It has become clear that the POE can be used either in 
a restrictive manner or an expansive manner, and also that it has never been free 
of ideological weight.
In 1980, Van den Wijngaert argued that the “implicit positive significance” of 
the term political crime was a creation of the liberal democratic state. Totalitarian 
regimes saw political offenders as the most dangerous among all criminals. Their 
criminal justice systems gave broad and vague definitions and harsh punishments 
for these crimes, as well as lower or non-existing procedural safeguards with 
regard to political offenders. Extradition law points to the same conclusion, as 
totalitarian states did not typically have the so-called POE, and the extradition of 
political criminals was the norm rather than an anomaly.
According to Van den Wijngaert, the protection of the political offender can be 
seen as an inherently democratic principle, and the depoliticisation was the means 
to not derogate from this doctrine. The depoliticisation, however, was prob-
lematic, as it was done merely to hold on to the principle of the non-extradition 
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of political offenders, and resulted in calling political crimes non-political.9 In 
relation to Van den Wijngaert’s analysis, the development described in this book 
regarding the depoliticisation of terrorism and the abolishing of the POE is highly 
interesting, as it seems that one of the two would suffice in achieving the goal of 
ending the protection of terrorists.
As suggested, together with the (international) depoliticisation of terrorism, 
there has been a (national) trend of repoliticising terrorism. Laws designed to 
prevent the spread of the ‘terrorist message,’ for instance, have been created. 
Terrorism has become a separate category in the national law of many countries 
and thus it is separated from other forms of crimes around the world.
The final main research question presented in this study was “Why did these 
changes occur and what are their implications?” Even if it seems that the de- 
and repoliticisation of terrorism are contrasting strategies, after a more thorough 
analysis, it has become clear that they actually serve the same purpose. They both 
aim at delegitimising terrorists and facilitating antiterrorist actions. The depoliti-
cisation does this by labelling terrorists common criminals, which excludes them 
from the category of selfless freedom fighters and helps to unify states against 
them. Simultaneously, the repoliticisation of terrorism on the national level pro-
vides for a stronger condemnation of terrorist acts as opposed to other, seemingly 
similar acts with no political goals or implications.
If we consider that liberalism has won the battle over ideologies, and democ-
racy is the system to strengthen and support, it can be argued that both the de- 
and repoliticisation strategies are, in fact, in stark contradiction with this idea. 
Depoliticisation turns the fight against the opponents into a technical matter, dealt 
with within the criminal justice system. As such, it does not take advantage of 
the common understanding that democratic ideals are worth protecting and use 
the opportunity to explain the reasons why these criminals are more dangerous to 
society than others. Repoliticisation, in turn, does also not serve as a value-based 
attack against those who target liberal nation states. As such, it does suggest that 
terrorism is reprehensible, but seems to assume the existence of a ‘terror-ism,’ an 
ideology that escalates as violence. Such an ideology does not exist, as terrorism is a 
means rather than an ideology. As a means, it can be used by any ism. It should be 
understood that terrorist action stems from a political background but is not itself 
an ideology. As such, the politics and crime should be separated from one another, 
but at the same time, one should not be forgotten when discussing the other.
6.3  Final questions
It has become clear that the existence of the political offence exception has 
affected not only extradition processes but also wider matters. Due to the exist-
ence of the POE, two alternative strategies have been used to prevent terrorists 
from escaping justice. First, politically motivated crimes, such as terrorism, have 
9  Van den Wijngaert, 1980, 101–102.
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been depoliticised so that they could be subject to extradition. Second, the scope 
of the POE has been restricted.
These developments raise questions: Has the perhaps naive liberalist cause suf-
fered a painful death, or have we indeed reached ‘the end of history’ where politi-
cal dissidents no longer need protection? Are our democracies so stable that we 
can abolish all protection for political offenders within these countries? Or have 
we thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we have, in trying to eliminate 
all protection for terrorists, also potentially eliminated protection for non-violent 
political dissidents?
As demonstrated in this study, several different reasons led to the politicisation 
of the POE, meaning that it would only be used selectively to protect ‘accept-
able’ political dissidents, champions of democracy or otherwise useful people. As 
criminal law is based on the principle that it has to be predictable, the weighing 
of the perpetrator’s goals’ legitimacy is highly problematic unless the aims of the 
application of the principle are openly stated.
This problem relates especially to the application of the POE by the judicial 
branch. Due to the political nature of the application of the exemption, passing 
the decision-making power to the executive has been suggested and planned. 
This would create the positive effect of publicising the political nature of the deci-
sions and underlining the inherently political aim of the POE, which is to protect 
those fighting for liberal democracy. The current situation in many countries is 
that a decision of high political significance is given to the judiciary and cloaked 
in ‘neutrality.’10 This is an unwanted solution.
For some reasons, democratic nations have refused to openly protect only 
offenders who have perpetrated crimes in an attempt to further liberalist causes. 
The status of the judiciary as an impartial organ is compromised if the judiciary 
is asked to remain neutral in a matter that is considered highly political by the 
executive, without clear guidelines from the legislature. Being open about the 
political roots and aims of the POE would also prevent the problems that relate to 
its application to terrorist cases. Terrorist acts against liberal democratic states are 
inherently contrasting to the original goals of the POE, which means that they 
would not be protected by it.
Unfortunately, giving the decision-making powers to the executive would by 
no means be an easy fix for the problem posed by the POE. One of the key pur-
poses of the POE was to prevent states from meddling in the political affairs of 
another state. This goal of neutrality would most likely still be of value. Giving 
the application of the POE to the hands of the executive would turn it into a 
completely political decision and shift its application according to the changes 
in decision-making organs. Such an uneven application of a legal construction 
would contrast constitutional principles in many states.
As demonstrated, within the EU the problems presented by the existence 
of the POE have been solved by abolishing the POE altogether. The historical 
10  See a lengthy discussion on the ‘neutrality’ of the law in Shklar, 1986.
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pattern presented in this book suggests that such a decision could be taken 
amongst other Western states in the coming years. For instance, the POE in the 
US–UK extradition treaty is already extremely limited.
Can it be said that political crime then has no place in our societies today? As 
a reminder, the conditions under which, according to Ingraham and Tokoro, a 
separate concept of political crime and toleration towards this type of criminals 
can arise are
(1) [when] the dominant political philosophy [is] liberalism, (2) where the 
state’s claim to legitimacy [is] infirm and relativistic, (3) where there [is] a 
clear division between the concept of the state (as merely representative of 
those interests in society politically in the ascendant) and the society as a 
whole, and (4) where the government’s or the state bureaucracy’s concep-
tion of itself [is] not as the representative of all the people of the society, but 
rather as the custodian or protector of a constitutional order which ensure[s] 
the institutions constituting the source of its political and economic power.11 
Have these conditions ceased to exist in modern-day societies?
As demonstrated by the cases of whistle-blowers such as Assange, Snowden 
and Manning, it is clear that there is room for political crime in democratic socie-
ties. These cases also prove that seemingly similar nations can strongly disagree 
on whether a specific act is a crime or a selfless act supported by the highly valued 
principles of freedom of speech or freedom of the press, for instance.
For this reason, to abolish the POE is dangerous; we have not reached the end 
of history, liberal democracy has not won. There are different representatives of 
the concept of liberal democracy and no way of telling who represents the true 
cause. The use of the exemption is highly political, thus it has to be either defined 
properly or brought to the ‘political’ openly, thus away from the courts. The 
quickest fix would be to retain the POE but to come up with a shared definition 
of terrorism. Whether this is possible in the near future is left to be seen.
I wish to end this study by citing the late Charles Tilly, a well-known scholar 
of sociology and political science:
Collective violence occupies a perilous but coherent place in contentious 
politics. It emerges from the ebb and flow of collective grievances and strug-
gles for power. It interweaves incessantly with non-violent politics, varies 
systematically with political regimes, and changes as a consequence of essen-
tially the same causes that operate in the non-violent zones of collective 
political life. Understanding those causes will help us minimise the damage 
human beings inflict on each other. In our own violent time, advocates of 
non-violent political struggle need all the help they can get.12
11  Ingraham and Tokoro, 1969, 154.
12  Tilly, 2003.
7This book has examined the complicated nature of the relationship between the 
political nature of terrorism on the one hand and the political offence exception 
to extradition on the other. Political crime is, by nature, different from other 
types of crime from the perspective of the state. It has, for this reason, received 
particular treatment for as long as the state system has existed. This study dem-
onstrates a notable change in the ways in which political crime and especially ter-
rorism have been viewed globally during the last half a century.
The political offence exemption, the child of revolutionary liberalism, was 
added to almost all extradition treaties around the world after the French and 
American revolutions in the late 18th century. During recent times, the excep-
tion, sometimes considered a part of customary international law, has slowly been 
suffocated by the complexity of the phenomenon called terrorism that emerged 
in the decades following the Second World War.
The exception was developed in the romantic and forward-looking ethos of 
the 19th century, where the winds of liberal thought seemed to be blowing from 
all directions and newborn national states were finding their footholds in the 
emerging ideology of democracy. It was created to protect those who fought the 
‘ancien régime’ and would become new leaders in the dawn of a more egalitarian 
world. Upon the creation of the exemption, it was never imagined that the politi-
cal offender could turn against a democratic state.
The political offence exemption survived the challenge posed by Nazi crimes 
and could be modified to exclude war crimes. It also proved flexible enough 
to provide for the ruling out of crimes such as genocide. It was however not 
indestructible; the straw that finally broke the camel’s back turned out to be ter-
rorism. With its elusive nature, ever-extending scope, growing efficient means 
and, most of all, its antidemocratic nature, terrorism has become too much of a 
societal threat that strategies that had previously safeguarded the exception were 
no longer sufficient.
As democracies have growingly been threatened by political violence during 
the last few decades, concerns with regard to the existence of the political offence 
exception have been expressed. At first, states made attempts to exclude terror-
istic acts and means from the protection of the political offence exception by 
ruling them out, one by one, in separate conventions. However, this proved too 
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complex. Increasingly, it was perceived as vital to condemn the whole phenom-
enon and tag it with a name.
In order to secure the capturing of terrorists, many scholars and politicians 
alike have wished for the exception to be modified, limited or even abolished. 
Political efforts have been made in order to exclude violent and indiscriminate 
acts from the scope of its protection. There has been some success: for instance, 
the US–UK Supplementary Treaty of 1985 managed to limit the possibilities of 
IRA members in fleeing abroad to escape justice.
Simultaneously with the limitations to the political offence exemption, some-
times called the politicisation of the exception, an effort has been made to globally 
depoliticise acts of terrorism. This has been done for several reasons, including 
the fact that a depoliticised crime cannot be protected by the exception. Thus 
there has been a two-direction attack against terrorism on the conceptual agenda.
Finally, within the European context, a solution was agreed upon. The depo-
liticisation of terrorism that had first been used in the late 19th century in the 
attempt to suppress anarchist terrorism was reinstated as a reaction to the ter-
rorist wave that hit Europe in the 1970s. The European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism in 1977 was the first instance to depoliticise terrorism 
since the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome of 1898. Since then, the depolitici-
sation wave has slowly progressed to cover the Western world as well as, step by 
step, a large number of United Nations member states. On the European level, 
it has reached a final stage with the eradication of the political offence exception 
with the coming into force of the European Arrest Warrant in 2004.
Thus, as a result of the seemingly necessary actions against terrorists, other 
political offenders, including those using non-violent means, have lost their pro-
tection with the abolishing of the political offence exception. This development is 
an undesirable one, as the world has not reached an end where there is no longer 
room for political crime. The present book suggests that terrorism should be 
internationally defined and excluded from the political offence exception, which 
in turn should be revived.
88.1  Multilateral conventions, resolutions and 
recommendations
(Chronological order)
Commonwealth Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881. 44 and 45 Vic. c. 69 (Imperial).
First South American Congress on Private International Law, Treaty on International 
Penal Law, 23 January 1889.
Propositions arrêtées par la Conférence internationale réunie à Rome sur l’initiative 
du Gouvernement Italien en vue d’étudier et d’établir les moyens les plus efficacies 
pour combattre la propaganda anarchique et soumises par elle à l’appreciation 
des Gouvernements qui s’y trouvaient représentés. December 21, 1898, Rome. 
Published in Kinna, Ruth, Early Writings on Terrorism, vol. 3, Routledge, London 
and New York, 2006, 326–329 (The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898).
Treaty for the extradition of criminals and for the protection against anarchism. 
Second International Conference of American States, Doc No 330, 22 October 
1901–31 January 1902.
Código de Derecho Internacional Privado (Código de Bustamante). Convención de 
Derecho Internacional Privado, 20 February 1928.
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. League of Nations, 
Treaty Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663, 28 October 1933.
Convention on extradition adopted by the Seventh International Conference of 
American States (Montevideo Convention), 26 December 1933.
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. League of Nations, 16 
November 1937.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UNTS 
No. 1021, 9 December 1948.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), GA Res 217 A, 10 December 
1948.
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I), 12 August 1949.
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II), 12 
August 1949.
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention 
III), 12 August 1949.
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Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
Convention IV), 12 August 1949.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, 31 January 1967.
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, UN GA Res 2312 (XXII), 14 December 1967.
The Arab States and the Arab League Extradition Agreement, 14 September 1952.
The Pan American Convention on Territorial Asylum, 28 March 1954.
Interpol Constitution I/CONS/GA/1956, 13 June 1956.
European Convention on Extradition, ETS No. 24, 13 December 1957.
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS No. 30, 20 
April 1959.
Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning Extradition and Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, 27 June 1962.
Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders within the Commonwealth, 
H.M.S.O. (Cm 3008, 1966).
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, 31 January 1967.
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, UN GA Res 2312 (XXII), 14 December 1967.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague 
Convention), 860 UNTS 105, 16 December 1970.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
(The Montreal Convention), 974 UNTS 177, 23 September 1971.
Report of the Special Committee of the United Nations on International Terrorism, 
G.A.O.R., Supp. No. 28 (XXVII); United States’ Draft Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism (US Draft 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Acts), UN Doc. 
A/C.6/L850, 25 September 1972.
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 684 on 
International Terrorism, 23 October 1972.
Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes 
Innocent Human Lives of Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of 
the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence 
Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause 
Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt 
to Effect Radical Changes. Study prepared by the Secretariat in accordance 
with the decision taken by the Sixth Committee at its 1314th meeting, on 27 
September 1972 (Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, 1972), UN 
Doc. A/C.6/418, 2 November 1972.
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 703 on 
International Terrorism, 16 May 1973.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 1035 UNTS 167, 14 December 
1973.
Council of Europe Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism, 24 January 1974.
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, ETS No. 86,15 
October 1975.
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, ETS No. 90, 27 January 
1977.
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 852 on 
Terrorism in Europe, 31 January 1979.
Agreement Concerning the Application of the European Convention on the 
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(the Dublin Convention). Assembly Document 4460, 17 December 1979.
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostage taking 
Convention), 1316 UNTS 205, 17 December 1979.
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General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/RES/34/145, 17 December 1979.
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 25 February 1981.
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Recommendation 916 on the Conference 
on “Defence of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe – Tasks and Problems.” 
26 March 1981.
Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent 
Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying 
Causes of the Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, 
Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice 
Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes. UN 
General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/RES/36/109, 10 December 1981
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States Concerning International Co-operation in the 
Prosecution and Punishment of Acts of Terrorism. No. R (82), Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers at the 342nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 15 
January 1982.
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Table on US extradition treaties
The following table contains those provisions of US extradition treaties that relate 
to political crime and terrorism. The table consists of 119 treaties dating from 1842 
until 2007.
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278 Appendix 
Explanations of the terms used
 a. Contains the political offence exception (POE; different wordings are used 
in different treaties).
 b. In the POE, in addition to political crimes or offences, also connected 
offences are protected from extradition.
 c. Regardless of the political nature of the crimes, extradition is possible should 
the political element of the crime prevail.
 d. Contains the Belgian or attentat clause excluding attacks against heads 
of state from the protection of the POE (variations of the clause are all 
included).
 e. Contains the discrimination clause, which allows the state to refuse the extra-
dition request should they evaluate that the fugitive could not receive a fair 
trial should they be extradited, due to for instance their race, political or 
religious opinions, or sexual orientation.
 f. Allows for the denial of the extradition in case the request is considered to be 
politically motivated.
 g. Limits the POE so that it does not cover international crimes that one of the 
parties to the treaty has a duty to extradite or prosecute, as a result of their 
obligations under the multilateral treaties they are party to.
 g.1. Specific crimes contained in multilateral treaties are mentioned as extradit-
able, regardless of their political motivation/nature.
 h. The treaty uses the term ‘terrorism.’
 i. The treaty categorically excludes violent crimes from the scope of the protec-
tion of the POE.
 j. The treaty excludes damage to property from the scope of the protection of 
the POE.
 k. The treaty excludes conspiracies to specific crimes from the scope of the pro-
tection of the POE.
 l. The treaty excludes anarchist crimes from the scope of the protection of the 
POE.
 m. All murders are excluded from the protection of the POE.
 n. The treaty party can consider the gravity of the crime in question when mak-
ing the decision whether it is to be considered a political crime (comparative 
to the Swiss predominance test).
 o. Only pure political crimes are considered political offences.
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